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When the African National Congress (ANC) assumed power in 1994, its main 
economic policy was to overturn over three Hundred (300) years of black 
economic exclusivity which were intensified by the institutionalization of racism 
through Apartheid in 1948. The new dispensation adopted the policy of 
Affirmative Action which had been practiced in other parts of the world and 
contextualized it to South Africa through Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). 
The policy was designed to permeate every aspect of state and the private 
sector, especially companies which deal with government as providers of goods 
and services.  The new government realized that because of former Apartheid 
privileges the established companies contain high specialist knowledge tacitness 
and management acumen, which would need to be utilised to benefit the new 
black-owned companies and assist in their development. Through the Targeted 
Procurement Policy the government compelled the established companies to 
unbundle their work packages to accommodate, small black-owned Affirmable 
Business Enterprises (ABEs) as sub-contractors or Joint Venture partners. This 
relationship between the government and the established companies is a typical 
Principal Agent (PA) relationship, and has quintessentially been beset with moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems militated by asymmetric information 
favoring the established companies.   
 
The identification of the construction industry as the flagship empowerment 
environment was due to its peculiarities of yielding more employment for a given 
capital flow and the low entrance barriers advocating for its amenability for a far-
reaching BEE inclusiveness. However, the opportunistic behaviours of 
established companies indicated through strategic misrepresentation of the true 
BEE beneficiaries has hampered the effectiveness of the BEE implementation. It 










suitable vehicle to provide an incubatory environment to nurture the up-and-
coming black owned Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs).  
 
This research uses PA theory to assess the efficacy of the PPPs in mitigating 
different forms of fronting which are indicative of opportunistic behaviours by 
established companies. The research also evaluates the effectiveness of the 
PPP environment in according ABEs access to complex and idiosyncratic 
information due to a PPP’s longevity and strict monitoring regimen. A critical case 
is deployed in this study using the basic tenets of PA theory as lenses to study 
the behaviours of three major parties; the government, BEE beneficiaries and 
established companies. The limitations of Principal Agent theory are augmented 
by the introduction of Principal Steward (PS) theory to account for agent 
(established companies) post-contractual behavioural “anomalies” not 
accommodated in the classic PA theory postulation. The observed bipolar agent 
character yields a new theory encompassing both the PA and PS theories 
demonstrative of a positive agent character transition akin to a Steward, which is 
yet intrinsically containing basic agent characteristics.  This character transition is 
found to have been induced by robust PPP contractual arrangement, which in the 
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South Africa’s history of racial segregation and economic stratification can be 
traced back to the arrival of the first Dutch settlers in the Cape of Good Hope in 
1652 (Worden, 2007). The first people to suffer from these settlers’ expansion 
into the hinterland of South Africa were the indigenous San people of the Cape, 
whose transhumant animal husbandry way of life was disrupted by the gradual 
abrogation of their traditional grazing lands (Hart, 1967). Within 150 years of 
Dutch settlement the San were completely dislodged from their lands and 
incorporated on a servitude role in the Dutch setters’ economy (Guelke, 1989).  
This situation persisted until the takeover of the Cape Colony by the British in 
1795, as part of the territorial windfall occasioned by the British victory in the 
Napoleonic wars (Legassick, 1989). The British administration brought with it 
structural economic changes which led to discontent among the Dutch settlers, 
notably due to the removal of tied labor system and the abolition of slavery in 
1834(Ross, 1999) 
The disgruntled Dutch who acquired the name of Trekboers, dispersed in the 
general easterly direction to escape British control, and settled in the present day 
Kwazulu-Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal (now Gauteng) (Muller, 1975). 
The Trekboers expansion into the interior of the sub-continent led to a struggle 
over land resources between African polities who occupied these territories and 
the new Afrikaner arrivals exacerbating the complexity of power and territorial 
struggle triggered by lifaqane (Gluckman, 1960; Guy, 1980). The British in turn 
took interest in the interior of the sub-continent and gradually the independent 
African polities were either annexed, subjugated or driven to the periphery of rich 
land resources (Ross, 1999).  
The discovery of Diamonds (1869) in Kimberly and Gold (1886) in the Transvaal 











the Anglo-Boer war of 1899-1902 (Shillington, 1987). The ensuing British victory 
paved the way for the creation of the unified South African state in 1910 
(Mbenga, 1980). Thus the protracted jostling for resources resulted in the 
complete conquest of South Africa by two major players; the British imperialists 
who were the ultimate Anglo-Boer victors and the Trekboers who were now 
collectively identified as the Afrikaners (Marks & Trapido, 1979). Existential 
pragmatism chiefly predicated on Afrikaner appeasement immediately led to the 
formalization of black racial economic exclusivity (Worden, 2007). It was in this 
context that the African National Congress (ANC) was formed, to provide a 
unitary voice protecting political rights of all black people in the country (Worden, 
2007; Ross, 1999).  
When the mainly Afrikaner-supported National Party came to power in 1948 it 
legitimized a long-standing philosophy of white supremacy through its policy of 
Apartheid (Worden, 2007). Apartheid led to the general black resistance and 
instability in the country, until political prisoners were freed in 1990 paving the 
way for democratic elections in 1994 (Ibid.). When the ANC came to power in 
1994 it identified Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) as a major vehicle for 
addressing the economic injustices of Apartheid (Reed, 2004). The legitimacy of 
Affirmative Action (AA) policies is to regulate the allocation of scarce positions in 
many areas including education, employment, or business contracting in order to 
increase the representation of persons from particular population subgroups that 
were previously unfairly excluded (Fryer & Loury, 2005).  Similarly in South Africa 
the main aim of BEE is to encourage and facilitate the meaningful participation of 
black people in the economy of South Africa (Ramphele, 1995) It includes and 
deploys measures such as employment equity, skills development, targets for 
ownership and management and preferential procurement (DTI, 2004). The 
South African government has particularly identified Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) as a suitable vehicle for delivering BEE, because their long-term nature is 
considered ideally suited to provide an incubatory environment for fledging black 
owned companies (National Treasury, 2004).  In PPPs and other procurement 











established companies, thus creating a Principal Agent relationship between the 
government (principal) and white-owned companies (agents). This research 
deploys Principal Agent theory to assess the efficacy of PPPs in delivering BEE.  
1.2 DEFINITION AND JUSTIFICATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
According to Ramphele (1995) there appears to be as many interpretations of AA 
as there are interpreters, as Adam (2000) also posits that the concept has not 
been authoritatively defined in legislation or international covenants. The term AA 
is imported from the United States where it is targeted at mostly black and Latino 
minorities (Weiner, 1993)) rather than the majority, and in that context tends to 
be perceived mostly as a moral issue bordering on charity (Adam, 2000). Typical 
definitions of AA include “policies that are intended to benefit historically 
subordinated racial groups and that do so by using race as a basis for allocating 
burdens and benefits” (Kennedy, 1993, p. 68). Eide (1992, p. 9) calls it 
“preferences given to members of a group typically defined by race or gender 
and is held to be justified because members of that group have in the past been 
discriminated against, not because of their individual characteristics, but because 
they belonged to the group concerned.” According to Samarasinghe (1993, p. 
45), it is “any public program or policy either implemented by the state or by the 
private sector, that is designed to help a particular ascriptively designated group 
in society, obtain share of resources that it would not be able to obtain 
otherwise.”  Weiner (1993, p 82) put it succinctly as “policies which aim to reduce 
racial inequality.”  (Innes, 1993, p. 4) elaborates it as “not necessarily a single 
policy or strategy; rather there can be a number of different ways of implementing 
affirmative action.” Thus it can realistically be treated more as a set of measures 
to achieve the desired end. The preponderance of race in the above definitions 
appear to negate the importance of gender and other criteria, whereas in reality 
the definitions should cooperatively be regarded to depict AA as a set of formal 
interventions intended to open doors to corporate statuses and general economic 












Justification of Affirmative Action 
Rosenfeld (1991) argues that defining AA without reference to justice and 
equality is impossible. AA can be “supported on moral, legal and responsibility 
grounds” (Thomas et al, 1996). According to Coleman (1983) the concept of 
justice in AA can be divided into two categories: firstly distributive justice, which 
is an obligation to extend particular actions to beneficiaries – in other words 
giving them the chance they should have had (Coleman, 1983). Secondly, 
correctional justice which is an equitable conduct for the purpose of achieving 
equality where there is equal treatment of all irrespective of background or race 
(Rawls, 1971). It is in this context that AA refers to programmes (Greenawalt, 
1975) which lift the previously discriminated to a greater participatory role with 
the ultimate aim of reversal of earlier discriminations. In a way it is a social  
“auditing system” (Tomasson et al, 1996), which alerts organizations about 
discrepancies between qualified citizens and the utilization of such citizens in the 
organization whilst demanding the correction of racial imbalances depicted by the 
system. The body of AA encapsulates the demolition of racial segregation and 
social imbalances (Ross, 1973). As such AA should be seen as a synonym for 
positive action (Parekh, 1992), which calls for actions that help sufferers of past 
discrimination. The intention of AA is to restore diversity in situations where past 
discrimination excluded such diversity, hence its intrinsic association with social 
justice and creation of fair balances. In South Africa it is explicitly deployed as a 
“tool for justice” (South Africa, 1997) to rectify past discriminatory practices whilst 
at the same time contributing to meet the demand for equity and equality. AA is 
thus an active attempt at integrating and restructuring society. 
1.2.1 Affirmative Action Lessons from Other Countries 
United States 
The issue of racial equality has been central to the American realpolitik discourse 











constitution acknowledges discrimination as part of historical legacy (Kluger, 
1975).  The American civil war centered around the issue of black slavery and 
white supremacy, the aftermath of which in the 1860s saw the 13th, 14th and 15th 
amendments to the constitution proffering equity between blacks and whites 
(ibid.).  Although there was always resistance to tangible existential equality 
(Anderson, 2004), the practical exigencies of American involvement in the 
Second World War triggered the desegregation of the war industry through the 
Executive Order 8802 signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt which 
prohibited government contractors from practicing employment discrimination  
based on race, color or national origin (EEOC, 2008). The word “Affirmative 
Action” was first used by President J.F. Kennedy in 1961 in Executive Order 
10925 which sought to sanction all contractors who contravened prohibitions to 
discriminate on account of race (Edwards, 1987).  Executive Order 11246 of 
1965 is regarded as the primary source of AA (Weiss, 1997), as it required all the 
federal contractors to “take ‘affirmative action’ to ensure that applicants are 
employed and that the employees are treated fairly during employment, without 
regard to their race, creed, color or national origin” (EEOC, 2008). Thus it can be 
seen that in the United States AA programmes since their conception in the 
1960s were at the behest of government agencies and state legislature. Their 
implementation throughout the seventies and eighties has been bedeviled by the 
legal challenges and policy strategists continually grapple with new issues 
(Badgett, 1995). To date there is evidence that amidst challenges there are a lot 
of positive developments.  
India and Malaysia 
AA has been practiced in other countries with mixed successes and constraints 
reflecting the historical background and geo-political dynamics within those 
countries. The policies have generally been criticized for their ineffectiveness 
and/or unfairness, especially because they appear to generally benefit the well-
connected elite within the target community. Of the countries which have 
implemented AA India has the largest programme. Instigated by Britain at 











and special political representation for lower castes in the society, it now caters 
for more than 300 million (Kumar, 1992) people out of a population of 1.15 billion. 
The AA programmes are an intervention to restructure the traditional 
compartmentalization of different castes into different economic and political 
functions (Wood, 1987). India’s AA is uniquely caste-based and not race-based 
and is usually referred to as compensatory discrimination for the benefit of those 
who have been marginalized by centuries of past injustices and repression 
(Boston & Nair-Reichert, 2003). The general complaint in India has always been 
that the beneficiaries are always the well-off groups within each caste, who would 
have been hired anyway, while the uneducated rural poor do not benefit at all 
from AA programmes  (Borooah, 2007). On the positive side AA has created a 
group awareness and political mobilization among the lower castes, as they are 
now regarded as a crucial constituency for any government, whose concerns 
need serious consideration (Adam, 2000). 
AA policies are nuanced by local peculiarities in diverse countries where they are 
implemented, but the common factor in nearly all the countries is that the 
beneficiaries are economically and socially disadvantaged and politically 
subordinate (Guan, 2005). Malaysia differs from these countries in that the group 
benefiting from AA also has the political power to legislate it (Adam, 2000; Lim, 
1985). There is also a striking similarity to the South African context because the 
policy benefits the majority, and also because the racial differences coincide with 
economic ones. At independence in 1957 the Malay assumed complete political 
control in the country, and they had had their special rights being the indigenous 
community conferred on them by the British colonial administrators as early as 
1874 (Lim, 1985). These special rights ensured the “protection” for Malays to 
practice peasantry and fishing without any hindrance, however this “protection” 
left them behind the Chinese and Indian communities who migrated into the 
country to take advantage of the capitalist economy created by the British (ibid.). 
In the 1960s there was widespread public debate over Malay economic 
backwardness and the worrying segmentation of the economy along the ethnic 











ineffective and inadequate, leading to increasing impatience among the 
Bumiputra (indigenous Malays) about the slow pace of the economic reform. This 
disgruntlement culminated in the ethnically charged riots of 1969 (Guan, 2005). 
The riots compelled the government to introduce the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) which was intended to be effective from 1971 -90 (Guan, 2005). At its 
heart the NEP encapsulated a concerted AA scheme to launch the Malays into 
the mainstream of Malaysian economy and to restrict the scope of laissez-faire 
capitalism and allowing greater state intervention to advance the general Malay 
welfare (Shamsul, 1997). The implementation of the NEP led to explosive growth 
in the civil service, with Malays recruited at a ratio of 4:1 to other groups, 
however this did not squeeze out the non-Malays as there was strong economic 
growth (Adam, 2000). A strong Malay middle class emerged as a direct result of 
the initiatives in the public and educational sectors over which the government 
had more control (Guan, 2005; Adam, 2000). While the NEP fostered the growth 
of the Malay middle class it however led to a more class-differentiated Malay 
community (Guan, 2005; Shari, 2000). It is this intra-ethnic inequality within the 
Malays that has led to a lot of criticism of the NEP, mostly because the benefits 
seem to be disproportionately channeled to the well-connected and the rich in the 
Malay community, who would do well even without the assistance of the NEP 
(Jomo, 1989; Guan, 2005). This criticism about the AA programmes 
implementation seems to be a reflection of similar sentiments in the United 
States and India, and it is the purpose of this study to see if the South African 
approach can improve on some of these drawbacks by particularly concentrating 
on the utilization of PPPs.  
Other African Countries: Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia 
Although there are other countries in Africa that have embarked on AA policies to 
reverse the economic inequalities brought by colonization, three which neighbor 
South Africa will be discussed as their proximity might be instructive because of 
similar historical experiences. At independence in 1964 in Zambia, about 97% of 











approach was a forceful approach, which promulgated laws entitling black 
Zambians a rightful occupation of all positions in public and private sectors 
(Lungu, 1980). The nationalistic approach which according to Madi (1997) was 
inspired by communalistic policies like Julius Nyerere’s “Ujamaa” and the 
Chinese “cultural revolution”, led to the abrupt departure of many expatriates 
leaving many positions vacant which were filled by less-qualified locals to the 
detriment of the merit principle. The government’s overriding economic policy 
was the indigenization of economic control, which inevitably targeted the flagship 
copper mining industry through nationalization, unionization and Zambianisation 
of the workforce (Daniel, 1979). The indigenization of other private industries was 
met with limited success because the policies were based on citizenship and not 
on race and non-African Zambians could not be legally dislodged from their 
traditional business preserves (Berveridge, 1951). While Zambia was forceful 
and nationalistic on one hand, Zimbabwe on the other hand opted for a softer 
approach. 
Zimbabwe like Zambia initially targeted the civil service such that an almost white 
civil service at independence in 1980 had 95% of senior positions occupied by 
blacks in 1984 (Mokgoro, 1996). Between 1981 and 1990 the civil service had 
expanded by 185%, largely through the infusion of inexperienced and corrupt 
officials, and once the Africanisation of civil service was achieved there were no 
further initiatives to reduce racial economic inequalities (ibid.).  The government 
approach to the private sector was to appeal to their sentiments and good-will to 
help their fellow human beings with no clear policies to restructure the economy, 
and the white wealthy minority did little to reciprocate the government’s 
reconciliatory overtures (Muzondidya, 2005). The belated cry against an illusory 
transformation by blacks led to coercive land grabs and white farms evictions and 
general authoritarianism (Raftopoulos & Savage, 2004) which has conflated with 
other blunders leading to a self-inflicted economic decline to an extend that 
Zimbabwe is largely regarded as a failed state (Financial Times, 2008b). The 
Zimbabwean approach has largely suffered from a lack of clear vision and well 











Namibia is a unique case in that after a long war of liberation independence 
came as a result of a negotiated decolonization settlement, thus limiting 
government policy to the terms of the settlement agreement. Paramount in this 
settlement is the protection of property rights and guaranteeing of jobs for all civil 
servants, which appears to have perpetuated the economic status quo (Melber, 
2006). However replacement of retiring, transferring or resigning civil servants 
with African candidates has gradually managed to change the face of the public 
service such that six years after independence 70% of the management posts in 
the public posts were held by previously disadvantaged individuals (ibid.). 
Beyond this little has changed in the general populace and notably in the mid-
1990s Namibia had the largest Gini coefficient at 0.701 when compare to any 
country in the world (UNDP, 1997). The Gini coefficient measures the extent to 
which the distribution of income in the economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution (World Bank Group, 2008). Thus the negotiated settlement in 
Namibia appears to have stifled the government’s policy options exacerbating 
economic racial disparities even amidst a changed economic climate 
representative of the majority of the general Namibian populace. 
1.3 APPLICATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Affirmative Action in South Africa 
Madi (1993) contends that jobs reservations in South Africa can be traced as far 
back as the 1890s, and as such they should not be regarded as a new invention, 
although the earlier drives were more black exclusion practices rather than legal 
policies.  However, AA in its modern conceptualization has been practiced in 
earnest in South Africa since 1922 following the “Civilized Labor Policy” which 
was initiated by the white miners’ strike, who were disgruntled by a move for an 
annulment of white job reservations and wage parity with the blacks (Lester, 
1996). The assumption of power by the National Party in 1948 saw the perfection 
of the most expensive, most extensive and most coercive AA in the world – 
Apartheid (Madi, 1993). Throughout the 1950s to the 1970s all the Apartheid 










AA in the context of black advancement started in the in the mid-to-late 1970s, as 
a direct response to the Sharpeville Massacre  of June 16th 1976 which was a 
consequence of brutal police response to a political march by Soweto youth to 
voice their disgruntlement about Apartheid (ibid.). The massive disinvestment 
that followed because of the international outcry, compelled the companies that 
stayed to voluntarily demonstrate that they are contributing to “black 
advancement” (Thomas et al, 1996) by promoting black career advancement and 
embarking on social responsibility programmes (Madi, 1997)  
These early initiatives have synonymously characterized the implementation of 
AA in South Africa with employment of quotas and targets based upon proposed 
formulas (Thomas et al, 1996; BMF, 1993). This has traditionally meant the 
recruitment and advancement of blacks and women up the ranks of the 
organization, as well as their appointment as non-executive directors at board 
level (Madi, 1997), which Thomas et (1996) claims clusters blacks at the top with 
little value to the company because they don’t become part of serious decision 
making. This “minimalist” approach (Edigheji, 1999) was the norm up until its 
partial adoption by the new dispensation, after which there has been a gradual 
shift to a new phase of AA implementation (Iheduru, 2004) because of the new 
implementation paradigm. This shift was triggered by discontent with the 
traditional AA implementation that was seen as black middle class-creation 
project (Freund & Padayachee, 1998), with little impact on the Widespread 
economic trickle-down. 
The new phase according to Edijheri (1999) is “maximalist” as it seeks to attain a 
comprehensive restructuring of the institutions and society rather than simply 
replacing white individuals with black ones in executive positions. The first AA 
phase in South Africa was known as Black Economic Empowerment after 1994, 
but after a widespread criticism Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment 
(BBBEE) was instead instituted, and seeks to broaden empowerment across the 
private economy by using policies such as ‘preferential procurement’ (Butler, 











to make empowerment less dependent on the goodwill of the previously 
advantaged, but rather to make it spearheaded by government proactivity in 
making it more ‘broad-based’.  The department that has spearheaded this drive 
is the Department of Public Works (DPW) (Strategic Procurement Systems, 
2002). By targeting the Affirmable Business Enterprises (ABEs) (Watermeyer, 
2000), this department has tried to redress the structural problems of the South 
African construction industry. 
1.4 THE CRITICAL ROLE PLAYED BY THE CONSTRUCTION 
INDUSTRY TO EFFECT SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE 
Governments have long recognized that the construction industry is uniquely 
able to impact on social and economic activities from Roosevelt’s New Deal in 
the US to National Socialism in Germany. According to McCutcheon (2001) and 
Watermeyer (2000), the construction industry is an efficient industry for 
generating employment for a given capital flow, especially when labor-intensive 
methods are deployed. Government procurement has been observed to realise 
socio-economic objectives, especially when “preferencing” procurement is used 
as was the case in the late 1940s where it was an integral part of the Marshal 
plan in rebuilding Europe after WWII (Shezi, 1998).  In South Africa change has 
been sought by the promotion of business linkages between large and small 
black-owned companies through joint ventures and sub-contracting, where large 
contractors are required to unpack or unbundle their contracts into smaller 
contracts in order to secure the involvement of targeted enterprises and/or 
engage these “targeted enterprises” as joint venture partners or structure the 
work to provide opportunities for targeted labor (Watermeyer, 2000).   
Internationally it has been recognized that Small Medium and Micro Enterprises 
(SMMEs), as opposed to large scale enterprises, tend to choose labor-intensive 
methods that they can afford, and that developing them places a significant 
portion of expenditure in local communities, thus enhancing employment creation 
(Larcher, 1999, 1998; Tajgman and de Veen, 1998). Because of the low barriers 











people can be absorbed for a greater empowerment effect  (Tajgman & de Veen, 
1998). 
Specific Role of Established Companies to Effect Change  
The specific nature of the South African Targeted Procurement Programme is 
such that the responsibility for the successful empowerment of the SMME in the 
economy is effectively ceded to the private sector (South Africa, 1997). The main 
contractor in most contracts functions as the implementation agent on behalf of 
the national government in achieving the long-term objectives of upgrading 
SMMEs economy in general and in particular the construction sector (ibid.). This 
is poignant in the South African situation where the previously advantaged white 
owners of established companies still have, capital, skills and experience skewed 
in their favour. Imbalances inherited from the apartheid era in the ownership 
structure in construction industry thus prompted the government to restructure 
this industry in line with the social and economic imperatives for the 
reconstruction (ibid.).  Rogerson (2000) argues that the best empowerment 
results occur where partnerships are formed between established (white-owned) 
construction businesses and emerging PDI-owned enterprises. In the context of 
the construction industry empowerment means less dependency on the dominant 
white-owned businesses (Havemann, 1999). The government is implementing 
this policy amidst the competing public needs from limited resources, especially 
because public procurement in most countries (including South Africa) accounts 
for a bigger share of economic activity (Maskin & Tirole, 2008). An arguably, 
“recent” development to address this challenge has been the development of 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in industrialized countries and emerging 
economies during the 1990s (ibid.). This is simply because PPPs have been 
practiced for a very long time even before the modern times as discussed 











1.5 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (PPPs) 
A typical PPP is a scenario where the non-public partner is required to raise 
private finance, and bear substantial risk for a project, where the revenue derives 
from some combination of government payments and user fees (Maskin & Tirole, 
2008). PPP arrangements have been set up for large scale schemes in 
transportation, medical care, telecommunications, energy, water systems and 
even orphan (for rare diseases) drugs (ibid.). The term “partnerships” according 
to McQuaid (2000) covers vastly different concepts and practices and is used to 
describe a wide variety of types of relationships in a myriad of circumstances and 
locations to such an extent that Lyons and  Hamlin  (1991, p. 55) claim that the 
“methods for carrying out such (private-public) partnerships are limited only to the 
imagination”, as there are infinite range of partnership activities, and economic 
development offices are increasingly becoming innovative in their use of the 
concept (McQuaid, 2000). 
In general terms any collaboration between public bodies, such as local 
authorities or central government and private companies can be referred to as a 
public-private partnership  (NCPPP, 2005; Akintoye et al, 2003; BBC, 2003). This 
partnership involves cooperation – i.e. ‘to work or act together’ – and according 
to McQuaid (2000) can be defined as organizations in the public and private 
sector cooperating for mutual benefit. They are sometimes referred to as 
collaborations among business, non-profit organizations and government in 
which risks, resources and skills are shared in projects that benefit each partner 
(Stratton, 1989; Akintoye, 2003) as well as the community (Stratton, 1989). The 
implementation of PPPs is predicated on the notion that there is a strong 
potential for synergy by working together. Principally as McQuaid (2000, p 11) 
posits the ‘sum is greater than the parts’, because none of the individual players 
have all the necessary skills and resources necessary to develop (Croft, 2005) 











Although the variety of PPPs arrangements are boundless they broadly come in 
two types; concession PPPs and availability-based PPPs (World Bank Group, 
2008). In a concession PPP the government mandates the private party 
(counterpart) to design, build, finance and operate for a fixed period of time, an 
infrastructure owned by the government (ibid.).  Although the private party is 
usually expected to assume all the demand risks, sometimes the government 
underwrites the minimum level of usage World Bank Group, 2008). Typical 
examples in this arrangement would be roads, railways, urban transport 
schemes, ports and airports (ibid.). The availability-based PPPs are similar to 
concessions PPPs in the structuring of the agreement and the upkeep of the 
infrastructure, however in this case payments come directly from the public 
authority and not from the user, and this payment is made when and to the extent 
that a public service and not an asset is made available (World Bank Group, 
2008).  In this arrangement the demand or usage risk remains with the public 
authority (ibid.). Availability-based PPPs are among the safest form of project 
financings with visible income streams and relatively benign penalty regimes 
(Projectfinance, 2008).  This arrangement is useful in non-“self-funding” projects 
such as prisons, government buildings and rural roads, where payment is based 
on the availability of the accommodation facility, equipment or system and not on 
the volume of usage (World Bank Group, 2008). 
Akintoye et al (2003) argues that PPPs could be used to redress ethnic income 
differences as in Malaysia (Akintoye et al, 2003).  This factor is very pertinent to 
the South African situation.  The South African Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act (2003) states that PPPs offer a valuable opportunity for strong 
and sustainable Black Economic Empowerment (BEE Act 53 of 2003).  Since by 
their very nature PPPs are long term they provide a good vehicle to empower the 
previously disadvantaged people in this country (National Treasury, 2004) 
through a steady flow of income. This satisfies the main objective of the BEE 
which is to assist the previously disadvantaged groups to participate in the 
mainstream of the economy (Manchidi & Merrifield, 2005; PPP Quarterly, 2002). 











are considered a useful route in capacity building in South Africa (Lezzard, 
2004).  Zarenda, 2001) backs up this view by arguing that their large-scale 
nature accommodates widespread inclusiveness, which makes them invaluable 
for BEE. This inclusive nature of PPPs can accommodate the black-owned 
SMMEs which need a very stable environment to be nurtured. However the 
enormity and complexity of these arrangements, and the scarce skills in the 
government to monitor and regulate the contract once construction and delivery 
has begun, might lead to a Principal Agent problem (OECD, 2006). The next 
session explores Principal Agent theory and its relevance to this research. 
1.6 PRINCIPAL AGENT THEORY 
The Principal Agent (PA) theory or “agency theory” is an branch of economics 
concerned with a relationship problem between contracting principals and 
agents, where “agency” specifically refers to a situation where the agent acts on 
the behalf of the principal (Denhardt, 2003). This prevalent problem is pertinent 
when the employee or contractor (agents) has an informational advantage over 
the principal and has divergent interests to the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The 
PA problem is a problem because it is hard to solve (Wessels, 2006). Since both 
parties’ efforts tend to be unobservable there is always a problem of correctly 
devising a contract that guides the interaction (Greve, 2008).  With the PA 
problem the principal and the agent have divergent interests, and since each 
cannot monitor what the other is doing, the resultant output is less than optimal 
(Wessels, 2006). The focus of the theory is on determining the most efficient 
contract given assumptions about people (e.g. self-interest), organizations and 
information (Eisenhardt, 1989). So the main theme of the principal agency theory 
is dealing with the problems encountered when co-operating parties not only 
have incongruent goals but divisions of labor too, making it difficult for the 
principal to monitor and verify the agent’s behaviour (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Nilakant & Rao, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). The theory is 
predicated on three fundamental assumptions; firstly that both parties are rational 











averse and thirdly that the relationship is beset with a problem of information 
asymmetry (Baiman, 1990; Jenson & Meckling, 1976; Levinthal, 1988). The 
theory posits that the existence of even one of these conditions creates a 
potential for an agency problem (Baiman, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Nilakant & 
Rao, 1994). 
Self-interest can be mitigated by installing monitoring mechanisms to protect the 
principals, from the agents’ divergent interests pursuit (Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001). 
A large body of literature (e.g. Bromiley, 1991; Sinha, 1994) has demonstrated 
that since agent employment security and income are inextricably tied to the firm 
(principal), agents would under normal circumstances exhibit risk aversion in 
decisions regarding the firm in order not to lower risk to personal wealth- i.e. 
loosing their job (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). This is more pertinent in the 
technical prescriptions where infringement might lead to contract termination, 
thereby using the agent’s risk aversion to induce goal congruency. For the 
purpose of this research asymmetric information and its implications on the agent 
contractual performance is going to be investigated further, because on BEE 
implementation superior informational advantage appears to favour the 
contractors (agents).  
Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetries are usually created where the agent has superior and 
specialized knowledge than the principal regarding task execution and where the 
agent is permitted a lot of managerial discretion (Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; 
Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992). Whenever asymmetric information exists it 
may lead to “opportunism” by the agent and researchers in this field have been 
most concerned in describing the governance mechanisms that solve this 
problem (Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). Opportunism is described by 
Williamson (1975, p. 9) as ‘pursuing one’s self-interests with guile’. BEE 
stipulation requires that contractual “set asides” be a preserve of the PDIs, 
however “guile” in the form of BEE beneficiary misrepresentation that abounds in 











asymmetry favouring the agents (contractors). According to PA theory the two 
forms of opportunism which are important aspects of agency theory are those of 
“moral hazard” and “adverse selection” (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Moral Hazard (post-contractual opportunism) 
“Moral Hazard” happens once the two parties have entered into a contract, and is 
a risk that one party will act to the detriment of the other within the contract 
(Wessels, 2006). Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that if both parties are utility 
maximisers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in 
the best interests of the principal. “Moral Hazard” is sometimes called “hidden 
action” because the agent’s adverse actions are always hidden from the principal 
(Greve, 2008). The inability to monitor each other in any kind of Principal Agent 
relationship will inevitably lead to a “moral hazard” problem (Maskin & Riley, 
1984). The fact that the empowerment of PDIs in South Africa is ceded to white-
owned established companies in South Africa demonstrates the enormity of the 
task, which the government on its own cannot effectively be able to implement. 
The reported sidelining of PDIs in contracts may be indicative of an endemic BEE 
“moral hazard” in government procurement as the PDIs are not benefitting from 
their participation in these projects.  
Adverse Selection (Pre-contractual opportunism) 
“Adverse Selection” is a direct result of asymmetric knowledge, leading to the 
agent to hide information that is relevant to the negotiation and signing of a 
contract (Greve, 2008). Under this condition the principal cannot ascertain if the 
agent accurately represents his true ability (Eisenhardt, 1989). As a result an 
adverse selection is made due to poor information and consequently this leads to 
selection of a bad agent (Wessels, 2006).  For Surowiecki (2004) and Venkatesh 
(2003), the “adverse selection” problem, which is also referred to as “hidden 
information”, normally occurs when one party knows more than the other, such 
that the principal is at the agent’s mercy or vice versa. Whereas “moral hazard” is 
about post-contractual action hidden from the principal, “adverse selection” is 











South African government procurement presenting PDIs as legitimate BEE 
beneficiaries during tendering, only to divert the financial benefits to unqualified 
beneficiaries post-contractually may be demonstrative of adverse selection.  
1.7 DEVELOPMENT OF A RESEARCH RATIONALE 
PPPs present governments with opportunities to increase efficiency but since 
contracting involves an agent, problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
will typically arise (Slyke, 2007).  The only way to explain this interaction and 
understand it better is through PA theory, because ithis represennts a complex 
problem of human action where the very act of framing the problem concurrnetly 
defines the solution. PA describes the interaction of unequal partners doing 
business in an environment of information asymmetry as is the case in 
government contracting. Opportunism is a “wicked problem” (Rittel & Webber, 
1973) and as a result there is no true-or-false solutions to opprtunistic behaviour 
only better or worse solutions. PA articulates the different aspects of observed 
behavioural tendencies in contracting and was thus applied to the South African 
PPP environment. 
The scenario of PPPs and of the construction industry in general where the 
government is the principal and the contractor is the agent is a typical economic 
PA Theory relationship, which is invariably bedeviled by the concomitant problem 
of opportunism. Misrepresentations of the true BEE beneficiaries in contract 
documents can all be encompassed under an umbrella term of “fronting”, which 
according to the ICT Draft BEE Charter (2005) means “any entity, mechanism or 
structure established in order to circumvent the BEE requirements as required 
under various government policy instruments”.  “Fronting” is seen by the ANC 
(2001) as an opportunistic dishonesty that tends to advantageously use 
government redress programmes for self-interested parties.  According to DTI 
(2001) it cannot be confined to one practice as it covers any practice or initiative 
that contravenes or is against the spirit of any law, provision, rule, procedure, 











pertaining to BEE. This represents a deliberate or attempted circumvention of the 
BBBEE Act and the Codes, through misrepresentation of facts, regardless of 
whether such claims are made by a company that purports compliance or by a 
third party (ibid.). Since this practice is rife particularly in the construction industry 
this research seeks to investigate whether the PPPs have adequate mechanisms 
to mitigate these “fronting” opportunistic practices (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2005). 
Shi et al ( 2007) acknowledges that there are currently limited studies on the 
moral hazard problem occurring in PPP projects. Where some research is done 
on the subject of PA problem specifically in government PPP concessionary 
projects, the PA theoretical framework has not been applied where there are 
secondary socio-economic objectives over and above the primary objectives of 
infrastructure provision. The work done on the traditional projects and general 
government contracting with regard to the PA problem does provide a foundation 
from which to investigate any nuances in the behaviour of the agents in the 
presence of additional soft project output requirements. At the heart of the 
research is the acknowledgement that the asymmetric information that abounds 
in contracting favors the agent and leads to opportunistic behaviour. 
Work done by Pongsiri ( 2004) has attempted to demonstrate how a partnership 
model pertaining to PA relationship can be used to explain how contracting 
parties behave in order to minimize the problems associated with their 
opportunistic behaviours. Kettl (1993) has tried to demonstrate that PPPs have 
introduced three issues into the focus; firstly government is relying on private 
partners to do the public work, secondly PPPs produce highly variable 
relationships that differ from project to project and thirdly the government’s role 
has changed from the traditional producer of goods and services to a supervisor 
of agents who do the actual work. Raganelli and Fidone (2007) in their work on 
reducing moral hazard in public works PPPs have established that the 
government and the private partner as rational operators have divergent 











questions; firstly that of selecting the best contractor and secondly guaranteeing 
the precise carrying out of the contract. With reference to the first question public 
type procedures are employed to identify the best contracting partner.  
Regarding the second one Raganelli and Fidone (2007) suggest that insight be 
drawn from the economic literature on the theory of incentives, which suggests a 
careful study into the construction of correct contract architecture. The provision 
of a good quality public works should comply and meet the private interest of 
attaining corporate profit (ibid.). This research investigates whether the private 
party is contractually incentivised enough to provide a good public infrastructure 
in an environment where an extra BEE socio-economic requirement is included 
in the contract execution formula, without necessarily shirking on neither.  
Research Questions 
In order to investigate whether PPPs are a suitable vehicle to efficacious delivery 
on BEE the questions were frame in the following fashion: 
 What Principal Agent problems exist in PPPs and in traditional 
procurement? 
 How can the principal use his influence to improve BEE delivery in PPPs 
given their long-term nature? 
 Are there underlying reasons that could militate towards PPPs being a 
better platform to interrogate the Principal Agent relationship in delivering 
BEE? 
 How does the efficiency of the Principal Agent relationship in PPPs in 
delivering BEE compare with traditional procurement methods? 
1.8 RESEARCH PROPOSITION 
In scientific research, a hypothesis is a definite statement that posits that there is 
a relationship between variables (Salkind, 2007). According to Mateo and 
Kirchhoff (1999) it is a statement of the expected relationship between variables. 











systematic enquiry is undertaken it is predicated on a tentative basis, which could 
be disapproved by the research data. In this way it is discipline (Bouma, 1993) 
and a sense of direction is infused in the way the formal enquiry is conducted.  
1.8.1 Primary Proposition 
PPPs offer a better environment than other procurement methods where the 
Principal Agent problems can be mitigated in the delivery of BEE 
1.8.2 Secondary Propositions 
 Principal Agent problems exist in both PPPs and in the traditional 
procurement methods.. 
 
 Since the relationship between the principal and the agent is long-term, 
the principal is better placed to learn and equip himself throughout the life 
of the project to institute measures that will ameliorate the Principal Agent 
problems.  
 
 The relationship of the parties in a PPP is an ideal Principal Agent 
relationship, the proper understanding of which can yield maximum BEE 
benefits. 
 
 Because of an ideal Principal Agent relationship in PPPs, they are more 
likely to yield key BEE elements 
1.9 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
In any research the adopted methodology must be able to support its legitimacy 
based on a fundamental guiding philosophy.  This argument must take 
cognizance of the fact that there is no such thing as perfect research, however 
the awareness of the guiding rules of research helps the researcher in defending 
the outcomes of the research (Descombe, 2002). Of the two research paradigms 











unsuitability of the quantitative positivist approach is chiefly because the whole 
research exercise could just amount to a ‘quick-fix’, involving little or no contact 
with people or the ‘field’ (Silverman, 2006). As this research is about 
understanding the behaviour of agents in order to find ways of ameliorating the 
Principal Agent (PA) problem, so there has to be some interaction with the 
agents at the ‘field’. Silverman (2006) argues that sometimes if statistical 
correlations are used in the context of naturally occurring interaction, they may 
be based on the variables that are arbitrarily defined. After-the-fact speculations 
that follow the meanings of these created correlations can involve the very 
common-sense processes that positivism tries to avoid (Cicourel, 1964). The 
pursuit of ‘measurable’ phenomena can mean that unperceived values creep into 
research by taking on board highly problematic and unreliable concepts such as 
‘discrimination’ and ‘empowerment’. 
1.9.1 Research Method Justification 
In this research case study method was chosen as the primary method because 
case studies are the preferred method when ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being 
asked, when the researcher has minimal control over activities, and when the 
main focus of the inquiry is on a contemporary phenomenon in the real-life every 
day context (Yin, 1994; Benbasat et al, 1987). A single ‘critical’ PPP case study 
of a referral hospital in Durban Kwazulu Natal was chosen. In this case the PA is 
used as a theoretical framework to study the behaviors of established companies 
in their compliance to implementing the BEE policy. This project was the largest 
PPP project in South Africa at the time of commencement and it included the 
largest number of BEE players at all levels, from shareholding, management 
down to sub-contracting. Because of its size, longevity and wide inclusivity of 
Previously Disadvantaged Institutions (PDIs) it was regarded the suitable case to 












1.10 GUIDE TO THE THESIS 
The thesis is structured as described below: 
Chapter 1:  This chapter set the scene for the whole research by introducing and 
giving a broad over-view of issues in this research. 
Chapter 2: This chapter introduces the concept of Affirmative Action, explores its 
evolution internationally and contextualizes the history of its application within 
South Africa. The second part of this chapter reviews the importance of the 
construction sector to BEE and problems that arise with in and introduces Public 
Private Partnerships (PPPs) and their role in giving effect to the South African 
policy of Black Economic empowerment (BEE). 
Chapter 3: Principal Agent (PA) theory as a description of the prevalent 
relationship problem between contracting principals and agents is explored and 
its utility and relevance to explain the behaviour of established consortia in PPPs. 
Is introduced. 
Chapter 4: This chapter discusses a range of research paradigms and an 
argument is made for the adoption of a phenomenological research design 
utilising cases studies as the methodology adopted for this research. Case study 
method is reviewed and the argument for a single case study of a critical case is 
defended. 
Chapter 5: Presents the case study of IALCH and reports on the data gathered 
from the field through open interviews with project stakeholders identifying 
potential behaviours to be subsequently analyzed through the PA theoretical 
framework. 
Chapter 6: Discusses the observed behaviours identified in Chapter 5 through 
the theoretical parameters of the PA theory. The chapter also identifies the 
limitations of PA theory to adequately explain all the post-contractual agent 











reflect a different behavioural phenomenon unanticipated by the research. 
Consequently these behaviours, which are anomalous to the PA are explored 
through the Principal Steward (PS) theory.  Reflections are made on the possible 
synthesis of the two theories to provide a foundational basis, which explains all 
the observed behavioural nuances of the agent. 
Chapter 7: This chapter revisits the research questions and propositions posed 
at the start of the research and evaluate these in the light of the observations and 
research findings. It draws conclusions and reflects on the contribution of this 
study to the corpus of knowledge on PPP efficacy in delivering BEE. It further 
provides recommendations for future research and suggests which findings have 
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2 BLACK ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The history of racial segregation and economic exclusion in South Africa that 
necessitated black Affirmative Action (AA) is explained in detail in Appendix 1.  
Institutionalized racism was only started in 1948 through the introduction of 
Apartheid as an all-encompassing policy regulating the social, economic and 
political conduct of blacks. The main economic tenet of Apartheid was to confine 
blacks to a state of perpetual peripheralisation from the mainstream economic 
activity. However the international outcry that followed the government’s 
crackdown on black resistance especially after the Soweto uprising led to the 
rethink of the policy and the formal systematic introduction of blacks into the 
economic mainstream through AA. This chapter starts by first articulating the 
concept of (AA) which has contextually and theoretically evolved into Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE) in South Africa. It starts by tracing the origins of 
this concept and interrogating its introduction and application in other countries 
whose history and political similarity make such enquiry relevant to the South 
African situation. The issue of the justification and importance of this policy is 
also discussed to see its role in maintaining sustainable economic role. 
The importance and role of the construction industry in achieving the primary 
intentions of the AA policy are discussed. The chapter ends by taking the 
discussion to the introduction and discussion of the Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) and differentiating them to the classic privatization of public assets. The 
PPPs’ role and usefulness in the attainment is laid out as they make up the 
environment chosen for the enquiry of this work.  
2.2 Introduction, Definition, Relevance and Justification of 
Affirmative Action 
When the African National Congress (ANC) came to power in 1994, their main 











broadening opportunities for the previously oppressed and disadvantage groups 
in South African society through Affirmative Action (AA) (Waddy, 2004). The 
concept of AA originated in the United States and is an umbrella term 
encompassing all actions aimed at redressing historical inequalities in a country 
(Nzimande & Sikhosana, 1996). South Africa’s history of segregation and 
apartheid is such that by 1994, the minority whites legally owned the majority of 
capital and land, hence the AA aim of establishing congruence rather than the 
current divergence between ownership and equity. The exclusion of Africans 
from ownership or self-benefiting participation in the economy came about as a 
result of a deliberate policy of successive governments, at the invocation of white 
entrepreneurs and backed by repressive security apparatus (Sachs, 2000). This 
exclusion has prevented the economy from reaching its full potential.  To achieve 
that potential the new South African government from 1994 has sought to 
implement policies that would grow the economy, develop and economically 
empower all previously disadvantaged people in the country, because the 
government considers these three as interrelated processes. In the words of 
president Mbeki: 
 
”…The empowerment we speak of is an inclusive process and not an 
exclusive one. No economy can meet its potential if any part of its citizens 
is not fully integrated into all aspects of that economy. Equally it follows 
that an economy that is not growing cannot integrate all its citizens into 
that economy in a meaningful way.”  (Mbeki, 2003) 
 
Affirmative Action Defined 
The concept of Affirmative Action has yet to be authoritatively defined in 
legislation or international covenants (Adam, 2002).  There seem to be as many 
interpretations of the term as there are interpreters (Ramphele, 1995). 
Unfortunately for South Africa, the term is imported from the United States where 











Latinos (Weiner, 1993) rather than a majority population and in that context tends 
to be perceived as a moral issue, with a somewhat paternalistic character 
bordering on charity (Adam, 2000).  
Typical definitions of AA include “policies that are intended to benefit historically 
subordinated racial groups and that do so by using race as a basis for allocating 
burdens and benefits” (Kennedy, 1993, p 68). Eide (1992, p 9) calls it 
“preferences given to members of a group typically defined by race or gender 
and is held to be justified because members of that group have in the past been 
discriminated against, not because of their individual characteristics, but because 
they belonged to the group concerned.” According to Samararisinghe (1993, p 
45), it is “any public program or policy either implemented by the state or by the 
private sector, that is designed to help a particular ascriptively designated group 
in society, obtain share of resources that it would not be able to obtain 
otherwise.”  Weiner (1993, p 82) put it succinctly as policies “which aim to reduce 
racial inequality.”  In the same vein Thomas et al (1996, p 7) calls it simply “a 
short-term strategy to open the corporate doors for previously disadvantaged 
people.” Innes (1993, p 4) elaborates it as “not necessarily a single policy or 
strategy; rather there can be a number of different ways of implementing 
affirmative action.” Thus it can realistically be treated more as a set of measures 
to achieve the desired end. The above definitions severally elevate race as a 
predominant criterion without necessarily negating gender and other 
identifications as common influences in the application of the AA. Cooperatively 
they depict AA as a set of formal interventions intended to open doors to 
corporate statuses and general economic opportunities to the previously 
marginalized members of the society. 
AA can be “supported on moral, legal and responsibility grounds” (Thomas et al, 
1996, p.6). Ronsenfeld (1991) argues that defining AA without reference to 
justice and equality is impossible. While Coleman (1983) posits that the concept 
of justice in AA can be divided into two categories: firstly distributive justice, 











words giving them the chance they should have had (Coleman, 1983). Secondly, 
correctional justice which is an equitable conduct for the purpose of achieving 
equality where there is equal treatment of all irrespective of background or race 
(Rawls, 1971). It is in this context that AA refers to programmes (Greenawalt, 
1975), which lift the previously discriminated to a greater participatory role with 
the ultimate aim of reversal of earlier discriminations. In a way it is a social  
“auditing system” (Tomasson et al, 1996), which alerts organizations about 
discrepancies between qualified citizens and the utilization of such citizens in the 
organization whilst demanding the correction of racial imbalances depicted by the 
system.  
The body of AA encapsulates the demolition of racial segregation and social 
imbalances (Ross, 1971). As such AA should be seen as a synonym for positive 
action (Parekh, 1992), which calls for actions that help sufferers of past 
discrimination. AA intension is to restore diversity in situations where past 
discrimination excluded such diversity, hence its intrinsic association with social 
justice and fair balances creation. In South Africa it is explicitly deployed as a 
“tool for justice” (South Africa, 1997) to rectify past discriminatory practices whilst 
at the same time contributing to meet the demand for equity and equality. AA is 
thus an active attempt at integrating and restructuring society. 
2.2.1 History of AA in the United States  
As early as the Declaration of Independence in 1776 in America, section 2 of the 
1789 constitution acknowledged discrimination as part of the historical legacy. In 
the century that followed, the American Civil War centered around the issue of 
black slavery and white supremacy (Kluger, 1975). After the civil war in the 
1860s the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments to the constitution granted the same 
freedom to blacks as whites. The amendments completely abolished and 
prohibited slavery. These gains were reversed in 1877 with the election of 
President Rutherford B. Hayes, who restricted the liberties of Blacks in the 
Southern and Border States. The constitutional protections were further 











case which enforced the “Jim Crow” laws and the “Jim Crow” way of life which 
advocated segregation between blacks and whites in all aspects of life 
(Anderson, 2004).  
Things started to change on the eve of American involvement in the Second 
World War when President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed Executive Order 8802, 
which sought to desegregate the war industry by prohibiting all government 
contractors from practicing discriminatory employment based on race, color or 
national origin (EEOC, 2008). The word “Affirmative Action” was used for the first 
time in Executive Order 10925 signed by President J.F. Kennedy in 1961, which 
established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), giving it 
authority to impose limited sanctions on government contractors for violations of 
the prohibitions to discriminate on account of race.  It was later in 1972 that the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act granted the full enforcement powers to the 
EEOC (Edwards, 1987)  
Of all the Executive Orders issued to quell racial tension (Weiss, 1997) in the 
1960s, Executive Order 11246 of 1965 is the primary source of AA. It required 
federal contractors to “take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are 
employed and that the employees are treated fairly during employment, without 
regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin” (EEOC, 2008). Two years 
later women were included in the Order.  In the context of the Order, to take 
“affirmative action” meant to consciously take steps in ensuring that the practice 
of discrimination against blacks was halted. The Order required a positive action 
because discrimination was so entrenched that it had been accepted as a way of 
life (ibid.). The Order came soon after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibited discrimination in a broad array of private conduct including public 
accommodations, governmental services and education (ibid.). One section of 
the Act, referred to as Title VII, prohibits employment discrimination based on 
race, sex, color, religion and national origin. Title VII applies to private employers, 











recruitment, hiring, wages, assignments, promotions, benefits, discipline, 
discharge, layoffs and almost every aspect of employment (ibid.). 
In the United States AA programmes from their inception in the 1960s have been 
implemented through the efforts of government agencies and state legislature. 
They were usually codified in Title VII and several Executive Orders as seen 
above, with enforcement residing with the administrative, judicial and economic 
powers of the United States government (Van Jaarsveld, 2000). Through the use 
of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC) the government was 
empowered to terminate contracts with any company that violated equality 
policies (Fisher, 1990).  Throughout the seventies and eighties economic and 
legal challenges have bedeviled the implementation of the AA programmes, and 
have brought new issues to the attention of policy strategists (Badgett, 1995).  
2.2.2 Affirmative Action in Other Countries 
The policy has been practiced in other countries with mixed success and 
constraints reflecting the historical background and geo-political dynamics within 
those countries. The methods vary widely between individual countries, and have 
almost invariably been criticized for their ineffectiveness and/or unfairness. 
Despites these concerns Waddy (2004) points out that few people question the 
central logic of AA. Initially in this research the experiences of two Asian 
countries, India and Malaysia, will be investigated as they have striking 
similarities to the South African situation in that the target beneficiaries also 
comprise the majority of the population in the country. As a result they can 
provide insight and guidance in the formulation of South Africa’s own version. 
Later on in this section AA approach in other neighboring countries to South 














Background to India’s AA 
India arguably has the largest AA programmes in the world. Its AA policies were 
bequeathed by Britain at independence and include subsidies and scholarships, 
reservation of government jobs and special political representation for the low 
castes in the society (Kumar, 1992). The scope of its various policies has over 
the years been steadily enlarged such that they now cater for about more than 
300 million people (ibid.) out of a population of 1.15 billion.  
India is a highly stratified society with segments of the population 
compartmentalized into different castes, which traditionally determined their 
economic and political role in the society (Wood, 1987).  The caste system has 
existed for over three thousand years and dates back to the ancient Hindu 
scriptures called the Rig Vedic. Hinduism consists of four castes arranged in a 
strict hierarchy. People who do not belong to any of these four castes are 
outcasts and untouchables for Hindus, because having any close contact with 
them is considered contaminating for anyone belonging to a caste (Mahar, 1972). 
The Vedic term for caste is “Varna” which just means color and any caste has its 
specific rights and responsibility in the society (Boston & Nair-Reichert, 2003). 
The highest “Varna” is the Brahman, which comprise the priests and educated 
people in the society. Next in line is the Kshatria who consist of the rulers and 
aristocracy. The “Varna” that follows is the Vaisias who are landlords and 
businessmen. The last “Varna” in this four-tiered ranking is the Shudras who are 
peasants and the working class. The members of the first three “Varnas” are by 
tradition considered to be “twice born”, and they have access to religious 
education and have to go through ceremonies that entitle them to certain special 
spiritual rights denied the Shudras. This arrangement dictates every significant 













Indian Social stratification and AA 
The Indian constitution has a preamble that proclaims equality of status and 
opportunity for all citizens, however three groups are targeted for special 
advantages and protection in Article 46 of the Directive Principles of State Policy: 
“The State shall promote with special care the educational and economic 
interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in particular, of the Scheduled 
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice 
and all forms of exploitation” (Wood, 1987). Although any form of discrimination 
both generally and specifically in government employment and government-aided 
education institution is prohibited, a qualifier is added which provides: “for the 
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or 
for the scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes” (ibid.). The scheduled 
castes include about 135 million people listed (i.e. scheduled) as untouchable by 
the Indian Act of 1935. This number accounts for 15.75% of the total population 
by 1991 census. They are, by any poverty measurement, living in the worst 
depravation of all Indians (Mahar, 1972; Beteille, 1993). They usually work in 
degrading jobs like cleaning and sewage (Boston & Nair-Reichert, 2003).  
They are one category, albeit the worst, of the three lower classes of Indian 
community who do not belong to the caste categorization. The second being the 
Scheduled tribes who are the aboriginal people of India, living deep in jungles, 
forests and mountains of India away from the main population. These are 
sometimes referred to as the Adivasi and they have never accepted the caste 
system (Boston & Nair-Reichert, 2003; Adam, 2000; Kumar, 1992). The third and 
the most recent group is called the Other Backward Classes (OBC) or the 
Socially and Educationally Backward Classes (SEBC) and they comprise of the 
Shudra “Varna” and the other former untouchables who converted from Hinduism 
to Islam or Christianity. There is an ongoing debate as to who qualifies to be 
included in this group as there are many different groups lobbying to be included 











AA in India is uniquely caste-based and not race-based, hence the Indian 
government’s insistence that it does not fall within the purview of international 
discourse on race-based discrimination. It is usually referred to as compensatory 
discrimination, whose sole purpose is to compensate those who are not even at 
the lowest level of India’s four-tiered system for centuries of past injustices and 
repression (Boston & Nair-Reichert, 2003). Hard hit are the untouchables who 
are variously referred to as the “Harijans” or “Dalits”, who have suffered many 
disadvantages because of segregation past and present but not as a direct result 
of isolation, as is the case with the tribal communities. Although they reside in 
almost every part of the country, they invariably occupy the lowest position in the 
economic hierarchy (Beteille, 1993).  
The 1950 constitution of India reserved 15% of educational and civil service 
seats to scheduled castes and 7.5% to scheduled tribes. Article 340 of the 
constitution provides for appointment of a commission to “investigate the 
conditions of socially and educationally backward classes within the territory of 
India and the difficulties under which they labor and to make recommendations 
as to the steps that should be taken by the Union or any State to remove such 
difficulties and to improve their condition and as to the grants that should be 
made for the purpose by the Union or any State…” . The first such commission 
headed by Kaka Kalelkar submitted its report on March 30 1955. This 
commission prepared a list of 2399 backward castes/communities for the whole 
country and classified 837 as the “most backward” (Boston & Nair-Reichert, 
2003). The commission recommended that the relevant factors crucial in 
classifying backward classes are their traditional occupation and profession, the 
percentage of literacy or the general advancement made by them, also the 
estimated population of the community and their distribution throughout the State 
or their concentration in certain areas. The central government of India did not 
accept these recommendations (ibid.). 
In 1963 the Supreme Court of India ruled that total reservation could not exceed 











officially decided to set up another commission in January 1 1979 (Stern, 2003). 
This commission was headed by a parliamentarian B.P. Mandal and came to be 
known as the Mandal commission. It was sanctioned under the same Article 340 
of the constitution. Its terms included determining the criteria for defining the 
socially and educationally backward classes, to recommend steps to be taken for 
the advancement of the socially and educationally backward classes of citizens 
so identified (ibid.). When it submitted its report on the 31st December 1980, it 
had recommended 49.5% of total reservations to the Scheduled Castes, Tribes 
and Other Backward communities (ibid.). The Commission used 11 “Indicators” 
or “Criteria” for determining social and educational backwardness and these were 
grouped under three broad heads, namely Social, Educational and Economical 
(Boston & Nair-Reichert, 2003).   
Since the Scheduled castes and tribes make up 22.5% of India’s population, the 
commission recommended that 22.5% of government jobs be reserved for them 
(Boston & Nair-Reichert, 2003). Due to the fact that the Supreme Court had put a 
limit of total reservations at 50%, the Commission recommended that 27% be 
reserved to the Other Backward Classes (OBCs), although their total numbers 
comprise 52% of the total population (ibid.). The 27% was applicable to all 
government services as well as the technical and professional education 
institutions. If any member of the OBCs obtains employment through open 
competitive application they would not to be included in the 27% adjustment 
(ibid.). The reservations were not to end at initial placements but were supposed 
to be utilised in promotion considerations with unfilled quotas being carried over 
for three years. This policy was also supposed to apply to all private sector 
institutions that receive government assistance, including universities and 
colleges. The commission also recommended the formation of a separate 
Ministry for Backward Classes and the reevaluation of the reservation scheme 
after 20 years. In 1990 Prime Minister V.P. Singh finally decided to implement the 












The government decision was challenged in what is considered to be a landmark 
case in India’s AA programme. In Indira Sawhney and Others vs. Union of India 
and Others the Supreme Court of India in 16 November 1992 (Stern, 2003), held 
that caste may still be used as a criterion for determining backwardness. In the 
case of non-Hindu OBCs not a single criteria was identified and but the 
government was permitted to use other criteria to identify backwardness. The 
court ruled that backwardness need not necessarily be defined socially and 
educationally, although it acknowledged that Article 16(4) of the Indian 
constitution referred mainly to social backwardness (Boston & Nair-Reichert, 
2003).  
Debates Surrounding AA in India 
The complaint in India has always been that the beneficiaries of the reservations 
are always well-off groups within each caste. These are usually skilled workers 
who in most cases would have been hired anyway, while the rural poor for whom 
higher education for most is beyond reach do not benefit at all (Borooah, 2007). 
To curb this problem the Supreme court in the above cited case directed the 
government to specify the basis for applying the relevant and requisite socio-
economic criteria to exclude socially advanced person/sections, dubbed the 
“creamy layer”, from other backward classes in order to ensure that reservation 
benefits flow to the needy among the OBCs (Stern, 2003). The court ordered that 
in order to achieve this, an “economic means test” has to be adopted by the 
government to ensure that the more advanced members of the OBCs did not 
benefit from the reservation schemes (Boston and Nair-Reichert, 2003).  
The debate around the AA in India does not end on the issue of the “creamy 
layer”, but as with many other countries where AA is applied the arguments for 
and against are; whether or not role models provided by AA are important, the 
relevance of “historical injustice” and its effects on efficiency among others 
(Kumar, 1992).  The “upper class” sentiments in the US are reflected in India 
(Boston & Nair-Reichert, 2003), where this group consistently complain that 











who came to prominent positions not by merit but by policy and hence they are 
likely to be incompetent to do their jobs successfully. There is also resentment 
and anger from the younger generations of the “upper class” who feel sidelined 
by their non-backward community status. The mostly cited criticism is that 
positive discrimination has not resulted in substantial upward mobility of the lower 
classes, especially in rural areas. The critics justify their claim on the grounds 
that social status quo is still maintained where the upper castes continue to retain 
their high position in the social hierarchy, and the OBCs remain low in the social 
order years after AA was initiated (ibid.).  Beteille (1993) argues that AA through 
the caste quotas makes them to be irreversible while they were meant to be 
transitional and a temporary measure.  Beteille (1993) goes on to say it is 
considered a cheap way of uplifting the majority of the population by successive 
Indian governments hence its continual renewal. A more meaningful approach 
would have required a re-structuring of the whole of Indian society, for instance 
removing disability and creating capabilities would have required a good 
elementary education, accessible and affordable to all (ibid.).  This would have 
been very expensive to the government and hence job reservation is seen as a 
cheap solution (ibid.).   
On the positive side AA has created group awareness and political mobilization 
among the Schedule Tribes and Castes (Adam, 2000). They now form a crucial 
constituency for any government in India and their concerns are taken seriously 
in the national agenda. It is in this sense that AA has played a positive role in 
enhancing political participation and feelings of political efficacy among the 
previously disenfranchised (ibid.).  Beteille (1993) states that AA has managed to 
change the perception that other sectors of the Indian community have of the 
untouchables and Scheduled Tribes, in that regard it should be regarded as 
successful (Beteille, 1993). There is general agreement on the positive role the 
economic growth has on the success of AA, with Adam (2000) lamenting the 
impact of slow economic growth in hampering the overall success of the 
programme because there were fewer funds to spend on education and other 











distribution front inadequate economic distribution, arguing that the growth could 
still have been adequate to cater for those needs. 
2.2.2.2 Affirmative Action in Malaysia ‐ Affirmative Action Based on 
Ethnicity 
AA in preference of the majority 
While AA policies vary substantially across many nations in respect of the 
beneficiary groups, the common factor in nearly all the countries is that the 
beneficiaries are groups which are economically and socially disadvantaged and 
politically subordinate (Guan, 2005). The Malaysian context is unique from the 
other cases discussed above in that the group benefiting from AA also has the 
political power to legislate it (Adam, 2000; Lim, 1985). There is also a striking 
similarity to the South African context because the policy benefits the majority, 
and also because the racial differences coincide with ethnic ones. The other 
important similarity to South Africa is that the minority Chinese still wield the 
economic power, whilst political power has passed to the Bumiputra, translated 
“sons/princes of the soil” – the indigenous people of Malaysia (Guan, 2005; 
Adam, 2000).  Another unique feature of Malaysia AA is that it is constitutionally 
sanctioned under Article 153, which exclusively warrants preferential treatment to 
Malays and other native groups, safeguarding their “special position” in modern 
Malaysian society (Guan, 2005).  
This “special position” had already been recognized by the British prior to 
independence in 1957. The British had started a form of preferential treatment by 
selecting Malays to be the elite administrative service in the government. In 1948 
an article of the Federation of Malaya Agreement reflected this, stipulating that 
the Malay Ruler should: 
 “….safeguard the special position of the Malays and to ensure the 
reservation for Malays of such proportion as he may deem reasonable of 











similar educational or training privileges…. And, ….of [business] permits 
and licenses.” (Guan, 2005) 
 
Malaysian Social Structure 
The concept of Malay special rights originated from the British colonial rule of the 
Federated Malay States in 1874. The underlying philosophy was that although 
Malaysia was now a British colony the myth that Malays were the rightful owners 
of the country could be maintained by giving them special status and protection 
(Lim, 1985). At the time there was a huge influx of foreigners from China and 
India, coming to work in the production of tin and sugar/rubber respectively, and 
these foreigners threatened to disrupt the Malay peasantry lifestyle (ibid.). It was 
in this context that the concept of “protection” was created, where the colonized 
Bumiputra could still be allowed to practice peasantry and fishing without any 
interference and hindrance (ibid.). This “protection” prevented them from 
engaging in modern economic activities and left them behind while economic 
growth advanced. Their ruling elites retained their symbolic sovereignty with 
handsome economic remuneration. This protection buttressed sentiments of 
“special position” status because the Bumiputra consider themselves the premier 
citizens of Malaysia- “sons of the soil” (ibid.).  
Independence in 1957 brought to power Malays who constituted a slim majority. 
The post independence government comprised of three distinct groups, the 
Malays who are Muslims (50%), the Chinese (39%) who are Buddhist and Hindu 
Indians and others (10%) (Manning, 2001; Puthucheary, 1993). The Chinese 
migrated to Malaysia in large numbers in the 19th century to work in tin mines, but 
quickly took advantage of the market economy created by the British and over 
time became an urbanized wealthy merchant class. The Indians came at around 
the same time as the Chinese, as laborers to work in rubber and sugar 
plantations. The peak of their migration was in 1910 during the rubber boom, and 
over the years they transformed themselves into government bureaucrats in the 











estates. The Malays were divided into aristocrats living in cities and a large 
uneducated proportion living in rural areas through subsistence farming 
(Manning, 2001; Puthucheary, 1993; Klitgaard & Katz, 1983). In time Malaysian 
society divided into the rich Chinese living in cities, Indian bureaucrats and 
laborers in the cities and plantations respectively and poor rural Malays. The 
Malays and the Chinese came to think of themselves as competing races, with 
continual resentment and stereotyping on both sides. Ethnic caricatures were 
long standing fueling the tension between the two: Malays were said to be lazy 
and un-enterprising, had a short time horizon, and had the attitude of tidak apa 
(“it cannot be helped”), whereas the Chinese were highly motivated toward 
education and business, the “Jews of Asia” (Klitgaard & Katz, 1983). These 
stereotypes were reinforced by the clear differences in behaviour, education and 
economic well-being. In these controversies the Indians were often left out. The 
Chinese had developed and gained control of most of Malaysian industry and 
commerce that wasn’t foreign owned. In brief it could be said that the Chinese 
had the wealth, whereas the Malays had the political power and control of the 
police and the army (Manning, 2001; Klitgaard & Katz, 1983) 
New Economic Policy (NEP) 
In the 1960s there was widespread public debate over Malay economic 
backwardness and the worrying segmentation of the economy along the ethnic 
lines (Shamsul, 1997). AA measures implemented at the time were largely 
ineffective and inadequate, leading to increasing impatience among the 
Bumiputra about the slow pace of the economic reform. This disgruntlement 
culminated in the ethnically charged riots of 1969 (Guan, 2005). It was 
unsurprising that the government White Paper on the 13th of May 1969 singled 
out Malay economic grievances as the one major cause of the riots. This gave 
birth to the New Economic Policy (NEP) implemented from 1971-90 (ibid.).  This 
policy sought to correct the mistakes of the ineffective policies of the past and 
comprised a comprehensive system of ethnic preferential policies, programmes 
and instruments that benefited the Malay community. At its heart the NEP 











of Malaysian economy and to restrict the scope of laissez-faire capitalism and 
allowing greater state intervention to advance the general Malay welfare 
(Shamsul, 1997).  
This policy could be likened to the South African National Party’s strategy of 
creating jobs for poor whites in the civil service after 1948 (Adam 2000). The 
major difference is that in South Africa the state extended patronage to its 
constituency, while in Malaysia the government could legitimize its policy through 
popular support and on the grounds that the targeted portion of the citizenry was 
in fact the poorest (ibid.). Puthucheary (1993) argues that it could still be 
supported from more formal grounds because when the constitution of Malaysia 
was drafted it was clear that the Malays did not form a distinct demographic 
majority, at about 50% they were the largest community but not the majority.  So 
it was entrenched in the constitution that the special rights for the economically 
disadvantaged was a democratic right and a social justice, and could not be 
changed by the whims and fancies of future governments.  Secondly, the case 
was not only based on socio-economic grounds but on the notion that the Malays 
had a ‘special position’ as the original people of the country – ‘sons of the soil’.  
Thirdly, the preferential policies established by the colonial regime which were 
meant to be temporary, had to be inserted in the Federation of Malaya 
constitution guaranteeing the continuation of these policies.  It was argued by 
many Malays that any attempt to remove these preferences would be tantamount 
to taking away something from this group. The special rights of the Malays were 
therefore crystallized and while the legitimate rights of the other communities 
were protected.  The colonial government before independence implemented 
these provisions in a way that while no one was completely satisfied, neither side 
felt completely deprived (Puthucheary 1993). 
NEP Success and the Creation of a Malay Middle Class 
The implementation of the NEP led to explosive growth in the civil service, with 
Malays recruited at a ratio of 4:1 to other groups, however this did not squeeze 











expansion in the civil service was due to the setting up of various new 
departments and agencies designed to move the Malays from the agricultural 
sector to the lucrative urban occupations, where their upward economic mobility 
could be enhanced (Puthucheary, 1993). A strong Malay middle class emerged 
as a direct result of the initiatives in the public and educational sectors over 
which the government had more control (Guan, 2005; Adam, 2000). The private 
sector for the most part resisted the AA programmes, however, the economic 
growth of non-Malays measured in terms of ownership slowed while the Malays 
increased their stake in the economic front, but with general economic growth of 
between 7-8 % both sides considered themselves winners (Adam, 2000). Adam 
(2000) suggests that such developments in South Africa would lead to the 
property owning black middle class. Please see Table 2:1 below on how the 
Malays society moved as a direct result of AA policy. 
 
Table 2:1: Incidence of Poverty in Malaysia (%) 
 
 1970 1990 1999 
Rural 58.7 21.8 10.0 
Urban 21.3 7.5 1.9 
Overall 52.4 16.5 5.5 
    
Bumiputra 65.9 20.8 10.2 
Chinese 27.5 5.7 2.6 
Indians 40.2 8.0 1.9 
    
Adapted from: Malaysian Plans, 1991, 1996, 2001 (Guan, 2005) 
 
As can be seen in the table above there has been a huge reduction of poverty in 
Malaysia since the NEP was implemented. Adam (2000) posits that this is a rare 
case of complete success in AA implementation, as the economic position of the 
Bumiputra was significantly shifted upwards.  This was what the architects of 
NEP had in mind as they sought to restructure the Malaysian society to correct 











identification of race with economic function (Klitgaard & Katz, 1983). This 
restructuring has also lead to ethnic integration; as prior to the NEP there was 
prevalent ethnic segregation along geographical location, residential 
neighborhood, economic activities and occupations and education institution. In 
the past for instance, the Chinese mainly resided in urban centers and worked in 
nonagricultural sectors while the majority of the Malays resided in rural areas and 
worked in the agricultural sector. Following the introduction of the NEP the push 
and pull factors led to an influx of Malay emigrants into all urban areas such that 
all urban centers in Malaysia are now ethnically heterogeneous (Guan, 2005).  
Puthucheary (1993) submits that this would not have been possible without the 
willingness and the cooperation of the non-target groups to give AA policies 
encapsulated in the NEP a chance to succeed. The government for its part 
introduced the programmes gradually to enhance acceptance, implementing five-
year reviews to assess progress and to institute necessary amendments (Guan, 
2005; Shari, 2000). The Chinese businesses were required to make structural 
adjustments to accommodate joint ventures with the Malay companies, and 
government involvement was warmly embraced by foreign firms as they saw the 
government as providing security and making them mutual beneficiaries of 
special concessions meted out to companies with Malay ownership (ibid.). In 
general terms the main aim of narrowing the inter-ethnic gap between Malays 
and the Chinese was achieved (ibid.). 
Criticisms of AA in Malaysia 
While the NEP fostered the growth of the Malay middle class it however led to a 
more class-differentiated Malay community (Guan, 2005; Shari, 2000)). However 
the Malay government has always been clear that it seeks to bridge the ethnic 
gap but not necessarily make all the Bumiputra rich; 
“The NEP … was not concerned with making all the bumiputeras earn 
equally, or share equally, the wealth distributed amongst them … The 











division of labor and rewards as was found in the non-bumiputera 
communities, particularly the Chinese. … The equitableness was not to be 
between individuals, but between communities.” (Roslan, 2001) 
The Gini ratios seem to confirm this point: within the Bumiputra it was 0.34 in 
1957, it rose to 0.46 in 1970 as income inequality increased. It fell slightly to 0.45 
in 1973, but rose again to 0.46 in 1984 (Manning, 2001). However, this 
development has led to a growing support to stop making ethnicity a determining 
factor for the beneficiaries but instead, to make income a criterion (Guan, 2005). 
It is this intra-ethnic inequality within the Malays that has led to a lot of criticism of 
the NEP, mostly because the benefits seem to be disproportionately channeled 
to the well-connected and the rich in the Malay community, who would do well 
even without the assistance of the NEP (Jomo, 1989; Guan, 2005). This 
discontent within the Malay community was accentuated after the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis, when the government channeled considerable financial resources 
to bail out prominent Malay businessmen, but was perceived to have done little 
to the poorer segments of the community especially among the small and 
medium businesses although they were severely hard done by (Guan, 2005).  
Even under normal circumstances the upper/middle class and the lower classes 
of Malays always clash because they vie for the same positions. For example the 
Malay chamber of Commerce representing smaller businesses accuses the 
government of favoring big business, while Malay workers’ organizations struggle 
against low wages set by their own ethnic entrepreneurs, as well as Chinese 
factory owners (Adam, 2000). The general discontent with the slanting of the 
NEP towards the more affluent Malays has been confirmed by studies 
undertaken by among others Tzannatos (1991), who showed that the more 
needy poorer sections of the community are sidelined.  
This is attributed to the fact that the NEP has not shifted from its initial goal of 
ethnic equality when it was first conceptualized (Guan, 2005). When the NEP 











in the society when the majority of Malays lived in poverty and the rural sector. 
Currently new problems, situations and challenges have arisen which the policy 
in its current ethnic emphasis cannot effectively address (ibid.). Hence the strong 
advocacy even among the Bumiputras for an emphasis on socio-economic rather 
than ethnic background (Tzannatos, 1991).  This, it is hoped (Guan, 2005), will 
dampen the ethnic polarity in the society that has led to the formation of ethnic 
enclaves in the business sector. The ethnicised state programmes and 
institutions to expand Malay representativity in employment, business, and 
education have carved Bumiputra enclaves in certain economic and education 
sectors (ibid.). Conversely, the Chinese and Indians when confronted with 
systematic discrimination have formed ethnic enclaves of their own, as survival 
strategies (ibid.). These sidelined groups accuse the programmes of preferential 
treatment of Malays in employment, business and education to have 
compromised the principles of meritocracy and equal opportunity (ibid.).  
Puthucheary (1993) argues that in fact efficiency does not seem to have been 
hampered by the NEP. Although the critics claim that the rise in international 
price of rubber and oil palm, combined with the discoveries of rich oil reserves in 
the 1970s helped to absorb some of the inefficiencies arising from the NEP. 
According to Puthucheary (1993) this would be hard to verify. However most 
critics of the ethnic preferential policy would not advocate doing away with it, but, 
rather, that it needs to be modified, this despite the fact that the programme was 
initially meant to run from 1971 to 1990 (Guan, 2005).  
2.2.3 Affirmative Action in South Africa 
Early Days of AA in South Africa  
AA has been practiced in earnest in modern South Africa since 1922 after the 
white miners strike, following which the “Civilized Labor Policy” was instituted to 
appease them which, according to Lester (1996), was inspired by the communist 
ideals. The strike action came after the Chamber of Mines in 1921 announced 
that because of the falling gold prices and rising costs the color bar for all semi-











black labor in jobs previously reserved for whites (ibid.).  The 1925 Wage Act 
then followed which instituted a salary hierarchy meant to favor white miners. 
This, in turn, was followed by Mines and Works Act of 1926, which inter alia 
reserved certain jobs for whites (Worden, 2007; Madi, 1993). Madi (1993) 
contends that there were job reservations in existence as far back as the 1890s, 
and as such the National Party government did not invent apartheid laws it 
simply perfected and institutionalized them. From the early 1950s through the 
1970s all the apartheid laws were meant to favor whites in general and the 
Afrikaners in particular. According to Madi (1993) the Afrikaners perfected the 
world’s most expensive, most extensive and most coercive AA - Apartheid. The 
empowerment of the whites by definition and application meant the subjugation 
the black people. 
Initial AA attempts for Blacks in South Africa 
AA, in the context of black advancement (Madi, 1993), started in the mid-to-late 
1970s.  In South Africa one of the most interesting phenomenon about AA is the 
continual changing of the names ascribed to it as it variously represented the 
socio-political psyche of the local business community or their understanding and 
/or reading of the political economy in South Africa (ibid.). In simple terms nobody 
wanted to offend the apartheid government so names were chosen carefully. 
After the Sharpeville Massacre of June 16th 1976, there were a lot of sanctions 
imposed on, and disinvestments from, South Africa. The term “black 
advancement” was used by those companies who chose to stay as a way of 
justifying their stay in South Africa, as they were under pressure to address the 
issue of black economic advancement with determination (ibid.). For the US 
companies the voluntary Sullivan Principles were introduced by the respected 
black minister, Reverend Leon Sullivan (Thomas et al, 1996) for companies to:  
 Introduce and implement fair and equal treatment of blacks in the 
workplace. By eradicating discriminatory practices that prevented their 











 Contribute towards social responsibility programmes particularly those 
projects targeted at black people and other non-whites (Madi, 1997). 
Since the 1970s black business was gradually permitted in the townships through 
the granting of licenses (Lipton, 1986).  However, Joint Ventures with these black 
entrepreneurs by whites were out of the question as in most cases such 
arrangements would be illegal. However it was beginning to be clear to most 
blacks that despite the excitement around the introduction of “Black 
Advancement” programmes there were no meaningful developments in the 
boardrooms or the business sector in general (Madi, 1997). The government of 
the day kept sending conflicting signals on its stance on the black economic 
advancement. When interviewed in 1986 Chris Heunis the Minister of 
Constitutional Affairs, whose department was responsible for this task eruditely 
responded that “the whole political concept of consociationalism is predicated on 
the existence of groups which should be entitled to a measure of segmental 
autonomy” (Financial Mail, 1986). The whole scheme was ultimately shelved 
(Madi, 1997) because the majority of whites demonstrated discomfort with the 
term “black” in “Black Advancement” as it had connotations of reverse racism.  
Another factor in its failure is that it was implemented immediately after the 1976 
Soweto riots, which were largely influenced by Steve Biko’s Black 
Consciousness Movement, and as such the “Black Advancement” scheme was 
seen as too political (Madi, 1997). The unrealized expectations of black 
management aspirants led to the formation of the Black Management Forum 
(BFM) which was advocating for the speedy progress of the black economic 
advancement (ibid.). A new term, “Equal Opportunity” coined by management 
gurus in the US and UK came into being soon after. This was a reflection of 
Ronald Reagan’s and Margaret Thatcher’s respective conservative governments’ 
views on minorities’ corporate advancement. This new approach was premised 
on the notion that fairness exists when all people are given equal opportunity to 











Madi (1997) relates that this novel conceptualization found a ready audience in 
South Africa in the 1980s. 
New Terminology in a Changing Political Climate 
The lifespan of “Equal Opportunity” was brief as the unexpected release of 
political prisoners and unbanning of political parties on 2 February 1990, 
heralded a new political climate (Madi, 1997). The bolder term of “Affirmative 
Action” resurfaced.  Madi (1997) postulates that if it had not been of the abrupt 
political change in February 1990, there was another term that was about to have 
come into vogue, but it received limited attention because of the transforming 
political environment. This was called “Managing Employee Diversity”, and it also 
had its origins in the US where it was propagated by an African American 
management consultant named Roosevelt Thomas Jnr. who touted it as an 
approach more pertinent to the 1990s compared to the others whose time had 
lapsed (ibid.). AA was slowly replaced by a new term “Black Economic 
Empowerment” (BEE) since 1994. Even this too ultimately had to add a new 
prefix “Broad-Based” to be seen to be accommodating to women, Indians, 
coloreds and the disabled (ibid.).  
The past approaches in South Africa when implementing AA have always been 
synonymous with the employment of quotas and targets, based upon proposed 
formulas (Thomas et al, 1996; BMF, 1993). This method according to Madi 
(1997) has involved the recruitment and advancement of blacks and women up 
the ranks of the organization, as well as their appointment as non-executive 
directors at board level. Thomas et al (1996) claims the danger has been that AA 
appointees end up being clustered at the top, where they are put in less critical 
positions where they are just given titles but are excluded from serious decision 
making, where value is added to the company.  Although this upward mobility of 
blacks in companies is encapsulated in the new view of AA, Madi (1997) argues 











2.3 JUSTIFICATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
In the context of South Africa the logical question to ask is; now that democracy 
is attained, is there a need for AA? Asking this question (Price Waterhouse, 
1996) assumes that freedom addresses all the imbalances in the system, 
whereas this is not so. The mere removal of obstacles to equality does not 
necessarily make people equal (Ramphele, 1995). Additional measures to attain 
equality of opportunity in the true sense of the word are both necessary in South 
Africa and recognized as legitimate in international human rights law (Ibid.). 
Apartheid legacy (Ramphele, 1995; Adam, 2000) has bequeathed South Africa 
with one of the highest levels of inequality in the world. This is reflected in the low 
levels of black participation in the economy (BEECom, 2001). Soon after the 
advent of democracy in South Africa, the richest 20% of South Africa population 
earned 63% of the country’s income while the poorest 20% earn 3% of the 
country’s income (Madi, 1997).  Thus the levels of inequality as measured by the 
Gini co-efficient of 0.61 is second only to Brazil’s 0.63.  The allocation of the 
country’s resources favored mostly white men who are a minority of a minority 
(Ramphele, 1995). Since this inequality was enforced through the use of the 
state and law, the level and correlation between race and social class is 
unsurpassed anywhere else in the world (Eide, 1992). The protracted system of 
race-biased accumulation of the country’s resources has led to an environment 
where wealth, income, education and power have all coincided with each other. 
The section of the society that has been at the top in power has had the best 
education, the most income, the most wealth and everything else (Beteille, 
1993). 
The justification of AA can be argued along the grounds that institutions need to 
compensate for their biases and exclusionary effects of their evaluative criteria 
and practices (Thomas et al, 1996). AA is particularly relevant where a person’s 
class, race or gender operates as a group status that impedes equality of 











otherwise had. Kennedy (1993) calls it a prophylactic measure, because of the 
under-enforcement of anti-discriminatory laws, as there are invisible 
discriminations that the legal system cannot detect or suitably deter.  Edwards 
(1995) posits that to correct the wrongs of the past it may once again be 
necessary to let race count, because trying to progress without the aid of AA 
(Carter, 1991) is tantamount to denying that black people have been retarded by 
racism. Equal treatment according to Edwards (1995) may not (probably will not) 
stop inequalities that are a direct result of past unequal treatment, and this call 
for the different treatment of different groups, in order to achieve greater inter-
group equality. To achieve equal opportunity for all members of society, special 
help will often be needed to those from a position of comparative disadvantage. 
Continuing with this reasoning Edwards (1995) claims that AA can be justified 
under two further conditions. Firstly, the minority groups – who in the South 
African context are also economic minorities – have the same kind of needs as 
the majority plus further, special needs. Secondly, the sum of ordinary and 
special needs put the minorities in a position of greater need than the needy in 
the majority, whose want would require allocation of resources.  An example of a 
formidable barrier submitted by Edwards (1995) is poor grasp of the English 
language by minorities. This might have little to do with the execution of the job 
but if it is put as a prerequisite for admission into a job, it will heavily prejudice 
minorities (ibid.). 
The dilemma of promoting AA and advocating for equity 
There is, however, a dilemma (Edwards, 1995) between promoting equality of 
opportunity in a society on the one hand and compensation on the other hand. If 
compensation for harm resulting from past (and present) discrimination is not 
acceptable as a reason for promoting AA, the question of what caused the 
disadvantage in the first place is still not addressed.  The relative disadvantage of 
minorities was occasioned by, among others, negative discrimination. The 
dilemma is whether to leave the costs and benefits of this negative discrimination 
unattended, or to adopt the quixotic ameliorations of need-based positive action 











question: “isn’t the basic demands of justice that harm be remedied and that 
rights overridden be recompensed, other than to ameliorate some of the 
disadvantage that is a consequence?” The results of continuing with 
discrimination are disillusionment among ethnic minorities and women, social 
and political unrest, the most critical one in the employment context, the misuse 
and/or waste of human resources (ibid.).  This view is reiterated by Wilkinson 
(2007) who claims that evidence from the United States shows that when left on 
their own, institutions in such areas as college admissions, hiring decisions and 
loan approvals always take choices that are perpetually discriminating against 
blacks. This in the end hurt not only the victims, but also the whole nation, as the 
riots of the 1960s demonstrated (ibid.). 
Continuing with that argument, Thomas et al (1996) postulate that without AA 
beneficiaries would be fewer if the preferences did not exist. This is based on 
empirical studies in the US, which have shown that African American candidates 
with identical credentials are treated more negatively than their white 
counterparts (ibid.). AA therefore includes a stress (Singh, 1996) on allowing 
individuals from disadvantaged groups to be given a head start and maximizing 
the opportunities now legally available to them. Subjective assessments (Thomas 
et al, 1996) of factors such as ‘fitting in’ ‘personality’ and ‘self-confidence’ always 
serve gender and race prejudices. Many women and blacks have relatively few 
experiences of being taught or trained by people like themselves, and are 
compelled to bear the tensions and complexities of working in environments 
where there are few people who share their experiences (ibid.). Personal 
interviews, job evaluations and recommendations all have an inescapable 
subjective element, which for the most part works for the better-off white men 
(ibid.).  
A well-structured AA policy will identify even those within the minority groups who 
are severely handicapped. For instance black women in South Africa are a very 
special case (Suzman, 1993). They have a triple disadvantage. First they are 











very important because tribal set-ups treats them as perpetual minors (ibid.). 
They have no contractual capacity; if their husband dies they have no share in 
the estate, all of it goes to the eldest son or if there is no son to the closest male 
relative (ibid.). In order to be fair to women they have to receive a special 
treatment to uplift their status in the new South Africa. Thus “treating people fairly 
does not mean treating them the same” (Thomas et al, 1996, p. 23) 
Group Inequalities and Justification of Affirmative Action 
There are reasons for under-representation and under-utilization of members of 
the affected groups in many important sectors of the economy (Edwards, 1995). 
The first is that people from the minority groups don’t have the equal opportunity 
to compete for and obtain the coveted positions and statuses (ibid.). This is a 
result of individual inequality of opportunity or group inequality of opportunity. The 
second reason might just be greater social and economic disadvantages people 
from those groups are subjected to. So the dominant reason for the minorities’ 
under-representation is lack of equal opportunity especially when there are 
discriminatory barriers (direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional) (ibid.). In 
simple terms group inequalities are a direct result of discrimination and 
disadvantage (ibid.). 
However, chiefly because of under-exposure among other reasons, people’s 
choices and preferences might result in systemic differences in the distribution of 
people in the different fields in the economy, even when complete equality of 
opportunity is achieved (Edwards, 1995). The motive behind AA is to address the 
under-representation or under-utilization of minorities in certain professions and 
statuses, and their over-representation among the unemployed. It further seeks 
to emancipate them from a compounded form of deprivation called “racial 
disadvantage” (ibid.). The idea of AA then, is to encourage institutions to develop 
realistic criteria for the job at hand and then to find a reasonably diverse mix of 
people qualified for it (Adam, 2000). The setting of numerical goals is necessary 











“couldn’t find anyone qualified” – then going back to hire the white male they 
wanted in the first place (ibid. p. 51). 
Adam (2000) contends that the two different conceptions of equality, one 
individual-based and the other group-based, complicates the whole debate 
especially when the notions of equality of result versus equality of opportunity are 
introduced into the discourse. But Thomas et al (1996) addresses this succinctly 
by saying AA policies accords the right to equal treatment of working class 
people, women, and blacks in a society setting where numerous social structures 
and institutional practices all conspire to deny their interests, equal consideration 
and respect. In this dispensation, the right to equal treatment of white men is not 
violated, as the policies are simply designed to counteract institutional practices 
that privilege their interests (ibid.). It is with the above philosophical 
underpinnings that the American leadership guidance provided insight and 
direction in the implementation of AA in South Africa, and the African pioneers’ 
experiences discussed below enlightened policy makers in South Africa of the 
policy’s proper administration. 
2.4 DIFFERENT TYPES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 
2.4.1 Affirmative Action in Other Parts of Africa 
The word “Affirmative Action” was never used in most parts of Africa (Singh, 
1996) wherein “Africanisation” and “indigenisation” remained the instruments 
through which these states hoped to redress inequalities created by colonialism. 
Although the examples of indigenisation can be found around Africa three 
examples of countries surrounding South Africa will be utilised: Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Namibia. According to Lungu (1980) africanisation meant “the 
process of replacing expatriate civil servants by nationals” it also meant the 
“training and development of this personnel. a change in the spirit of service in 
accordance with the policies of new governments” (Lungu, 1980: p.1). 
Africanisation was also justified on political, economic and security grounds (Adu, 











transfer of ownership, though the term is sometimes used in a broad sense to 
cover indigenization and even nationalisation. On the other hand indigenisation is 
a process deployed by governments to restrict participation to citizens in certain 
industries and usually force aliens to sell (ibid.). The target is usually small and 
medium enterprises that citizens of emerging nation states believe they can 
manage successfully (ibid.). 
Zambia –The Kragdadige (Forceful) Approach 
At independence in 1964, 97% of the highest Division Grade 1 positions in the 
government in Zambia were occupied by whites, a the result of a non-existent 
African training and development policy before independence (Lungu, 1980). 
Zambia then adopted a forceful approach and promulgated laws that all power 
should rightfully reside with black Zambians at all levels in the public and private 
sectors. The typical setup soon after independence would be a white technocrat 
who is overshadowed by a black learner, who took over after a short period of 
time (ibid.). This new policy led to the abrupt departure of many expatriates, with 
a resultant scenario where there were more vacancies than could be filled.  
Although the government had committed to the merit principle in 1964 the post of 
permanent secretary was excluded from the merit system and the president 
could make direct appointments along partisan lines (Mokgoro, 1996). The 
Constitutional Amendment Act of 1969 empowered the state president to declare 
any post political, and the trend was such that the entire senior ranks of the 
public service were placed outside the Public Service Commission in 1972 (ibid.). 
Lungu (1980) observes that the relationship between Africanisation and the merit 
principle has not always been a positive one. Although in India where the British 
merit legacy was retained at independence there has been ineffectiveness in 
dealing with issues of national development. In China, where the civil service is 
highly politicised, developmental effectiveness is amongst the best in the 











On the economic front the government resorted to indigenisation of the control of 
the economy. The Zambian economy has always heavily depended on copper 
mining, which was developed as a foreign controlled enclave. It was for this 
reason that it was a target of unionisation, Zambianisation and nationalisation 
(Daniel, 1979). This was a direct response to the reluctance of the British to 
completely relinquish powers on key areas critical for any emerging nation state, 
as seen in the following utterance in the British House of Commons: “Don’t forget 
that the form of political power and the content of real power are different things. 
We are after the latter…  The vital thing is that security, mines, and foreign 
relations and the judiciary should remain under our real control whatever nominal 
power and position is given to the Africans” (House of Commons, 1961: 13). 
Thus the government focused on Zambianisation and mine expansion, by 
compelling the mining companies to convert existing European expatriate 
contracts to a three-year limit. On the other hand Africans were promoted to 
middle level posts by training the locals and fragmenting existing jobs, and thus 
creating a new labor aristocracy. The grand plan in all these was to, (1) eliminate 
the European miners’ monopoly while securing an adequate supply of skilled 
labor; (2) expanding the mines’ output while “Zambianizing” the labor force, 
without undue wage increases; and (3) mobilizing the mine workers to support 
national development (Daniel, 1980).  
The Zambian economy during the time of independence was typical of most 
African colonies: Europeans and/or Americans at the top holding the large 
industries, Asians in the middle doing much of wholesale and retailing and the 
bottom rung occupied by Africans in farming, market petty trading and 
rudimentary services. Nationalisation of the sole extractive copper industry was 
comprehensive as the government assumed 51%, this was extended to other 
industries like the urban transit industry, banks, newspapers, insurance and 
hotels (Rood, 1976). Indigenisation was initially achieved by revoking all licenses 
in retail trade, lorries, buses and taxi industries without 75% Zambian ownership 
(Rood, 1976; Beveridge, 1974). There was very limited success in these policies, 











were applied on the basis of citizenship and not on race and this opened a lot of 
loopholes as there were a large number of non-Africans in Zambia who had 
acquired citizenship (Beveridge, 1974). However Madi (1997) claims corruption 
was the main source of the failure of Zambian empowerment initiative. In contrast 
Zimbabwe sought empowerment through a soft approach that that was 
predicated on sentimentalism.  
Zimbabwe –The Good Vision/Feel-Good Approach 
Madi (1997) postulates that this has been the approach of many nations seeking 
to uplift backward sections of their populace from past articulated discriminations, 
and most of the time they have been met with grave disappointments. In this 
approach as was the case in Zimbabwe, the “haves” are appealed to, to show 
patriotic fervor by not discriminating against their fellow citizens and it is hoped 
that by so doing they will help the “have-nots”. The disappointment with this 
approach has led to the belated cry of indigenisation of the economy. In 
Zimbabwe soon after independence in 1980 the legal status of racial distinctions 
(Muzondidya, 2005) and their institutional supports were erased. In the economic 
sphere, justice and reconciliation was sought through black economic 
empowerment, the Africanisation of the public service and the active 
development of the black middle class (ibid.).  
The government initiated a massive lateral entrance (Mokgoro, 1996) at all levels 
of the civil service such that an almost white civil service at independence in 
1980 had 95% of senior positions occupied by blacks by 1984. This 
inexperienced and mostly corrupt workforce did not provide the effective delivery 
of service to the electorate, even though the civil service had expanded by 185% 
between 1981 and 1990. Although people who had moved to positions of 
influence were politically agreeable, lack of cooperation from the private sector, 
lack of expertise and corruption prevented the reduction of racial inequalities in 
the country (ibid.). After the three-year drive to Africanize the civil service that 
was sanctioned by the 1980 Presidential Directive (Chikuhwa, 2004), there was 











number of years and the mere presence of these black managers and workers 
did not amount to empowerment of the general populace. The white minority in 
Zimbabwe, for their part, did not reciprocate reconciliatory overtures 
(Muzondidya, 2005) made by blacks, and thus the hoped for political 
reconciliation proved illusive. In the meantime the absence of concerted pressure 
from the government and the general populace for economic reform, the 
privileged whites with massive capital investments did little to contribute to the 
redressing of the racial economic inequalities in the Country (Banana, 1996).  It 
was this laissez-faire attitude towards reform that perpetuated the prejudices and 
destructive social relations that existed before independence (Huyse, 2003). This 
“culture of contentment” by whites according to Huyse (2003) led to dire 
economic and social inequality, most visible in the skewed distribution of land 
and prosperity in white suburbs in cities like Harare. 
However from 1992 black business lobbies such as the ‘Indigenous Business 
Development Council’ (IBDC) were started, comprised of people who had worked 
in the private and public corporate sectors and had left to start their own business 
(Chikuhwa, 2004). They used their business insight and political connections to 
pressure the government to create an enabling environment for black business 
people to enter the mainstream of the economy in order to break the monopoly of 
the white minority (ibid.). The government, under pressure to be seen to be doing 
something to redress economic imbalance, resorted to violence particularly on 
the issue of land as the bulk of productive farmland remained in white hands. The 
patterns of coercion characterized by the ruling party militia land grabs and white 
owner evictions, and authoritarianism have intensified to the point of a crisis 
(Raftopoulos & Savage, 2004). The critical land issue was not a concerted 
government effort to attain real empowerment but was used for political gain in 
the 2000 and 2002 elections (Africa Research Bulletin, 2008).  
This, and other blunders catapulted by the 1997 government’s ‘100% 
empowerment drive’ has led to a self-inflicted economic decline (Financial Times, 











of urgent international rescue. The government has also passed the country’s 
indigenisation legislation in March 2008 on the eve of general elections that were 
scheduled for 29th March 2008. The law provides that foreign owned companies 
and those owned by people not disadvantaged during colonial times (whites and 
Asians) to sell 51% of their shares to indigenous (black) Zimbabweans. The 
government has however stated that not all foreign-owned companies will be 
forced to sell 51% of their shares, rather the minister will prescribe on the basis 
of capital and employment levels (ibid.). Thus Zimbabwean AA program seems 
to be disjointed, intermittent and characterized by periodic political 
appeasements rather than a well thought-through policy with clearly defined long-
term goals and objectives. 
Namibia 
Namibia attained independence from South Africa in March 1990, as a result of a 
negotiated decolonisation settlement. The controlled change perpetuated existing 
socio-economic inequalities (Melber, 2006) in that the country’s constitution 
endorsed the status quo in terms of its protection of property rights and 
guaranteeing all civil servants their jobs. This made it hard for the new 
government to drastically change the civil service like in other countries, such 
that black workers were only introduced when the white incumbents retired, were 
transferred or resigned (Jauch, 1998). As the new appointees could not have 
gained experience anywhere else since they were not allowed to work in the 
colonial civil service under apartheid, the Public Service Commission dropped 
the experience requirements in jobs but retained the qualification standards 
(Melber, 2006). Within six years of independence 70% of the management posts 
in the civil service were held by people from disadvantaged groups (ibid.). 
Beyond that, little has changed since independence although the Namibian 
constitution allows for the redressing of the imbalances (Melber, 2006; Jauch, 
1998). The Gini coefficient of 0.701 in the mid-1990s made Namibia the country 
with the highest unequal distribution of wealth anywhere in the world (UNDP, 
1997). The deep internal economic divides run along both regional-ethnic as well 











the legacy of a migrant labor system throughout the 20th century promoted rural-
urban divide and led to the marginalisation of whole areas with dire lasting effects 
which still exist today (Frayene, 2005; Tvedten, 2004). 
Nevertheless AA in Namibia has made great strides in education and women’s 
empowerment.  Soon after independence the government guaranteed free and 
compulsory primary education and up to ‘28% of the annual budget was 
allocated to education, however 80% of that was spent on salaries hampering the 
acquiring of vital resources’ (Namibia Ministry of Education and Culture, 1993: p. 
35-37) The local government elections’ gender quota in 1992 increased women 
representativity to 30% of all the representatives at the local level, far higher than 
other tiers of government where few women are represented (Jauch, 1998). On 
the business front AA and BEE have resulted in a slight diversification of the 
class structure, with new office bearers and other former freedom fighters as the 
chief beneficiaries (Melber, 2006).  
A similar translation of AA into further privileging the new elite (Melber, 2005) can 
be witnessing in an ongoing and very limited redistribution policy of land reform. 
The former blatantly racist power structures and property relations have gradually 
been replaced by a color-blind class creation agenda (Melber, 2006), favoring 
what Adam et al (1997) calls in South Africa “comrades in business”. These 
“liberators” have used their political and public service offices secured at and 
since independence to profitably cash on the country’s resources through blatant 
corruption (Melber, 2006). A trace of corruption cases since independence shows 
that Namibia, although a small economy, has extensive corruption, mostly 
involving government agencies entrusted with huge national resources but 
furnished with the weakest controls (Maletsky, 2005). The Namibian constitution 
protection of property rights has been used to perpetuate pre-independence 
economic disparities, with the civil service as the only realistic arena where the 
majority government can exercise its power in speeding change. A corrupt 











themselves in the private sector, and this has led to the stagnation of the policy 
beyond the initial civil service gains. 
2.4.2 Affirmative Action Implementation in South Africa 
AA in South Africa has gone through some transformation as prior to 1994 it was 
practiced under a poignantly racist regime and its ambitions were limited to what 
the state would consider tolerable. This has resulted in the transition of the view 
of the ultimate goals of AA in the new non-racial dispensation that came after 
1994.  
Old view – Minimalist  
The traditional view of AA in South Africa since the 1970s has been to 
concentrated on the promotion of recruitment and advancement of blacks and 
women up the ranks of companies, as well as their appointment to key posts, 
usually as non-executive directors on company boards (Madi, 1997). Even after 
1994 this was the dominant view but Iheduru (2004) posits that there has been a 
gradual shift to a new phase over the first ten years of democracy. The first 
phase labeled “minimalist” by Edigheji (1999) only concerned itself with altering 
the racial composition of privileges and exploitations. It was therefore viewed by 
some as a black class-creation project  (Freund & Padayachee, 1998) The 
dominant characteristic of the purely compliant early BEE deals after 1994 was 
acquisitions rather than wealth creation (Hauki, 2001). The strong emphasis on 
equity transactions limited empowerment to a small group of blacks that was 
already economically well off (ibid.). Iheduru (2004) argues that this voluntary first 
phase failed to produce a sustainable increase in ownership and control of 
business by blacks. 
New View – Maximalist  
The new view still accommodates the characteristics of the old view but seek to 
encompass the following: the ownership level, the corporate advancement, the 
SMMEs (Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises) and the out sourcing level (Madi, 











(BEE) but after a widespread criticism Broad Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) was instituted, which seeks to broaden empowerment 
across the private economy by using policies such as ‘preferential procurement’ 
(Butler, 2005). BBBEE definition proffered by the Black Economic Empowerment 
Commission (BEECom) is as follows: 
‘Black Economic Empowerment should be viewed within the broad scope 
of empowerment processes including job creation, rural development, 
urban renewal, poverty alleviation, specific measures to empower black 
women, skills and management development, education, meaningful 
ownership, and access to finance for households for the purpose of 
conducting business’ (BEECom, 2001). 
According to Butler (2005) BBBEE came about as a result of the pressure to 
make empowerment less dependent on the goodwill of the previously 
advantaged, but rather to make it spearheaded by government proactivity in 
making it more ‘broad-based’.  Edijheri (1999) posits that this phase is 
‘maximalist’, seeking to attain a comprehensive restructuring of institutions and 
society rather than simply the replacement of white individuals with black ones in 
executive positions (Edijheri, 1999). It promotes a developmental approach 
through the fostering of SMMEs that are seen as playing a pivotal role in the 
economy (Radebe, 2006). It is also accompanied by a shift from passive 
investment companies, towards full-time involvement at the operational level 
particularly at the grass-roots level where it is believed job creation, skills transfer 
and value adding could be actuated by small, entrepreneurial companies (Hauki, 
2001). This is pertinent because SMMEs absorb almost half the people formally 
employed in the private sector and contribute about 37% to the country’s GDP 
(Southafrica, 2005). It is in this context that the government has decided to 
explore intensely Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) as an alternative to 
traditional procurement in a quest to leverage empowerment, especially in the 
provision of infrastructure (CIDB, 2004), as the government views PPPs as 











Treasury, 2004). Theoretically speaking it is difficult to separate the terms BEE 
and BBBEE as the latter is only used to show the scope and the extent of the 
policy reach and does not represent a fundamental shift in its intention, so for the 
rest of this discussion BEE will still be used but in its more encompassing 
meaning. 
2.5 INTENSIONS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (BEE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA) 
2.5.1 Beneficiaries of AA 
(a) Creating a Black Middle Class  
The notable success of AA in the United States has been the enlargement of the 
black middle class (Kennedy, 1993; Larson, 1999). Although the bottom one third 
has not benefitted, police, fire-fighters, carpenters and other skilled crafts have 
been assisted by it in their advancement (ibid.). Some of the businesses that 
were created compete independently. The African American Policy Forum 
(AAPF) (2008) argues that although a lot of criticism on AA is that it benefits the 
middle class, the very middle class was created by the AA policy itself. By 
opening the educational doors for an entire generation of poor and working class 
Blacks; people who had been locked out because of color benefited irrespective 
of the their class (ibid.). This argument is extended by (Nanda, 2006) who posits 
that it is the best way to provide upward social mobility to historically oppressed 
population groups. 
In South Africa the economic empowerment of black South Africans and the 
creation of a robust black middle class is, according to Macdonald (2005), 
intended to stabilize the South African society by bridging the wealth gap. Great 
strides have been achieved in this regard. According to the Human Sciences 
Research Council HSRC ( 2008) in 1994 29% of the middle classes were black 
and in 2000 the proportion had increased to 50%. This growth far exceeds 
overall growth of the middle classes from 8.8% of the population (approx. 2.5 











Macdonald (2005) identifies three waves of direct BEE beneficiaries; the initial 
one being the black elite which is comprised of the politically well-connected 
individuals and dynamic individuals who took full advantage of the new economic 
opportunities that were presented post-1994. The second was the emergence of 
the black professionals the ‘buppies’ (black up-and-coming professional persons) 
of the 1990s, which has now been followed by the third wave, which is by far the 
largest and is comprised of the ‘bappies’ (booming, aspirational and previously 
poor) who are taking advantage of the booming economy and moving up the 
social ladder (ibid.).  
UCT Unilever Institute ( 2007) reported that the black middle class grew by 30% 
in just over a year between 2005 and 2006. The black middle class has also 
expanded annual spending power from R130 billion at the end of 2005 to R180 
billion at the beginning of 2007. Although the black middle class was only 12% of 
the South African black population at the beginning of 2007 they accounted for 
over half (54%) of all black buying power; this compares favorably with 10% 
accounting for 43% of black buying power just 15 months earlier (ibid.). 
Macdonald (2005) attributes this growth to an increase in the number of black 
employees in the white-collar public sector jobs and a marked increase in the 
number of black people employed in the private sector and an increase in the 
black business enterprises. The above successes in the creation of a sizable 
black middle class came at the back of BEE race identity-based redistribution 
(Nanda 2006), which appears to have overlooked a concomitant aggravation of 
black underclass squalor. The frustration in this class were manifest in the 
xenophobic attacks in May 2008 sending a ‘dire warning’ that the ever increasing 
number of immigrants from the rest of the continent are putting pressure on the 
poor as they compete for scarce jobs and public services (Financial Times, 
2008a). 
(b) Creating and Offering Jobs to the poor 
The unemployed in South Africa are also mostly uneducated and unskilled; their 











majority of the black people who have yet to enjoy the benefits of the liberation 
from apartheid.  South Africa under apartheid dispossessed black people and 
limited their ability to accumulate assets, such that in the immediate post-
apartheid era, the economic scenario in the country was such that the poor were 
disproportionately found among households that shared similar endowments and 
were facing similar constraints to the use of those endowments (Carter & May, 
2001). The policies of segregation and discrimination left a lingering legacy of 
inequality in education and skills, and in the final years of apartheid, low 
economic growth (Woolard, 2002). Low skills always translate into 
unemployment and poverty which are currently major problems facing the 
country (Haddad & Adato, 2002). This is seriously hampering the attainment of 
‘better life for all’ aspirations, which according to Mbeki (2008) is only achievable 
when a country is able to harness the energies of its people and put them to 
productive use. Mantashe (2008) claims that since 1994 substantial progress in 
transforming the economy to benefit the majority has been made, although the 
combined challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequality remains. 
Challenges to job creation 
Loots (1998) laments that five years after the advent of democracy that economic 
growth, which is generally regarded as the creator of employment, had not been 
able to create sufficient employment opportunities for the ever-growing South 
African labor force. This scenario exists despite the pervasive notion that a high-
quality economic growth ensures the expansion of income-generating 
employment opportunities (ibid.). Ten years later any prospects of massive job-
creation has been dented by the recent global economic crisis which will affect 
economic growth and pose challenges for job creation and other goals 
(Mantashe, 2008). According to Mahadia (2003) the problem started once the 
country’s global economic integration was initiated; South African firms had to 
rationalize and re-engineer their activities to be internationally competitive and 
improve productivity and this adversely affected the low-skilled workers who 
could not be so easily absorbed in the labor market. The situation was so critical 











(Cant & Erdis, 2005 ). The problems in creating jobs are also leveled at the 
macro economic policies adopted by the government since 1994. 
South Africa, like all transitional societies, experienced the emergence of a new 
ruling elite ushered in by the nascent democracy (Habib & Padayachee, 2000), 
and this had a huge bearing in the economic policy arena. Habib and 
Padayachee (2000) argue that the ANC has been experiencing what the former 
Soviet Union societies and Eastern European states went through where new 
policy-makers initially enthusiastically embraced market oriented ‘shock therapy’ 
reform packages; policies met in those countries with despondency and 
trepidation due to unexpected transitional social and economic costs, and slow 
improvements in living standards. In some countries elsewhere in the world 
undergoing similar changes the policies were actually imposed by powerful 
international institutions (e.g. World Bank, IMF), potential foreign investors and 
local capital (ibid.). Most of the time the newly ascendant elites discarded 
previously held developmental approaches still supported by their grassroots 
constituencies in order to implement the globally dominant neoliberal agenda of 
the Washington Consensus (ibid.). This economic policy direction in both the 
Eastern Europe and other developing countries elsewhere, weakened the 
prospects of consolidated democracies in different ways (ibid.).  
Aliber (2003) identifies the economic policy shift of the ANC as following this 
pattern, as on the eve of the first democratic elections the ANC planned to 
transform the country using the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) policy. The central theme of the RDP policy framework was the 
overarching need to reduce the poverty afflicting a large share of the country’s 40 
million people, thereby redressing the inequalities and injustices of the past 
(ANC, 1994). According to Aliber (2003) the RDP was largely impressionistic 
because apart from massive infrastructure investment the RDP document gave 
little indication of its broader strategy. In November of 1994 the RDP white paper 
was publicized the content of which was not dissimilar to the original policy 











conservative bent (Bond, 2000). In 1996 amidst criticism about its meaning as 
the economic policy document the office of the RDP was closed and its staff 
transferred to other departments (Aliber, 2003). Later that year a new economic 
framework called Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) was 
introduced by the Department of Finance (ibid.).  
While not incompatible with the goals of the RDP, GEAR is a neoclassical 
macroeconomic recipe for economic growth that eclipsed the RDP as the central 
economic program of the government (Bond, 2000).  Because of its emphasis on 
fiscal restraint, the expressed commitment to controlling inflation and interest 
rates, as well as the promise of relaxed foreign exchange controls, GEAR was 
applauded and embraced by business leaders (ibid.).  However critics labeled 
GEAR a neoliberal sell-out by the ANC (Bond, 2000), as well as an inappropriate 
tool for solving the South African pressing economic challenges, principally 
unemployment and poverty (Adelzadeh et al, 1998). RDP continued to be 
associated with an assortment of government activities targeted at poverty 
reduction, but according to Aliber (2003) the charge leveled from both outside 
and inside the government was that the RDP was dead. 
The GEAR economic policy is premised on three basic pillars: fiscal discipline, 
exports and labor market flexibility (Mahadia, 2003). Unfortunately on the labor 
front, new laws that have since been promulgated have imposed rigidities on the 
labor market, fueling suspicions (ibid.) that overburdened employers have opted 
for capital-intensive methods of production, thus aggravating unemployment 
even further. Flexibility in the labor market, which encapsulates changing the 
production function, is pivotal in maintaining a firm’s competitiveness (ibid.) as it 
responds to changes in demand, technology and legislation.  (Barker, 1999) 
argues that in the classical economic model, flexibility in the labor market is 
fundamental in the fight against unemployment.  According to Lewis (2002) in 
economies where wages are rigid, demand, technological and legislative shocks 
are manifested by high levels of unemployment since employers are unable to 











response is to hire less labor. Such economic realities have played themselves 
out since 1994 and the government has responded with a series of tactics to 
improve its overall strategy.  
Strategies to Combat Joblessness – way forward 
To combat these problems the government has intensified the National Public 
Works Programme (NPWP) established in 1994, whose main purpose was to 
reduce unemployment through the creation of productive jobs by the building, 
rehabilitation and maintenance of physical assets (Haddad & Adato, 2002).  
According to Mahadea (2003) public works programmes (PWPs) of short 
duration can have an immediate impact on job creation, and these can have 
various multiplier effects in generating indirect employment in other sectors, more 
so as the South African government is increasingly spending more on 
infrastructure programmes. However, a major drawback about PWPs is that they 
are not sustainable in the long run (ibid.) simply because they do not generate 
adequate returns as in the case of private-driven, market-oriented programmes. 
Since they are financed by the government this translates into the draining of the 
fiscus, a reduction of spending on other pressing needs or a rise in taxation with 
crowding-out, debt servicing and other attendant disincentive effects (ibid.) all of 
which may ultimately impact adversely on job creation and economic growth. 
The second strategy has been the promotion of SMME entrepreneurship. 
According to Rogerson (2004) the increasing focus on the promotion of SMMEs 
is to achieve economic growth through competitiveness on the one hand and 
employment generation and income redistribution on the other.  The importance 
of SMMEs as a critical sector in employment and income generation (Cant & 
Erdis, 2005) is increasingly being recognized the world over. In South Africa this 
is even more pertinent because the more than a million jobs the non-agricultural 
formal sectors shed between 1990 and 2000 has contributed to the continued 
high unemployment rate (ibid.). The SMME sector is widely regarded as the 
driving force in economic growth and job creation in both developed and 











of this sector and in achieving the country’s national objectives and is committed 
to its growth (ibid.). Mahadea (2003) argues that the long-term solution to the 
South African unemployment and growth problem lies in the consolidation of 
existing entrepreneurship and in the stimulation of a new entrepreneurial class 
involved in SMMEs including the informal sector. The vigorous exercise of 
entrepreneurship which is underpinned by millions of viable enterprises can 
create millions of jobs (ibid.). Schlemmer and Levits (1998, p 80-81) argue that 
the ‘optimal route’ to employment is through the critical mass of the informal 
sector and small businesses with active public-private support. 
2.5.2 Importance of Affirmative Action to South Africa 
AA in the South African context has a unique urgency because the intended 
beneficiaries are the numerical majority (Adam, 2000; Madi, 1993). 
Commentators have always argued that if this is not implemented with the 
necessary urgency the potential danger of political turmoil will be accentuated 
(Ramphele, 1995; Madi, 1993). The widespread xenophobic attacks on 
foreigners in May 2008 were largely blamed on the neglect of the poorest of the 
poor; and the frustration they experienced seeing other fellow blacks becoming 
extremely rich at their expense (Lehulere, 2008). Black people generally feel that 
their poverty was generated politically and as such it should be redressed 
through political means (Adam, 2000; Ramphele, 1995; Madi, 1993). Moshapelo 
(2001) summarizes these views he states “first the rationale for black 
empowerment is premised by the fact that we have only achieved half of the 
liberation struggle, political liberation minus economic liberation. This is a recipe 
for a disaster of volcanic proportions” (Moshapelo, 2001). 
As with Malaysia, in the South African context the BEE policy is not simply a 
moral initiative correcting the imbalances of the past but it is rather a pragmatic 
growth strategy that is aimed at realizing the country’s full economic potential 
(SouthAfrica.info, 2008). The apartheid policy of excluding blacks from 











economy; a distortion that led to zero GDP growth in the 1970s and an average 
3.4% growth in the 1980s (ibid.). BEE is therefore being implemented to meet the 
needs of all economic citizens (people and their enterprises) in a sustainable 
manner (DTI, 2003). According to DTI (2003) there cannot be any meaningful 
growth in the economy if any part of the populace is excluded; as such the BEE 
strategy is associated with growth, development and enterprise development and 
not merely distribution of existing wealth. The strategy as the names suggests, is 
broad-based and it aims at situating black empowerment within the context of a 
broader national empowerment strategy focusing specifically on historically 
disadvantaged majority including the youth, women, the disabled and rural 
communities (ibid.) 
2.5.3 Removal of Barriers and the Merit Principle 
Removal of Barriers 
AA seeks to adjust the entry and promotion requirements to remove bias against 
particular cultures and value systems, which have in fact no bearing on 
vocational performance (Price Waterhouse, 1996). This could be unconsciously 
executed as recruitment committees and established businesses have affinity to 
individuals with similar outlook (Adam, 2000). Thomas et al (1996) argues that 
AA is justified because these biases have to be compensated for. Carter (1991) 
posits that even when applying AA the merit principle should be maintained by 
searching the best among the best and “not the best among the blacks”. In South 
Africa the barriers are removed through the Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act (2003), Employment Equity Act (1998) and Preferential 
Procurement Act (2000).  
The Merit Principle 
According to Price Waterhouse (1996) there has to be a redefinition of merit, to 
go beyond the immediate ability to do the job but the potential to do the job in the 
future, given the appropriate training and motivation of the candidate. Adam 











the educational injustices of apartheid will make the country less competitive. 
Carter (1991) observes that there is a trend to recognize soft-skills like 
motivation, initiative, and tenacity or drive as equally qualifying competencies for 
black managers. Carter (1991) goes on to assert that with the right motivation 
many of the hard skills can be learned at work. Less qualified people could still 
do the job without using strict academic qualifications which are, according to 
Carter (1991), are a white male invention intended to maintain a Eurocentric 
hegemony. Thomas et al (1996) muses that since a lot of black managers were 
denied decent university degrees or business experience the focus should be on 
their future personal contribution not their historical work experience. Edwards 
(1995) posits that the merit principle is not as pristine as is often thought, and 
that is why there should be a scope for preference policies and AA. If previously 
disadvantaged people are not treated as “exceptional” and the liberal view of 
merit is upheld, Adam (2000) opines that there will always be a tendency to 
legitimize all the decisions not based on AA as meritocratic.  Determinations of 
merit are often very subjective (ibid.), since most employers naturally hire people 
they can best relate to, who are often of similar backgrounds, and such decisions 
cannot be said to be based on pure objective meritocracy. 
Carter (1991) argues that as much as it is possible to turn away highly qualified 
whites in preference of less qualified blacks – with the resulting harm; it is also 
possible by the same preferences to select the highly qualified blacks from a pool 
of all excellent candidates. Anybody given the mandate to select can claim to be 
doing the latter while they are in fact doing the former, but the latter is not 
impossible to do either (ibid.).  Despite the misgivings about the appointment, if 
the employer is genuinely seeking to pursue the second option, the lack of 
qualifications should not contribute to the misgivings (ibid.). However, Carter 
(1991) concludes by postulating that human analysis is not adequately sensitive 
to detect the difference between the two options. 
Edwards (1995) postulation on this is no different but emanates from an 











override the requirements of “justice” either in the merit principle or the needs 
principle could be called preferential treatment. These practices could include the 
hiring or promoting of less qualified minorities over a better qualified majority – in 
South African context the economic majority - or it could involve the allocating of 
resources of state to minorities in a volume that is not equitable to the ones 
allocated to the less needy majority (ibid.).  According to Edwards (1995, p.21)  
“merit” is a serious contender as a material principle of justice, to override “merit” 
may well be unfair, but it is doubtful that it can be labeled unjust.  AA procedures 
do not override the demands of justice or fairness in respect of either merit or 
needs principles, what they do instead is to identify beneficiary groups by –it has 
to be admitted—morally arbitrary criteria such as race, and thereafter at least in 
theory everything else lies within the ambit of justice and fairness (ibid.).  
However in practice the two often overlap as it has been shown above. 
2.6 IMPLEMENTATION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
2.6.1 AA Implementation 
Ramphele (1995) points out that AA is not necessarily a panacea for all the past 
wrongs in South Africa, rather a creative economic management by leaders is 
crucial in leading the country to a better future. AA’s pivotal role is to create an 
affirming environment but success still resides in the personal drive and hard 
work of AA beneficiaries.  According to Adam (2000), South Africa, as a 
latecomer to AA, has a good chance of avoiding the mistakes made elsewhere, 
although its unique situation makes the uncritical emulation of successes 
impractical. The government has elected to use as its major tool preferential 
procurement in all sectors wherever possible in a quest to bridge the economic 
racial divide. 
2.6.2 Preferential Procurement Policy 
Preferential Procurement, sometimes referred to as Affirmative Procurement or 











designed to reform public sector procurement in South Africa (SEDA, 2005). It is 
a strategy devised to enhance the participation of the Historically Disadvantage 
Individuals (HDIs) and the Small, Micro and Medium Enterprises (SMMEs) in the 
public sector by creating a favorable environment for them (DTI, 2001).  While 
the BEE drive is central to the government policy planning (DTI, 2005), 
Preferential Procurement is a pivotal strategic tool within a broad BEE 
government policy (SEDA, 2005).  Manuel (1997) stipulates that the government 
took the opportunity of its status as the largest buyer of construction services in 
the country to ensure that its procurement policy supports its overall economic 
objectives.  
2.6.3 Objectives and Goals of Preferential Procurement  
The socio-economic objectives that the South African government is aiming at 
include access to tendering information and the simplification of tender 
documents, breakout procurement, awarding of tenders in terms of a 
development objective mechanism, affirmative SMME participation, promoting 
employment-intensive practices, and affirming marginalized sectors of society in 
construction projects (Polity, 2005). In building on these objectives the main aim 
of implementing Preferential Procurement and making it fundamental to all 
procurement activities is to:  
a) Advance the development and sustainability of SMMEs and Historically 
Disadvantaged Institutions (HDIs);  (Shilowa, 2006; National Treasury, 
2005; DTI, 2001); 
b) Promote women and the physically handicapped people (National 
Treasury, 2005; (South Africa, 1995)Promote local enterprises in specific 
provinces, in a particular region, in a specific local authority, or in rural 
areas (Treasury, 2005, DTI, 2001); 












d) Redress skewed employment and ownership patterns through black 
economic empowerment (CIDB, 2004); 
e) Create new jobs; Creation of Opportunities for job creation and poverty 
alleviation (Community participation) (Treasury, 2005; CIDB, 2004); 
f) Stimulate Skills Development and Transfer  (IDC, 2006; DTI, 2001), and; 
g) Fast track economic growth (IDC, 2006) 
The government envisages that this strategy will assist in the inclusion of the 
informal business sector into the mainstream economy and uplift disadvantaged 
communities (DTI, 2001). 
Importance of Preferential Procurement to SMMEs 
Brown II ( 2004) and (HEFMA, 2005) argue that the black majority who were 
precluded from meaningful participation in the economy would be assisted by a 
well-structured preferential policy, particularly one that concentrates on the 
SMME sector which they currently dominate. Management IQ (2004) posits that 
Preferential Procurement entrenches BEE beyond the political and business elite 
to a broader community base. Morgan (2003) asserts that it is the most powerful 
and accessible empowerment tool the South African government has (Mbeki, 
2005) viewed it as the seedbed of job creation, entrepreneurship and sustainable 
wealth generation and considered it the lifeblood of the economy. Brown II (2004) 
contests that without the development of SMMEs, the economy stagnates, 
employment declines and all these ultimately lead to a lowering of the standard 
of living.  
According to HEFMA (2005) the South African SMMEs are of immense 
importance, as around 250,000 medium and small companies contribute some 
R220 billion annually to GDP, with small and ‘survivalist’ operations adding a 
further R72 billion. According to (SAIBL, 2004) there is plenty of credible 
evidence that many black-owned SMMEs companies are increasingly benefiting 
from preferential policies adopted by large corporations, mostly through 











becomes the critical tool in spreading the economic inclusiveness of the 
previously marginalised and supporting the emerging black-owned SMMEs. The 
construction industry specifically could benefit from preferential procurement 
because the government is the largest procurer in the country.  
2.6.4 The Role of the Construction Industry in Preferential 
Procurement 
The construction industry is a national asset (Kganyako, 2005) and the economy 
depends on the physical infrastructure delivered by this industry. Dodge (2005) 
concurs that infrastructure plays a key role in creating an efficient, productive 
economy. Infrastructure investment is the key to generating long-term economic 
growth (Talent, 2003), by promoting efficient and productive flow of goods and 
services. Any clusters of industrial, manufacturing and technology companies 
located in major centres exist and function better with quality water, sewer, 
transportation and municipal and social services provided by the construction 
industry (Talent, 2003; Dodge; 2005).  The industry is mostly characterised by 
average wages and labor intensive activities and as such could develop to the 
advantage of SMMEs and HDIs through preferential procurement (Capegateway, 
2004). Inclusion of SMMEs may even enhance rural areas enterprises, because 
the construction industry can accommodate most of the semi-skilled people 
residing in these areas (HEFMA, 2005). The centrality of the construction 
industry in driving economic development and its accommodative peculiarity to 
large numbers of low-skilled entrants makes it a suitable vehicle for 
empowerment implementation. 
2.7 IMPORTANCE OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY TO 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION/ BBBEE  
2.7.1 Construction Industry and Easing of Social Problems 
Governments have long recognized that the construction industry is uniquely 
able to impact on social and economic activities from Roosevelt’s New Deal in 











managed the construction industry can assist the national economies with 
recovery and contribute towards the easing of social problems. This observation 
is supported by McCutcheon (2001) and Watermeyer (2000), who submit that the 
construction industry is an efficient industry for generating employment for a 
given capital flow, especially when labor-intensive methods are deployed. 
According to Shezi (1998) government procurement has widely been utilised to 
realise socio-economic objectives, notably the application of ‘preferencing’ 
procurement in the 1930s as an integral part of the marshal plan in rebuilding 
Europe after WWI. However Keddeman (1998), Watermeyer, 1999 and (De 
Veen, 2002) warn against implementing “make-work” projects, which are purely 
for the creation of employment opportunities with little economic benefit for the 
assets created. To justify consideration (Watermeyer, 1999) employment-
intensive construction must be technically feasible and technically efficient. 
Devising alternative creative ways of offering massive employment in South 
Africa is very importance because the handful of monopolies in the construction 
industry can only offer a limited number of jobs. 
2.7.2 The Nature of the South African Construction Industry and the 
Improvement of the Status Quo 
The South African construction industry reflects other leading oligopolistic 
markets in that it is dominated by five major players, who do a bulk of the work 
themselves or sometimes with international joint venture partners (Business 
Monitor International Ltd, 2006). According to Monama (2004)) these companies 
have been slow in increasing black participation and management in the industry 
except in the area of enterprise development. The South African construction 
industry has for a long time been in recession, and this has led to the shrinking of 
its capacity, which now manifests itself in the shortage of skilled labor, outdated 
machinery and the closure of some building firms (Economist Intelligence Unit, 
2005).  Although there is a clear revival underpinned by increased infrastructure 
investment in the country, Economist Intelligence Unit (2005) observes that it has 
not been easy for black-owned companies to penetrate the market at the highest 











environment for new black-run contractors. This scenario has prompted the 
government to seek to align this industry with the general restructuring of asset 
ownership in the country.  
The drive to achieve a changed public procurement regime in South Africa has 
been led by the Department of Public Works (Strategic Procurement Systems, 
2002). By targeting the Affirmable Business Enterprises (ABEs) (Watermeyer, 
2000), this department has tried to redress the structural problems of the South 
African construction industry. This it has sought by promoting business linkages 
between large and small black-owned construction companies through joint 
ventures and subcontracting, in an arrangement where a large white-owned 
construction company is contractually expected to set aside a certain percentage 
of the work for ‘targeted enterprises’ (ibid.). Large contractors are thus required 
to unpack or unbundle their contracts into smaller contracts in order to secure the 
involvement of targeted enterprises and/or engage these ‘targeted enterprises’ 
as joint venture partners and/or structure the work to provide opportunities for 
targeted labor (ibid.). Work done by  (Gounden, 2000) has demonstrated that 
where the contract is properly structured, joint ventures and subcontracting 
benefit the smaller companies in transferring expertise. Another study 
undertaken by Manchidi and Harmond (2002) demonstrated that impediments to 
gaining better benefits from these kind of partnerships are usually poor targeting, 
inadequate prior planning at community level and the absence of tight monitoring 
and evaluative procedures  (Anon, 2002; Manchidi and Harmond, 2002). The 
Department of Public Works (DPW) two pronged approach is on one hand to 
accommodate black-owned SMMEs in large contracts that they would not 
otherwise solely undertake. On the other hand the aim is to reduce the high 
unemployment by absorbing the targeted black unskilled labour during 











2.7.3 Specific role of established private companies as empowerment 
agents  
The nature of the South African Targeted Procurement Programme is such that 
the responsibility for the successful empowerment of the SMME in the economy 
is effectively ceded to the private sector (SouthAfrica.info, 2008). The main 
contractor in most contracts functions as the implementation agent on behalf of 
the national government in achieving the long-term objectives of upgrading 
SMMEs economy in general and in particular the construction sector (ibid.). This 
is poignant in the South African situation where the previously advantaged white 
owners of established companies still have, capital, skills and experience skewed 
in their favour. Apartheid-inherited imbalance in the ownership structure in 
construction industry thus prompted the government to restructure this industry in 
line with the social and economic imperatives for the reconstruction (ibid.).  
Rogerson (2000) argues that the best empowerment results occur where 
partnerships are formed between established (white-owned) construction 
businesses and emerging PDI-owned enterprises. Berry et al (2000) posits that a 
truly participatory economy can be achieved when SMMEs from disadvantaged 
backgrounds graduate from micro to SMEs, because growth will bring with it an 
increased competitiveness which will decrease the undesirably high black-owned 
SMMEs mortality rate. 
2.7.4 The Role and Importance of SMMEs empowerment in 
Construction Industry 
In the context of the construction industry empowerment means less dependency 
on the dominant white-owned businesses (Havemann, 1999).  Lack of finance 
has for a long time turned SMMEs to labor-only contractors with minimal profit 
because of many unfair packages they get and this contribute very little to 
empowerment (ibid.). However, the South African government believes that 
these emerging construction-related SMMEs can contribute significantly to the 
realisation of key economic and redistributive objectives (South Africa, 1998). It is 
for the attainment of this goal (Rogerson, 2000), that the government is 











The government is taking inspiration from other countries’ experiences as studies 
by the ILO (2002) and Toole et al (2002) have shown that the division of work 
into smaller work packages provides better access to public infrastructure 
programmes by SMMEs. According to the Department of Public works DPW 
(2002) the government is adopting these interventions to support the emerging 
contractors so that they ‘indeed emerge’, with the ultimate goal of eradicating any 
identifiable disparities between the emerging and established contractors, 
operating in the same markets. Internationally it has been recognized that 
SMMEs, as opposed to large scale enterprises, are liable to choose labor-
intensive methods that they can afford, and that developing them places a 
significant portion of expenditure in local communities, thus enhancing 
employment creation (Larcher, 1999, 1998;Tajgman & de Veen, 1998). Because 
of the low barriers to entry, demand for labour in construction industry is very 
elastic and a lot of people can be absorbed to a greater empowerment effect 
(Tajgman & de Veen, 1998).  Several studies (Tendler & Amorim, 1996; Tendler, 
1997) show that public procurement supporting SMMEs must be linked to an 
associated support structure in order to achieve local economic development. 
The established companies in the private sector have been identified as veritable 
partners in supporting and grooming these emerging SMMEs in South Africa. 
2.7.5 The Role of the Corporate Sector in Implementing BBBEE in 
Alternative Procurement 
Traditionally, infrastructure provision has been regarded as the sole responsibility 
of the state and has been financed mainly through taxes and loans via the 
budget allocation of the country (Manchidi & Merrifield, 2005; Smith, 2004).  The 
South African government is faced with the global challenge of governments 
struggling to pay for their immediate infrastructure requirements (Chege, 2003). 
According to Manchidi and Merrifield (2005) in South Africa this has necessitated 
the need to seek alternative financing methods, while at the same time 
considering the deficit reduction proposed in the government’s GEAR strategy. 
GEAR advocates for the co-operation with the private sector in addressing the 











government’s commitment to the application of the Public-Private partnerships 
(PPPs), based on cost recovery pricing where practical and fair (ADB , 2005; 
Verschueren, 2005; Streeter et al, 2004). ADB (2005) advocates for a greater 
involvement by governments of the private sector in development and growth as 
this involvement can bring about a greater positive impact.  Vershchueren (2005) 
argues that this can be achieved by the implementation of successful Public 
Private Partnerships. The global trend of private involvement in infrastructure 
provision appears to be an approach suited for South Africa immediate needs. 
2.8 PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
2.8.1 Introduction of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
Public procurement in most countries accounts for a substantial share of 
economic activity (Maskin & Tirole, 2008). The dilemma with most states has 
been how to continue to deliver high-quality public services at the lowest possible 
cost to the taxpayer and user (ibid.). An arguably, ‘recent’ development to 
address this challenge has been the development of PPPs in industrialized 
countries (e.g. the UK’s Private Finance Initiative [PFI] launched in 1992) and 
emerging economies during the 1990s. PPP arrangements have been set up for 
large scale schemes in transportation, medical care, telecommunications, 
energy, water systems and even orphan (for rare diseases) drugs (ibid.). In each 
case, the government invariably engages the private partner to a dual task of 
developing the project and also operating and servicing it (ibid.).  The term 
“partnerships” according to McQuaid (2000) covers vastly different concepts and 
practices and is used to describe a wide variety of types of relationships in a 
myriad of circumstances and locations to such an extent that Lyons & Hamlin 
(1991, p. 55) claim that the “methods for carrying out such (private-public) 
partnerships are limited only to the imagination”, as there are infinite range of 
partnership activities, and economic development offices are increasingly 
becoming innovative in their use of the concept (McQuaid, 2000). Whilst each 
partnership is a product of a particular historical, economic, social and political 











Definitions of Public Private Partnerships 
A typical scenario in these partnerships is that the non-public partner is expected 
to raise private finance, and bear substantial risk for the project and the revenue 
usually derives from some combination of government payments and user fees 
(Maskin & Tirole, 2008). The fundamental structuring of these partnerships 
informs the basic assumptions underlying their definitions (Osborne, 2000), 
hence the common thread in the phraseology of these definitions. The World 
Bank Group (2008) submits that the term (PPP) does not have any legal 
meaning and can therefore be used in a wide array of arrangement where the 
private and the public sectors are working together somehow. In general terms 
any collaboration between public bodies, such as local authorities or central 
government and private companies can be referred to as a public-private 
partnership (NCPPP, 2005; Akintoye, 2003; BBC, 2003). This partnership 
involves cooperation – i.e. ‘to work or act together’ – and according to McQuaid 
(2000) can be defined as organisations in the public and private sector 
cooperating for mutual benefit. When taking a purely economic development 
perspective, Sellgren (1990) simply defines partnership as a scheme 
implemented by the involvement or funding from more than one agency, one 
public and the other private. They are sometimes referred to as collaborations 
among business, non-profit organisations and government in which risks, 
resources and skills are shared in projects that benefit each partner (Stratton, 
1989; Akintoye, 2003) as well as the community (Stratton, 1989). The last point is 
extended by Morutoa (2004) who asserts these partnerships should incorporate 
local communities and capacitate them to establish their own businesses. The 
developmental goals of these partnerships are underpinned by the philosophy 
driving them and the peculiarities of the countries’ history. 
The History of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
The history of infrastructure provision is rich with institutional variation and 
experimentation (Jacobson & Tarr, 1996). The early references of private 
infrastructure provision (Roth, 2006) can be traced from the mythology of Ancient 











people across the river Acheron to the land of the dead; to concrete historical 
evidence in the ancient world. Garrison and Levinson (2006) postulate that it was 
easy to transfer the idea of tolls for service from ferries to bridges, and then from 
bridges to roads. Aristocles Oeconomicus recounts of tolls in the Arabia and 
other Asian kingdoms (Pritchett, 1980). Before the 4th Century B.C. India’s 
earliest known political philosopher Kautilya, mentions tolls in the Arthasastra, his 
treatise on statecraft, economic policy and military strategy (Lay, 1992). During 
the time of Augustus of Rome, Strabo’s Geographies mentions tolls manned by 
the Salassi Tribe on the little St. Bernard’s Pass (Roth, 2006). During that time of 
Augustus elsewhere in the Roman Empire bridges and ferries were tolled, with 
the collection of taxes contracted to private companies; the supply of water to 
major cities was also franchised to private contractors (Policy Solutions, 2006). 
Although the Roman concept was that public roads should be free, landowners 
that could offer shortcuts or bridges sometimes built toll roads (Crandall, 2006). 
The precursor to the modern ‘concessions’ as PPPs are sometimes called, can 
be traced back to the Roman Empire’s postal service EESC, 2005. During the 
reign of Emperor Augustus the Empire took responsibility for the transportation of 
mail throughout the realm, in what was termed the “vehiculatio” and the local 
authorities were responsible for the “stationes” i.e. postal stations (ibid.). These 
postal stations were tendered out to private operators who were mandated to 
construct, maintain and operate the these huge “post houses” for five years – a 
“lustrum”- which was a typical Roman empire contract in the area of land 
ownership (including “precaria” contracts) (ibid.). Not only was mail distribution 
based on concession contracts where responsibility was ceded to the private 
operators, but the system was extended to the building of ports, thermal baths, 
market places and entire roads (Policy Solutions, 2006; ibid.). After the 
predominant public and occasional church provision and maintenance of 
infrastructure, it would take twelve centuries for this type of contract to re-emerge 











In the nineteenth century limited public finances meant the railway networks in 
Europe were built entirely through concessions (EESC, 2005; Sperber, 2005), 
utilizing private franchising (Policy Solutions, 2006). EESC (2005) posits that the 
arrangement was extended to water, gas and electricity, household refuse 
collection and later telephones; such that in most countries in Europe 
procurement law stems from the law of concessions. Privately owned 
communications and transport infrastructure and private finance were major 
contributors to the industrial revolution in the period 1760-1830 and included -on 
top of others mentioned above- post and telegraphs, canals and toll roads (Policy 
Solutions, 2006). The ILO (1999) argues that despite the widely held view that 
large infrastructure services have traditionally been provided by the state, there is 
ample proof to attest to the fact that private enterprise has actually been in the 
forefront of utilities provision. However, Jacobson and Tarr (1996) state that there 
have been numerous shifts towards and away from private involvement in its 
different forms, in the provision of different infrastructures over the past 150 
years. In addition Jacobson and Tarr (1996) postulate that the functioning of both 
the private and public ownership arrangements has been affected by 
contingencies of political, institutional, and organisational development; with 
much change occurring at which level the government furnishes infrastructure or 
oversees the privately owned service providers.  
The main drivers of change have been in many instances the pragmatic 
judgment of political leaders and other important constituencies with a concern 
that existing ownership and regulatory arrangements inadequately served 
economic development goals (Jacobson & Tarr, 1996). According to Policy 
Solutions (2006) the substantial rise in the role of government infrastructure 
provision stems from complex circumstances, which include market failure, 
private capital shortage, concerns about equity and improvements in the 
understanding of economics in the late nineteenth century and twentieth century. 
Jacobson and Tarr (1996) assert that ideological views and ideals have also 
shaped outcomes in this public/private ownership discourse. Thus where there 











the hands of the state like in the United States, private infrastructure ownership 
has thrived (ibid.) whereas on the other hand socialist ideals in France and 
Britain led to the nationalisation of electric utilities after World War II, only to 
revert to private ownership under the Conservative government in Britain in the 
1980’s and early 1990’s as a direct result of different ideological and economic 
considerations (ibid.). The 1990s has seen the establishment of PPPs across the 
world as a key public policy tool in the general provision of infrastructure, and 
according to Osborne (2000) they have been seen as cost-efficient and effective 
mechanism particularly in the development of socially inclusive communities. 
2.8.2 The Philosophy of Public Private Partnerships 
The implementation of PPPs is predicated on the notion that there is a strong 
potential for synergy of some form by working together. Principally as McQuaid 
(2000, p 11) posits the ‘sum is greater than the parts’, because none of the 
individual players have all the necessary skills and resources necessary to 
develop (Croft, 2005) the infrastructure for which there might not be commercial 
viability. This links with the second argument in which McQuaid (2000) postulates 
that the involvement of the public sector precludes the pursuance of purely 
commercial goals, as this ushers in, some level of social partnership and thus 
excludes a purely commercial transaction. Lastly the public sector is enticed by 
the reality that it will not be equally involved at all stages, although initially it 
would have been instrumental in the development and delivery of a strategy or a 
set of project objectives (ibid.). 
All these came about because of a changed paradigm in the way in which 
governments view and envisage the role that the private sector could play in 
infrastructure provision. Akintoye et al (2003) state that the increasing backlog in 
service delivery and infrastructure provision and the scarcity of funds available to 
governments make PPPs viable alternatives. The private sector is now being 
utilised to finance some of the service delivery needs (EC, 2003; Akintoye et al, 











transformation of government departments from owners and operators of assets, 
to purchasers of services provided by the private sector. The private sector 
becomes long-term providers of services after they have assumed the 
responsibility for the design, construction, financing and operation of assets 
(ibid.). This role should be distinguished from an arms length relationship that the 
government has with any private company in a purely commercial transaction. 
2.8.3 Differences between Public Private Partnerships and 
Privatisation 
Privatisation in its broad meaning, according to Savas (2000) includes any 
substantial private sector involvement in infrastructure and service provision, and 
could include contracting out, franchising, deregulation and PPPs. Whereas in 
the view of Beecher (2000) privatisation can be understood as moving along a 
continuum of options from “completely public” to “completely private”.  
The World Bank Group  (2008) posits that the PPPs are more lying on the 
privatisation part of continuum between complete privatisation (maximum 
involvement of the private sector) and short-term term service contracts 
(minimum involvement of the private sector). In countries with many state owned 
enterprises, including developing, post-socialist and Western Europe countries, 
privatisation is the transfer of the state enterprise ownership in whole or in part 
into private ownership (Savas, 2005). The defining difference between PPPs and 
privatisation (World Bank Group, 2008)) is accountability; under a PPP 
arrangement the public sector retains ultimate accountability to the citizen for the 
provision of a public service, whereas under privatisation, accountability for 
delivery is transferred to the private party. The distinctions between the two are 
further explored in below.  
Discussing Privatisation 
The privatisation of state assets and utilities has been premised on the notion 
that governments should alter their traditional way of operation and rely more on 











development has been sparked by evidence of weaknesses of in-house 
government provision (World Bank Group, 1995).  Hemson (2004) lists ten points 
showing the weaknesses of the public sector and its lack of efficiency in 
delivering goods and services; low scores on production costs, efficiency, labor 
costs, capital costs, consumer input, innovation and flexibility, decision-making, 
condition of equipment, interruption of service and responsiveness to cost 
control. Given these weaknesses Shleifer (1998) is one of many economists 
questioning the case for any state ownership at all, even if social goals of 
government involvement are factored in. Savas (2000) believes government 
employees are inherently inefficient, but competition in the private sector 
provides the government with a tool to meet the rising demands for services in a 
cost effective manner. However privatisation in its extreme form is fraught with 
challenges that work against it. 
Criticizing Privatisation  
The critical concerns about privatisation are both pragmatic and theoretical (or 
ideological, or philosophical), the pragmatic concerns cluster about the kinds of 
failures that sometimes occur under privatisation (Table 2.2). The public 
perception on privatisation (Hemson, 1998) is one of excessive executive pay 
and share options, excessive returns to shareholders, under-investment and a 
raw deal to customers. By doing so privatized industries have shown a tendency 
to embrace and demonstrate all the worst manifestations of corporate excess 
(Hemson, 1998). The deal sometimes short-changes the public because the 
assets to be divested are undervalued from the start, due to negligence or lack of 
expertise or corruption (Savas, 2005) giving scope to many abuses. Martin 
(1993) asserts that a study of many privatisation examples in the US concludes 
that corruption has been an endemic feature of contracting-out at state and local 
level. This manifests itself by failure to conduct a proper competitive procurement 
or sale, or unnecessarily opting for sole-source procurement (Savas, 2005) 












Table 2:2 : A comparison between Privatisation and PPP 
 
Privatisation Public Private Partnership 
Government and company (or 
consortium) are involved in a purely 
Principal Agent relationships 
Government and company 
(consortium) are in joint decision 
making and production 
  
Government defines the problem, 
specifies the solution and selects a  
private company that can produce 
results in a cost-efficient way. 
Both parties are involved in joint 
processes early on in order to develop 
products that contribute to both their 
interests 
  
Benefits of contracting out 
arrangements especially concern 
efficiency (quicker and cheaper) 
Benefits of partnership arrangements 
especially concern increasing 
effectiveness (synergy and enrichment 
of output) 
  
Keys to success are unambiguous 
definitions of goals, projects, rules 
of tendering, rules of selection and 
rules of delivery 
Keys to success are an interweaving of 
goals, establishing rules for ongoing 
interaction, developing rules and tailor-
made assignments concerning joint 
effort and production commitments 
  
Based on the principles of project 
management because there is a 
clear principle, clear goals and well-
defined project specifications 
Based on the principles of process 
management because the joint goals, 
the art of financing, realisation and 
utilisation remain subject to joint 
decision making 
  
Contractual transparency regarding 
rules of tendering, selection and 
delivery and rules of inspection are 
crucial for a good relationship 
Mutual trust is crucial for lasting 
relationships between partners who 
maintain their own interests, ways of 
working, accountability and financing 
principles 
Adapted from: Klijn and Teisman, 2000 
 
Where this has occurred it has translated into corruption, patronage and other 
unhealthy relationships (Cohen et al, 1997), such as companies winning 
contracts from municipalities and making electoral contributions to leading 
politicians.  Hemson’s (1998) extends this point by further observing that the 
companies benefiting from privatisation and contracting-out render financial 
support to politicians supporting privatisation and all manner of what Cohen et al 











‘unprofessional’ relationships usually lead to poor monitoring and the providers 
opportunistically cut corners and lower service quality (Savas, 2005). After 
privatizing, a competitive environment is not maintained by delegation (e.g. 
contracting and franchising), this leads to the incumbent provider acquiring and 
exploiting the monopoly status, thereby only replacing the public monopoly 
(ibid.). These developments in the United States have undermined all the civil 
service systems of local government established to eliminate local patronage and 
corruption (Hemson, 1998). In the third world privatisation has been associated 
with austerity and impoverishment, the extraordinarily bleak ‘crossing of the 
desert’ on the way to the promised land of prosperity (Hemson, 1998). This is 
because privatisation is a key feature of the World Bank’s model of “structural 
adjustment” which has led to high unemployment in Central America and 
Caribbean countries, and also the implementation of policies that resulted in the 
destruction of human capital in terms of the worsening of schooling, infant 
mortality and malnutrition (Martin, 1993). Hemson (1998) argues that most 
improvements in Britain claimed for privatisation took place when the companies 
were still in the public sector. PPPs on the contrary, can be structured such that 
they address the specific local needs and there is a whole array of different 
permutations and arrangements, to curb some of the problems mentioned above. 
Different Type of Public Private Partnerships 
Although the list of PPPs arrangements is endless they come broadly in two 
types, Concession PPPs and Availability-Based PPPs (World Bank Group, 
2008). In a concession PPP the government mandates the private party 
(counterpart) to design, build, finance and operate for a fixed period of time, an 
infrastructure owned by the government (ibid.). Although there are many different 
project stages, the government only deals with one private party, because only 
one tender will have been submitted by the bidding consortium for all the 
activities from start to finish (Deloitte, 2008). Although the private party is usually 
expected to assume all the demand risks, sometimes the government 











examples in this arrangement would be roads, railways, urban transport 
schemes, ports and airports (ibid.). 
The Availability-Based PPPs are similar to concessions PPPs in the structuring 
of the agreement and the upkeep of the infrastructure, however in this case 
payments come directly from the public authority and not from the user, and this 
payment is made when and to the extent that a public service and not an asset is 
made available (World Bank Group, 2008).  In this arrangement the demand or 
usage risk remains with the public authority (ibid.). The Availability-Based 
projects enjoy a relatively benign payment regime that is not sensitive to volume 
risk (van Vries Robbe & Ali, 2006). Availability-Based PPPs are among the safest 
form of project financings with visible income streams and relatively benign 
penalty regimes (Project finance, 2008).  This arrangement is useful in non-“self-
funding” projects such as prisons, government buildings and rural roads, where 
payment is based on the availability of the accommodation facility, equipment or 
system and not on the volume of usage (World Bank Group, 2008).  According to 
the World Bank (2008) governments find these types to be very effective in 
ensuring that public facilities are delivered on time and on budget, are properly 
maintained and are able to deliver public services in the context of restrained 
resources.  Although pioneered in the UK as part of the PFI, it is now increasingly 
used by countries including South Africa (ibid.). 
Although the main types have been described above there are a number of 
common arrangements, depending on what the government requires. Some of 
the common arrangements are Build-Own-Operate (BOO), Rehabilitate-Own-
Operate (ROO) –and this is where the infrastructure is not returned to the public 
sector (World Bank Group, 2008), Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO), Build-
Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT), Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Develop-
Operate-Transfer (DOT), Rehabilitate -Operate-Manage (ROM), Build-Transfer-
Operate (BTO), Design-Build-Finance-Manage (DBFM) (Akintoye, 2003; NCPPP, 
2005). Because of a wide range of permutations available the National Treasury 











the final analysis good partnerships define themselves on the role they play in 
the development of the country (National Treasury, 2004). In South Africa all the 
different PPP combinations are implemented because of the social-economics 
benefits that they bring into the country apart from pure infrastructure provision. 
2.8.4 Benefits of Public Private Partnerships  
The bulk of economic literature on policy has largely acknowledged that the 
government does certain activities best, the private sector others, while the not-
for-profit and voluntary sector performs still others. (HM Treasury, 2000; 
Zarenda, 2001). The introduction and attraction of PPPs relates to the fact that 
much of these traditional functions become blurred, and unlike nationalisation 
and privatisation which are at the extreme ends of the public/private cooperation 
continuum, PPPs offers a new form of organisational arrangement  (Turner & 
Wirth, 2003; Zarenda, 2001). David (1996) argues that in theory the policy should 
be accepted not just because it is a trendy third way but because it combines the 
best of both. The logic for accepting this policy should thus rely on a mutual 
interaction that focuses on the strengths of the public and private sectors 
(Zarenda, 2001). 
In trying to bring the public and private sectors together, the government hopes 
that the management skills and financial acumen of the business community will 
create better value for money for taxpayers  ( Gouvernement du Québec , 2006; 
EC, 2003; BBC, 2003). For many services Stainback (2000) and the OECD 
(2006) submit that the private sector can provide services faster and cheaper. 
Privately developed projects are generally planned and constructed more quickly 
than publicly financed projects because there is an incentive to generate revenue 
as soon as possible (Manchidi & Merrifield 2005; PPP Quarterly, 2002). The 
government benefits at this stage as it makes no payment for construction, as the 
procurement is for services, not structures (Transports Quebec, 2006; Manchidi 












 Leverage Development—PPPs can provide new capital and leverage the 
available public funds to develop or repair additional infrastructure, and 
ameliorate the problem of infrastructure deficit, which retards economic 
growth (Hakim et al, 1996). This leverage can lead to more projects 
realized sooner than when the government is the sole financier and this 
increased project delivery can lead to faster economic development and 
tax base growth (Manchidi and Merrifield, 2005).  
 Efficient Development and Operations—Through the use of design-build 
construction schedules, flexible contracting and procurement, and other 
innovative practices a PPP may develop new facilities more rapidly (Hakim 
et al, 1996). Prospective private operators in the consortium may also apply 
specialized expertise, technology and operating flexibility to increase the 
operational efficiency (OECD, 2006; Hakim et al, 1996). 
 Project Revenue Enhancement—Apart from reliance on toll fees PPPs may 
also develop innovative revenue sources, such as real estate development 
and parallel uses of the right-of-way (Hakim et al, 1996) 
 Increased Public-Sector Revenues—New revenues for government can be 
created where there is an agreement for profit sharing if the private 
developer’s rate of return exceeds a predetermined level (Hakim et al, 1996) 
 Risk Allocation—PPPs allow the risk transfer to the private sector that would 
otherwise be borne by the public sector and ultimately the taxpayer (OECD, 
2006; Hakim et al, 1996). The risk sharing on the other hand could allow 
some projects to be undertaken that neither party would be willing to 
undertake alone (Hakim et al, 1996). 
The above benefits are purely economic benefits but it has been observed that 
there are other social spin-offs to be gained from undertaking PPPs. This is more 
pertinent to a country like South Africa, which is trying to use procurement to 











Public Private Partnerships and Social Benefits in South Africa 
Akintoye et al (2003) argues that PPPs could be used to redress ethnic income 
differences, as was the case in Malaysia (Akintoye et al, 2003).  This factor is 
very pertinent to the South African situation. The South African Broad Based 
Black Economic Empowerment Act (2003) states that PPPs offer a valuable 
opportunity for strong and sustainable Black Economic Empowerment (BEE Act 
53 of, 2003).  Since by their very nature PPPs are long term they provide a good 
vehicle to empower the previously disadvantaged people in this country National 
Treasury (2004) through a steady flow of income. This satisfies the main 
objective of the BEE which is to assist the previously disadvantage groups to 
participate in the mainstream of the economy (Manchidi and Merrifield, 2005; 
PPP Quartely, 2002). PPPs are particularly viewed as an important tool in the 
policy of BEE, as they are considered a useful route in capacity building in South 
Africa (Lezzard, 2004). Zarenda (2001) backs up this view by arguing that their 
large-scale nature accommodates widespread inclusiveness which makes them 
invaluable for BEE. This inclusive nature of PPPs can accommodate the black-
owned SMMEs which need a very stable environment to be natured. 
Public Private Partnerships and black SMME sustainability 
There is general acceptance in South Africa that black participation in the 
economy where it exists is at micro and small business level where there are low 
levels of sustainability (CSC, 2005; Shilowa, 2006). Black owned companies do 
not penetrate those sectors that are more capital and knowledge intensive and 
the situation is exacerbated by the absence of financial and other support 
mechanisms for black SMMEs (CSC, 2005). But BEE as defined by the 
government is a strategy aimed at substantially increasing black participation at 
all levels in the economy (SEDA, 2005).  PPPs are inherently suited for achieving 
BEE objectives and SMMEs sustainability because:  
 Their long term nature provides an opportune instrument to grow black 
equity and black management over time (National Treasury PPP Unit, 











 Risk is clearly identified, clearly costed and appropriately allocated, so 
black participants know in advance what they are committing to (National 
Treasury PPP Unit, 2008);  
 The formation of private consortia in the form of special purpose vehicles 
(SPV) for many PPPs facilitates long-term beneficial partnerships between 
new black enterprises and experienced, resourced companies - both as 
equity partners and in project management, and both at the Private Party 
SPV and sub-contracting levels (National Treasury PPP Unit, 2008);  
 Where government is the buyer of a service, and insofar as the service is 
provided to the agreed standards, there is a secure revenue stream to the 
Private Party, reducing risk to new black enterprises (National Treasury 
PPP Unit, 2008; National Treasury, 2004b);  
 Principal equity sponsors in a PPP are often also the primary sub-
contractors, building incentives for optimal risk management;  
 PPPs provide significant subcontracting opportunities for black 
enterprises, where early cash flow benefits can be derived as delivery 
commences;  
 PPPs have far-reaching broad-based BEE potential: through the sub-
contracting and procurement mechanisms they can involve a full spectrum 
of large, medium and small enterprises, and bring tangible local economic 
development benefits to targeted groups of people (PPP Quarterly, 2005); 
 Return on equity to the Private Party is competitive where risk is properly 
assumed. There is an increasingly strong demand for black professionals 
as transaction advisors to both public institutions and private parties in 
PPPs (IPFA, 2005) 
 PPPs develop skills; and create jobs (National Treasury PPP Unit, 2008; 











All the above points cover all the different levels envisaged by the new view of 
AA, from job creation, accommodation of black SMMEs entrepreneurs to black 
corporate involvement. On the SMMEs development front PPP opportunities can 
range from very small enterprise (requiring low capital investment and limited 
enterprise experience) to large-scale developments (involving higher risk and 
significant operator experience), providing entrepreneurial avenues for a full 
spectrum of black enterprises (National Treasury PPP Toolkit For Tourism, 
2005). PPPs also provide a valuable vehicle for galvanising and coordinating all 
governments endeavours to support SMMEs especially in areas of private party 
financing, legal and business advice and skills development (ibid.). However the 
enormity and complexity of these arrangements, and the scarce skills in the 
government to monitor and regulate the contract once construction and delivery 
has begun, might lead to a Principal Agent problem (OECD, 2006). 
2.9 SUMMARY 
The international outcry that followed the Soweto uprising led to the rethink of the 
apartheid policy by the South African government and resulted in a limited 
inclusion of blacks in the mainstream economic participation. This was the birth 
of Affirmative Action in South Africa. It was however given different names which 
changed with the transforming political environment: first it was called “Black 
Advancement” then “Equal Opportunity” in the late 1980s, but after political 
prisoners were released in 1990 a bolder term “Affirmative Action” became the 
norm. The term Affirmative Action was replaced by “Black Economic 
Empowerment” (BEE) following the advent of a new ANC political dispensation in 
1994.  
The previous Apartheid era AA implementation dealt with the incorporation of few 
blacks into executive positions but did little else to alter the racial structural 
composition of companies. The new policy under the ANC is meant to drastically 
alter more than three hundred years of economic exclusion by altering the 











policy has since adopted a further extension to its name, as it is now known as 
“Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment” (BBBEE), in order to 
accommodate women, coloreds, Indians and the disabled. The South African 
government as the largest buyer in the country (involved in every sector) has 
decided to use procurement to effect is main economic policy of BEE. The 
government is utilizing preferential procurement as its main tool to create a 
favorable environment for black-owned SMMEs and enhance their participation 
and growth in business. Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been 
particularly singled out, as a procurement method that could yield empowerment 
results efficiently.  
The PPPs that this research is concentrated on are in the provision of 
infrastructure in construction industry. Construction industry has been used to 
achieve socio-economic objectives in times of need and it is still touted as the 
most efficient industry for generating employment for a given capital flow, 
especially when labor intensive methods are applied. The long-term nature of 
PPPs, which combine construction and operation of the infrastructure facility 
under one contract, are deemed to be able to provide an effective incubatory 
environment to grow the up-and-coming black-owned SMMEs. Through the use 
of the Preferential Procurement Act, which applies to PPPs as well as to other 
procurement methods, the main consortium is bound to unbundle the work and 
sub-contract to the black-owned SMMEs. However the reliance of the 
government on the established white-owned companies to act as its 
empowerment agents in imparting skills and business acumen to the black-
owned SMMEs could result in the undesirable consequences of the Principal -












3 PRINCIPAL AGENT THEORY 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The last chapter introduced BEE and PPPs and discussed these at length. The 
purpose of this chapter is to introduce a third concept of Principal Agent (PA) 
theory that is equally critical to this research. After introducing and discussing the 
PA concept at length, its applicability to the PPP environment with regards to 
BEE will be explored. Although pre-contractual and post-contractual opportunism 
abounds in the shirking from the intended and stipulated implementation of BEE 
by the main actors in construction and other industries, until now there has been 
no systematic scholarly investigation of ways and techniques to study this 
phenomenon and curb its unwelcomed accretion. This thesis develops an 
argument that this represents a gap in the existing body of knowledge. It 
concentrates its investigation within the construction industry PPP environment 
by using the PA theoretical framework and to assess the comparative efficacy of 
these PPPs in BEE delivery. 
The purpose of the literature reviewed in this chapter will be to present the 
historical background of PA theory. Then the PA problem will be discussed 
together with the mechanisms established in the corpus of this theory to mitigate 
its ill-effects. The review will then look at the PA problem as it exists in PPPs 
whilst contextualizing this to the BEE delivery challenge in the construction 
industry in South Africa. The role of the contract in streamlining BEE delivery 
therefore will be at the centre of the discussion of PPP efficacy in delivering BEE. 
This theoretical section forms the basis of the subsequent field research 
conducted on the consortium engaged on the PPP project that was identified as 











3.2 DESCRIPTION OF PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEM 
The Principal Agent theory or “agency theory” is an economic theory concerned 
with the relationship between principals and agents, where “agency” refers to a 
situation where one party (the agent) acts on behalf of another (the principal) 
(Denhardt, 2003). The PA “problem” occurs whenever a principal delegates 
‘authority’ to an agent to act in his or her interest (Surowiecki, 2004; Sheil, 2003; 
Venkatesh, 2003). The PA theory initially arose as a subject of study in a 
business management environment associated with behavioural studies of 
employer-contract or employer-employee interactions but it can also be applied 
to public and non-profit settings as well (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985; Harris & 
Raviv, 1978). A conventional list of examples would include master and servant, 
landlord and tenant, lender and borrower (Ross, 1973; Spence & Zeckhauser, 
1971). Apart from the usual scenario where the running of the company is 
deputized by shareholders to a CEO, on a daily basis people hire lawyers to 
handle their affairs, stockbrokers to manage their investments, and doctors to 
look after their health (Surowiecki, 2004; Sheil, 2003).  
These kinds of relationships play an especially large role in an economy in which 
knowledge is increasingly specialized and where deferring to the judgment of 
experts makes sense (Surowiecki, 2004). Early work on this subject centered on 
dilemmas of dealing with incomplete information in insurance industry contracts 
(Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973). The theory was soon broadened to 
dilemmas associated with contracts in other contexts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Harris and Raviv, 1978). Because some research in this area utilises 
experiments in small group interaction, there is a close relationship to game 
theory, as some Principal Agent writers explicitly recognize (e.g. Gratto et al, 
2002). The problem usually refers to the difficulty employers (the principal) have 
in ensuring that employees (agents) in making day-to-day decisions, act in the 
best interest of their employers (Gratto et al, 2002; Sappington, 1991). This 











pertinent when the employee or contractor has an informational advantage over 
the principal and has divergent interests to the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989).   
The PA problem is a problem because it is hard to solve (Wessels, 2006).  
Denhardt (2003) extends the example of the lawyer to demonstrate a practical 
PA problem; where the lawyer has multiple incentives in a case where he/she 
represents the principal, the primary one being to win the case (also the 
principal’s) alongside the incentive to maximise billable hours (the lawyer’s other 
goal). Wessels (2006) calls this a dual problem of (1) the principal hiring the 
agent and setting up a contract so that the agent will do what the principal wants 
and (2) the agent setting up the contract in order for the principal to pay for the 
work the agent does. According to (Greve, 2008) the key problem in the agency 
relationship is to devise a contract that motivates the agent to work efficiently at 
the same time ensuring that the principal remunerates the agent’s effort 
correspondingly. Since both parties efforts tend to be non-observable there is 
always a problem of correctly devising a contract that guides the interaction 
(ibid.). With the PA problem, the principal and the agent have divergent interests, 
and since each cannot monitor what the other is doing, the resultant output is 
less than optimal (Wessels, 2006). The focus of the theory is on determining the 
most efficient contract given assumptions about people (e.g. self-interest), 
organisations and information (Esenhardt, 1989). So the main theme of the 
principal agency theory is dealing with the problems encountered when co-
operating parties not only have incongruent goals but divisions of labor too, such 
making it difficult for the principal to monitor and verify the agent’s behaviour 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Nilakant & Rao, 1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1994; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The theory can be summed up as being underpinned by three fundamental 
assumptions:  












2. Secondly the agent is both effort and risk averse.  
3. Lastly there is an assumption that there is a persistent problem of 
information asymmetry (Baiman, 1990; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Levinthal, 1988).  
The presence of any one of these conditions creates the potential for an agency 
problem (Baiman, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989; Nilakant & Rao, 1994). Self-interest 
can be mitigated by installing monitoring mechanisms to protect the principals, 
from the agents’ divergent interests pursuit (Elloumi & Gueyie, 2001). A large 
body of literature (for example Bromiley, 1991; Sinha, 1994) has demonstrated 
that since agent employment security and income are inextricably tied to the firm 
(principal), agents would under normal circumstances exhibit risk aversion in 
decisions regarding the firm in order not to lower risk to personal wealth- i.e. loss 
of their job  (Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia, 1998). This is more pertinent in the 
technical prescriptions where infringement might even mean contract termination, 
thereby using agent risk aversion to induce goal congruency. For the purpose of 
this research asymmetric information and its implications on the agent 
contractual performance is going to be investigated further, because on BEE 
implementation superior informational advantage appears to favour the 
contractors (agents).  
3.2.1 Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry, sometimes called asymmetric information, is a situation 
where the agent has more information than is available to the principal (Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin, 1992). The Principal Agent theory is concerned with 
accountability while correcting for opportunistic behaviour that result from 
asymmetric information (McDonald, 1997; Moe, 1996; Bogart, 1995; Kearns, 
1994; Frey, 1993; Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Sappington, 1991; Donahue, 1989; 
Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989; Savas, 1987; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Alchian & 
Demsetz, 1972). Information asymmetries are usually created where the agent 











execution and where the agent is permitted a lot of managerial discretion 
(Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Rajagopalan & Finkelstein, 1992). Managerial 
discretion accompanies environmental and strategic complexities that together 
create operational contexts with multiple decision options, low task 
programmability and ambiguous cause-effect relationships (Rajagopalan & 
Finkelstein, 1992; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1988). 
The asymmetry in information can originate both from internal or external 
sources (Siller-Pagaza et al, 2006). The internal information would have evolved 
during the development of the project or any enterprise (ibid.). The external 
information originates out of the firm and is in most cases in the public realm as it 
comprise matters such as patents, new products and laws among others (ibid.). 
However, only the agent has the ability to gather together both the internal and 
external information in order to make the best possible contribution to the 
enterprise (ibid.). Whenever asymmetric information exists it may lead to 
“opportunism” by the agent and researchers in this field have been most 
concerned in describing the governance mechanisms that solve this problem 
(Jensen, 1983; Eisenhardt, 1989). Opportunism is described by Williamson 
(1975, p. 9) as ‘pursuing one’s self-interests with guile’. BEE stipulation requires 
that contractual “set asides” be a preserve of the PDIs, however “guile” in the 
form of BEE beneficiary misrepresentation that abounds in government 
procurement in South Africa may be a manifestation of information asymmetry 
favouring the agents (contractors). The two kinds of opportunism which are 
important aspects of agency theory are those of “moral hazard” and “adverse 
selection” (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Moral Hazard problem (post-contractual opportunism) 
“Moral Hazard” happens once the two parties have entered into a contract, and is 
a risk that one party will act to the detriment of the other within the contract 
(Wessels, 2006).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that if both parties are utility 
maximisers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in 











be aware of the extent of the work he has delegated leading to “moral hazard” 
sometime referred to as “hidden action” (Venkatesh, 2003). It is called “hidden 
action” because these adverse actions are hidden from the principal (Greve, 
2008). Under this condition the principal cannot be sure if the agent has put 
maximum effort in doing the job assigned (Eisenhardt, 1989). For instance the 
employee may be acting in such a way that the company’s profits are not 
maximized, the person tasked to buy raw materials, may not be scouting around 
for the best possible quality and price in the market (Venkatesh, 2003). 
The inability to monitor each other in any kind of Principal Agent relationship will 
lead to a “moral hazard” problem (Maskin & Riley, 1984). The more autonomy 
the agent enjoys in performance and the greater the information the agent 
possesses and the greater the specialized knowledge to perform the task, the 
greater the chances for the occurrence of the moral hazard (Holmstrom, 1979). 
But at the heart of this problem is that the agent is specifically needed because 
the tasks are too complicated or costly for the principal to perform him or herself, 
and as such the principal is obliged to hire an agent with specialized skills and 
knowledge (Sappington, 1991). The fact that the empowerment of PDIs in South 
Africa is ceded to white-owned established companies in South Africa 
demonstrates the enormity of the tasks, which the government on its own cannot 
be able to effectively implement. The reported sidelining of PDIs in contracts may 
be indicative of an endemic BEE moral hazard in government procurement as 
the PDIs are not benefitting from their participation in these projects. This 
problem might stem from the fact that people who have not bought into the spirit 
of BEE were selected to execute the contract. 
Adverse Selection (Pre-contractual opportunism) 
“Adverse Selection” is a direct result of asymmetric knowledge, leading to the 
agent to hide information that is relevant to the negotiation and signing of a 
contract (Greve, 2008). Under this condition the principal cannot ascertain if the 
agent accurately represents his true ability (Eisenhardt, 1989). As a result an 











selection of a bad agent (Wessels, 2006).  For Surowiecki (2004) and Venkatesh 
(2003), the “adverse selection” problem, which is also referred to as “hidden 
information”, normally occurs when one party knows more than the other, such 
that the principal is at the agent’s mercy. Whereas “moral hazard” is about post-
contractual action hidden from the principal, “adverse selection” is about pre-
contractual information hidden from the principal (Greve, 2008). This information 
asymmetry is very common and it can lead to an opportunistic behaviour where, 
the party that knows a lot takes the advantage of the knowledge and uses it 
unfairly to gain advantage (Surowiecki, 2004; Maskin & Riley, 1984). Classic 
examples are sellers of used cars (the ‘lemon’ problem) who seek out 
uninformed buyers and try to pass off their cars as good, or insurance buyers 
who are sick and who seek to buy health insurance from sellers who cannot tell 
who is sick, impoverishing the insurance company with high claim payout later on 
(Wessels, 2006). In South African government procurement presenting PDIs as 
legitimate BEE beneficiaries during tendering, only to divert the financial benefits 
to unqualified beneficiaries post-contractually may be demonstrative of adverse 
selection.  
3.3 HOW TO MITIGATE THE PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEM 
Before the start of the formal relationship (ex ante) the principal is not in a 
position to know the true “quality” of the agent in relation to performance 
dimensions such as productivity, soft skills and education; as these are “hidden 
characteristics” (Keil, 2005). Many of these agent problems can be eliminated by 
introducing competition among the candidate agents, to determine who the best 
prospect is (Spence, 1973). Competition helps in that the agent can “signal” his 
type to the principal which may assist in solving the problem of “adverse 
selection” (ibid.). Another way of avoiding the “adverse selection” especially in 
long-term relationships is by “screening” the agents (Stiglitz, 1975). The principal 











uncertainty over important “anchors” like indices (data1 such as track records, 
economic situation, number of employee) or signals (e.g. guarantees given by 
agent, special qualifications, certificates, etc.) would at least be known very early, 
and this would reduce the information asymmetry (Keil, 2005). 
3.3.1 Inducing Signalling 
According to (Spence, 2002, 1973) to engage the agent in a contract is like 
purchasing a lottery ticket, because there is so much uncertainty around the 
capabilities of the agent at the time of contracting and the cost of this lottery is 
the remuneration paid to the agent. The principal’s problem is to offer a contract 
that induces the agent to reveal his true type (Jamison, 1998). “Signalling” is 
based on the idea that the agent chooses an action that credibly signals their 
private information (Keil, 2005). The agent’s problem is to take some visible 
action that the principal will correctly interpret as revealing the agent’s true type 
(Jamison, 1998). An example of a signaling problem is a CEO (the agent) taking 
an extraordinary action to signal his type to his Board of Directors (the principal) 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998).  
At the time of application what the principal observes is a plethora of personal 
data in the form of observable attributes and characteristics, which might include 
education, previous record, race, sex, criminal record and host of other data 
(Newcombe, 2000; Spence, 1973). These observable datum can be divided into 
two distinct types; one that is immutably fixed and the other which is alterable; for 
instance race and sex are generally thought to be unalterable whereas 
educational level can be altered by the investment of time, money and effort. 
Spence (1973) refers to unalterable attributes as “indices” whilst the ones subject 
to manipulation by the agent as “signals”. The costs incurred by the agent in 
manipulating the signals are referred to as “signaling costs”; when the principal is 
                                                
1 1 Data here refers to all the information pertaining to the agent that the principal gathers in order 












confronted with an applicant agent he uses the “signals” to formulate the 
subjective assessment of the lottery he has in front of him (ibid.).  
The signaling approach relies on the heterogeneity of employees with regards to 
their abilities to work hard, sometimes called “unobserved human capital” (Huang 
& Capelli, 2006). Under this view some prospective agents are better than others 
as they may be willing to work hard for the same pay and/or are less inclined to 
shirk their responsibilities, requiring less monitoring and supervision as a result 
(ibid.). However, applicants that are not hard workers have an incentive to 
pretend that they are, especially if regimes of low monitoring make it easier for 
them to shirk and if the jobs pay premiums of the kind that might be associated 
with having better workers (ibid.). The above model relies on self-selection: it is 
premised on the belief that potential applicants typically sort themselves out such 
that those with a propensity to work hard will apply whereas those who lack 
“unobserved human capital” associated with hard work will not apply (ibid.). To 
curb the shortcoming of this assumption “screening” of applicants is deployed.  
3.3.2 Screening 
Information asymmetry means that the agent possesses private information 
about himself or the object of exchange (product or service) that the principal 
does not have. To ameliorate this problem the principal would screen the agent’s 
appropriateness and suitability for the assignment (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). 
Rather than requiring applicants to sort themselves out, the employer can use 
proxies or other clues to identify which applicants have the “unobserved human 
capital”, such as a strong work ethic (Huang & Capelli, 2006). Through a process 
of prequalification, pre-specified criteria can be used to evaluate the prospective 
agents, thus ex ante the principal can identify who can act in the principal best 
interest and those who fail to meet the minimum criteria are eliminated (Mishra et 
al, 1998). The most common screening process most people are familiar with at 
the work place is an interview (De Loof, 1995), but there are also reference 
letters, obtaining the agent’s past histories through credit bureaus or through 











types (Huang & Capelli, 2006). If the focus is on the firm, each competing firm 
(agent) can be investigated based on its prior implementation experience, 
financial position, vendor certification of its individual consultants and other 
important factors (Hancox & Hackney, 2000; Martin, 1993; De Loof, 1995). The 
reputation of the consultants assisting the firm is also important (Wathne & 
Heide, 2000). Lastly inquiry can be made about the firm’s expertise and 
commitment in terms of technical skills, business process knowledge, 
infrastructure support, target date adherence, and after sales service in prior 
implementations (Stein, 1998).  
Screening applicants involve costs and firms decide on how much to spend on 
screening, as there are trade-offs between screening and efforts to monitor 
agents: Greater use of screening can lead to a more conscientious work force 
that can perform at a given level with less monitoring, oversight, and 
performance-related incentives (Huang & Capelli, 2006). Employers prefer 
conscientious and ethical employees and screening assists in their identification, 
but once workers with these characteristics are identified, they contribute value 
by reducing the need for monitoring costs, saving money for employers (ibid.). 
Employers may be motivated to retain these conscientious workers, by paying 
them higher compensation through rent sharing arrangements (ibid.). Therefore 
before they reach this stage principals would have used screening to sort out 
good agents from bad ones before delegating to them (Strom, 2000).  If the 
dominant agency problem is adverse selection, then ex ante mechanisms of 
screening have clear advantages (ibid.). The proposition that follows from the 
above could then be that the greater the screening (pre-qualification) efforts the 
less the adverse selection. 
These two mechanisms of signalling and screening are what the principal uses to 
contain agency losses ex ante, the remaining mechanisms to be discussed 
below operate ex post and they are utilised to contain agency losses once a 
contract has been entered into. The media reported prevalence of PDI peripheral 











traditional procurement methods that fail to identify veritable BEE-committed 
bidders and also fail ex ante to induce appropriate BEE implementation signals. It 
could also mean that the government’s oversight mechanisms are weak resulting 
in agents’ BEE clawback to maximize their own utility. 
3.3.3 Monitoring 
The choice of an oversight mechanism largely depends on the nature of agency 
problem. If the moral hazard is the greatest concern after contract signature, then 
there is a stronger case for ex post control through monitoring (Strom, 2000). 
Monitoring forces the agent to share with the principal information that the agent 
might otherwise not share (ibid.). Hidden information (adverse selection) and 
hidden action (moral hazard) represent the main sources of uncertainty and 
vulnerability for the principal (Arrow, 1985; Eisenhardt, 1989), and this legitimizes 
monitoring ex post. By monitoring the agent the moral hazard problem is 
mitigated, in simple situations complete monitoring is possible; however in most 
cases observation is either impossible or prohibitively costly to the principal 
(Holstrom, 1979).  
According to Lawther (2000) there will always be shirking in a PA relationship. 
Möllering (2006) extends this argument by asserting that what seems to be an 
ideal exchange is actually full of uncertainty and vulnerability from the principal’s 
point of view as the agent’s attitude towards risk differs from the principal’s. With 
this view in mind Jensen and Meckling (1976, p. 308) maintain that, the principal 
‘has a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best 
interest of the principal.’  However, House (1984) argues that all monitoring, even 
the use of imperfect monitoring, will improve outcomes. Since contracting is an 
ongoing process, monitoring is a key feedback mechanism (Hefetz, 2004). The 
monitoring process should start with service specification and continue with 
oversight and assessment of service delivery, and when monitoring is weak the 
output from the agent is likely to be lower than expected (Sclar, 2000; Siegel, 
1999). The principal can engage in “oversight” of the agent either through direct 











alarm oversight). The third party alternative can be implemented by introducing 
“procedural checks and balances” so that one set of agents is authorised to 
monitor and veto decisions made by other agents and report back independently 
to the principal (Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991). 
According to agency theory the agent pursues his own interests even if they are 
contrary to the principal’s goals. This goal incongruence and the desires to 
maximise own utility will induce the agent to shirk on some actions that would be 
in the best interest of the principal (Bergen et al, 2001; Tuttle et al, 1997). 
Monitoring is an important governance mechanism to assure the principal that 
the agent’s behaviour is aligned to the principal’s (Phelps, 1996). Since it is 
implemented at the post-contractual stage it assists the principal to ratify or 
appreciate the agent’s actions, at the same time it creates a social pressure on 
the agent and increases the probability and extent of the agent’s compliance 
(Blau & Scott, 1962). Monitoring controls agent behaviour and curbs post-
contractual agent opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Work done by Fama and Jensen (1983) has shown that Boards of Directors use 
monitoring to control and assess managers who make important decision in large 
organisations (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Governance mechanisms or devices 
normally deployed to monitor agents include auditors, supervisors and other 
structural arrangements (Shapiro, 2005). It has also been established by Kirby 
and Davis (1998) that unmonitored agents exhibit greater commitment to and 
allocate more funds to failed strategies than their monitored counterparts (Kirby & 
Davis 1998). In formal terms it could be said that the greater the monitoring the 
less the moral hazard. Thus the shirking on BEE implementation in South Africa 
could be regarded as a manifestation of weak monitoring mechanisms in the 
projects.  
The Measurability and programmability of tasks 
Programmability of the tasks is very important if the moral hazard problem is to 











others not so; for instance a retail sales clerk can be expected to have served ‘x’ 
number of customers within an hour whereas the productivity of hi-tech 
entrepreneur is very difficult to assess (Eisenhardt, 1989). In practice this means 
that complex jobs will not generally be evaluated through explicit contracts 
(Prendergast, 1999). The reason is that such tasks often take a long time to 
produce, involve team effort and in the end produce soft, difficult to measure 
outcomes (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
A clear specification with a clear performance evaluation is therefore preferable 
when contracting, with all the relevant attributes of a good or service, including 
latent ones associated with citizen (public) voice (Poister & Streib, 1999; Eggers, 
1997). In order to guarantee success of the project, performance measurement 
demands that professional monitoring systems must be put in place (Perrin, 
1998). Sanderson (1998) asserts that by and large performance measurement is 
usually criticized for failing to measure the two most important aspects which are 
core to good governance process, these being citizen voice and engagement 
(Sanderson, 1998). Warne and Hefetz (2002, 2003) extend this observation by 
pointing out that contracting governments give more attention to technical 
efficiency measure but not to citizen voice.  Although it is fair to accept that some 
activities might be difficult to measure, the introduction of incentives in a contract 
will always induce better performance from the agents, and thus align the 
principal/agent goals. 
3.3.4 Incentives 
In agency theory the principal uses incentives to induce the agent to do 
something that the agent would not otherwise want to do (Jamison, 1998). It may 
be possible under certain circumstances for the principal to induce the agent to 
behave exactly as the principal would if the principal had the necessary skills and 
knowledge (Laffont & Martimort, 2002; Foss, 1998). The objective is to specify 
the payments so that they depend on the observed outcome of the task such that 











manager will more likely maximise his efforts if he has a stake in the company 
(Möllering, 2006). According to PA theory “moral hazard” is based on an 
imperfect surrogate of the desired behaviour (Tuttle et al, 1997). If the incentive 
structure is not properly structured this gives the agent a motive to shirk and let 
his own economic interest diverge from those of the principal (Brown & Adams, 
2000). If the incentive structure is properly structured there will be no incentive to 
shirk because when the agent hurts the principal he hurts himself too 
(Surowiecki, 2004; Venkatesh, 2003; Basu & Lederer, 2000).  
Aligning incentives through an appropriate reward structure greatly reduces the 
conflicts of self-interest between the principal and the agent and helps to curb 
agent opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989). Greve (2008) posits that agents as 
rational maximizing individuals have certain distinct tastes, like the desire to limit 
taking risks or any costly effort. In this scenario it is the principal’s job to 
anticipate the rational responses of the agents and to design a set of incentives 
such that the agents find it in their own interests (given the incentive system) to 
take the best possible set of actions (ibid.). For instance, incentive structures in 
outsourcing contracts help to align the motives of the agents and the principals to 
facilitate project success (Bower et al, 2002). If incentives are structured well 
such that there is a balance between penalties and rewards, there will be an 
increased desired on the agents part to meet the terms of the contract, this kind 
of behaviour is consistent with the principal’s best interest (Bryson and Sullivan, 
2002). The traditional options for aligning agents goals with the principals are; 
commissions, bonuses, piece rates, equity ownership, stock options, profit 
sharing, sharecropping and deductibles (Shapiro, 2005). The proposition for 
incentives is that the greater the incentive alignment, the less the moral hazard. 
3.4 PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEM IN PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS 
Eisenhardt, (1989) cites many scholars who have utilised Principal Agent theory 
from different disciplines; accounting (Demski & Feltham, 1978), economics 











1985), political science (Mitnick, 1986), organisational behaviour (Eisenhardt, 
1985, 1988; Kosnik, 1987) and sociology (Eccles, 1985; White, 1985).  According 
to Yescombe (2007) asymmetric information which is at the centre of Principal 
Agent theory may arise in any public procurement, giving rise to the potential for 
excess profits for a private sector supplier. Correspondingly even in a PPP 
arrangement there is a Principal Agent problem, which will arise when there is 
goal incongruence between the government and its contractors (Agents); the 
private sector sees a business opportunity and the government wants the 
benefits offered by the private sector but at the least cost (Hefetz, 2004). A large 
body of literature including work done by Megginson and Netter (2001), strongly 
supports the view that privatizing publicly owned enterprises improves both 
efficiency and profitability.  
PPPs present governments with opportunities to increase efficiency but since 
contracting involves an agent, problems of adverse selection and moral hazard 
will typically arise (Slyke, 2004).  Governments essentially “hire” private agencies 
to provide goods and services on their behalf; therefore, goals of government 
and contractors must be aligned (Evans et tal, 2005). Although private firms 
unlike the public sector are independent of the government control, governments 
in situations of national distress have compelled the private firms to better utilise 
their resources for the “social interest” (Sappington & Stiglitz, 1987). In South 
Africa, consortia are required to render socio-economic benefits as part of PPP 
deliverables, as the government uses the BEE vehicle to redress racial economic 
imbalance bequeathed by apartheid. Although there is some work about PPPs in 
South Africa, their efficacy in harnessing the PA problem in BEE delivery has not 
yet been scholarly and systematically investigated.  
Nature of Black Economic Empowerment PA problem in South African construction 
Industry 
The scenario of PPPs and of the construction industry in general where the 
government is the principal and the contractor is the agent is a typical economic 











Opportunism may manifest itself pre-contractually in various forms of strategic 
misrepresentation of the true beneficiaries of the BEE contractual “set asides”, or 
post-contractually through tokenism, which is characterized by superficial 
inclusion of historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) with peripheral roles in 
the execution of the contract. All these can be encompassed under an umbrella 
term of “fronting” which according to the ICT Empowerment Charter (2005) 
means “any entity, mechanism or structure established in order to circumvent the 
BEE requirements as required under various government policy instruments”.  
Fronting is seen by the ANC (2001) as an opportunistic dishonesty that tends to 
advantageously use government redress programmes for self-interested parties. 
According to DTI (2005) it cannot be confined to one practice as it covers any 
practice or initiative that contravenes or is against the spirit of any law, provision, 
rule, procedure, process, system, policy, practice, directive, order or any other 
term or condition pertaining to BEE. This represents a deliberate or attempted 
circumvention of the BBBEE Act and the Codes, through misrepresentation of 
facts, regardless of whether such claims are made by a company that purports 
compliance or by a third party (ibid.). Fronting and “tokenism”, which represent 
superficial inclusion of historically disadvantaged individuals, may be regarded as 
strong manifestations of opportunism in the construction industry as far as BEE 
implementation is concerned. Although fronting is usually taken as an umbrella 
term, it was decided for this research to label pre-contractual fronting as 
“Window-Dressing” while post-contractual fronting will be called “tokenism”. 
Window Dressing (pre-contractual opportunism) 
This type of fronting is normally deployed pre-contractually as a way of sending 
the correct signals to the government about a company’s commitment to 
economic transformation. Usually black individuals or groups front for white 
establishments, the practices sometimes called ‘rent-a-black’ schemes are purely 
used to secure government contracts for white-owned construction companies 
(ANC, 2001). At the executive level this practice manifests itself by the planting of 











on tenders (Bayat et al, 2005). Rogerson (2004a) explains that PDIs (Previously 
Disadvantaged Individuals) businessmen are not always victims, as some might 
not have office or staff but they set themselves as ‘tender winners’ and then 
subsequently pass the job on to an established contractor. When this is not 
detected it leads to adverse selection at the detriment of the objectives of BEE. 
Table 3:1 below list all the common practices of window-dressing in South Africa. 
Tokenism (post-contractual opportunism) 
Whereas window dressing may lead to BEE adverse selection, tokenism may be 
taken as a moral hazard that exists ex post. Tokenism is shirking on the 
requirements of BEE and it sometimes takes place without knowledge of PDIs. 
Sometimes it takes place either with the complicity of PDIs or they just go along 
as it improves their economic situation although in the greater scheme of things 
the structural nature of the economy remains unchanged, as there is no real 
empowerment of the intended individuals. Usually according to Andrews (1998) it 
means appointing black candidates to positions way beyond their level of 
expertise and using that appointment as a symbol of the company’s commitment 
towards BEE. 
The DTI (2005) classifies tokenism practices into three categories, the first one 
being one of symbolic appointees who are mostly under-qualified blacks 
discouraged or inhibited from participating in the core activities of an enterprise. 
Regardless of their qualifications or purely though the company’s prejudice, PDIs 
are discouraged or inhibited from substantially participating in the stated areas 
and/or levels of their purported post (ibid.). This practice is particularly insidious 
because of the appointee’s inability to satisfactorily perform his/her duties or of 
never being treated in a way a white person similarly situated would, often 
reinforces the racial prejudice that black people would never be up to the job 
(Andrews, 1998). This leads to the second category of “benefit diversion”, where 
the economic benefits received by the company because of its BEE status do not 
flow back to the black people in the ratio specified in the contractual documents 











Table 3:1: Construction Industry Opportunistic practices 
 
Pre-contractual opportunism Post-contractual opportunism 
 Fronts on paper: where the 
documents are legitimate, but 
the “owners” are unaware of 
being shareholders (e.g. black 
maids, gardeners), have no 
control in the company and do 
not manage any aspect of the 
company 
 Company fronts: contractors claim to be 
black owned or black empowered, but 
when they are awarded the contract they 
subcontract a major portion of the works 
to a white contractor. On paper the 
majority shares are owned by blacks with 
whites owning a minority shares, 
however the minority shareholders are 
the majority shareholders in the 
subcontracted company 
 Fictitious companies: where 
the fictitious black company is 
established just to win a 
contract, only for a white 
company to be subcontracted 
all the works. The “skeleton” 
company is used for invoice 
purposes but all funds accrue 
to the subcontractor. 
 Fronts in Joint Ventures (JV): a non-BEE 
contractor forms a JV with a BEE 
emerging contractor, only to find that the 
BEE partner has no meaningful role, or 
responsibilities in the JV, if given any 
responsibility it is usually in the provision 
of labor. 
 The black people identified by 
an enterprise as its 
shareholders, executives or 
management in reality have 
roles of responsibility that 
differ significantly from those 
of their non-black peers;  
 A BEE subcontractor only conducts 
peripheral functions and does not 
perform the core functions reasonably 
expected of other, similar, enterprises  
 The black people who serve in 
executive or management 
positions in an enterprise 
would in reality be paid 
significantly lower than the 
market norm.  
 A BEE enterprise relies on a third-party 
to conduct most core functions normally 
conducted by enterprises similar to it  
 
 There is no significant 
indication of active 
participation by black people 
identified as top management 
at strategic decision making 
level.  
 A BEE subcontractor cannot operate 
independently without a third-party, 
because of contractual obligations or the 
lack of technical or operational 
competence  
  Black contractor compelled to accept the 
subcontract at lower rates while the main 
contractor charges the government much 
higher rates  
  Black sub-contractor used primarily as a 
conduit of money to a white contractor 
whom he is compelled to in turn sub-
contract. 
 
Adapted from Moloi, 2006 & DTI, 2005. 
 
The third category is one of “opportunistic intermediaries” where white owned 











intermediary’s favorable BEE status in circumstance that include substantial 
limitations or restriction on the identity of the opportunistic intermediary’s 
suppliers, service providers, clients or customers. It also includes the 
maintenance of a black business operation in a context where it is improbable 
considering the black business resources. Finally, it involves the opportunistic 
intermediary accepting unfair and unreasonable terms and conditions which are 
not negotiated at arms-length. Table 3:1 lists all the common practices of 
tokenism in South Africa. It is in this context that the South African government 
has identified the potential of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a suitable 
vehicle for developing BEE in the country (National Treasury, 2004).  
3.5 CURRENT RESEARCH CONCERNING PRINCIPAL AGENT 
PROBLEM IN PPPS 
Shi et al, (2007) acknowledges that there are currently limited studies on the 
moral hazard problem occurring in PPP projects. Where some research is done 
on the subject of PA problem specifically in government PPP concessionary 
projects, the PA theoretical framework has not been applied where there are 
secondary objectives over and above the primary objectives of infrastructure 
provision. South Africa’s unique historical legacy has compelled the country’s 
government to impose the country’s socio-economic imperatives as mandatory 
project deliverables alongside the traditional output expectations. The gap in the 
corpus of knowledge regarding this aspect of PA in concessions has initiated this 
research. The work done on the traditional projects and general government 
contracting with regard to the PA problem does provide a foundation from which 
to investigate any nuances in the behaviour of the agents in the presence of 
additional soft project output requirements. At the heart of the research is the 
acknowledgement that the asymmetric information that abounds in contracting 
favors the agent and leads to opportunistic behaviour. 
Work done by Pongsiri (2004) has attempted to demonstrate how a partnership 
model pertaining to PA relationship can be used to explain how contracting 











opportunistic behaviours. Kettl (1993) has tried to demonstrate that PPPs have 
introduced three issues into the focus; firstly government is relying on private 
partners to do the public work, secondly PPPs produce highly variable 
relationships that differ from project to project and thirdly the government’s role 
has changed from the traditional producer of goods and services to a supervisor 
of proxies who do the work. Because the contractors doing the work do not fall 
under the government’s direct chain of authority, their response to government 
expectations can only be shaped by the incentives devised by the government 
(ibid.).  
Incentives play a crucial role in mitigating the moral hazard problem, which 
Metzger (2003) in his work on government delegation, has argued has always 
been a danger in that the private actors will exploit their position in government 
programs to advance their own financial or partisan interests at the expense of 
program participants and the public.  This is to be expected because in work 
done by Raganelli and Fidone (2007) on reducing moral hazard in public works 
PPPs, the government and the private partner as rational operators have 
divergent interests.  The government, continues Raganelli and Fidone (2007) has 
two questions, firstly that of selecting the best contractor and secondly 
guaranteeing the precise carrying out of the contract. With reference to the first 
question public type procedures are employed to identify the best contracting 
partner. Regarding the second one Raganelli and Fidone (2007) suggest that 
insight be drawn from the economic literature on the theory of incentives, which 
suggests a careful study into the construction of correct contract architecture. 
There also has to be a foresight utilizing the adequate contract clauses of 
incentives and sanctions on how to induce the contractor to correctly comply with 
the contract. In PPPs (ibid.) the provision of a good quality public works should 
comply and meet the private interest of attaining corporate profit. 
Assymentric Information 
Coase (1937) in his seminal work submitted that in the real world, competition is 











laureate, extended this argument by stating “it is impossible for the behaviour of 
a single, isolated individual to reach any high degree of rationality.” Simon (1945) 
further elaborated that if individuals cannot be expected to be highly rational, 
then the organisations they work for can scarcely be any better. This  results in 
rationality being a bounded (limited) phenomenon (ibid.). The central importance 
of both Coase’s and Simon’s contributions was in defining information and the 
ubiquitous barriers in obtaining it, as the major challenge that organisations must 
overcome (Kettl, 1993). Governments frequently contract out under the premise 
that the contractor knows more and can deliver a better performance than the 
government could. This acknowledgement means the government might not 
know enough to choose the best contractor and it also gives the contractor more 
opportunity to shirk (ibid.). Kettl (1993) points to the regularity of newspaper 
reports testifying to the frequency and gravity of this problem and goes further to 
submit that the PA theory suggest that this is unavoidable. 
Kettl (1993) showed in his work that the problems of asymmetric information 
inherent in the PA relationship pose significant problems for any government that 
contracts out. It means the results are inevitably suboptimal; it further imposes 
costs, especially in monitoring, which in the end makes the whole transaction 
more expensive (ibid.). Raganelli and Fidone (2007) posited that governments 
are less informed compared to the private sector due to shortage of personnel 
and scarcity of suitable instruments enabling correct access to the information. 
This distorted distribution of information occurs both before the stipulation of a 
PPP contract and in its execution phase. The existence of asymmetric 
information entices the private partner to pursue its own interests that might be in 
conflict with the government’s, and this renders the relationship necessarily 
incomplete (ibid.). If this impediment of asymmetric information which breeds 
moral hazard were absent (Raganelli & Fidone, 2007), then the optimal contract 
would require the agent to make the effort considered most socially convenient 
for the principal, given only the respect of a constraint of acceptance of the 












However following on from Coase (1937), in the real world rationality is bounded. 
Kettl (1993) maintains that no matter how thorough the search, the government 
can never be sure that it has hired the best possible contractor. The government, 
like all principals, want to hire the best agents, however agents know more about 
their qualifications than principals can ever discover (ibid.). As a result a 
contractor that wins any bid is likely to have flaws the government will only 
discover later. This inadvertent ex ante adverse selection exposes the 
government to an inferior contractor who appears more diligent or competent 
than they really are (Uttley, 2006). Renda and Schrefler (2006) propose the best 
way to ensure that output quality is at least comparable to what would be 
expected in case of in-house public provision, is to clearly set out quality 
standards and indicators during tender procedure. A precise definition of quality 
standards does not only help in avoiding adverse selection, it also minimizes the 
attraction of low quality bidders (ibid.). However, Kettl (1993) demonstrates that 
government’s screening of contractors that informs its choice can never be 
perfect and some loss of efficiency and effectiveness (loss of utility) is inevitable.  
The basic reason for seeking to implement screening is to try to mitigate moral 
hazard problem later on during project execution. 
Moral Hazard 
Sclar (2000) has argued that given the high inherent risk of moral hazard in 
public contracting and the large amounts of taxpayers money at stake, there is 
no place in the field for business organisations with low moral standards. 
Raganelli and Fidone (2007) acknowledged that deviant behaviour by the 
concessionary can take a variety of different forms, in consideration also of the 
difficulty, in many cases, of control and verification by the government. Uttley 
(2006, p. 86) describes this ex post moral hazard as the exploitation of the 
contract by the concessionaire by doing ‘as little work as it can get away with, all 
the while sending information back to the government that suggest it is 
performing at an acceptable level’. In point of fact the quality of the project and of 











the private partner/agent (Raganelli & Fidone, 2007). It is in this context of PPPs 
that the presence of information asymmetries between the parties can give rise 
to concealed actions (moral hazard) by the concessionary, contrary to the 
interest of the government, or in any case too costly for verification of the state of 
progress (ibid.). Raganelli and Fidone (2007) maintain that the solution is 
contained in the PA models and more specifically by the theory of incentives. 
Stipulating contracts with incentives induces the agent to behave virtuously, by 
allocating rights of intervention and financial flows and controls, both during the 
phases of project execution and after its completion. Although the incentives can 
induce cooperation from the contractor the government must still take an initiative 
by monitoring what the contractor is doing on a regular basis. 
Monitoring 
Principals seek to mitigate shirking by monitoring their agents, but Kettl (1993) 
argues that no matter how much monitoring a principal does, some shirking 
persists and every dollar spent on monitoring is money diverted from the 
principal’s basic mission. However Jacoby and Mansuri (2009) in their work to 
link observed contractual forms in sharecropping to models of PA relationships, 
found that the share-tenants who are monitored by their landlords are as 
productive as owner-cultivators whereas unmonitored sharecroppers yield 18% 
less on average. Kettl (1993) observes that information asymmetry present in 
choosing the best agent carries over even more significantly in monitoring 
performance.  
Kettl (1993) extends the observation that it is imperative for principals to know 
what agents are doing, yet even if they receive reports, and complaints, observe 
the work directly, and study the agents’ general work habits, principals will never 
be in a position to be fully informed about agents’ private activities. Agents on the 
other hand have strong incentives to protect themselves – to pass on only the 
good news and hide the bad ones and to try to discourage anyone from looking 
too closely at their work. Renda and Schrefler (2006) observe that linking service 











premium, means an indirect form of public involvement particularly if 
output/outcome indicators to monitor the private agent’s performance also act as 
incentive schemes. One form of deterrent for deviant ways of acting ascribable to 
moral hazard is the provision of mechanisms of greater transparency vis-à-vis 
consumers by according them avenues for reporting any defects or irregularities 
in general (Raganelli & Fidone, 2007). Apart from this, the problem is 
compounded by the fact that good monitoring systems are hard to design, as 
there is always a danger that the principal will be inundated by paperwork (Kettl, 
1993). So too is the development of a good feedback system which does not 
interfere with the agent’s work (ibid.). If principals scrutinize agents’ operations 
too closely the principal/agent dividing line can disappear. This is compounded 
by the fact that monitoring is costly (Shi et al, 2007). At the same time agents 
cognizant of the fact that monitoring is difficult for the principal can underperform, 
knowing that they will not be detected (Kettl, 1993).  
In what Kettl (1993) calls “the monitoring problem”, the principal must try to find a 
balance between the extent of shirking they will tolerate and the amount they 
must pay in monitoring costs to achieve that level.  However, if principals do not 
make any attempt to look deeply enough, scandals and potential disaster can go 
undetected. Kettl (1993) concludes his contribution regarding this matter by 
acknowledging that asymmetric information poses a significant problem for any 
government that contracts out, as it replaces old problems of public delivery with 
new ones. Feaver (2003) acknowledges two schools of thought. One school hold 
that agents work best under “optimal” monitoring, where the incentives to shirk 
are minimized and the effort remains cost-effective, whereas the other holds that 
monitoring is inherently inefficient and it is therefore best ensuring a consilience 
of the principal’s and the agent’s goals (ibid.). In the end the critical point in 
determining the effectiveness of monitoring is the complexity of the contract. In 
simple contracts as demonstrated by Jacoby and Mansori (2009) monitoring can 
have recognizable impact. In complex and large contracts like PPPs the 
foregoing observations have demonstrated that optimal performance hinges on 












Taking into account the monitoring challenges the government faces as a 
principal, the government must draft a contract that induces the contractor as an 
agent to behave as the government wishes (Kettl, 2009). Pongsiri (2004), in his 
work on PPP projects in the oil exploration industry, points out that the crucial 
question is what should be the optimal incentive scheme for the government 
(principal) to lay down for the agent to prevent shirking and opportunistic 
behaviours. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) address this by saying in the first place 
the scheme must be attractive enough for the agent to be willing to participate in 
the venture with the government. Secondly, the contractor will behave in a self-
interested way given under the incentive scheme (ibid.). Designing inducements 
and sanctions is at the core of every relationship between the principal and the 
agent (Kettl, 1993). In government contracting the sanctions tend to be more 
substantial and more clearly spelled out, as government officials attempt to 
design payment and penalty clauses to get the contractor to deliver the desired 
product on time and at a mutually agreeable cost. 
Another hurdle to reducing shirking is that although principals supply incentives 
to induce the agent’s work (Kettl, 1993), agents always have additional interests 
that they seek to satisfy first. Kettl (1993) extends this argument by saying to one 
degree or another, shirking of duties is inevitable in PA relationships, because 
shirking could simply mean the agent does not work as hard as the principal 
believes is essential. Moreover, shirking tends to be asymmetrical as agents 
have more opportunities and incentives to shirk than principals have to control 
them (ibid.). Conflicts of interest from the minor to the major are the result, this 
according to Kettl (1993) is the greatest danger because the government can 
never know everything about its agents, it might discover serious potential 
conflicts of interest very late, if they get discovered at all. In government 
contracting, such information asymmetry is endemic (ibid.). In order to remedy 
this disincentive of the contracting firm fulfilling the mandate of the public sector 
principal Sclar (2000) proffers an alternative approach identified as “relational 











contract participants (ibid.). As an alternative to ordinary contracting, the 
relational contract is heavily based on mutual interdependence. Sclar (2000) 
demonstrates that by showing that aligning the incentives of the private sector 
with the public interest mandate of public service delivery, as measured in terms 
of costs and benefits, service delivery would undoubtedly improve. This is offered 
as a viable solution to the emerging fiscal and legitimacy crises in the public 
sector (ibid.). All these incentives must be clearly stipulated in the contract, which 
in the final analyses is the instrument that inspires and directs the relationship 
between the two parties. 
Contract 
Kettl (1993) submits that if the government as a principal does not lay down clear 
legally enforceable goals specified in the contract, there are no clear standards 
against which to measure the contractor’s performance. However defining these 
goals is at once a very important and very elusive element in the PA relationship 
(ibid.). Renda and Schrefler (2006) submit that public parties can generally rely 
on extensive experience developed through traditional public procurement 
contracts, to produce well-crafted tender requirements. In a contracting 
relationship it is of utmost importance that the goals are specified far more clearly 
in advance, and reduced to a legally enforceable language (Kettl, 1993). It is 
from these goals that the efficiency of the contract is going to be determined.  
Bindenmann (1999) has argued that a contract would be efficient if it cannot 
improve one party’s terms without making the other party worse off. 
Governments usually have hard times making sanctions stick because of 
frequently fuzzy goals (Kettl, 1993), and unclear goals give contractors an 
always-ready defense against charges of poor performance. Uttley (2006) 
submits that PPP reduces incentives for ex post supplier opportunism because 
contracts are configured to create forms of ‘gainshare’ or ‘incentivisation’ that 
provide ‘value-added’ benefits to both the government and the concessionary. 
Spitzer (2007) proffers as the “truth” that what is measured is prioritized, and 











the construction stage of a PPP contract, reliance on previous experience in 
public procurement contracts and use of accurate output indicators are the only 
operational means of control. In PA relationships Anderson et al (2008) have 
observed whenever there are aspects of an organisation’s performance that 
cannot be easily expressed in numerical terms but which are equally critical to 
the organisation’s achievements, benchmarking can be implemented to measure 
performance in order to influence behaviour. By using benchmarking, the 
principal reinforce the message and communicate more clearly, the policies it 
wants the agent to pursue (ibid.). The principal can define performance indicators 
for this purpose that will be utilised to assess behaviour and achievements of the 
agent, in pursuing the objectives defined by the principal (ibid.). If these 
performance indicators are clearly communicated (ibid.), followed up regularly, 
also in periodic agent’s performance reviews, the chances are the agent will be 
more inclined to take the policies more seriously. Alternatively, as proposed by 
Renda and Schrefler (2006), when the ex ante specification of applicable quality 
standards is unfeasible because of the peculiarities of the service/asset output 
then “competitive dialogue” procedures may present a viable and manageable 
alternative for the public sector. The use of competitive dialogue is on the 
increase (ibid.) particularly for highly complex public contracts, where the public 
party does not have predefined standards/options on how to deliver the service.  
It works by inviting bidders to propose their own solution during competition, and 
this guarantees the government access to creative and innovative approaches 
and from these the government can utilise its prerogative of defining expected 
output characteristics (ibid.). These observations have a particular resonance to 
BEE implementation on South African concessions. 
Even when goals are clear, when implementation is the agent’s private 
information, hidden action (moral hazard) could creep in, necessitating the 
principal to insert an additional constraint to try to reduce this impediment. 
Raganelli and Fidone (2007) call this the “incentive compatibility constraint” and 
they submit that this induces the agent to put the level of effort deemed optimal 











constraint is one of index-linking the payment of contractor in favor of the 
observable quality of the work once it has been carried out (ibid.). Raganelli and 
Fidone (2007) also submit that the duration of the concession acts as a 
compliance-inducing instrument, it that by lengthening the time of management 
of the concession the amount of cash flow expected of the project is increased. 
The concessionary (agent) could be induced to put a high effort if there is a 
clause that especially allows for the extension of the concession, provided there 
is a correct fulfillment of contract resulting from periodic verification conducted 
every X number of years (ibid.). 
Conclusion 
Contracting out government work always creates a moral hazard problem better 
explained by the PA model, which advocates for the pivotal role played by 
incentives in mitigating hidden action. However agents always respond to 
incentives in addition to those established in the contract (conflict-of-interest 
problem) and principals can never be able to detect and deter all shirking during 
the contract implementation (the monitoring problem) (Kettl, 1993). Competitive 
Contracting replaces traditional authority-based public management, with all the 
problems of government performance that critics have long since identified 
(ibid.). Contracting however introduces new problems, and for the competition 
prescription to work it must answer a series of questions that flow from the 
conflict-of-interest and monitoring problems (ibid.).  
Malkonen (2008) submits that PPP contracts may be appropriate instruments to 
mitigate agency problems in the public sector. Raganelli and Fidone (2007) 
assert that the PA theory provides recourse in likening the relationship between 
the government and the private partner to that of the principal and agent, and this 
enables the distorting effects of the existence of information asymmetries to be 
evidenced. These distortions according to Raganelli and Fidone (2007) can 
happen both in the phase prior to the conclusion of the contract, and in that after 
it has been stipulated and their existence harm the relationship. A mechanism of 











completed work is able to implement the optimal level of commitment by the 
private partner and this produces no inefficiencies (ibid.). This view is extended 
by Pongsiri (2004) who proclaims that in sum the PA model has contributed to 
the understanding of various kinds of mechanisms to minimize-opportunistic 
behaviours. Although the success of PPP arrangements depend on the 
performance of existing pioneer projects, Renda and Schrefler (2006) 
demonstrate that the preliminary conclusions from Europe show that as the PA 
theory suggests, PPPs can be successfully applied only to those sectors where 
service quality can be clearly specified, measured and guaranteed. In order to 
make the model workable the government must design a contract that balances 
incentives and risk sharing as well as rewards and punishments in a way that 
induces maximum effort from the private partner. 
3.6  SUMMARY 
The Principal Agent theory is a micro-economic theory that has been applied 
widely to many fields covering many disciplines. The theory helps employers to 
better understand how to induce goal congruency between themselves and their 
contractors (employees). Every employer would like to hire a diligent contractor 
(agent), and once formal relationships are established with the contractor, the 
employer would like to be certain that the contractor is doing only the contracted 
work and not shirking (doing something else). The contractor would like to get the 
project and so has an incentive to appear more diligent during the interview than 
he/she really is, and this complicates the task of picking the suitable hard working 
contractor, and in PA theory this is called adverse selection (hidden information). 
Once he/she has secured the project, the contractor has an incentive to do as 
little work as he can get away with, but he/she would be sending information to 
the employer that indicate the contract performance is at a desired level. This 
behaviour is referred to in PA theory as moral hazard (hidden action) and it 
frustrates the employer’s efforts of controlling the contractor’s (employee) effort.  
Thus the PA theory is concerned in investigating ways the employer can utilise in 











wishes in the face of the adverse selection and moral hazard problems that 
attend any agency situation (Feaver, 2003). Feaver (2003) explains the 
underlying principle of the theory as being; all principals want work to occur for 
minimum pay and all agents want to be paid for minimum work. 
Adverse selection can be minimized by instituting stringent screening 
mechanisms whilst moral hazard can be mitigated by monitoring the agent’s 
performance throughout the duration of the contract. In simple contracts 
monitoring can improve performance considerably but in complicated contracts 
shirking is to be expected especially where delivery is private information of the 
contractor. This asymmetric information leads to conflicts-of-interest as the 
contractor (agent) can use his superior knowledge to pursue other goals, which 
are in the contractor’s best interest and not necessarily beneficial to the 
employer. The role of incentives offered to the agent become critical in 
stimulating congruency between the principal and agent goals especially when 
the agent is made the resultant beneficiary of his own effort, but at the centre of 
the debate over PA theory is the selection of the most efficient contract to 
achieve the congruency of the principal/agent goal. The desirable contract is the 
one that maintains the delicate balance between incentives and sanctions meted 
on the agent to induce optimal performance that is mutually beneficial. On 
construction projects the contract takes centre stage as it is most important tool 
that guides and influences the behaviour of the contractor. PPPs in particular 
have been singled out as being the most suitable arrangement where the PA 
theory can be applied to greater effect in mitigating agency problems. The 
following observations were made with regard to the research in PA problem in 
PPPs: 
1. The quality of the project work activities in general, and ways of 
carrying it out, are known only to the private partner (agent) in PPPs. 
2. This Asymmetric information in PPPs contributes to sub-optimal 











necessitating the implementation of monitoring mechanisms in an 
effort to mitigate it. 
3. Asymmetric information abounds because of lack of personnel and 
proper instruments enabling correct access to information, in the 
government. 
4. Because of bounded rationality it would be unrealistic to expect socially 
convenient effort from the private party in PPPs in the absence of 
stringent monitoring mechanisms. 
5. Asymmetric information creates conflict-of-interest and this is a sign of 
incomplete contracts in PPPs. 
6. Monitoring is costly and ineffective. 
7. Contract goals must be specified clearly, in advance and reduced to 
legally enforceable language. 
8. Benchmarking is crucial for aspects of performance not easily put in 
numeric form. 
9. Incentive compatibility constraint, which index-links the payment of 
contractor to the observable quality of works once it is completed, 
restricts the creeping in of hidden action (moral hazard) where there is 
asymmetric information. 
10. PPP contracts may be appropriate instruments to mitigate agency 
problems in the public sector. 
11. PPPs can be successfully applied to those sectors where service 
quality can be clearly specified and measured. 
In conclusion, this chapter has investigated the relevant literature with regard to 











approach. It has been observed from many researchers that PPP provide a 
suitable platform to mitigate agency problems, especially if the outcomes can be 
measured and clearly stipulated. BEE is an expected output in the South African 
PPP arrangement. The next chapter will justify the methodology that was 












4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Research is the systematic inquiry to attain knowledge. It is a disciplined way of 
coming to know something about either oneself or one’s own world (Bourma, 
1993). Apart from settling disputes it is an effective way of satisfying one’s 
curiosity about the nature and operation of some aspect of the universe (Cooper 
& Emory, 1995; Bouma, 1993). Four different types of studies can be classed as 
research namely; reporting, description, explanation and prediction. Methodology, 
which is the process of doing research in order to gain knowledge, must be well 
laid out and clear to the researcher for the inquiry to be effective.  
“Knowledge can be defined as a description of the state or operation of 
some aspect of the universe upon which a person or group is prepared to 
act” (Bouma, 1993, p. 2). 
Any methodology must define the research process in enough detail for the 
outcomes of the research to have credibility with the readers of the research 
report. The adopted research methodology itself must be able to support its 
legitimacy based on some fundamental guiding philosophy. There are different 
methodologies based on different philosophies and they reflect the underpinning 
paradigms of the researchers. In this chapter the different paradigms and their 
merits and demerits are discussed and this will be followed by a discussion that 
justifies why a particular methodology was followed for this research and why it 
was found to be appropriate. The chapter then goes on to describe various 
research tools chosen to gather data and an explanation is given of their 
appropriateness. In essence this chapter details the methodology adopted and 
seeks to offer a justification for its adoption and ends by explaining the 













4.2 DIFFERENT RESEARCH PARADIGMS  
There is no such thing as perfect research. However there are guiding rules, the 
awareness of which can assist the researcher in doing a competent job which 
can be defended and justified if the quality of the outcomes is questioned 
(Descombe, 2002). These rules are informed by the paradigm the researcher has 
adopted.  
The concept of paradigm in the sociology and history of science was first 
introduced by Kuhn (1962). There are two major paradigms in conducting 
research; positivist and constructivist/phenomenological (ibid.). The positivist 
paradigm is rooted in the world of natural science, which has a rich history of 
rigor in the approaches adopted to formulate new theories, or test existing ones 
about the nature or the operation of particular aspects of the universe (ibid.).  
Science has been successful at providing explanations of how the world works; 
the natural sciences – physics, chemistry, biology and medicine - have all 
contributed immensely in increasing humanity’s wealth of knowledge (Descombe, 
2002). The advances in these fields have been so great that it might appear that 
there are no boundaries to what is possible to do or to know utilizing science and 
its methods of investigation (ibid.). It is that success rate that has compelled 
researchers from other fields, such as social research particularly in its formative 
years, to try to adopt the same kind of practices and reasoning that natural 
science has successfully employed (ibid.). Such aspirations are still rife within 
sections of the social research community (ibid.). The proponents of this 
approach believe that by implementing the tried and tested scientific methods, 
diagnosis of social, economic and psychological problems can be done, and 
informed advice can be presented to political leaders for appropriate solutions 
(ibid.). The application of scientific methodology is not necessarily bad, unless 
there is a blind faith in its superiority as the sole avenue of conducting any 
credible research (ibid.). It has to be acknowledged that it still remains the 











chemistry etc. and the arguments that one currently exists in a ‘postmodern’ 
world in which the old model of scientific discovery is outdated is perhaps a little 
premature (ibid.). Although the rigor of scientific method which is underpinned by 
investigative pillars like, ‘precise measurement’, ‘careful record-keeping’ and 
‘keeping an open mind’ are still regarded as fundamentals of a good research, 
there is a growing interest in pursuing a phenomenological approach in research 
(ibid.). 
Kuhn calls this development a shift in the way research is conducted (Kuhn, 
1962). Qualitative as opposed to quantitative research must be taken to be a part 
of this emerging paradigm, which includes lessons taken from theoretical physics 
and mathematics (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). This naturalistic form of inquiry, which 
is comprehensive in its scope and emphasizes elaborateness in detail plays a 
pivotal role in the recognition of the qualitative research as a legitimate way of 
conducting research (ibid.). Acceptance within the research community is slowly 
being achieved after a rigorous articulation of the methodology of qualitative 
research; and it did this by taking lead from and understanding the changes 
within the ‘hard’ sciences, which have relied heavily on the ‘traditional’ positivist 
approach (ibid.). This emerging phenomenological approach or paradigm is 
based on a very different set of underlying assumptions that differ from those that 
underpin the positivist approach. These different assumptions will be separately 
discussed below. 
4.2.1 Positivism 
The positivist way of approaching research is fundamentally different from the 
phenomenological paradigm both in the general approach to research and 
particular practices within this particular tradition. The positivist approach is 
generally concerned with generating a hypothesis, testing it and generalizing the 
findings of the research to a wider population (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). It is 
also identified with complex mathematical formulae that are seen to be important 
for their own sake and the tests for significance of the outcomes are confused to 











reality somewhere out there to be studied, captured and understood (Denzin & 
Lincoln, 1998). 
The main philosophical standpoint of positivist approach is that an observer or 
the observer’s instruments are objective. The truth about the nature of any 
segment of the universe can be found by dividing it into its simplest parts. 
Numbers are regarded as the primary source of data and the mathematical 
formulations that are employed to analyze this data play a prominent role in 
enriching humanity’s understanding and expansion of knowledge. 
4.2.2 Phenomenological Approach  
Although it has been explained above that there is an alternative way of doing 
research, which is different from the ‘traditional’ scientific approach it should be 
clear that this alternative phenomenological paradigm is equally scientific, 
although it is easy to assume that science is confined to the world of experiments 
and large random samples (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). In other words there is 
not one scientific method, but at least two scientific methods (ibid.). A 
phenomenological approach is holistic, with a primary focus on human 
experience and sustained contact with people in their natural experience 
(Munhall, 2001; Streubert & Carpenter, 1999). This sometimes calls for a high 
level of researcher involvement in the setting and the data presentation with this 
approach is very descriptive and/or narrative (ibid.). So a phenomenological 
researcher will ask the question:  
 “What is the essence of this phenomenon as experienced by these 
people? The phenomenologist assumes there is an essence that can be 
understood, in much the same way that the ethnographer assumes that 
cultures exist. The phenomenologist investigates subjective phenomena in 
the belief that essential truths about reality are grounded in people’s lived 











The dichotomy between this approach and the positivist can be appreciated in 
terms of an orientation towards a realist vs. an idealist worldview (Power and 
Knapp, 1990). Whereas positivists who are realists, believe the world can be 
perceived more or less directly. Phenomenologic idealists argue that our 
perceptions of the world are mediated through a series of distorting lenses and 
can only be known subjectively (ibid.). Whereas realists posit a material world 
that exists independent of any observers, idealists always argue that the world, in 
one way or another, exists only or fundamentally in our minds (ibid.).  
A more common and perhaps apt term in opposition to realism is constructivism 
(Gergen, 1999) or sometimes anti-realism (Okasha, 2002), neither of which reject 
outright the idea of a ‘real’ world, but argue that knowledge and meaning of the 
world is a human construction. These two research persuasions are sometimes 
referred to as positivism and interpretivism, reflecting the differing aims of 
research as, on the one hand, to directly perceive and measure the world and on 
the other, to offer a more or less subjective interpretation of it (Rolfe, 2006). So 
this qualitative/naturalistic/interpretive paradigm which is known as 
phenomenology advocates the acquisition of knowledge through the study of the 
lived experiences of the subjects, as it is difficult according to this view to 
separate the known from the knower. In other words, the study of subjects in 
their natural setting and interpreting the data found through the experiences of 
the subjects is how humanity can gain knowledge and understanding. This belief 
about the relationship between the object and the subject forms the basis of the 
epistemological or ontological orientation of phenomenologists. 
4.2.3 Levels of Understanding  
Porter (1996 p. 113- 122) describes research as being founded on four main 
levels of understanding: 
 Level 1: Ontology – What is reality? 
 Level 2: Epistemology – What counts as knowledge? 











 Level 4: Methods – How can evidence be collected about reality 
The first, ontological level is concerned with the subject matter of the research.  
The matter that is at the center of the inquiry, it asks a basic question; what is the 
nature of reality? The second is the epistemological level and it basically 
explores what counts as knowledge of the real world. The third level is 
methodological, and examines the whole process of gaining an understanding of 
reality. What are ways and channels to pursue to increase our cognitive insight 
into the matter under investigation? The fourth one enables the researcher to 
collect ‘evidence’ about the world (Porter, 1996). This last one investigates and 
justifies the right tools to use to gather evidence. In everyday experiences if one 
wants to know more about water for instance, a jar and a bucket could be used to 
draw water for analysis; but if one wants to analyze and know more about sand, 
then a shovel and a wheel barrow might be better tools to use. Going back to the 
levels of understanding in the context of this study, in level 1 one might ask what 
constitutes ‘reality’ of the PA problem in PPPs with regard to BEE? Level 2 – 
What should we regard as the knowledge of PA problem in PPPs? And Level 3 -- 
Are there means at our disposal for accessing knowledge of agent behaviour that 
will count as PA problem in PPPs? Lastly, how can we collect evidence of reality 
of PA problem with regard to BEE? Although in research all these levels could be 
grouped under the umbrella term of methodology. But in order for a research to 
have methodological clarity (Maggs-Rapport, 2001), there are decisions that 
need to be made that must be based on informed choices. The next section 
compares the two research paradigms in order to justify the one ultimately taken. 
4.3 A COMPARISON OF THE TWO PARADIGMS  
The way one understands the nature of reality directly affects the way one sees 
oneself in relation to knowledge. In other words the epistemological position 
influences how one conceives knowledge. Positivists believe that knowledge can 
be separated into parts and examined individually; if that is the case then a 











phenomenological view on the other hand is of the view that knowledge is 
constructed, and as a result the knower or researcher cannot completely be 
separated from what is known because knowledge is co-constituted. In other 
words the phenomenological approach sees the world as complex and 
interconnected, thus research must seek to maintain this complexity if any 
explanation emanating from that research is be trustworthy. It follows that the 
phenomenological position regards information as being arranged in heterarchies 
or a web of meaning. This differs to the positivist view which regards information 
as be being arranged in hierarchies, that means some things will always be on 
top (super-ordinate) and other things will always be at the bottom (subordinate) 
(Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). Closely related to the arrangement of sources of 
information is the relational functioning of elements within these two structures. 
The phenomenological position advocates for fluidity in the interactions of 
elements within a structure while the positivist view advocates mechanical forms 
of relationships (ibid.). 
The mechanical relationships in the positivist view can be likened to a one-way 
flowchart, whereas the phenomenological view advocates for a holographic form 
of relationship (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). A holographic reproduction is a 
three dimensional reproduction. This means that the two positions present a 
distinct difference regarding the nature of change. The positivist approach sees 
the sources of change as determined and potentially identifiable, because to 
change mechanically is to change by replacing individual and discrete parts 
(ibid.). The phenomenological approach sees change as indeterminate and 
therefore not identifiable. This is because rather than being a mechanical model 
the phenomenological position is morphogenetic (ibid.). Morphogenesis 
advocates for an organic change where one subtle change is affected by the next 
change in a connected and organic manner. It therefore follows that research 
results from these different approaches will be presented differently.  In positivist 
approach findings are presented as linearly causal, that is, A causes B. In the 
phenomenological approach causality is mutual, that is, A and B cause each 











from each other. In fact continuing with the analogy of a three-dimensional 
holograph, to alter or distort one part of the holographic image is to change the 
entire image, because of the interconnectedness of the individual parts that build 
up the whole (ibid.). 
Table 4:1 below provides a synopsis of the difference between these methods.  
Table 4:1: Research paradigms and characteristics 
 
Research Characteristics Positivist Paradigm Phenomenological 
Paradigm 
World view Simple Complex  
Organisation of info Hierarchic Heterarchic  
Forms of relationships Mechanical  Holographic 
Sources of change Determined Indeterminate 
Explanation Linear causal  Mutual causal 
Nature of change Assembly Morphogenesis 
Observer perspective Objective Perspectival  
 
Adapted from Maykut and Morehouse 1994  
 
Although the two methods are not necessarily competing and indeed they can at 
times compliment each other, they are at the same time very different. The first 
distinction between the two is the observer’s perspective. As mentioned above 
the positivist view regards the observer as objective, but in the phenomenological 
position the observer’s view is perspectival, in other words the observer has a 
singular perspective. Data in positivism are numbers, conversely the 
phenomenological approach is characterized by the close examination of 
people’s words, actions, and documents to determine any pattern of meaning 
coming out of this data.  The researchers within these two distinct paradigms will 
ask different questions and by necessity approach research in different ways 
(Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). As will be argued in the following section, for this 












4.4 JUSTIFICATION OF ADOPTED PARADIGM FOR 
INVESTIGATING PA PROBLEM IN PPPS  
The phenomenological approach was selected for this problem because the 
study of the behaviour of agents in PPPs settings is fundamentally a study of 
human behaviour. Human behaviour is a very complex dynamic area, which 
cannot easily be investigated mechanically with only numbers as a sole source of 
data. The researcher has to be embedded in the environment of the subjects in 
order to have a deeper meaning of the data and must gain the perspective of the 
subjects about aspects of the subject under investigation. The positivist approach 
could explain the prevalence of the phenomenon or the frequency of its 
occurrence with the assistance of the statistical techniques, but the principal 
reason for undertaking this research is to have a deeper and richer appreciation 
of the underlying reasons. It is also chiefly to find a pattern in the data gathered 
and make appropriate propositions based on the contextual data and the 
research subjects’ perspectives. A qualitative approach was deemed to be better 
suited to yield the desired results because the intention is to find meaning from 
the research subjects’ perspective and the artifacts found in their environment. 
The following description in this section will dissect the qualitative approach in 
order to qualify its deployment. 
From the onset it should be clear that the choice about the research method 
should depend on what one is trying to find out with the research rather than 
about what is good (i.e. in this case qualitative) and bad (i.e. quantitative) 
(Silverman, 2006). The phenomenological paradigm was selected in this 
research because its qualitative approach is holistic in orientation and it treats the 
phenomenon as a whole system as it searches for patterns that lie with the 
boundaries of the research environment.  
Although is the phenomenological method application is very taxing and 
exhaustive it incorporates as many different parts of the structure that affect each 
other as possible.  This produces a coherent account from a number of different 











This is a reflection of an empathetic understanding, not necessarily sympathetic, 
structure of the environment as seen through the eyes of the participants 
(Cupchik, 2001). An empathetic approach is one where an attempt is made to 
understand phenomena holistically from the perspective of the participants (ibid.). 
This phenomenological grounding is constructive in that meaning is generated 
from a world understood by researchers but who generally come from outside 
that world (ibid.). However, on the one hand to the extent that the researcher 
comes from outside the environment, there is bound to be speculative leaps in 
the search for solid coherent account of the phenomenon. On the other hand if a 
quantitative approach could be adopted, the questions asked will be a pale 
shadow of the original phenomenon as they will be too restrictive, although 
precision will be gained, it will be at a loss to subtlety (ibid.). A positivistic 
approach that relied on quantitative analysis will fail the researcher by not 
bringing up the understanding of the ‘meanings’ that are embedded in an 
environment (Filmer et al, 1972). This is where qualitative research becomes 
useful because it is by definition stronger on long narratives than on statistical 
tables (Silverman, 2006). Thus the quantitative approach is not going to be 
suitable in providing an adequate discernment. 
4.4.1 Criticism of Quantitative Approach  
The unsuitability of the quantitative positivist approach is chiefly because the 
whole research exercise could just amount to a ‘quick-fix’, involving little or no 
contact with people or the ‘field’ (Silverman, 2006). As this research is about 
understanding the behaviour of agents in order to find ways of ameliorating the 
Principal Agent (PA) problem, so there has to be some interaction with the 
agents at the ‘field’. Silverman (2006) argues that sometimes if statistical 
correlations are used in the context of naturally occurring interaction, they may 
be based on the variables that are arbitrarily defined. After-the-fact speculations 
that follow the meanings of these created correlations can involve the very 
common-sense processes that positivism tries to avoid (Cicourel, 1964). The 











research by taking on board highly problematic and unreliable concepts such as 
‘discrimination’ and ‘empowerment’. Glaser and Strauss, (1967) posit that while 
hypothises testing is important, a purely statistical logic can make hypotheses 
development a trivial matter and fail to help in generating hypotheses from data.  
While quantification of data may sometimes be useful in revealing basic social 
processes there is also the danger that it can also conceal much. Quantitative 
research is rightly concerned in establishing correlations between variables, it 
can tell us a lot about inputs and outputs. For instance in the case of PPPs, how 
many subcontractors were involved in the project and how many managed to be 
on their own in the following projects without assistance from their main 
contractor counterparts. This is a purely ‘operational’ description of the 
phenomenon and quantitative research does not have the resources to describe 
how the phenomenon is locally constituted. It cannot give an insight into the 
attitude of the agents (consortia) towards empowerment and therefore enrich the 
understanding of how the agents behave the way they do. However there are 
criticisms leveled at qualitative research as well. 
4.4.2 Criticism of Qualitative Approach  
Qualitative research is usually accused of being subjective and political, while 
quantitative research is purported to be objective and value-free (Silverman, 
2006).  Some funding agencies, according to Denzin and Lincoln (1994, p. 4) go 
as far as saying qualitative researchers are ‘journalists or soft scientists’ whose 
work is ‘termed unscientific, or only exploratory, or entirely personal and full of 
bias’. This originates from the issue of reliability of the research, especially, the 
problem that arises with how events or activities are categorized during analysis 
(Silverman, 2006).  When subjects’ activities are audio or video recorded and 
transcribed, the reliability of the interpretation of these transcripts may be 
weakened by failure to note trivial but often crucial, pauses, overlaps or 
movements. Silverman (1989) also introduces a second criticism closely related 
the one of bias above, in what is termed ‘anecdotalism’. Qualitative researchers 











the phenomenon without any attempt to analyze the less clear or contradictory 
data (Silverman, 1989). The complaint of anecdotalism questions the validity or 
the truthfulness of qualitative research. The following section counteracts these 
two main accusations. 
Countering Qualitative Approach Criticism 
The accusation of subjectivity or bias can be addressed by looking closely at this 
issue of objectivity. According to positivists, objective has come to mean true, 
factual and real. The corollary to this is that subjective means partially-true, 
tentative, and less-than-real. Taking a closer look at the word a different sense 
and meaning could be constructed from the word. An object is a thing, an entity; 
it can also be described as ‘other,’ in other words to make something an object is 
to make it into ‘other’. To be objective then is to be cold and distant. Within this 
argument framework, subjective takes on a different action and meaning.  
Phenomenologically speaking, subjective then becomes synonymous with 
agency or, put in other terms, with the actor’s perspective put through his words. 
To be subjective, therefore is to ‘tend to’ the subject. The purpose of the 
qualitative research is to get at the world of the agent or subject, through the 
speech pattern and behaviour of the agent and the specific context in which this 
behaviour occurs (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). To use another basic argument, 
even if the research methods applied by the researcher are ‘hard’ quantitative 
ones, they can never be purely objective. Humans are unable to process 
information without some degree of embedded subjective interpretation. 
Quantitative data, like qualitative data, is interpreted and often manipulated by 
the researcher and therefore incorporates subjective acts within what is a 
supposedly pure objective analysis (Westmarland, 2001). 
To counteract the second accusation of anectdotalism, it should be remembered 
that the extended immersion in the field, which is typical of qualitative research, 
leads to a certain preciousness about the validity of the researcher’s own 
interpretation (Lynch, 1984). The main goal of qualitative research is to discover 











thoughtful analysis of the research topic. Qualitative research is not concerned 
about sweeping generalisations but contextual findings, and this process of 
discovery is critical to qualitative approach philosophy (Maykut & Morehouse, 
1994). The blame that qualitative researchers selectively report on ‘telling’ 
examples can be put squarely on journal editors who continually demand shorter 
and shorter articles (Lynch, 1984). What could be happening with qualitative 
researchers is something that can happen in much the same way to natural 
sciences where, for instance, laboratory assistants have been shown to select 
‘perfect’ slides for their professor’s important lecture (ibid.). While the qualitative 
researcher will not have to confront statistics, the tasks of understanding and 
presenting qualitative research is as demanding as the task of understanding 
statistics (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994), so the accusation of anecdotalism falls 
away. What should inform the choice of either quantitative or qualitative method 
is the understanding of the requirement of the research question, rather than a 
lack of conviction about the ‘scientific’ adequacy of either method. Hence a 
discussion about differences between the two is necessary, and how the 
strengths of both could be combined to achieve greater academic rigor. 
4.4.3 Synthesising the Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 
In the context of sociology the major difference between the qualitative approach 
and quantitative approach is in the data collected. Qualitative research places 
emphasis on understating by taking a closer look at people words, actions and 
records and this is considered data. The quantitative traditional approach looks 
beyond these words, actions and records to their mathematical significance 
through the use of statistics. A major difference is not the counting or lack of 
counting of words, actions or documents but rather the meaning given to the 
words, actions or documents as interpreted through statistical analysis as 
opposed to meaning emanating from the data which is often presented in the 
subjects’ own words. Why words? Words are the product of how people interpret 
the world. Most people come to understand their situation through words, ‘we 











we defend and hide ourselves with words’ (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994, p. 18). 
The challenge with qualitative research is to find patterns within those words 
(and/or actions) while staying very close to the world as the subject’s originally 
experienced it (ibid.). If the situation is presented mathematically the whole 
experience will be stripped of its meaning as that meaning was experienced by 
the participants (ibid.). At the end of the day there is some good in going either 
the quantitative way or the qualitative way given the intention of the research. 
The choice between qualitative and quantitative approach when doing research 
is not a question of either/or. The two could even be combined in order to 
address the research topic. Another way of gaining from the strengths of 
quantitative method when doing qualitative research is to use simple, quantitative 
tabulations as a means of achieving greater validity (Silverman, 2006). This is 
because both the positivist and the phenomenological scholarly communities 
express a deep concern for ecological validity in research. That is, the extent to 
which a finding reflects an event or process in the world in a meaningful way. 
This they do while bearing burdens to their doctrinal commitments.  If the two 
approaches are independently applied they might not adequately address the 
needs of the inquiry. On the one hand, in the case of positivism, precise 
operational definitions can so deplete a studied phenomenon of its richness and 
texture that it all but disappears in the rush to actuarial prediction. On the other 
hand, phenomenologists can so link a phenomenon with a particular interpretive 
context that it runs the risk of being isolated within a collective solipsism 
(Silverman, 2006). In the words of Cupchik (2001) ‘the two communities have 
different albatrosses dangling from their epistemological necks’. In the case of 
positivists, too much measurement can transform meaning into nothingness. For 
phenomenologists in their constructivist approach, the priestly use of 
impenetrable esoteric language can generate meaning, but only to the initiated 
few (Cupchik, 2001). 
Inquiry can be treated as a kind of action engaged by researchers in the process 











systemic activity extends to all phases of the research project. From noticing a 
phenomenon, to framing the research problem, decisions about method, the 
collection and analysis of data, the interpretation of findings and their 
communication in written and sometimes oral forms (ibid.). Reconciliation must 
therefore begin with a shared notion of a social phenomena I’n-the-world’ and 
therefore of what is ‘real’. What is real is what people experience like ‘giving 
birth’. Although would ‘eating’ be a better example that most would identify with. 
But just as people can share the ‘facts’ of everyday ‘reality’, even while differing 
in interpretations of their meaning, positivist and constructivist ‘realities’ are not 
necessarily foundationally incompatible (ibid.).  
In the light of the above discussion, this section can be summed up with an 
observation that an insistence that any credible research should follow a purely 
quantitative logic would simply rule out and nullify the study of many interesting 
phenomena. Most of the phenomena that is of interest relates to what people do 
in their day-to-day lives, whether in homes, offices or other public and private 
places. A balanced view in a scholarly inquiry should accept the strengths, as 
well as the limitations of quantitative research. To simply call oneself a qualitative 
researcher settles very little (Silverman, 2006). Especially if the description is 
used merely as a sort of negative epithet – simply saying one is not a quantitative 
researcher (ibid.). As Grahame (1999) puts it: 
 “the notion that qualitative research is non-quantitative is true but 
uninformative: we need more than a negative definition” (Grahame, 1999, 
p. 4). 
In other words qualitative research is not about avoiding or downplaying 
quantitative mechanics and statistical techniques of the kind used in survey 
research or epidemiology for instance (Silverman, 2006). It should rather be 
utilised because its holistic approach is better suited in investigating certain 
phenomena about daily experiences better than a purely quantitative approach. 











of indwelling which uses humans to study humans and also its use of humans as 
instruments of analysis. This human-as-instruments has certain strengths given 
the ability of one human to empathize with another and if accorded adequate 
insight, to be able to articulate the experiences of the one studied (Polanyi, 
1969). Although this is the preferred approach it would not be a blind strict loyalty 
to qualitative approach, and imperatively excluding even the minimal use of 
quantitative techniques, which could increase robustness of the inquiry. 
4.5 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
For a researcher to firmly ground the research within a particular methodological 
discipline it is imperative to able to defend that choice (Maggs-Rapport, 2001). 
Qualitative research in the human sciences represents a diverse set of 
techniques and philosophies that underpin research practice (Silverman, 2006; 
Mason 1996). Different disciplines approach qualitative research in different 
ways. For example social anthropology has a long association with ethnography 
(Spradley, 1980), and it emphasizes the importance of the researcher’s 
immersion in the data through fieldwork and observation. In this research, which 
deals with PA problem in PPPs qualitative research was adopted because of its 
strengths in interrogating the dynamics of human behaviour and interactions. The 
qualitative approach is likely to be more effective because it adopts a posture of 
‘indwelling’ in the research environment. 
4.5.1 Indwelling  
A posture can be defined as a state taken by one person at a particular time in 
relation to other persons or thing. To indwell means to exist as an interactive 
spirit or principle – to exist within an activating spirit, force or principle. This 
literally means live within (Polanyi, 1969). In research it means to understand the 
person’s point of view from an empathic rather than sympathetic position. While 
information gathering is a common task for all research, the fundamental 
difference between quantitative and qualitative research persuasions is in the 











traditional quantitative researcher claims to achieve objectivity by looking and 
utilizing reliable and valid non-human instruments for data collection (Maykut & 
Morehouse, 1994). Quantitative research is focused on finding causal 
relationships, which are described in terms of observation statements, verification 
and prediction. On the other hand qualitative research explores human behaviour 
and the search for understanding through people’s actions. Thus the researcher 
observes and records events and relationships through text and dialogue. Once 
this data is analyzed, it may be used to throw some light on participants’ thoughts 
or ‘relationships’, clarify a specific human experience or improve understanding 
of a complex phenomenon (Porter, 1996). PA in PPPs with regards to BEE is 
about human relationships. This is a complex dynamic phenomenon, which was 
the intention of this research to explore through a qualitative approach. This was 
achieved by adopting indwelling as a posture and the human-as-instrument for 
the collection and analysis of data. 
4.5.2 Human-as-Instrument  
‘Human-as-instrument’ is a concept coined by Lincoln and Guba (1985) to 
illustrate the unique position taken by qualitative researcher and it adds on the 
Polanyi’s (1969) concept of indwelling. A person that is acting as human-as-
instrument, is the only instrument which is flexible enough to capture the 
complexity, subtlety, and the constantly changing situation that is the human 
experience. Qualitative research is about human experiences and situations 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In a PA study of PPPs the empowerment agents have 
their experiences and the intended beneficiaries their own experiences as well in 
this situation and that is one reason why this research adopted qualitative 
research to study these experiences. According to Lincoln and Guba (1985) this 
simply means that the person with all of her/his skills, experience, background 
and knowledge, as well as biases is the primary, if not the exclusive source of all 
data collection and analysis. A human instrument is responsive, adaptable and 
holistic. On top of that a human investigator has a knowledge-based experience 











can explore the atypical and idiosyncratic responses in ways that are not 
possible for any rigid instrument constructed prior to the commencement of the 
inquiry. Quantitative researchers assume the world can be broken into simpler 
parts, enabling observation by less-complex non-human instruments. This is 
because they view reality including human behaviour as quantifiable, as objective 
and as divisible into still smaller parts without distorting the phenomena being 
investigated. 
The reality of human behaviour is that it is not predictable nor is it pre-
determinable. Polanyi (1969) puts the complexity of human observation in these 
terms: 
”As we proceed to survey the ascending stages of life, our subject matter 
will tend to include more and more of the very faculties on which we rely 
for understanding it. We realize then that what we observe about the 
capacities of living beings must be consonant with our reliance on the 
same capacities for observing it” (Polanyi, 1969 p. 365). 
In other words the subject is as complex as the observer. This refutes the notion 
that static one-dimensional instruments can adequately capture human beings 
and their situations. If then, one cannot capture humans and human situations 
with a single instrument or a single observation, what is the researcher to do? 
The answer from the point of view of the phenomenological perspective is 
indwelling (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). This again is the research framework 
adopted in this research as the PA phenomenon is investigated in PPPs. The 
complexity of human behaviour makes indwelling indispensable in learning 
significant aspects of reality (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). These complexities cannot 
be figured out, cannot be understood by one-dimensional, reductionist 
approaches; they demand the human-as-instrument and they also demand 
indwelling. In one sentence it could be restated that the human instrument is the 
only data collection instrument, which is multifaceted enough and complex 











Sections 4.4 and 4.5 above have both discussed the justification of adopting a 
phenomenological approach in this research. Although the data in this research 
will be mostly qualitative, this was compared against quantitative data collection 
methods to see how the two could be combined to bring sufficient rigor in the 
inquiry. The synthesis of the two data collection methods was explained after 
weakness and criticisms of each approach were discussed. Synthesis was 
introduced in order for qualitative method to be bolstered by a quantitative 
method, not because of the inadequacy of the former, but because of its 
limitations given the complexity of the research. The following section discusses 
the research strategies that will be deployed, and the justification of a selected 
method. 
4.6 RESEARCH METHOD JUSTIFICATION 
Having discussed the choice of research paradigms, it is necessary to discuss 
the choice of research methods. These are the tools researchers gather 
information with. It is therefore imperative that the right tools are deployed if the 
research question is to be adequately addressed at the end of the research. 
Before the methods are selected researchers should be aware of what they are 
trying to research, or the essence of the research question. Fetterman (1998) 
argues that in essence, the problem or its definition should be the driving force 
behind the research exercise. The problem must precede the selection of a 
research method to avoid the trap of having a method in search of a problem – a 
situation that produces very frustrating and imprecise results.  
There are fundamentally two types of research questions in social science: (1) 
What is going on (descriptive research)? (2) Why is it going on (explanatory 
research)? (de Vaus, 2001). These questions are pertinent in this research 











4.6.1 Descriptive Research  
Although sometimes simply dismissed as ‘mere description’ good descriptive 
research has added immensely to our understanding and knowledge of the 
shape and nature of our society.  Descriptions can either be concrete or abstract 
(de Vaus, 2001). A relatively concrete description can for instance simply 
describe the racial mix of company owners in PPP projects. An abstract question 
in this context might be ‘is there a higher racial tolerance in PPPs than in ordinary 
contracts’? By demonstrating the existence of social problems competent 
description can challenge accepted assumptions about the way things are, and 
can, provoke action. In other words it can provoke the ‘why’ questions of 
explanatory research.  If the research is engaged in a mindless fact gathering, 
what Mills (1959) calls ‘abstracted empiricism’, then unfocused surveys or case 
studies can report trivial information and fail to provoke any ‘why’ questions or 
any basis for generalisation. This however, is a function of ill-defined research 
which leads to inconsequential descriptions, rather than a blanket indictment of 
descriptive research itself (Mills, 1959). 
4.6.2 Explanatory Research  
Explanatory research focuses on ‘why’ questions. The way research design is 
developed is fundamentally affected by whether the research question is 
descriptive or explanatory. It greatly affects what information is collected. If a 
problem is identified and there is a decision to research that problem normally a 
researcher will have a ‘hunch’ about the source of the problem. So answering the 
‘why’ questions involves developing causal explanations (de Vaus, 2001). Causal 
explanations argue that phenomenon X is affected by factor Z. So in the context 
of this research it will be investigated, from the participants’ point of view, as to 
what extend the environment (PPP) influences the implementation of the BEE 
using the agents (white owned consortia). Parts of the research have some 
descriptive elements, that is establishing that empowerment agents (white-owned 











of the research through interviews tries to find out why’ this was so. In order to 
achieve this, the right research tools were identified and their utilisation justified. 
4.6.2.1 Research Methods  
There are four research methods that could be applied in the study of 
organisational operations; action research, ethnography, grounded theory and 
case study. They are normally deployed where researchers want to understand 
individual and group experiences at work (Cassel & Symon, 1994) and where 
research questions focus on organisational processes and outcomes. Yin (1994) 
stipulates three major reasons that should influence a choice of a research 
strategy see (Table 4:2 below). 
Table 4:2 :Different Research Strategies 
 








Experiment How,why Yes yes 
Survey  Who, what , 
where, how many, 
how much  
No yes 
Archival analysis Who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much 
No Yes/no 
History How, why  No no 
Case study  How, why  No  yes 
 
Adapted from Yin (1994) – Relevant situations for different research strategies. 
 
Yin (1994) cites the main reasons for selecting a research method as firstly the 
type of question posed; a ‘what’ question for instance would be better addressed 
by a survey other than a case study. The second reason is the extent of control a 
researcher has over the behavioural events of subjects/participants. In an 
experiment, there is control of the behaviour of the subjects whereas by definition 
this does not exist at all in a case study. Lastly a focus on contemporary as 











(Yin, 1994). The research methods are discussed below to determine their 
suitability. 
Action Research 
Action research’s most fundamental tenet is that to make research relevant, 
researchers should try out their theories with practitioners in real situations and 
real organisations. In action research, research informs practice and practice 
informs research synergistically (Avison et al, 1999). Within a mutually 
acceptable ethical framework, action research combines theory and practice, in 
other words researchers and practitioners, through change and reflection in an 
immediate problematic situation (ibid.). It is an iterative process where these two 
groups of people work together on a particular cycle of activities, including 
problem diagnosis, action intervention and reflective learning (Avison et al, 1999) 
Explicit criteria set at the beginning of the research is used to judge its outcome, 
as are ways to manage alterations in this criteria as part of the process of 
problem diagnosis, action intervention and reflective learning. In this process 
there is a delicate balancing act to avoid the whole operation just becoming an 
action but not research or simply a research that is not necessarily action 
research (ibid.).  
Unlike most research that provides descriptive theory, action research is 
basically prescriptive theorizing (see Table 4:3 below). It is a kind of research 
that is targeted at improving both practitioners’ and organisational performance. It 
prescribes how an organisation should work, and not only simply finding how it 
works and why it works in a certain way. It is more like a consultative initiative 
because behavioural change in the organisation is expected and that becomes 
part of the success of the research (Tsang, 1997). The purpose of this research 
is to provide a description and assessment of the prevalence of the PA problem 
in PPPs vis-a-vis ordinary contractual arrangements. The aim is therefore to 
improve the body of knowledge about this phenomenon as it exists in PPPs, but 











ameliorating it. As such this method was not considered to be appropriate for this 
kind of research. 
Table 4:3: Dichotomy Between Descriptive and Prescriptive Theorizing 
 
 Descriptive writings on 
organisational learning 
Prescriptive writings on 
the learning 
organisation 
Key question How does an 
organisation learn? 
How should an 
organisation learn? 
Target audience  Academics Practitioners 
Objective Theory building Improving organisations 
performance 
Source of information Systematic data 
collection 
Consulting experience 
Methodology Rigorous research 
methods 
Rough case study and 
action research 
Generalisation Aware of the factors 
limiting the 
generalizability  
of research results 
Tendency to 
overgeneralize a theory 
to all types of 
organisations 







Can be positive or 
negative 
Taken to be positive 
 
Adapted from Tsang, 1997 
 
Ethnography 
Ethnography emanates from the descriptive research of non-literate peoples, as 
part of the term ‘ethno-from ethnic’ suggests (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952). One of the 
earliest classics in this genre is a work by Whyte (1943), which was investigating 
the social structure of an Italian slum in Boston Massachusetts, in the USA. 
However this method has since grown from the study of indigenous/isolated 
peoples, to include any study whose research question generally concerns the 
link between culture and behaviour and/or how cultural processes develop over 
time. In order to address these research questions, ethnographers often live 
among the people they are studying for a considerable amount of time. While in 











participate as much as possible in ordinary daily lives of the participants while 
learning as much as they can about that culture and environment. As Fetterman 
(1998, ix) puts it, ‘is more than a 1-day hike through the woods. It is an ambitious 
journey through the complex world of social interaction’ (Fetterman, 1998). The 
fieldwork in this kind of research has been represented as both a scientific 
‘laboratory’ and a personal ‘rite of passage’. These two metaphors capture 
precisely this genre impossible attempt at fusing objective and subjective 
practices. The researcher treats the field as a scientific laboratory, which can be 
observed objectively, at the same time the very same researcher has to be 
‘initiated’ into the culture and be part of it. This poses fundamental problems for 
any science that seeks to move predominantly from the particular to the general. 
In this case personal truths of experiences can be used as examples of typical 
phenomena or as excerptions to collective patterns (Roth, 1989). 
The main aim of ethnography is to find how cultural values influence behavioural 
patterns at the participants’ environment. In the context of this research culture is 
not a major concern although it would be interesting to find out how it influences 
the agent in the project. The prolonged period of time in trying to have a thorough 
understanding of the ‘culture’ of participants in the projects militates against the 
use of this method. Subjectivity could creep in and compromise the validity of the 
outcomes as the researcher juggles between the dual role of being a participant 
and an outsider. Hamilton (2007) had this problem in ‘Muck and magic’, “I had to 
work at becoming a ‘stranger’, learning to become a virtual outsider by visualizing 
the everyday discourses of working life as ‘data’ (Hamilton, 2007 p. 488). For the 
reasons stipulated above this approach was not utilised. 
Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory has its foundation in the seminal work of Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) and the more recent developments of the method of Strauss and Corbin 
(1998a, 1998b). Glaser and Strauss, and to a great extent Strauss and Corbin 
emphasize theory generating through the construction of conceptual categories 











approach inductive, which means it moves from the specific to the more general. 
According to Glaser (1998), what distinguishes this method from others is that 
the theory generated is explicitly emergent as it is discovered in the data. The 
method does not test a hypothesis, rather is sets to find out what theory accounts 
for the research situation as it is. It provides an understanding of the research 
situation by discovering the theory implicit in the data. This mode of qualitative 
study (Strauss & Corbin, 1997) has spread from its original use by sociologists to 
the other social sciences, and to practitioner fields like accounting, business 
management and education. 
The test to establish the generality and factualness of a concept is through 
comparative analysis, where incidents are categorized, their properties identified 
and then models are constructed. The careful execution of these set of steps 
according to Strauss (1998a), is thought to “guarantee” a good theory as the 
outcome. It is maintained by the architects of grounded theory that the quality of 
the theory can be evaluated by the process by which a theory is constructed. 
This contrasts with the scientific perspective that how a theory is generated is 
irrelevant; whether through dreams, analogies or sheer luck, the quality of a 
theory is determined by its ability to explain new data. 
Grounded theory specifically attempts to investigate the real world mainly 
through the use of interviews as the source of data. It does this by discovering 
concepts ‘grounded’ in the data. Those concepts ‘’grounded’ in the data are used 
to build theory; this is because data analysis involves searching for concepts 
behind the actualities, recorded in the data (Allan, 2003). The approach taken in 
this research is interpretivist, in that the interest is trying to find how people make 
sense of the world around them, and discovering the motives that lie behind 
people’s actions. The PA manifests itself by peoples’ actions and to understand 
the motives behind those actions an interpretivist approach is appropriate. To be 
able to do that and ‘empathize’ with participants’ views, the tools of grounded 
theory was considered to be very useful in this research as its medium of 











prominent role in this research as it was chiefly people and their behaviour the 
research was concerned about and that can only be known through talking to 
them. This method, originally called ‘constant comparative data analysis 
technique’ is useful in creating theory which is the main criticism against case 
study, were it to be deployed alone in this inquiry. The premier criticism against 
case study is the one of the lack of generalizability of case study findings. Thus a 
decision was taken to combine the two methods if needs be as research unfolds, 
with the case study as an overarching method and grounded theory embedded in 
it. 
Case Study 
Case studies are defined in very many different ways and there is no standard 
definition. However a definition compiled from a number of sources will help 
explain the modus operandi of this method. A synthesis from a number of writers 
runs in the following fashion: 
A case study examines a phenomenon in its natural setting, employing 
multiple methods of data collection to gather information from one or a few 
entities (people, groups or organisations). The boundaries of the 
phenomenon are not clearly evident at the outset of the research and no 
experimental control or manipulation is used. (Bonoma, 1985; Kaplan, 
1985; Benhasat, 1984; Yin, 1984; Stone, 1978). 
As can be seen from Table 4:1 above, case studies are the preferred method 
when the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are being asked, when the researcher has 
minimal control over activities and when the main focus of the inquiry is on a 
contemporary phenomenon in the real-life every day context (Yin, 1994; 
Benbasat et al, 1987). The same is also true if there is no strong theoretical base 
for the research, i.e. if it is a theory building research project. "A rich and natural 
setting can be fertile ground for generating theories" (Benbasat et al, 1987 
p.370). There are however, traditional criticisms to this method that is why great 











Case studies require multiple data collection methods, whose results will 
hopefully converge in establishing construct validity. Stake (1995) and Yin, 
(1994) identified at least six and they are as follows: 
 Documents 
 Archival records 
 Interviews 
 Direct observation 
 Participant-observation 
 Physical artifacts 
Documents could be letters, memoranda, agendas, administrative documents, 
newspaper articles or any piece of evidence that is considered germane to the 
inquiry. In the interest of triangulation of evidence, the documents serve to 
corroborate the evidence from other sources. Documents are useful for making 
inferences about events. When these documents are communications between 
parties in the study, the researcher is just a vicarious observer, if this stance is 
maintained (Tellis, 1997) the investigator will avoid being misled. Archival 
documents could be records, organisational records, lists of names, survey data 
and other related documents. Interviews are one of the most important sources 
of case study information, and they could be open-ended, focused and 
structured/ survey. Direct observation happens when a researcher visits the site. 
The visit could be casual in the course of collecting data or as part of a formal 
protocol to measure and record behaviours. These visits provide additional 
information about the topic under investigation. If research observations are 
made during these visits Glesene and Peshkin (1992) recommend that 
researchers should be as ‘unobtrusive as the wallpaper’. Participant-observation 
and physical artefacts would not be of much help in this study; Participant-
observation is useful in the studies of neighborhoods and groups. Its main 
disadvantage is that apart from requiring a huge investment in time, the 
researcher could well alter the normal behaviour and course of events in the 











tools, instruments or physical evidence that may be collected during a field visit 
(Tillis, 1997). The very nature of this inquiry makes this source of evidence not to 
be of much relevance. Yin (1994) supports this position that not all sources are 
relevant for all cases. 
Most of the above data collection methods could be used in examining 
contemporary events, when relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated. They all 
provide useful information in the form of documents, interviews and observations 
which could all be used in one case study at the same time. This allows the 
investigator to gain a holistic and meaningful appreciation of the characteristics of 
real-life events – such as individual life cycles, organisational and managerial 
processes (Yin, 1994). It is for this reason that a case study was found relevant 
to investigate PA in PPPs as the investigation is going to yield a holistic picture of 
this dynamic phenomenon. However it has to be accepted as articulated by Yin 
(1994) above that there is a lot of criticism meted against a case study as a 
method. In the following section these criticisms will be discussed, justification 
will be made why they are mostly unfounded and at the same time justification of 
the adoption of case study method will be made. It was intended in this research 
to adopt case study as the main method of enquiry, but to accommodate the use 
of tools from grounded theory should the emergence of unanticipated 
phenomena during data analysis occur.  
Utilising Grounded Theory methods within a Case Study 
The tools of grounded theory are primarily concerned with analyzing interview 
transcripts, whereas case study methodology has the freedom to use other forms 
of data including interviews. However there are criticisms to both methods. 
Grounded Theory is criticized for the bias that is claimed to be prevalent in 
interviews. Case studies are also criticized for a number of reasons (see section 
4.6.3 below). In this instance it was decided that case study would be adopted at 
the methodology, providing the framework for collecting the data, but that 
grounded theory tools for analyzing the data would be utilised. What unfolded 










the manifestation of the PA behaviour among established consortia members 
(agents). When the shortcomings of the PA theory were observed in explaining 
the totality of the agents’ behaviour, grounded theory methods could then be 
deployed as a supplementary analysis within the case study in identifying the 
presence of the unanticipated phenomenon and in the building of theory to 
explain the presence of that phenomenon.  
When precautionary measures are taken to mitigate weaknesses in these two 
methods separately, it is proposed that their combined strengths will bolster their 
case against their traditional detractors. In other words the proposed approach is 
to have the case study as a main method but using grounded theory in the 
‘critical case’ to generate theory, which will arguably give the ‘critical case’ even a 
wider acceptance. This approach is supported by Allan (2003) as being valid 
where the phenomenal being investigated is a contemporary one in a real-life 
context, where the boundaries between phenomena and context are not clear. It 
is argued here that such a situation exists in this research. As seen above in an 
argument presented by Benbasat et al. (1987) and will even be clearer below. 
(Section 4.6.3), that the idea of generating theory in case study is not novel. 
However, it is also worthwhile for this research to briefly discuss also the 
tensions between these two methods.  Yin (1994, p. 13) suggested that the case 
study ‘benefits from the prior development of the theoretical propositions to guide 
data collection and analysis’ whereas Glaser and Strauss (1967) insisted that a 
grounded theory approach should have no pre-conceived ideas or hypothesis. 
One of the criticisms of a case study as a research method is that one cannot 
generalize its findings but Yin (1994) defends an alternative position that case 
studies do lead to building theories applicable to the world at large. While 
grounded theory specifically attempts to investigate the real world, usually 
through interviews, it discovers the concepts grounded in the data and uses 
those concepts to build theory. Drawing from both of these methods, according to 
Allan (2003) minimizes the criticism of case study’s lack of generalisability. There 











use of grounded theory tools in analysis, especially because, as Allan (2003) 
notes, both research methods collect data using interviews. 
4.6.3 JUSTIFICATION OF THE LEGITIMACY OF CASE STUDY AS A 
METHOD 
Flyvbjerg (2006) calls the following criticisms misunderstandings or over-
simplifications of the case study method: 
1. General, theoretical (context-independent) knowledge is more valuable 
that concrete, practical (context-dependent) knowledge 
2. One cannot generalize on the basis of an individual case; therefore, 
the case study cannot contribute to scientific development 
3. The case study is most useful for generating hypothesis; that is, in the 
first stage of a total research process, whereas other methods are 
more suitable for hypothesis testing and theory building. 
4. The case study contains a bias toward verification, that is, a tendency 
to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions. 
5. It is often difficult to summarize and develop general propositions and 
theories on the basis of specific studies. 
4.6.4 General Theoretical Context-Independent Knowledge vs. 
Practical Context-Dependent Knowledge  
In order to understand to understand why in the conventional view the role of 
context-dependent knowledge found in case studies is criticized, it is important to 
grasp the role of cases and theory in human learning in general. According to 
Flyvbjerg (2001), research on learning shows that the type of context-dependent 
knowledge found in case studies help researchers, to develop from rule-based 
beginners to virtuoso experts. Secondly in the study of human affairs there 
appears to exist only context-dependent knowledge, which presently rules out 











Phenomenological studies of human learning demonstrate that adults take a 
qualitative leap in their learning process from beginner rule-governed use of 
analytical rationality to fluid performers of tacit skills (Flyvbjerg, 2006) in what 
Bourdieu (1977) calls virtuosos and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) calls ‘true 
human experts’. Flyvbjerg (2006) contests that people are experts in a number of 
everyday activities whether social or technical, like giving a gift or riding a bicycle. 
With giving a gift for instance we get to know when to give it and what gift is 
suitable to whom. Only few people reach the level of expertise in specialized 
fields like playing chess or flying a fighter jet. However common to all these 
experts is that they operate on the basis of intimate knowledge of several 
thousand concrete cases in their areas of expertise. Thus context-dependent 
knowledge and experience are at the very heart of expert activity. It is that very 
same knowledge that lies at the heart of a case study as a research and teaching 
method. It is in experience gained from cases that one can move from a beginner 
to an expert. If all training was based in context-independent knowledge and 
rules, such as the one found in textbooks and computers, people would remain at 
the beginner level in the learning process. This is where the limitations of 
analytical rationality lie; and this is inadequate for an exercise of a profession, 
research and for practitioners (ibid.). In teaching, well-chosen case studies help 
in bringing competence compared to context-independent facts and rules which 
just bring students to the beginner’s level (Christensen, 1987). Nevertheless rule-
based knowledge is not to be discounted as it is important in all the areas 
especially to beginners. But Flyvbjerg (2006) argues that to make it the highest 
goal of learning is regressive. Although there is a need for both approaches, the 
highest levels of learning are reached by the person’s own experiences. Thus for 
research the closeness of a case study to real-life everyday experiences and its 
multiple wealth of details has two benefits. Firstly it gives a nuanced view of 
reality, and it yields a rich detail of human behaviour, which cannot meaningfully 
be understood as simply the rule governed acts, found at the lower levels of the 
learning process and theory. Secondly, cases are crucial for researchers own 











experiences in case studies are achieved via continued proximity to the studied 
reality and via feedback from those under study. Lastly, the main point in 
connection with the learning process is that there does not, and according to 
Campbell (1975), cannot exist any predictive theory in social science. Social 
science has not succeeded in producing general context-independent theory, it 
can only offer concrete context-dependent knowledge. The case study is 
especially well suited for that purpose. That is why it was chosen to be a method 
in this research, because it gives that intimate in-depth knowledge that helps the 
researcher to capture the minute nuances of a complex phenomenon such as 
human behaviour, as PA problem is. 
4.6.5 Lack of Generalizability of Case Study Findings  
There is a prevalent view that one cannot generalize on the basis of one case, 
and this has always been considered devastating to the case study as a scientific 
method. Giddens (1984) for instance argues that the case study outcomes can 
only be acceptable if they are repeated across a number of cases (Giddens, 
1984). According to Flyvbjerg (2006) this view is both appropriate and valuable, 
but it would be incorrect to assert that this is the only way to work, just as it is 
incorrect to conclude that it is impossible to generalize from a single case study. 
It basically depends on the case and how it was chosen. This applies to the 
natural sciences as well as the study of human affairs (ibid.). 
To support this point Flyvbjerg (2006) takes Galileo’s rejection of Aristotle’s law 
of gravity. Galileo’s rejection was consisted primarily on a conceptual experiment 
and later on a practical one. It was not based on a wide rage of observations 
carried out in large numbers. Although the Aristotelian view of gravity held sway 
for 2000 years, it operated in a counter-intuitive way for Galileo. Galileo 
reasoned: if two objects with the same weight are released from the same height 
they will hit the ground simultaneously. If the two objects are stuck together the 
‘new’ object’s weight will be double the first individual two and it will hit the 











and the only way to settle this in his mind was to remove weight as determinant 
factor for acceleration in free fall. Although it is still debatable whether Galileo 
actually performed the famous experiment from the top of the tower of Pizza or 
not, the fact of the matter is that the issue was settled by a single experiment - a 
case (ibid.). Galileo’s experimentalism did not involve a large random sample of 
trials of objects falling from a wide range of randomly selected heights under 
varying wind conditions and so on. Galileo’s views were not fully accepted 
though, until half a century later with the invention of a vacuum pump (ibid.). Here 
two objects; a piece of lead and a feather were allowed to drop inside a vacuum 
tube at the same time, and they both hit the bottom at the same time. After this 
Aristotle’s view could not be held any longer. But the matter was solved by a 
single experiment; an ‘individual’ case because of the clever choice of the 
extremes, a metal and a feather. This experiment might be called a ‘Critical 
Case’, in other words if Galileo’s thesis held for these materials, it could be 
expected to be valid for all or a larger range of materials. Carefully chosen 
experiments (cases) and experience were also critical to the development of the 
physics of Newton, Einstein, and Bohr. The case study also played a pivotal role 
in the works of Darwin, Marx, and Freud. In the social science in the same 
manner (Flyvbjerg, 2006), the strategic choice of a case may greatly add to the 
generalizability of a case study. On the relationship between case studies, large 
samples and discoveries Beveridge (quoted in Kuper and Kuper, 1985, p. 95) 
had this to say: ‘more discoveries have arisen from intense observation than from 
statistics applied to large group’. However this observation (Flyvbjerg, 2006) 
should not be taken to mean that the case study is always appropriate or relevant 
as a research method or large random samples are without value.  
Generalisation, whether on the basis of large samples or single cases, is 
overrated as the premier source of scientific progress. Thomas Kuhn (1987) 
posits that what is an important precondition for science researchers is that they 
possess practical skills for carrying out their work, not any form of self-declared 
adherence to the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific inquiry. One of the 











ways by which people gain and accumulate knowledge, but it does not mean that 
any knowledge which cannot be formally generalized cannot enter into the 
collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or even society. 
A purely descriptive, phenomenological case study without any attempt to 
generalize can be of great value in this process. This is not to criticize and 
condemn formal generalisation, as it is sometimes the only and effective means 
of scientific development. The main point here is that there are limitations when 
formal generalisation becomes the only legitimate method of scientific inquiry. 
Eckstein (1975) has shown that if predictive theories would exist in social science 
then the case study could be used to test those theories just as other methods 
would. Walton (1992, p. 129) similarly observed that ‘case studies are likely to 
produce the best theory’. According to Popper (1959) case studies are ideal for 
generalizing using the type of test called “falsification,” which in the social 
science is part of critical reflexivity (Popper, 1959). Falsification is one of the 
most rigorous tests (Flyvbjerg, 2006) to which a scientific hypothesis can be 
subjected. If just one observation does not fit the proposition, the proposition is 
considered not valid generally and must therefore be either revised or rejected.  
Popper used in his seminal work this now famous example: ‘all swans are white’, 
and proposed that just one observation of a black swan was enough to falsify this 
proposition and stimulate further investigation and theory building. Because of its 
in-depth approach a case study is well suited for identifying ‘black swans’, 
because what appear ‘white’ may turn out to be ‘black’ on closer examination 
(ibid.).  
4.6.6 Case Study only Useful for Generating Hypotheses  
This misunderstanding about case studies derives from the previous 
misunderstanding that one cannot generalize on the basis of individual cases. It 
logically follows that if one cannot generalize on the basis of just one case, then 
the case studies are just useful in the initial stages of a research where a 











wisdom by asserting that case studies ‘are valuable at all stages of the theory-
building process, but most valuable at that stage of theory-building where least 
value is generally attached to them: the stage at which candidate theories are 
tested’ (Eckstein, 1975, p. 80). The testing of the hypotheses is directly related to 
the question of ‘generalisability’ and in turn this relates to the question of case 
selection (Flyvbjerg, 2006).  
Generalizability of cases studies can be increased by the strategic selection of 
cases (Ragin, 1992, Rosch, 1978). When the objective of the research is to 
obtain the greatest amount of information on a given problem or phenomenon, a 
representative or a random sample may not be the most appropriate approach. 
The typical or average cases are not the richest sources of information, but 
atypical or extreme cases are. This is because atypical and extreme cases reveal 
more information because they activate more actors and more basic 
mechanisms in the situation studied. Both from an understanding and an action-
oriented perspective, it is often more important to clarify the deeper causes 
behind a given problem and its consequences than to describe the symptoms of 
the problem and how frequently they occur. Randomly selected cases will 
seldom produce this kind of insight; it is more appropriate to select few cases 
chosen for their validity (Flyvbjerg, 2006). The extreme cases are well suited for 
getting the point across in an especially dramatic way (Freud’s, 2003; Foucault’s, 
1979). The lead and feather example cited above could be taken as a classic 
example of a critical case. In order to test whether different objects fall with equal 
velocity, the selection of materials provided the possibility to come up with a 
generalisation characteristic of critical cases: “if it is valid for this case it is valid 
for all (or many) cases.” The same generalisation in its negative form could go 
like this: “if is not valid for this case, then it is not valid for any (or only few) 
cases.”  
But the major problem is, how does a researcher identify a critical case? This is 
equally difficult when answering a similar question, ‘what constitutes a critical 











methodological principles exist by which one can identify a critical case. The best 
advice in locating a critical case is to look for either “most likely” or “least likely” 
cases. Those are the cases capable of either incontrovertibly confirming the 
proposition or irrefutably falsifying it (Flyvbjerg, 2006). A classic case of “least 
likely” case is Michels’s (1962) study of oligarchy in organisations. Here Michel 
chose a horizontally structured grassroots organisation with strong democratic 
ideas, an organisation one would logically think would have a low probability of 
being oligarchical. A test in this research would be “If this organisation is 
oligarchic, so are most others.” Conversely a “most likely” case is Whyte’s (1943) 
study of an Italian slum in Boston cited above. This society according to existing 
theory should have demonstrated a stark disorganisation, but in fact showed 
quite the opposite. If organisation exists here where it was expected not to exist 
then social organisation exists everywhere, or in most areas as discussed before. 
So from the above explanation it is clear that case studies can generate and test 
a proposition, which leads to theory creation. That puts them on par with other 
strategies as a legitimate scientific method. 
4.6.7 Case Studies Contain a Subjective Bias  
Another criticism towards this method is that case studies have a bias toward 
verification in that they give a researcher more room to use the method to 
confirm the preconceived notions. If this were true then case studies would have 
a doubtful scientific value. The bias towards verification is everywhere (Flyvbjorg 
(2006), but the accusation against the case study and other qualitative methods 
is they ostensibly give more room for subjective and arbitrary judgments than 
other methods. This stems from the fact that they are seen as less rigorous than 
quantitative, hypothetico-deductive methods. Experienced researchers like 
Flyvbjerg (2001, 1998), Geertz (1995), Ragin (1992), Wieviorka (1992) and 
Campbell (1975), have shown that this critique is fallacious, that this form of 
study has its own rigor, albeit different, but no less strict and thorough than the 











‘close in’ on real life situations and test views directly in relation to phenomena in 
practice.  
The very researchers cited above who have conducted intensive, in-depth case 
studies typically report that their preconceived views, assumptions, concepts, 
and hypotheses were wrong and that the case material has compelled them to 
revise their hypotheses on essential points. According to these experiences cited 
above it is falsification, not verification that characterizes the case study. The 
issue of subjectivism and bias is a universal problem prevalent in all methods, 
not just case study or other qualitative methods. Specifically the element of 
subjectivism will be significant in the choice of categories and variables for a 
quantitative or structural investigation, such as a structured questionnaire used 
across a large number of cases. According to Flyvbjerg (2006) there is a high 
probability that firstly, this subjectivism will survive without detection throughout 
the study. Secondly, that this subjectivism will affect the results simply because 
the quantitative/structural researcher does not get as close to those under study 
as does the case-study researcher, and is less likely to be corrected by the study 
subjects “talking back.” 
If the researcher’s work is to understand and learn about the phenomenon that is 
the subject of research, then research is simply another form of learning. Like all 
the other processes for the phenomenology for human learning, the most 
advanced form of understanding is only achieved when researchers place 
themselves within the context being studied. It is only through this way, the 
researchers can understand the viewpoints and the behaviours that characterize 
social actors. In other words a prerequisite for advanced understanding, which is 
close proximity, is undoubtedly afforded by the case study. Thus Beveridge’s 
(1951) assertion cited earlier on, that intense observation in a case study 
environment leads to more discoveries, than statistics applied to large groups. 
With that crucial point of departure in the learning process, it becomes clear why 
researchers engaged in case studies end up casting off their preconceived 











study and a variety of data collection methods and processes available in a case 
study, are adequate to give an ‘advanced’ knowledge about the human 
behaviour in the PA problem, and this justifies its utility. 
4.6.8 The Difficulty of Developing General Propositions and Theories 
from Case Studies   
Critics of the case study see the narrative contained in case studies as a 
drawback, yet it is through good narratives that complexities and contradictions 
of real life can be tackled. Most researchers admit that such rich narratives can 
be difficult even impossible, to summarize into neat brief scientific formulae, 
general propositions and even theories (Mitchel & Charmaz, 1996; Benhabib, 
1990; Rouse, 1990; White, 1990; Roth, 1989) but to the case study researcher a 
“thick” and hard-to-summarize narrative is not a problem. It is, rather, considered 
as a sign that the study has uncovered a particularly complex problem. To 
counter the absence of a summary, it is worth asking the question whether the 
summary is always ideal or desirable. According to Flyvbjerg (2006) Narrative 
inquiries do not – indeed, cannot- start from explicit theoretical assumptions, they 
instead begin with an interest in a particular phenomenon that is best understood 
through a narrative. They then engage in developing descriptions and 
interpretations of the phenomenon, essentially from the perspective of 
participants, researchers and others (Flyvbjerg, 2006). A number of researchers 
have observed that is an ancient method and perhaps our most fundamental 
form of making sense of experience (Mattingly, 1991; Carr, 1986; Ricoeur, 1984; 
Novak, 1975). 
Labov and Waletzky (1966) argue that when a good narrative is finished, “it 
should be unthinkable for a bystander to say, ‘so what?’” (Labov & Waletzky, 
1966, p. 37-39). Nehamas (1985) posits that every good narrator is continually 
warding off this question. It is not necessarily pointless to have a narrative that 
does not have a moral that can be briefly stated. If the narrative is rich it actually 











the narrative has already supplied the answer before the question is asked; “the 
narrative itself is the answer” (Nehemas, 1985, p. 163-164). 
For the reasons articulated in the preceding sections, it is clear that the case 
study is a necessary and sufficient method when investigating a complex subject 
such as human behaviour. The case study as a method holds up well when 
compared to other methods in the gamut of social science research 
methodology. The difference between qualitative and quantitative methods 
touted about in the bulk of literature is spurious. Both approaches are legitimate 
means of conducting research but it is the context and the question of the 
research that will determine the method. The advantage of large samples is one 
of breath, whereas on the other hand their problem is one of depth. For the case 
study the situation is the reverse. The intention here was to gain an intimate 
knowledge of how organisations deal with BEE in PPPs and in order to find out 
how the PA problem plays out in this context. The only way to gain this kind of 
knowledge is to use a case study as a vehicle to start with that context-
dependent knowledge, which leads to advanced knowledge of this phenomenon. 
4.6.9 Validity and Reliability Design Tests  
The demand on case study researchers to address the validity of the evidence 
they have gathered is no different from conventional inquiry (Polkinghorne, 
2007). In conventional inquiry, the issue is the question of how well the scores 
produced by instruments are representative of the intended construct. In a 
narrative research such as a case study, the concern would be the clarification of 
what the narrated text is intended to represent (ibid.).  Validity is explained in the 
following manner by Hammersley and Atkinson: ‘By validity, I mean truth: 
interpreted as the extent to which an account accurately represent the social 
phenomena to which is refers’ (1992, p. 57). In other words the reader of the 
research must be convinced that the narrative is depicting the truth of the matter 
not just the opinion of the researcher. In this research four tests were conducted 











1. Construct validity: according to Ruane (2005) a claim to construct validity 
is actually a claim to have accurately measured what was set out to be 
measured at the beginning of the research (Ruane, 2005). In this research 
construct validity was achieved by using multiple sources of data to 
assess whether there was any convergence in the findings. 
2. Internal validity: internal validity, which is also known as causal validity, is 
basically concerned with the overall research design capability of 
detecting causal relationships when they exist. It means that the research 
is capable of genuinely demonstrating that changes in one entity are due 
to the changes in another (Ruane, 2005). Yin (1994) brings to the fore a 
second issue of inference every time an event cannot be directly 
observed. The argument is that inferences cannot be made until there has 
been a proper cross-referencing of all the sources of data to make the 
inference airtight. In this study apart from using multiples sources of data 
all the interview transcripts will be submitted back to the interviewees to 
increase accuracy and validity. 
3. External validity: this deals with the problem of knowing whether a study’s 
findings are generalizable beyond immediate case study (Yin, 1994).  This 
is basically asserting that knowledge claims gained from the case study 
are generalizable (Polkinghorne, 2007). The traditional view has always 
been that with case studies you cannot, because of their bias to 
verification but as discussed above generalisation, in most cases can still 
emanate from a case study. The best way to achieve that is to select a 
critical case, because with a critical case by applying falsification (or 
verification) of the hypothesis reasonable generalisation can be achieved. 
Although this will not necessarily be universal, given the fact that in the 
construction sector there is no homogeneity of projects. But taking into 
account that PPPs are operating within a strict legislative framework one 
can reasonable predict that the findings could be replicated elsewhere 











selecting a critical case in PPPs. A critical case would be a project where 
the PPP BEE requirements are explicitly stipulated in bidding documents 
and have been adhered to. That is the “most likely” case, unlike the “least 
likely case” where the PPP BEE requirements are not elaborated and 
there are no legal requirements except the goodwill of the consortia in 
empowering PDIs. 
4. Reliability: According to Hammersley and Atkinson (1992): “Reliability 
refers to the degree of consistency with which instances are assigned to 
the same category by different observers or by the same observer on 
different occasions” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1992, p. 67). The objective 
here is to ensure that if a later researcher were to conduct the same study 
all over again, this later investigator should arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions. This is only achieved by systematically documenting all the 
processes and procedures used in arriving at the outcomes of the 
research. This thorough documenting minimizes the errors and biases of 
the researcher and increases the auditability of the research (Yin, 1994). A 
case study protocol was adopted and followed in this research in order to 
systematically approach the inquiry in a way that will leave a trail to any 
later repeat investigator. 
4.7 CASE STUDY DESIGN AND PROCEDURE  
The identification of a case is linked to the design of the study, as well as the 
specific properties of the actual case (Flyvbjerg, 2006). This is because logic 
must be maintained throughout the structuring of the research. This means that 
data to be collected must be able to fit within the created framework. In this 
section the design of the actual collection of data is described. The case units 
chosen are described, the analytical strategy, the case selection procedure, and 











4.7.1 Unit of Analysis  
There are two approaches in the case study method. One can either use a single 
case or multiple cases (Yin, 1994). Sometimes multiple cases are taken as a 
completely different approach in their own right when doing case studies. In this 
research a single case study was adopted. A single case was identified because 
of the depth of information embedded in its complexity. PPPs are highly 
regulated contracts so any contract administered under these strict regulations 
should be useful in shedding the light on the PA problem. 
4.7.2 Analytical Strategies  
1) Analyzing qualitative data involves examining, categorizing, or otherwise 
recombining the evidence, in a quest to address the initial propositions of the 
study. Is a good practice for every investigation to start with a general 
analytical strategy (Yin, 1994), as this prioritizes on what to analyze and why. 
The following main strategies are usually used to analyze case study data:  
 Pattern-matching  
 Explanation-building 
 Time-series 
 Program logic models 
In this research pattern-matching was deployed as a dominant analytical 
technique. This type of logic compares an empirical pattern with a predicted 
one. Internal validity is enhanced when the patterns coincide. Since this is a 
descriptive study the pattern was predicted prior to data collection. Yin (1994) 
encourages researchers to make every effort to produce an analysis of the 
highest quality. In order to accomplish this, he presented four principles that 
should be at the center of the researcher’s attention. 
 Show that the analysis relied on all the relevant evidence 
 Include all major rival interpretations in the analysis 











 Use the researcher’s prior, expert knowledge to further analysis 
2) Again, analysis specifically directed at the interviews with an intention of 
formulating a theory out of that type of data is summarized in Table 4:3 
above. This draws from the Grounded Theory approach and which was only 
to be deployed if the need was perceived to arise (e.g. the identification of 
emergent or unanticipated phenomena) and operates almost in reverse to the 
traditional way of conducting scientific inquiry. This is because rather than 
beginning with developing a hypothesis, data in the form of interviews 
collected first. This data is then immediately transcribed as early as from the 
first interview.  From this data key points are marked with a series of codes 
(Maykut & Morehouse, 1994), which will be extracted from the transcripts.  In 
order for the codes to be more workable, those that portray similar concepts 
are put together under the same category. From this point the categories are 
cross-checked to see if there is no similarities between them, those that 
contain very close concepts are combined. The conceptual thread that runs 
through the categories is the basis of a theory from data. This is a form of 
reverse engineering, from the traditional approach where a theoretical 
framework is first chosen, and then applied to the studied phenomenon as the 
research proceeds. 
Table 4:4: Four Stages of Analysis in Grounded Theory 
 
Stage Purpose 
Codes Identifying anchors that allow key points of the data to be gathered 
Concepts Collections of codes of similar content that allows the data to be grouped 
Categories Broad groups of similar concepts that are used to generate a theory 
Theory A collection of explanations that explain the subject of the research 
 
4.7.3 Case Selection Procedures 
The selection of a case is important in achieving the mission of the research. 











A) Critical Case 
The project used for this research was one of the few that were concluded before 
the PPP legislation in BEE was promulgated, Since there was not much in the 
way of prior experience to draw from, the government institutions decided to put 
stringent BEE requirements in order to test the practicality of such requirements 
and the market responsiveness thereof. When the code of practice for BEE in 
PPP (2004) was finally promulgated it had much lower BEE percentage 
prescriptions than this project’s. For instance the BEE shareholding was set at 
30% in the codes whereas this project required 40% BEE shareholding. The BEE 
requirements are fully met in this project from the shareholding level, sub-
contractors and sub-subcontractors. The project’s operational longevity of seven 
years qualifies it to be one of the oldest in South Africa enabling a proper tracking 
of BEE success, its high BEE prescriptions makes it amenable to high 
empowerment outcomes and its broad PDI inclusiveness (12 PDI sub-contracts)   
all present it as a ‘critical’ case. It was also decided to go for a project that 
included a wide range of skills and disciplines. It was thought that a case like this 
would be ‘critical’ enough as it includes a wide range of players both as agents 
(members of the consortia) and also a wide range of beneficiaries of BEE. The 
outcome of the analysis from this case would justify a question that says: “If this 
is not valid for this case, then it applies to no case” (see Table 4:5 below). In 
other words the outcomes would be strong enough to nullify the proposition at 
the beginning of the inquiry. 
BEE is a process and this project was chosen among other reasons for the fact 
that it has been running for a long time and offers an environment where the 
effectiveness of the policy can be studied. The PPP projects in South Africa are 
from very many sectors and have different time spans. However according to the 
Treasury PPP Quarterly (1st Quarter, 2009) the projects signed in terms of 
Treasury regulation 16, as of 15th January 2009 are 19, and IALCH is the oldest 
of them all and, at R4.5 billion, the second largest after Gautrain (R23.09 billion) 
and which only commenced construction in 2006. They range from highly 











accommodation provision. As of 19th January 2010 the National Treasury (2010) 
have 84 projects in different stages of completion ranging from those at inception 
stage through to those that are fully operational. IALCH project longevity of 
operation and its size militates for its utility in assessing the PPP efficacy in BEE 
delivery.  
Table 4:5: Strategies for The Selection of Samples and Cases 
 
 TYPE OF SELECTION PURPOSE 
A. Random selection To avoid systematic biases in the sample. The sample 
size is decisive for generalisation 
 1. Random sample To achieve a representative sample that allows for 
generalisation for the entire population 
 2. Stratified sample To generalize for specially selected subgroups within the 
population. 
B. Information-oriented selection To maximize the utility of information from small samples 
and single cases. Cases are selected on the basis of 
expectations about their information content 
 1. Extreme/deviant cases To obtain information on unusual cases, which can be 
especially problematic or especially good in a more 
closely defined sense. 
 2. Maximum variation cases To obtain information about the significance of various 
circumstances for case process and outcome (e.g. three 
to four cases that are very different on one dimension: 
size, form of organisation, location, budget). 
 3. Critical cases To achieve information that permits logical deductions of 
the type, “If this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies 
to all (no) case.” 
 4. Paradigmatic cases To develop a metaphor or establish a school for the 
domain that the case concerns. 
Adapted from Flyvbjerg, 2006.  
 
B) Project Access and location 
Access to projects was established through personal contacts. In studying this 











researcher had come into contact with a number of people working in both 
academia and industry. PPPs are a new area in South Africa and many role 
players in industry encourage research, assisting researchers as far as they can 
because they see research as being mutually beneficial to the research 
community and to them as practitioners. The location of the project was not an 
issue. However, because of the limited number of PPP projects in the operational 
phase, it was clear from the beginning that potential case studies would be 
located around South Africa. 
4.7.4 Researcher/Interviewee Noise and Bias  
Interviews formed a critical part of this research and through them respondents 
relate their lived experiences. It was not expected that their stories were going to 
be objective ‘facts’ but they were rather authentic accounts of subjective 
experiences. That is why as much as possible it was intended “to formulate 
questions and provide an atmosphere conducive to open and undistorted 
communication” (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997, p. 116). The intention was to obtain 
rapport with respondents and to avoid manipulating them (Silverman, 2006). This 
can be achieved by not asking leading questions that give respondents little room 
to fully express themselves in a way that articulates their personal experiences 
(Ruane, 2005). The only way to achieve this is by engaging in epoche. According 
to Katz (1987): ‘Epoche is a process that the researcher engages in to remove, 
or at least become aware of prejudices, viewpoints, or assumptions regarding the 
phenomenon under investigation. Epoche helps enable the researcher to 
investigate the phenomenon from a fresh and open view without prejudgment or 
imposing meaning too soon’ (Katz, 1987, p. 36 -37). 
Interviewees can also give contaminated information. This could be the result of 
noise (Ruane, 2005). Noise basically refers to non-patterned error in the 
measurement (in this case interview) process. It is a situation where there is no 
set direction to the error involved in the measurement process (ibid.). Sometimes 
respondents overstate certain things and sometimes they understate. If the 











some amount of error in the measurement/interview process (ibid.). Noise, in 
research like this, can also be introduced by the researcher presenting poorly 
constructed interview questions and other poorly constructed measures of 
soliciting data. Excessively complicated measures, poorly designed measures or 
measures with vague directions can all contribute to noisy measurement (ibid.). 
According to Ruane (2005) noise has a “forgiving” characteristic in that the 
overstatements and understatements in the end cancel each other out. But since 
noise can come from very many sources, the main task of the researcher is to 
keep the noise levels as low as possible, to produce a “cleaner” data (ibid.). 
Not all measurement error is as forgiving as noise is (Ruane, 2005). Error 
sometimes can be patterned, in other words the measurement processes are 
consistently in one directly as opposed to the other. In this situation the 
measurement processes are consistently overestimating or consistently 
underestimating the true value. This patterned error is known as bias. It is very 
difficult for bias to cancel itself out in the long run, so it is more problematic and 
undesirable to the research than noise. Bias just like noise can either come from 
the researcher or from the respondents. It can be built into the measurement 
instrument; in this case for instance questions can be phrased in such a way that 
a respondent is “lead” more to certain kind of responses over others. Though that 
might not be what they genuinely feel. The choice of a subject especially if it is 
sensitive one might unwittingly introduce bias. In a sensitive topic like BEE in 
South Africa, there might be a tendency for respondents not to answer honestly 
but to give answers that they think the researcher would want to hear. This 
phenomenon is known as the “social desirability bias” and can distort findings in 
the direction of social expectations.  
To curb the problems mentioned above as many people as possible from the 
leading members of the consortia were interviewed particularly from senior and 
middle management because they are the ones who are best placed to hold a 
view of what is going on, and what the legal requirements of the contract 











companies, which are not related to them and also those who are coming from 
completely different disciplines in the consortia. All the beneficiary shareholders 
and managers were interviewed to gain an understanding of their BEE 
experience in PPPs. A greater participation was considered to be critical for this 
category of respondents as most of them might not be very educated, so their 
expectations might not be what the regulations stipulates in as far as BEE is 
concerned. Special questions were designed for this category of respondents 
and through feedback it was found whether they really understood what the 
question required. This was done to remove complications from the questions, so 
that noise would be lessened. One has to recognize that in the context like South 
Africa where the economy is stratified along racial lines there is always going to 
be resentment from one side of the color bar and denial from the other, such that 
in the end bias from the respondents’ perspective was going to be difficult to do 
away with completely. More so because there is a distinct dichotomy in the 
ownership of companies in South Africa in general, PPPs included. The BEE 
government agents (leading consortia) are almost all white and all the 
beneficiaries are coming from the PDIs.  
4.7.5 Research Procedures  
In this section of the research an overview of the relevant steps, requirements 
and tasks necessary for the good conduct of the this case study is elaborated. 
 
1. A background to the research that includes a proposition for the research 
problem. 
2. A literature review of BEE, PPPs and PA problem. All these areas are 
contextualized into the construction industry. 












b. Elaborate PPPs as procurement method with a bias to the 
construction industry. 
c. Defined the PA problem and contextualize it to the construction 
industry PPPs.  
3. Provide a case study interview design protocol 
a. Develop a case study protocol that contain the instrument but also 
the procedure and general rules that will be followed in using the 
instrument 
b. Provide an outline of the case study including the objective and 
particularities of the case 
c. Develop procedures and general rules for the data collection on 
location. 
d. Develop case study questions related to the research hypotheses 
e. Design a guide for the case study report. 
4. Perform the research: 
a. Select a PPP project which has a wide range of disciplines and has 
the largest number of BEE beneficiaries  
b. Identify potential sources of data. For this research leading 
members of the consortia will be interviewed as well as all (most) 
the BEE beneficiaries if possible. 
c. Carry out the case study interviews to collect data 
5. Case study analysis procedures: 
In this research pattern matching of the participants’ answers and documents, 











strategy was to follow the theoretical proposition that led to our case study. The 
objectives and initial design of this study was based on propositions, which in 
turn reflected the research question, the literature review and new insights. A 
variety of different kinds of data was collected and all the gathered information 
was analyzed, the analysis was concerned with finding a pattern in the data that 
was going to fit in with the initial ‘hunch’ that led to this study in the first place.   
The second approach was to concentrate on analyzing transcribed interviews 
separately using grounded theory. This was done in order to triangulate the 
findings of the above method and in support of a claim that the case study is a 
triangulated strategy (Tellis, 1997).  The application and combination of several 
research methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon is called 
triangulation. Tellis (1997) assertion that a case study is a triangulated strategy 
addresses the issue that the results obtained by a case study are better verified 
by a different method to increase validity. Stake (1995) states that all protocols 
used to ensure accuracy and alternative explanations are called triangulation. 
This arises from the ethical need to confirm the validity of the processes. 
According to Yin (1984) this could be achieved by multiple sources of data, which 
was achieved by using other methods, including interviews initially in this study. It 
can also be achieved by deploying different methodologies (Feagin et al, 1991). 
The grounded theory analysis includes searching for concepts behind actualities 
by looking for codes, then concepts and finally categories (Allan, 2003). The 
coding process was done whenever a word or a phrase that is related to 
empowerment, attitude of agents towards empowerment and the mandate of the 
project to empower PDIs is mentioned. This is then described in a short phrase; 
a descriptor phrase called a code. A method adopted is one recommended by 
Strauss and Corbin (1998a, p. 65-68) where coding is done by ‘microanalysis 
which consists of analyzing data word-by-word and coding meaning found in 
words and groups of words (phrases)’. The codes that convey similar concepts 
are grouped together in one category. After assessing the contents of the 











The old ones might be redundant to the research in which case they will not be 
used. The theme that emanates from these categories is generalized into a 
theory that is grounded in data. 
4.8 CASE STUDY PROTOCOL 
4.8.1 Case Study Protocol Importance 
A case study protocol is important because it firstly (Yin, 1994) reminds the 
investigator what the case study is all about. In also forces the investigator to 
anticipate several problems that might appear including that of how the case 
study report might be completed. It is also a major tactic in increasing the 
reliability of a case study, as it provides a track and a trail. Yin (1994) suggests 
that it should include the following sections: 
 An overview of the case study project (project objectives and auspices, 
case study issues, and relevant readings about the topic being 
investigated); 
 Field procedures (credentials and access to the case study site, 
general sources of information, and procedural reminders); 
 Case study questions (the specific question that the case study 
investigator must keep in mind in collection of data, table shells for 
specific arrays of data, and the potential sources of information for 
answering each question), and; 
 Case study report guide (outline, format for the narrative, and 
specification of any bibliographical information and other 
documentation). 
4.8.2 Case Interview Structure 
It was decided in this research to adopt an ‘ open interview guide’ instead of an 
’interview schedule’. An interview guide or “aide memoire” is a list of topics 











created ahead of conducting the interview, but it is constructed in such a way that 
it allows flexibility and fluidity in the topics and areas covered. It is an 
acknowledgement that flexibility cannot be achieved with a rigid list of interview 
questions. On the other hand the interview schedule is the guide that the 
interviewer uses when running a structured interview. It is basically made of two 
components. A rigid set of questions structured to be asked exactly as worded 
and instructions to the interviewer as when to proceed through the questions 
(Lewis-Beck, Bryman, & Liao, 2004) . Thus the interview schedule is used when 
the researcher is interested in standardizing the process and making the 
experience the same for all the respondents (Ruane J. M., 2005).  
In this research interviewees were basically asked to relate their BEE 
experiences and the extent of their involvement in the project from its inception.  
Instead of writing a set of detailed questions and probes, broad interview 
questions were posed where the interviewee is given the freedom of full 
expression with only occasional probes from the interviewer to give the 
interaction some form of direction and purpose (Patton, 1990).  With this posture 
the intention was to discover what was important to the interviewees, within the 
broad boundaries of the interview topics and questions, and pursue these new 
discoveries in the interview (Maykutt & Morehouse 1994).  The rationale was that 
interviewees would be better placed to highlight important points about BEE in 
PPPs and the researcher can only get insights from the interview interaction.  
4.9 SUMMARY 
The main intention of this chapter was to introduce and discuss different research 
paradigms and critically discuss the methodology suitable for this research. A 
case study was identified as a suitable method to study the manifestation of a PA 
theory in a PPP hospital project. However the use grounded theory tools was 
advocated as appropriate to bolster theory building should the PA theory not be 











Consequently a phenomenological approach with a case study method that 












5 DATA ANALYSIS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the Inkosi Albert Luthuli Central Hospital (IALCH), a 
referral hospital located in Durban Kwazulu Natal. The analysis of the project 
concerns the BEE initiatives adopted by the government and implemented by the 
IMPILO consortium who are the concessionaires on this PPP project. Secondly, 
it examines the behaviour of the consortium as a direct response to the 
government requirements and analyses those behaviours though the lens of 
Principal Agent theory and later principal steward theory. Chiefly in the Principal 
Agent theory, opportunism in the form of adverse selection and moral hazard are 
analyzed. During the implementation of the project, the analysis will concentrate 
on whether the consortium (agent) has made any shift towards steward 
behaviour in the implementation of BEE. All throughout the project the 
beneficiaries’ posture with regards to empowerment will be under focus. Finally 
the role of monitoring in inducing compliance will be analyzed throughout the 
project operation.  
The factors mentioned above encapsulate the main tenets of Principal Agent 
theory and are used as a guide to evaluate BEE implementation success/failure 
in the project. Consequently the chapter is structured around the main areas of 
analysis of adverse selection analysis (ASA), moral hazard analysis (MHA), 
monitoring analysis (MA), beneficiaries’ behaviour analysis (BBA), empowerment 
analysis (EA) and agent behaviour shift analysis (ABSA). The analysis boxes 
describe the conclusions of the analysis from the project as it progressed, and 
each box represents any of these factors as and when they are applicable. The 
boxes are to be read sequentially to have a broad picture of the concept as 
evolves. Thus at certain instances some analysis boxes will not be utilised if their 
applicability at that particular stage is not suitable. This approach to analysis has 
successfully been applied by Rintala (2004) for his PHD thesis on the economic 











analysis (OA), incentive analysis (IA) and solution analysis (SA) were utilised 
among others in three case studies to assess the economic benefits of PFIs in 
comparison to traditionally procured projects. The particular focus of Rintala 
(2004) study was the effects of PFI procurement on the heating and ventilation 
design solutions of the project-facilities. It was that study that provided a lot of 
inspiration and also guided the identification of that particular analysis approach 
as suitable, because in this research there are also important theoretical factors 
that have to be evaluated at each phase of the project to assess the impact of 
the PPP approach on the BEE delivery. 
5.1.1 Research Analysis Overview 
The analysis is structured in such a way that it takes the reader through the early 
stages of the project when the project was conceptualized by providing the 
background of the project and the legislative environment in which it was 
conceptualized and implemented. The analysis then looks at the tender stage 
and its input on the empowerment of the PDIs. The main focus on the BEE 
beneficiaries is on the women amongst the consortium shareholders and the 
management of the two women-run companies who comprise the women’s 
group in the consortium. The PDI sponsor company is not regarded as an 
emerging black-owned enterprise because he has been involved in other PPP 
projects as a shareholder and could be regarded as already empowered. After 
the tender stage the internal contract arrangements and their contributions to 
enhancing the practical participation of BEE beneficiaries are discussed. 
The operations stage of the project is divided into the early days and latter period 
of operations. The early operation days are ascribed as such because it was a 
time when a lot of contractual practicalities were first appreciated by the women 
PDIs. It was also a time when a lot of misunderstandings between women PDIs 
and other consortium partners were dealt with and this resulted in the practical 
BEE posturing of established companies and women’s group PDIs alike for the 
rest of the project. The ‘later operations’ stage followed and was guided by initial 











also the stage of the project where the results of the implementation strategies 
can be systematically studied because they run for a long time.  Furthermore it is 
a stage that provided a lot of data into the benefits and efficacy of the PPPs in 
BEE delivery.  The last section of the analysis provides a reflection on the 
benefits of the project through the eyes of the BEE beneficiaries and government 
officials and provides new insights into the improvements that could be put in 
place for new PPP projects to enhance BEE benefits. 
All the data is based on the transcribed interviews from respondents, which were 
transcribed in their totality after twelve hours of interviewing. During the 
transcription process the Nvivo software programme was used to code all the 
necessary excerpts from the transcriptions into different categories that ultimately 
followed the same pattern of the project phases explained above. Each category 
was compared for its similarity with other categories and where there was not 
much difference the categories were merged to form a sub-category within a 
particular project stage. The categories that were substantively different but fell 
under a particular project stage were used to form new sub-categories. All the 
sub-categories were analyzed using the lenses described above to assess the 
BEE outcomes, agents’ (established companies) behaviour in BEE 
implementation, beneficiaries’ behaviour and the PA problem (opportunism) 
mitigation mechanisms with regards to BEE. The analysis was used to test the 
applicability and suitability of the PA theory in explaining established companies’ 
behaviour in PPPs. Any deficiencies were augmented by the incorporation of the 
PS theory, and the development of a new theory, which is explained in detail in 
the next chapter. There were booklets and videos about the operation of the 
facility that the writer was exposed to although in the end they did not add 
materially to this research, as they were concerned about the technical 
operations. The analysis itself starts by giving a project background and the 












5.2.1 The History of IALCH 
At the time this project was formulated the Kwazulu Natal provincial government 
and the national government were recovering from the huge over-expenditure 
incurred by the previous Apartheid regime. In response to the constraints that 
this imposed on public expenditure, the National Treasury had started 
investigating innovative ways of providing government infrastructure without 
necessarily over-spending the limited allocations. When it was found that R800m 
was needed upfront in order to build a modern referral hospital in Durban, the 
Provincial Treasury similarly tried to look for other innovative ways of financing 
the scheme. One of the provincial treasury officials who instigated this approach 
related the project background in the following words:  
“From conceptualisation actually…. You see at Treasury we were coming 
from a situation where we were recovering from huge over expenditures, 
in previous years.  And we started looking at ways and means of building 
government infrastructure without necessarily spending the scarce 
allocations. Which in itself was a serious balancing act because you 
needed to balance up what you deliver versus the available resources and 
we found that at the time to deliver this level of infrastructure or project or 
infrastructure you would have needed upfront something in the vicinity of 
800 mil. …And National Treasury on the other hand had just spend a bit of 
time and resources in PPP but related to road infrastructure. And when we 
engaged with National Treasury and colleagues at the National Treasury 
they felt that we could try and look closely at this PPP we then decided to 
give it a go.  At the time we needed cooperation of National Treasury, 
National Health, Provincial Treasury and Provincial Department of Health. 
So the four of us ….then we were together. Why we needed National 
Departments is that on the policy space there was a bit of a vacuum. 
Particularly on the medical management side, because here you would 











records including people’s medical records. So you needed just to see 
how you deal with those kinds of aspects. And we also needed the 
National Treasury because it was the first time a province would do a 
PPP. But also there were certain restrictions in terms of the law at the 
time. It was only a National Treasury which could approve a PPP project 
without reference… in other words the province couldn’t do it without 
reference to the National Treasury. So that is why we needed the National 
Treasury, so they literally had to approve the project in each of the stages 
as we went along. Now the hospital had actually been built already at the 
time. The basic infrastructure was there… the brick and mortar were 
there”. [Government official-T] 
The fact that the structure of the building was already put up when the decision to 
take a PPP approach was taken was regarded as an anomaly by the official but 
in actual fact there a lot of PPPs where the government transfers infrastructure to 
the private sector just for operation. They however had to pay money for a 
condition audit before the consortium could agree to take over responsibility for 
the new building.  
 “The fact that the buildings were secured using Traditional Procurement 
did not give us an opportunity to optimize on the benefits of a PPP. You 
could look at it that way, but you could also look at it at the way that says 
well given…it being the first PPP maybe that was the best way to start. 
Because the issue of managing risk would have been better managed if 
you have a project that …at least the walls were there. However it has its 
own difficulties in that the PPP private party refused to accept risk on the 
building that was already standing. They had to do a ….what they would 
call a condition audit. Which would then give them a sense of what is the 
condition of the building they are taking.  They asked us to spend a bit of 
money to fix it here and there so that they can take it and accept risk. So 
that is how we got around the issue of building being built with the 











The novelty of this approach to the procurement of hospital services meant the 
National Treasury had to approve each and every stage of the project as it 
progressed. Prior to this a substantial amount of preliminary research was 
undertaken by the provincial Department of Health particularly on experiences 
gained in other countries. The UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI) model was a 
source of inspiration for the implementation and execution of IALCH. A, high-
ranking envoy of Health MEC and the Health Chief Finance Officer (CFO) were 
sent to London in 1996 to assess similar work that had been undertaken in the 
UK. In 1999 a larger delegation comprised of high-ranking Provincial Health and 
Provincial Treasury officials was also sent to the UK to carry out further research 
into this Initiative 
After consultations between Provincial Health and Treasury departments a 
decision was taken to implement a PPP arrangement for the provision of a 
hospital where patients would be admitted only on referral basis, with direct ER 
admissions on extreme cases. The approach adopted here at IALCH was that 
the government would be responsible for all clinical staff (doctors, nurses, 
medical specialists) but all the support services, medical equipment and 
consumables would be supplied and maintained by the private party.  This site 
which is situated not far from the N2 highway is easily accessible and it is about 
20 minute drive from Durban CBD see Figure 5:1 and Figure 5:2 below. 
 
 















Figure 5:2: Arial view of the hospital [adapted from googlemaps] 
 
5.2.2 BEE Legislative Framework During IALCH Implementation 
The overarching BEE legislation in South Africa since 1996 has been the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 108 of 1996 (South Africa, 
1996).  Chapter 13 of the constitution, which deals with finance under section 17, 
deals specifically with procurement and it is framed in the following manner: 
1) When an organ of state in the national, provincial and local sphere of 
government, or any other institution identified in national legislation, 
contracts for goods or services, it must do so in accordance with a system 
which is fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.  
2) Subsection (1) does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred 
to in that subsection from implementing a procurement policy providing for 
a) Categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and 
b) The protection or advancement of persons, or categories of 











c) National legislation must prescribe a framework within which the 
policy referred to in subsection (2) must be implemented. 
The constitution made general provisions and specific legislation had to be 
promulgated in the country to deal with mechanisms of implementing this 
constitutional stipulation. Thus in 2000 the Preferential Procurement Policy 
Framework of 2000 was promulgated. The main intention of the act was to give 
effect to the means of procurement policy contemplated in section 217(2) of the 
constitution cited above. The Preferential Procurement Policy served as a basis 
for selecting the suitable consortium for IALCH project. The legislation required 
that an organ of state must determine its preferential procurement policy and 
implement it within the following framework. 
a) A preference point system must be followed. 
b)     
i. For contracts with a Rand value above a prescribed amount a 
maximum of 10 points my be allocated to specific goals as 
contemplated in paragraph (d) provided that the lowest acceptable 
tender scores 90 points for price. 
ii. For contracts with a Rand value equal to or below a prescribed 
amount a maximum of 20 points may be allocated for specific goals 
as contemplated in paragraph (d) provided that the lowest acceptable 
tender scores 80 points for price.  
The Act stipulates that among others the Act may include specific goals such as 
they appear under section 1 (d): 
i) Contracting with persons, or categories of persons, historically 












Section 1 (e) requires that any specific goal for which a point may be awarded, 
must be clearly specified in the invitation to submit a tender. Hence a cited 
stipulation at IALCH that the contract must accommodate new entrants: “I’ll tell 
you where we were involved since we were newcomers, and a lot of the 
requirements of the tender were that the consortium should accommodate new 
entrants” [Women’s Group participant-M]. There was also a clear stipulation that 
women be invited to participate in this project as their gender represents a 
category that was previously discriminated from the mainstream economic 
activities, especially black women who were previously secluded under 
apartheid. All the PDIs who were invited were supposed to be included at all 
levels of the contract. One of them attested to that in these words:“when I read 
the tender document it said BEE parties had to be involved at all levels both 
management and operational” [Women’s Group participant-M]. 
During the time when this project was tendered the National Treasury were busy 
formulating Codes of Good Practice for BEE in PPPs which were later 
promulgated in 2004. The codes are more suitable for the PPP climate but the 
ideas that drove the formulation of these codes were tested and implemented at 
IALCH. The government officials who were involved at the time took IALCH as a 
test case for the practicality of these codes.  
 “We were very interested in setting future policy. So I would say the major 
outcome of this for us is the BEE targets in major areas. So that is in 
ownership, in employment, in sub-contracting value, in even quite detailed 
stuff like black women in management et cetera. These targets were 
achievable and as a result with projects like Albert Luthuli we then were 
with confidence issued the Code of Good Practice in 2004”  [Government 
Official-D]. 
The main areas of emphasis that eventually informed the structuring of the Code 
of Good Practice of BEE in PPPs of 2004, were black equity, black management 











economic Impact. Black equity meant active equity (as opposed to passive 
equity) where black shareholders were expected to have direct day-to-day 
participation in the management and operations of the project. “Black 
management” in this context is means the practical ability of black managers to 
direct the cause or direction of the business and management policies or 
practices of that enterprise. Employment equity was informed by the Employment 
Equity Act, No. 55 of 1998. Section 2 of this Act stipulates the purpose of the act 
in the following manner: 
2)   
(a) Promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through 
the elimination of unfair discrimination; and  
(b) Implementing affirmative action measures to redress the 
disadvantages in employment experienced by designated groups, in 
order to ensure their equitable representation in all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce.  
The purpose of this act was to forge compliance and give effect to the 
constitution. It basically drives for a racially representative workforce, which 
mirrors as much as is practically possible the racial composition of the peoples of 
South Africa. At IALCH the interpretation of the act meant that black people had 
to be represented at all levels of the contract structure. At shareholding level, 
sub-contractor level and sub-sub-contractor level black people had to be 
represented either through employment in established companies or through 
ownership of black enterprises and/or as employees at sub-sub-contractor level 
as contracts managers. This is attested to by one of the BEE beneficiaries: 
“when I read the tender document it said BEE parties had to be involved at all 
levels both management and operational”. [Women’s Group participant-M].  
Another area of focus was the sub-contracting of black-owned enterprises. At 
IALCH “a lot of the requirements of the tender was that the consortium 











expected to play a role as sub-contractors at operational level in both second tier 
and third tier. All the companies that were not owned by the PDIs consortium 
shareholders had to be BEE companies. A company is regarded as a black 
business enterprise when 50.1% of the company is beneficially owned by black 
people and within which black people exercise substantial management control. 
The same requirements of employment equity and BEE management stipulations 
still applied for the employees from these sub-contractor companies assigned to 
work at IALCH.  
On the issue of local socio-economic impact the companies had to devise 
strategies that will promote positive local socio-economic impact from the project 
to benefit the most marginalized members of the local community (i.e. disabled, 
youth, and the aged) within a targeted area of project operations. The main aim 
of this element was to ensure that the project is tangibly experienced in the 
neighborhood in which it was operating. Chiefly among the requirements of local 
socio-economic impact at IALCH was that 60% of all unskilled workers at the 
hospital should come from within 100km radius of the hospital.  
The IALCH project was thus implemented amidst the afore-mentioned legislative 
climate and the bidders had to comply with all these in a competitive climate with 
other consortia. The requirements of the Acts discuss above were implemented 
in all the stages of contract procurement discussed below. The Provincial and 
National governments through their counterpart departments of Health and 
Treasury put BEE at the center of project delivery using available legislation 
while at the same time the National Treasury was working on a directly suitable 
Codes of Good Conduct For BEE in PPPs which were later promulgated in 2004.  
5.2.3 PPPs Tendering Process 
The tendering process at IALCH was initiated by the issue of a Request for 
Qualification (RFQ). This was a document issued by the Provincial Treasury to 
invite all the interested bidders in this project to submit their profiles for pre-











companies were also assessed on the basis of their BEE status. If the company 
was found to be technically compliant but had submitted an inadequate BEE 
document, they would be disqualified at this stage and not been shortlisted in the 
companies that were invited to bid in this project later. 
The next stage immediately following the one above was a stage where the 
government issued the Request for Proposals (RFP). At this stage the bidders 
had to elaborate their approach to contract implementation and in detail describe 
the methods they would adopt to accommodate the PDIs and their skills transfer 
strategies. Because of the level of detail required at this stage a longer time (i.e. 
6 months or above) is given than the RFQ stage. At this stage the government 
would be acting with a lot of insight on what the private sector is expecting from 
the project as they were requested to comment on the project requirements on 
the previous RFQ stage. The intrinsic nature of PPPs of including a lot of 
different players in the project means a lot of companies have to come together 
to form a consortium and enter into a lot of agreements that governs their 
relationships for the duration of the project. This necessitates the use of a lot of 
professional advisors in the form of legal advisors, financial advisors and others 
who all come under the umbrella term of transaction advisors. The government in 
turn relies on the advise of its own contracted transaction advisors as the there 
are a lot of unique specialized elements that would not necessarily be adequately 
dealt with by government’s own procurement officials. The issue of BEE was 
emphasized in the RFP documents and the government ensured that there is no 
ambiguity on its centrality in this project. When all the bids were submitted the 
government evaluated the bids and nominated a successful bidder. 
When a successful bidder was nominated the government entered into the next 
stage of Negotiations. This stage is very important as good negotiators can make 
gains and induce some claw-backs on bid requirements in an environment where 
there is no competition from the other bidders, although the normal practice is to 
have the next preferred bidder as a reserve in case there is a deadlock in the 











duration of the negotiations. Negotiations in PPPs can sometimes drag on for 
months (up to 6 months) as the contract details are elaborated and aligned with 
the expectations from both sides. At IALCH the government was very emphatic 
at this stage that no dilution of the BEE elements would be accommodated. BEE 
was brought to the centre of project implementation and all the established 
companies comprising the consortium were clear that any infringement on this 
issue could easily jeopardize the contract irrespective of the soundness of the 
technical implementation of the project. Thus the government took charge of the 
project structured to ensure its alignment with its BEE economic policy.  
5.2.4 Government Initiative in Project Structuring 
The government through the national and provincial departments of Health and 
Treasury had to rely on what had been done overseas, in the UK PFIs and follow 
the experiences of few PPP projects that had been completed then. The 
government’s main intention was not just to procure a hospital using private 
funding but it was also to take that opportunity to deliver a world-class referral 
hospital that could compete with any in the private sector. After the PPP route 
was decided upon the government’s secondary socio-economic implementation 
strategy was to ensure that there is a substantial BEE involvement in the project 
from the start and that is what they did in formulating the bidding documents and 
emphasizing in negotiations. This project served as a blue print of the later PPP 
projects as the government was keen to see if their BEE targets were practical 
and achievable. It was intended to provide a lot of insight into the BEE 
practicalities in PPPs but at the same time, the government wanted to get it right 
the first time. Thus IALCH project was used as a platform to empower the 
previously disadvantaged individuals/institutions (PDIs). The government 
considered this as central to the whole project and any infringement on this issue 
could lead to a technically compliant bid being rejected, as the BEE policy 
conflated infrastructure provision with empowerment. The empowerment goal 
and the mechanisms to achieve it are going to be traced in this analysis, by 











established conglomerates, the government and the PDIs (particularly the new 
women entrants). The analysis will just concentrate on the tender stage, 
negotiations stage, internal negotiations and share apportionment after award 
and operations stage in all its phases till now -2009. 
5.3 TENDER STAGE 
The IMPILO consortium which finally won the 15-year concession project to 
operate IALCH is headed by a black CEO. The CEO through his company 
Vulindlela Holdings had earlier been involved in the Mangaung maximum prison 
PPP project in Bloemfontein and the experience gained served as a platform for 
their interest in this project. Vulindlela invited all the other eventual members of 
the IMPILO consortium and could be regarded as consortium sponsors. This is 
how the CEO describes his role: 
 “My role….I mean… I was heavily involved form the project inception. I 
brought together most of the parties that ended up forming IMPILO 
consortium I mean all the relevant elements I can safely say that I was the 
common denominator I knew or I got to know almost everyone in the 
group before the others…even before the group was formed. We were 
fortunate even then in that we were not new. We have had some 
involvement in PPPs. I mean we had closed the private ….prison in 
Bloemfontein”. [IMPILO Consortium shareholder-T] 
Vulindlela invited the Siemens Group to partner as medical equipment suppliers 
and they also invited AME to supply and maintain the IT infrastructure in the 
hospital. AME innovative contribution has set a milestone in hospital operation 
not only in South Africa, but the rest of Africa by delivering the first paperless 
hospital in Africa; most of the patients’ medical records are kept and accessed 
electronically. Drake & Skull was also invited to take charge of all the Facility 
Management (FM) activities in the project. There was a strong requirement in the 
tender document for women to be involved in this scheme at all stages, as 











invited two companies owned and run by women, which were basically new 
entrants in PPPs. One was Mbekani, a company owned by a qualified medical 
doctor who left medicine to pursue business interests. Prior to being involved in 
this project, she had completed an MBA, and was working at an investment 
bank. However she was also nurturing her fledging businesses. Her business 
interests now range from property, pharmaceuticals and casinos. Mbekani is one 
of her companies and is involved in IALCH in running the Central Sterile Supply 
Department (CSSD) together with Theatre Sterile Supply Unit (TSSU). The other 
company Omame is an investment company started by a group of young 
professional women, who had a keen interest in business. At the time of the 
tendering of IALCH their interest was in investment although they had dabbled in 
catering for weddings, funerals etc. But they could largely be considered to have 
been a start-up company at that stage.  
5.3.1 Invitations to PDIs  
Vulindlela invited the two women companies with Vulindlela’s CEO having known 
the key players socially. The response was positive as the women saw this as an 
opportunity to be involved in a large high profile project and as an opportunity for 
them to grow their businesses. Together, Vulindlela, Mbekani/Omame (women’s 
group) and international players formed a consortium called IMPILO, and the 
structure was as shown in Figure 5:3 below. At this time the consortium had all 
the BEE requirements as stipulated by the government; the sponsor was a PDI, 
and there was women representation.  Siemens the German company, which 
specializes in medical equipment, created Siemed specifically for this project, so 
Siemed could be regarded as a subsidiary of Siemens. Drake and Skull (D&S) is 
a UK Facility Management (FM) company with a strong South African presence. 
AME is an Austrian Information Technology (IT) company, which introduced the 
first paperless IT system in South Africa through this hospital.  
It would appear that social acquaintances are the way most PDIs get involved in 











 “Let me give you an example of what we did at other PPPs, ….. We went 
out and we approached people ok. we knew that there was a requirement 
on the BEE side and we needed to have a partner to get this contract that 
we tendered for. So we approached people, and how we approached 
people there was no specific criteria at a time. In terms of how we will 
identify people it was more about directors CEOs in our board, that would 
say we know people that are already involved with empowerment 
projects.” .[IMPILO Consortium shareholder-D] 
“But really the criteria was more that we would identify people, instead of 
say advertising or tendering, and saying we are looking for partners. In my 
experience … that hasn’t ever happened.” [IMPILO Consortium 
shareholder-D] 
One of the women directors attested to that view: 
“Yes we knew him before that is how we got involved.…. Socially”. 
[Women’s Group participant-O] 
The second one gave a similar view: 
“I happened to know Vulindlela director through a relative of mine, and I 


















5.3.2 Tender Documents Compilation 
The tender process involved an elaborate structuring of the financial models and 
the integration of the project processes. All the strategies were organized with a 
sole purpose of presenting a winning bid accommodating all the government’s 
requirements including BEE. The first stage was the Request for Proposal 
Qualification (RFQ) stage where the tenders were checked for their initial 
technical profile and their BEE qualification. This stage was fairly brief and as it 
dealt with mainly ensuring the commitment of bidders to the project. Even if a 
consortium could be found technically compliant at this stage they would be 
disqualified if they did not include PDIs in a format and role required by the 
government. Once this was done the next stage was the Request for Proposals 
(RFP) stage. This was the stage where a lot of work that comprise the bid 
package was structured. Immediately after their invitation, the PDIs started 
attending meetings where bidding documents were compiled. Since they were 
new businesses this was a very new experience for them. 
ADVERSE SELECTION ANALYSIS (ASA/1) 
It appears that in PPPs PDIs get involved through personal acquaintances and 
connections; there is no systematic way of involving the PDIs. In traditional 
procurement, PDIs get to compete in a transparent manner. But where the 
formation of consortia is required when bidding for jobs using the traditional forms 
of procurement the connections could still be playing a bigger role. Although there 
is nothing wrong with this since all good business people have/make good 
connections it might lead to adverse selection where the major players might 
collude with PDIs to window-dress BEE. It also does not give PDIs enough time to 
prepare to get into the scheme and strategize to their own advantage, especially if 
they are a new enterprise they might not have adequate time to prepare for 
involvement, as it is natural to crab an opportunity with a hope that it would yield a 












One of them said: 
“In terms of writing and collecting all the information that is required for the 
tender our role was limited. We were not involved in terms of collecting 
information and actually sitting down and putting together a tender”. 
[women’s Group participant-O] 
Again a following comment was made: 
“We were sort of playing an observatory role. But we use to observe quite 
a lot. Before they qualify, you observe for a while and you are given a time 
where they teach you and they sort of evaluate you but the first part is 
observation. But we were accommodated in that way”. [women’s Group 
participant-O] 
But in order for the women PDI shareholders to understand what was happening 
and to equip themselves they had to do a lot of reading and consultation. 
“Sitting in that office and just observing and seeing how they were putting 
together a tender …you know… interacting with the big managers it helps 
you to understand what it takes to put a tender”. [Women’s Group 
participant-M] 
“So we had to do research as to the policies…what are the policies, what 
do we need and all that goes with that. So we had to submit all these to 
the bid”. [Women’s Group participant-M] 
“At that time I really didn’t know what was happening. They were talking 
big numbers and they were talking big things, but what I did was to consult 
a lot after hours to understand. ‘what is this? What is happening here?’ 
and slowly things were getting clearer in terms of this is your financial 
model. Because they were talking big words like hedging this and hedging 
whatever” [Women’s Group participant-O] 
Apart from reading and observing the women PDIs had to identify and decide the 











“We had to give input as to what role we were going to play. Because 
there was an understanding that if you are just sitting at the equity level 
[first tier] there is no cash flow. So you would have a nice equity on paper 
but you won’t be generating any money,… and yet there is a deposit that 
you pay for the loan that you get. So we had to find a way of getting 
involved at FM level”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“So we then talked to FM company in terms of ‘here are the services that 
the hospital is going to need ….ok, obviously D&S has filled in Cleaning… 
actually I think cleaning wasn’t filled in… but all the nice ones are taken by 
some people. So you sit there two women companies .Mbekani and 
Omame”.[Women’s Group participant-M] 
“So the decision was not based on an economic or business sense, it was 
to say what can we do, what do we understand where we will have no 
competition”. [Women’s Group participant-M] 
After the roles were identified the women PDIs had to contact the other big 
players in order to see where they could be accommodated. 
“Through the help of the sponsor we started interacting with these guys on 
forming joint ventures … which were going to be vehicles for implementing 
that which we had presented during our tendering stage. There is an 
important role that was played by the sponsor here.  The sponsor 
facilitated those JVs because as newcomers we knew we wanted to be on 
the FM side but we had no skills. So I was sort of anxious and I was 
asking ‘how are we going to do this?’ …. ‘how exactly are we going to 
implement this?’… I am still thinking about you know my profession. If 
somebody were to ask me to do something in my profession I would know 
exactly what to do”. [Women’s Group Participant-O] 
“There we were new…. we just knew there is BEE… and when there is 
BEE there is money that is involved. You gonna be involved with big guys. 











ok fine. ‘you are in this consortium here are these big guys  how do you 
make money here?’. So the sponsor facilitated those roles. He facilitated a 
JV between ourselves and … he didn’t facilitated on our behalf but he 
spoke to D&S and he said ‘listen these women are in the FM arena, what 
is it that can be done in that basket of services that are going to be 
provided by the service providers through an FM company’.  So he sort of 
delegated to D&S. so we had a meeting with D&S during the tendering 
process … D&S sort of said we have already battled to convene the big 
players because the key thing they kept on bombarding to us which 
actually diminished our self-esteem is that ‘this is a high-risk project what 
can you do, you don’t know anything”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“The big guys . this is what they used to say. ‘this is a high-risk project, 
you don’t know anything … you know. ‘this is high-risk project’ and of 
course we sort of had a scanned information about FM. We would say ‘we 
will learn we will bring professional women we’ve .you know… proven 
ourselves in our professions surely that should count for something in 
terms of potential. We do have the potential and the enthusiasm, and we 
are prepared to learn and we can learn quickly we just need a platform 
and we just need people who can trust us’”. [Women’s Group participant-
O] 
Being accommodated was a big challenge because the other big players in FM 
activities like cleaning where the women PDIs were going to be involved were 
reluctant to enter into a JV with the women because they already had their own 
BEE arrangements internally. But the role of the sponsor here was very 
invaluable because he told them: 
“Well if you don’t take these women then you gonna loose the opportunity 
because these women are shareholders and the government is insisting 











benefiting from this. So if you are saying you are coming with your own 
BEE parties tough”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“Bidvest although they had their own BEE parties because they wanted a 
piece of the cake they said we will accommodate them. So we started 
having discussions with Bidvest of which it was tough because you know 
we didn’t know exactly what we were doing… we were just pulled around.  
and it was just said here are the Bidvest parties negotiate with them. 
‘Negotiate what?’ during the tendering stage.  ‘negotiate what?’ well one 
had to draw a lot from big guys the consultants. ‘Exactly what exactly are 
we supposed to be negotiating?” [Women’s Group participant-O]  
“We had to speak to the likes of the sponsor ‘ok once we are around the 
table, what are the key areas that we have to locate? And also consulting 
relevant officials from the government side. They were very strong on BEE 
at the time. So we spoke to the sponsor. That is when I started reading a 
lot on BEE. ‘no no you just don’t shoot from the hip you have to have 
certain guidelines that are going to guide you. I started reading … that 
time the blueprint of BEE was very faint. We knew that it was ownership. 
you know that when we sit around the table that one thing that you have to 
negotiate is shareholding. ‘How much shareholding are we going to have?’ 
but with  a lot of reading at the time then I began to see. that it is not about 
shareholding you have to negotiate the roles in terms of skills transfer, 
preferential procurement wasn’t that big and then corporate social 
investment at the time, and negotiate what sort of programmes are you 
going to have and which areas are you going to contribute”. [Women’s 
Group participant-O] 
“But the big thing was shareholding and skills transfer so we were able to 
negotiate shareholdings with some of them and skills transfer with some of 
them which was a big tick for us. That was during the tendering stage. So 











work together to provide cleaning and linen;  we had an agreement with 
Fedics that if we get the tender we are going to work together in doing 
service accommodation at the residences at the hospital. We had an 
agreement with Archtech that if we get the tender we gonna work together 
and manage the crèche there at Luthuli. That was the operational side..” 
[Women’s Group participant-O]  
 
 
BENEFICIARIES BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS (BBA/2) 
From the start of the tendering process the women PDIs were honest with 
everyone and with themselves about their lack of experience. They then went on to 
consult knowledgeable people within the consortium and outside.  The PDI project 
sponsor seems to have played a big role in assisting and setting up processes that 
resulted in the formation of JVs involving the PDIs. The fact that both groups of 
women PDIs are professional women seem to have been an advantage because 
they did a lot of reading around the field areas that they were not familiar with.  
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/1) 
At the tendering stage there was no economic empowerment. But there was 
empowerment which came in different forms; the skills transfer that the women 
PDIs gained from sitting in meetings when the bids were compiled and watching 
the negotiations between big companies within the consortium. Although they were 
not part of the complicated financial models they noted the areas that are important 
in these kinds of financial arrangements and they were able to take those skills for 
future use. Sitting down and concluding JV arrangements after inquiring which 
areas to concentrate on when negotiating increased their skills in concluding and 












5.3.3 Government Input During Tendering 
This was one of the first PPP projects where the government was determined 
that there should be a substantial BEE involvement. So from shareholding, 
management to practical day-to-day involvement PDI s were supposed to as 
much as is practically possible to have a representativity that reflects their 
composition in the demographics of South Africa at large. 
 “At the time of this project we did want to see very high participation by 
BEE entities in the project. We would have liked the BEE element to be 
slightly higher than it is now. Say for the fact that there were certain 
restrictions that were associated with the project the terms that worked 
against empowerment people. For instance starting with the Bid Bond, just 
to raise money for a Bid Bond if you are a BEE participant it is a very 
difficult hindrance.” [Government official-T] 
AGENT BEHAVIOUR SHIFT ANALYSIS (ABSA/1) 
From the beginning the involvement of women PDIs was resisted by all, because of 
the high project standards that are set by the government. None of the companies 
seems to have been interested in taking on a start-up company which did not have 
any money at stake in terms of investment. However since this was a compliance 
imperative Bidvest took them on, although they had their own internal BEE 
arrangement. This the agent (Bidvest) did to comply with the demands of the 
principal (government). The shift of Bidvest to take on Mbekani/Omame was to 
comply with the bid requirements but at the same time it was congruent with the 
government policy of empowering women- as part of the PDIs.  The monetary 
incentive of being involved in the project may have been the chief reason for 
Bidvest to compromise in order to increase their utility, but at the same time it was 
not at the government own utility’s (BEE) expense because at this stage any 











“The RFP we had done was clearly making sure that there is at least 40% 
BEE participation in the SPV”. [Government official-C] 
“Codes were not promulgated but there were a lot of guidelines. That gave 
you some idea of what it should be. When the codes came out they were 
much lower than what we pushed for”.[Government official-C] 
 
5.3.3.1 Tender Negotiations with Government 
The government officials were watching the behaviour of PDIs from the start of 
the proceedings on how they were behaving and how they were involved in the 
project negotiations and deal structuring. This was instigated by the 
government’s intention of fostering practical PDI involvement in PPPs in order to 
enhance skills transfer.  
“But you do get that impression. Which is different with the sponsor and 
his involvement with some of the others .eh….he really got  involved in 
putting this lot together….I am pretty sure he is gaining the experience you 
see him busy” [Government Official-C]. 
“And in fact my recollection is that it was a very strong involvement. In the 
negotiations they were very active participants, who would have come 
under the BEE requirement it was a very satisfactory engagement, 
because what we had been quite concerned about is that there would be 
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/2) 
Although by the admission of government representatives there were other issues 
working against a higher PDI involvement like the Bid Bond, the government put 
the 40% requirement as a test for market appetite in the PPPs. A higher PDI 
involvement would have meant inexperienced people were given charge of a highly 
technical and highly specialized project. However it was a good test case to see 











some form of window dressing….you know there would be like a whole 
row of white faces then 2 black people at the end who would say nothing. 
And certainly my recollection is that it was not that way at all. I think the 
sponsor was a very strong participant in the negotiations” [Government 
Official-D]. 
“In the Albert Luthuli deal, very significant role [played by PDIs].  But 
unfortunately this thing goes with the nature of the BEE player. It also 
goes with the kind of ability to understand one of the skills that are needed 
in a PPP transaction”. [Government Official-S] 
The government was not very much involved in the commercial agreements that 
the PDIs were concluding with large companies. They were however aware that 
there were shortcomings in the PDIs ability to participate in the financial 
discussions. 
“We find that the majority of our people are not quite at home with issues 
of finance. And the majority of negotiations in a PPP are around finance. 
Whether is finance in relation to the project agreement or whether in 
relation to finance itself, whether is finance in relation to the sub-contracts. 
And you find that although people want to participate the speed with which 
the discussions are taking place does not allow a person who is not 
necessarily having finance as a basic skill”. [Government Official-S] 
“Government is not in the business …you know what I mean…it is a 
facilitator through a BEE code. But it is not in the business of saying 
regardless of whether you provide service or not,……. I mean we are not 
mothers to companies”. [Government Official-D] 
“The jargon is exclusionary….even for some. I mean …. it would take you 
seriously going back to school just getting in touch with the jargon and 
being able to participate in the discussion. And most of these things are 











out everybody, because it is IT-based, and it is project finance-based and 
it is numbers-based. Which is a legal combination for people that you are 
seeking to empower.  You will find that people understand better the legal 
agreement and the issues associated with the contract, most people … 
you will find that in the case of a hospital …for instance the …most people  
will know the instruments that are necessary and those kinds of things but 
beyond that you will find that they would not contribute significantly”. 
[Government Official-S] 
Assistance was offered by the government through the Development Bank of 
South Africa (DBSA- A government financial institution which helps development 
projects in Southern Africa), which proved inadequate and in the end the PDIs 
depended on the sponsor and the goodwill assistance of others members.  
“In that team….they had hired their own advisors. At some point they had 
hired a person who was given by the DBSA to assist them with the 
financing. It wasn’t a very successful appointment. I think that guy was as 
lost as they were. He happened to come in from outside of South Africa 
and wasn’t really familiar with South African systems…. But eventually 
(they) were carried by the advisors that were advising the larger 
group…but even in that consortium the sponsor had done a project with 
prisons. He had already done that one which had assisted him to pay his 
school fees. So in a way he became the advisor of the rest of the BEE 
team”. [Government Official-S] 
The PDIs played their role during this period by putting their views across during 
presentations although it was not easy for the other partners to easily allow them 
to just present.  
“Ya… this was very fascinating because again… people saw that we are 
part of the team .ok. You will think that it goes without saying that when 











fight to be part of a  team that was presenting, in terms of having a role in 
presenting”. [Women’s Group participant-O]  
“We presented….Ya….  it is a part that was very important to us because 
we were presenting the BEE part. We had to be sure of what we were 
presenting. We had to be comfortable of what we were selling you know. 
So we were comfortable with the boards sides…you know…. because 
during the collation of information it was clear that we were going to be 
directors. The part that was missing was this one [second tier of PPP 
contract], although we mentioned that we were still negotiating the 
management side. And the operational side was clear .you know, as we 
presented to government. So that part was very pronounced during the 
tendering stage, our role as the presenters. So it was the sponsor who 
presented, one of the ladies introduced us and the bank did their part, FM 
did their part, we did the BEE part”. [Women’s Group participant-O]  
“And what was also profound about the presentation is that it is very easy 
for BEE companies to say that there are women in there, and you never 
see them. We were new entrants and we were there so the message that I 
was driving to government is that help us grow we are here we want to 
grow.   And our partners have shown commitment and also they want us 
to grow by giving us this contract. .you know. you will be helping us to 
grow if . that was the thing”. [Women’s Group participant-O]  
During the negotiations the government was very particular on the BEE details 
that it wanted emphasized during the presentations. Whenever those details 
were not clarified meetings were disbanded in order for the issues to be 
corrected. This showed the seriousness of the BEE issue and the centrality 
which the government wanted it to play.  
“Did government help,…. did it help in terms of our partners taking it 
seriously… it did. .it did. So it was known that when we present BEE is 











always there. You don’t collect it only when it is needed you ensure that 
you have all your ducks in a row. And it didn’t end there. The responsible 
government official did a paper and he looked at the scorecard at the time 
and said I want all the BEE reports to follow this format. You must tell me 
in terms of the ownership in terms of the 40% how far you are, in ensuring 
that  you get 40%” [Women’s Group participant-O]  
“On the monetary side he [the leading Treasury Department negotiator] 
wanted the flow of money, he wanted to know how it flows to BEE 
companies. Because in terms of reporting, companies were reporting that 
if you own 40% then you are getting 40% of the project. Then he said no I 
want the trickle down. How does it trickle down to BEE, because it does 
not mean you own 40%, because if government pays in money; money is 
going to pay for operations. It is only the profits that get paid to BEE, our 
partners wanted to know what exactly should they put on the report. 
Should they put 40% which is your ownership or the actual money that 
goes” [Women’s Group participant-O]  
“He [the leading Treasury negotiator] said I want to know the actual 
money. Because we know that most of the BEE companies they are not 
involved in operations, so you can’t assume because they own 40%, they 
have 40% of what government pays. He said no. I want the actual, the 
profit. So companies started reporting on those profits at that time” 











ADVERSE SELECTION ANALYSIS (ASA/3) 
The government was quite wary of the issue of window dressing even during 
negotiations and was aware that it could lead to adverse selection if allowed. But 
for this project there was a strong PDI participation at this stage and the PDI 
sponsor was very active and aware of the pertinent BEE issues and assisted the 
others in this regard and the experience gained in the previous PPP where he was 
involved proved invaluable. The over-dependence of the other PDIs in the project 
sponsor and advisors of other consortium members was not the best idea 
especially when it comes to finer financially details which they were clearly not 
conversant with. An independent advisor solely responsible for guiding them into 
attaining a gainful deal would have spotted pitfalls that would work to the detriment 
of an ideal utility maximization.  
 
The issue of not being involved at the second tier stage [sub-contractor level] is 
one area where an experienced advisor would have fought strongly for. Although 
the PDIs mentioned this weakness during their presentation it would appear that 
they did not appreciate its gravity at the point of negotiations. The government 
however fought for a proper demonstration of a profit and financial trickle down of 
40% to PDIs. This issue could have been drowned in financial jargon and ended up 














MONITORING ANALYSIS (MA/2) 
The behaviour and the treatment of the PDIs seem to have been on the spotlight in 
as far as the government is concerned. The introduction of an advisor by DBSA 
was a result of recognition of a need by the PDIs, although in the end it did not 
assist much but the government showed willingness and determination to monitor 
empowerment and come up with remedies to rectify PDIs deficiencies.  The 
presence of a strong PDI sponsor player and the fact that the women were 
professionals might have made the job lighter. Although the government was not 
really involved in how the deal was structured within the consortium itself, at least 
on the issues of a trickle down of the project profits they wanted to make sure that it 
was transparent and detailed. 
 
 
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/3) 
The greatest achievement at this stage for PDIs was playing an active part in a 
multi-million rand project. Although their strongest contribution at this stage was 
presenting the BEE issue, this on its own gave them enough confidence and self-
belief in the sense that they had a role, taking into account the centrality of the BEE 
issue in the project. Even if the technical issues were all complied with, the deal 
would not have gone through if the BEE issue was compromised. So their 
contribution was beneficial to the securing of the deal for the consortium.  
 
AGENT BEHAVIOUR SHIFT ANALYSIS (ABSA/2) 
The issue of elaborating financial flows to the PDIs as emphasized by the 
government did a lot to demonstrate that BEE is not just a superficial requirement, 
but that it has to be incorporated into the technical financial details. That 
demonstrated the seriousness with which the government regarded the issue and 
shifted the posture of the consortium (agent) to regard it as an important issue like 











5.3.4 Internal Negotiations and Shareholding Apportionment 
Internal consortium structure negotiations as is probably the nature of things 
were very heated and it was at this time that the members of the consortium took 
part in agreeing on the specific duties and details of involvement of the PDIs. 
With the other parties it was not a problem because they were basically invited 
because of their specialties in different fields, so they knew what was expected of 
them but the women PDIs had to negotiate and understand their involvement. It 
was at this stage that the apportionment of shareholding was decided. The 
decision taken at this stage resulted in the structure shown in Figure 5:4 below. 
This was the stage that women PDIs should have prepared intensively for or 
could have had a better advice on, in order to choose the most gainful approach.  
“We were awarded the tender… I am just trying to think… because the 
percentage split was towards the end. And you can imagine we are not 
bright business people who’ve been in it for a long time. This is what 
…2000, 1999… and there is also this trust you know. And at the final 
stage the split in the shareholding at the equity level at IMPILO, is that we 
are supposed to have 40% BEE across the board that was part of that 
deal. So when we got to splitting that 40% went to BEE… 7% went to 
Omame, 7% went to Mbekani, 26 % went to Vulindlela, which is fine 
because the sponsor did most of the work. 60% was split amongst the 
white companies, which is ok. 
Then we came to the next level where you had to have 40% as IT, you 
have to have 40% as medical equipment, you have to have 40% as FM”. 
[Women’s Group participant-M]  
“You look at this structure.. … you look at it .this is IT, this is Medical 
equipment… this is FM [second tier below IMPILO] now which has got a 
whole basket of services here [third tier] (see Figure 5:5: Final consortium 
structure). When we were negotiating we were at this level [third tier—sub-











now what was missing was this area [second tier]. Because when I read 
the tender document it said BEE parties had to be involved at all levels 
both management and operational. You could say largely this is 
operational [third level service provision] but the way this consortium is 
structured, it is a management level, once you look at FM side they are 
managing these operations these are the guys who are really operating. 
So it is really operation but operation at a different level. So we were here 
[third tier] and then government kept on saying we want you to be involved 
at this level as well [second tier] because what happens is that money is 
paid by government to these companies [ second tier] and they decide the 
fees of these companies [third tier]. So you have to have a proper 
knowledge of what happens in these consortiums at all levels.  Ok. so the 
tenders went in and we were not involved here [second tier]”. [Women’s 
Group participant-O]  
“It is the way it was structured .you see here [second tier] it was Vulindlela 
40%, Vulindlela 40% … and with D&S saying their BEE partners are going 
to be their representative from national [countrywide partners]” [Women’s 
Group participant-O]  
“No you will actually form a company the 2 women entities and own 40% 
of this soft services company. I had a problem with that because when 
money comes from government to IMPILO it is not labeled. It is FM, if you 
are not sitting there [second tier] the money that will come to soft 
services… guess what … it will be determined by this guy. So we are 
short changed. Because you can’t say ‘why are you giving me R100, it is 
supposed to be R300?’ Why, because you don’t know what came here 
[second tier]. ‘Even if you guys give us 5% as hard services, we just need 
to have our eye there’. We didn’t succeed, not only that, FM is about the 
whole thing; Soft services is just the contracts …you know like…. cleaning 
and what have you.  When it comes to hard services it is the buildings, it’s 











you say this women’s group can only learn the cleaning…. its insulting, we 
tried … at a certain stage we decided that ‘you know what the 




















ADVERSE SELECTION ANALYSIS (ASA/4) 
This is a stage that there is clearly an adverse selection on the part of the 
government. The exclusion of women PDIs altogether at level two [second tier] was 
not going to result in effective empowerment. The PDIs being professional 
business women who had studied the contract were aware of this but it would 
appear that they did not fight hard enough for their inclusion at this level. The fact 
that complete tender documents were handed in without this matter being 
adequately and finally resolved internally meant that it was always going to be 
difficult to reverse what was submitted to the government and would normally be 
regarded as an internal agreement. The inclusion of women only at the first and 
third tier has got its problems. The first tier is basically for investors who can afford 
to have their returns deferred for a number of years. The women were supposed to 
be empowerment beneficiaries and would be better served by immediate flow of 
financial proceeds from their involvement in order for them to attain economic 
empowerment.  
 
Being involved at the third tier means the company is basically managed by the 
one above it in terms of determining the pay and looking at a broader picture of 
operation. The women PDIs being start-up operations were given simple tasks and 
although by their admission they needed help even in performing those tasks to the 
required standards, they still do not understand the FM operation in its totality (see 
5.7.4). The other problem is that the government pays for the full occupancy and 
yet the facilities are never fully utilised and occupied by the patients. The operator 
however pays the sub-contractor the amount they deem fit, not necessarily the 
proportional pro-rata apportionment of patients’ occupation at that point in time. 
This is a direct result of not being involved at the second stage in order to observe 













5.4 IMPILO INTERNAL CONTRACT CLUSURE 
5.4.1 Joint venture (JV) Formation and Duty Allocations 
The negotiations for joint ventures were going on even before the tender was 
awarded. The Women PDIs were aware that they would not be able to perform 
the duties required for Facility Management without the assistance of well-
MONITORING ANALYSIS (MA/3) 
The government was very clear in its documents on what it expected from the deal, 
it terms of PDI involvement at all levels. However the acceptance of the bid 
whereas other PDIs were excluded from the second tier, could mean an 
inadequate monitoring. However on the other hand the government might have 
looked purely at a PDI representation not necessarily an inclusive representation.  
With that view there is no technical infringement although it could be argued that 
there was a moral oversight, because the BEE policy is for a fair and equitable 
economic distribution and participation in the republic.  
AGENT BEHAVIOUR SHIFT ANALYSIS (ABSA/3) 
All the established members of the consortium seem to have been complying with 
the BEE contractual requirements up until the moment before contract award. 
Whether they sensed that that the contract has been secured or they thought that 
the government would not notice is not clear. But at this point in time there was a 
clear issue of non-compliance especially where there was complete women’s group 
exclusion, at the second tier. This behaviour could only be interpreted as a move to 
maximize utility at the expense of the principal’s (government) goal of fair 
empowerment of PDIs. The natural behaviour of the agent to maximize utility at the 
least cost and the disproportionate leverage of one PDI player (project sponsor) 
conflated to work against the maximum involvement of women PDIs. At this stage 
there was a clear sign that opportunism was taking place, and had the government 












established companies, so these negotiations were started ahead of award so 
that all the role players would be in place were the consortium awarded the 
tender. When the tender was approved and soon after the contract negotiations 
with the client, the women’s group together with D&S formed a JV company 
called Umongi which was essentially an FM company tasked with the duty of 
managing all the FM soft services around the hospital. The Omame group also 
formed JVs with other companies experienced in cleaning, property management 
and education. These companies were in turn answerable to Umongi, which was 
reporting to D&S at the end of the day. At the time when the deal was concluded 
the organisational structure was as Figure 5:5 below. There were other 
independent companies involved in different kinds of soft services and they are 
all listed in below.  Mbekani was also independently sub-contracted by Siemed to 
run the Theatre Supply Unit (TSU) which supplies sterile surgical equipment to 
operation theatres, they are also responsible for the running of the Central Sterile 
Supply Department (CSSD), which is a department tasked with supplying the 
wards and clinics with sterile instruments. They also provide milk feeds for babies 
in the wards whenever needed.  
“Remember I said that during the tendering stage I said we were involved 
in identifying them together with D&S. But because the FM contract is for 
D&S a lot is by D&S. they had to identify companies that they had a 
relationship with, companies that had a track record using their experience 
and all that. How we got involved was that now that you have identified 
those companies, we realize that we cannot perform the service on own, 
in spite of the government’s wishes for us to be practically involved. That 
led to the formation…let me get to the operations … that led to the 
formation of Umoja.  
Umoja is Bidvest 49% and Omame 51%. Now those are the companies as 
we are going to operations. Now this company does cleaning, steaming 











Number 2 you have Omame Fedics at 60% / 40%. Its the management of 
service accommodation.  
No -3 is Omame Archtech and it is also 60%/40%. It is the crèche at Albert 
Luthuli”. [Women’s Group participant-O]  
“So they were approached by the chairperson of IMPILO consortium 
because D&S applied to get into this contract but because the requirement 
says they need to have a BEE partner then these two were approached to 
come together with D&S so they are now this company, its called Umongi. 
Its 60% D&S and 20% Mbekani and 20% being Omame. And then they 
formed Umongi Facilities Services”. [Women’s Group participant-T] 
“I have always been independent’ and so was my partner. We want to 
dirty our hands, we don’t want to sit there and just be partners. Because 
you do not learn and you are not in control of anything. So that is why we 
said we will run this. the areas allocated to us …its our thing. You are 
likely to mess up because you haven’t done it before but guess what, you 
learn and you make it better”. [Women’s Group participant-M]  
The women PDIs actually tried on a number of occasions to be involved with 
hard services as well but they were never successful. Hard services is essentially 
all the mechanical and technical side of FM, i.e. maintenance of lifts, machines, 
stand-by generators, the upkeep of the building structure etc. Soft services deal 
with value-added services that are not necessarily core to the hospital business 
but enhance the effectiveness of day-to-day operations but do not necessarily 
affect the hospital’s technical functionality.  
“FM is about the whole thing; Soft services is just the contracts …you 
know like…. cleaning and what have you.  When it comes to hard services 
it is the buildings, it’s the maintenance of machines and stuff like that. Now 
I have a problem if you say this women’s group can only learn the 











know what the relationships are getting quite bad so lets leave it’”. 
[Women’s Group participant-M]  
Government actually played an active part in ensuring that the women were 
involved. 
“So here [third tier] I would say in terms of negotiating facilitating this 
structure, because government was involved. I actually went to 
government and say can you help us to be involved at this level [third tier]. 
And government called D&S and say ‘D&S come up with a structure that 
accommodates women.’  Which led to the formation of Umongi”. It is a 
women’s group plus D&S. D&S has got 60%.you know one of the 
government requirement was 40% BEE. Yes. Omame and Mbekani they 
have 20/20. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
The women PDIs also negotiated for the secondment of their staff at D&S which 
was approved and this helped in enhancing skills transfer.  
“Now those are the operating companies. Now you will remember that one 
of the things during this stage that we put on the table to those companies 
was that in terms of the BEE scorecard, ownership being involved at the 
operational level, preferential procurement and so forth. We want skills 
transfer, now at that time… Retrospectively we should have fought for the 
role of Omame the company. But we fought for the role of individuals that 
they transfer skills to individual shareholders.  So what happened was we 
seconded some of our shareholders to these companies. At this level the 











Table 5:1: FM sub-sub-contractors 
 
NO Company Name Activity Contracts 
Manager 
Gender 










CLEANING FEMALE/B None (lawyer) 300 W/G 
2 FEDICS CATERING FEMALE/B 2 35 PVT 












LANDSCAPING FEMALE/B 5 20 PVT 
7 UMONGI FACILITIES SERVICES 
PORTERING 






FEMALE/B 10+ 62 W/G 
9 BARLOW 
STORES 
WAREHOUSING MALE/B 5 25 PVT 
10 ENVIROSERVE 
WASTE 
WASTE  MALE/B None 6 PVT 
11 UTI MOUNTIES MAIL MALE/B None 5 PVT 
12 ENFORCE 
SECURITY 
SECURITY  MALE/W 22 93 PVT 
 














Figure 5:5: Final consortium structure 
 
 
MONITORING ANALYSIS (MA/4) 
Government seems to have been very responsive even at this stage to any 
compromise of the spirit of the BEE policy, which was essentially the involvement 
of the PDIs at all levels in order for them to learn and garner appropriate skills.  














BENEFICIARIES BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS (BBA/4) 
The women requested the assistance of the government in bolstering their claim for 
involvement at the third tier. Once this was accepted by D&S the two parties 
worked together in identifying and approaching potential partners. The over-
reliance on D&S at this stage meant that D&S only approached the companies that 
were in their own conglomerate (see5.4.2 Lack of Leverage During Negotiations, 
page 10). Although that might not have contravened any regulations, however 
other BEE companies who operate in those areas and who are experience were 
precluded from consideration.  
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/5) 
The involvement in seeing the deals and formation of JVs to the end and learning 
in the process was a valuable lesson for the PDIs. It has given them confidence 
that they could correct the mistake they made here in the future. If this was a 
traditionally procured project the PDIs would not have been party to any 
negotiations mostly and they would just be given an apportionment or a task to do 
during operations without actually having a proper feel of how the deal was 
structured and concluded. The role played here by the women PDIs has been more 
empowering in giving them invaluable lessons that only experience and 












5.4.2 Lack of Leverage During Negotiations 
The women PDIs did not have money as beginners to pay for the bid bond and 
this was used against them whenever a complaint was raised against what they 
perceived to be an unfair arrangement.  
“When we went to complain they would be like so, ‘how much did you pay 
for the guarantee’? How much were we going to pay….so I tell you to be 
black…you can’t talk you can’t complain, those guys have put in their 
money”.  [Women’s Group participant-M] 
The main established FM partner who has sub-contracted the women PDI group 
has been in business for a long time and they were too experienced and the 
PDIs felt that they sometimes had to compromise to get the work done because 
AGENT BEHAVIOUR SHIFT ANALYSIS (ABSA/4) 
The other sub-contractors of IT and Medical equipment had very sophisticated 
operations which could not be sub-contracted except for the supply of sterile 
surgical instruments by Mbekani. However the FM side’s complete exclusion of 
PDIs on the hard services seems to have been harsh and opportunistic. It is an 
area that could have been entered into even later once the new companies had 
settled in, because the idea is to mentor rounded FM operators, not just soft 
services specialists. There are a lot of skilled PDI people whose skills could have 
been sought by the women PDIs to work in this project and this could have given 
PDIs a fuller experience of being bona fide FM operators in the future. However it 
would seem that the agents (consortium) would always posture themselves to 
comply only when there is strong enough emphasis by the government on any one 
particular issue and would not independently do what is in the fuller benefit of the 
PDIs.  Their position on this matter might not be interpreted as opportunistic it could 
just be that it was not the area that was emphasized by the government, which 
might have just been preoccupied in seeing an active involvement by the PDIs, and 











the established company at the end of the day have their own BEE partners 
outside the IALCH.  
“So that has been a juggle with BEE companies and these big companies 
and there are a lot of factors that are contributing towards that. You have 
empowerment partners,… I am sure that putting myself in the shoes of 
those empowerment partners…. they would be saying ‘why are you not 
growing us, why are you growing those people? We’ve bought these 
shares and we own probably 20% of this company’”. [Women’s Group 
participant-O] 
“Bidvest is just a monopoly when it comes to providing FM, because they 
do everything. They do your cleaning, they do your linen they do 
everything”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“Ya. what Bidvest does .like I said Bidvest is a monopoly. It’s a big 
company. Bidvest has a stream of operational companies …a stream. 
Their cleaning company is Prestige; their Linen Company is Boston; their 
security company …but it is not involved with us” [Women’s Group 
participant-O] 
“Its still Bidvest. they are all owned by Bidvest. But operationally it is its 
Prestige. So the company that will operate that cleaning contract will be 












ADVERSE SELECTION ANALYSIS (ASA/6) 
The inequality of two parties that have to form JVs and work together means that 
there would always be a manifestation of a power relationship. This would be more 
so when there is a diminished government involvement with its interventionist 
leverage, to essentially fight for the BEE policy. In internal commercial agreements 
where the women PDIs were left on their own to negotiate with established 
companies an issue of the payment of Bid Bond was always brought up. This went 
against the BEE policy because the policy is essentially to assist PDIs who cannot 
be expected to pay a Bond. Although the largest contributor to the bond has more 
leverage in other deals, in BEE projects this has to be considered as an 
infringement on the spirit of the BEE policy and if it has been used to advance 
certain favorable contractual arrangements for the established companies; then this 
should be interpreted as an adverse selection by the government on the BEE 
issue.  
 
Bidvest appears to be a part of a big conglomerate and to maximize their own utility 
they invited companies within their own group. Although this naturally has to be 
expected from any agent who is essentially seeking to maximize their own benefits, 
it has however shut worthy beneficiaries of the BEE policy who are equally involved 
in the FM business and who were not given the chance to take part and who might 
even have a high BEE involvement in their structures. So in this regard there 














5.4.3 Restrictive contractual Clauses 
During the internal negotiations the spirit within the two women PDIs was to build 
their companies and cooperate as much as possible with the established 
companies. This led to the signing of the restrictive clauses that they now seem 
to regret.  
MONITORING ANALYSIS (MA/5) 
Again on this point the government involvement seems to have been removed. And 
the agent (FM operator) took advantage of this. The companies forming JVs with 
women PDIs should have been subjected to the same scrutiny like all the other 
companies who were tendering with the government. However on the other hand 
government might not have wanted to be too disruptive in allowing a smooth 
running of business, once they have set the parameters they deemed crucial. 
Which is the practical involvement of PDIs.  
 
BENEFICIARIES BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS (BBA/5) 
The beneficiaries at this stage seem to have been concerned with securing good 
individual deals for themselves and setting up structures for their new companies. 
And although there were things that might have not been favorable to them, they 
were probably taking this as a step to learn and do it better next time.  
AGENT BEHAVIOUR SHIFT ANALYSIS (ABSA/5) 
The agent at this time never actually infringed on the policy or acted surreptitiously 
opportunistic against it, but they were just increasing their utility as business 
people. The involvement of PDIs in the general sense was not actually 













“There is a clause that D&S can tender for another job in KZN without us. 
But we are not allowed to tender without them. But we can tender on our 
own outside KZN, but not within KZN. But as for themselves they can 
tender anywhere. And although it is something you don’t have prove of,  
there are projects that they get that they have tendered as Albert Luthuli 
BEE. But nobody from us gets involved, D&S people only get involved. 
The site is run by D&S, everything that is done here is done by D&S”. 
[Women’s Group participant-T] 
“No what we signed…. in KZN we are partners…. right. In KZN according 
to the agreement they don’t go to other BEE partners because we are 
partners. But in other provinces they can and we can, but that hasn’t 
happened”. [Women’s Group participant-M] 
“You see what was driving us was the spirit of building a company  ..if I 
come to you and say lets form a company and you have your own 
company. And you say lets not compete. If we have a vision of working 
together I don’t see it as malicious if somebody says that, ‘don’t compete 
with me’, because you want to grow together anyway. That was the spirit 
at the time,…. no,…… lets work together and if you are going to work 
together lets grow this company then. I put my screws here you put yours 
here. If again we are going to go our separate ways I am going to sleep 
one day I am wearing this hat the next day I have the other hat… you also 
confuse the market as well. So we agreed that lets use this as our 
vehicle”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“But what happened is that we are the only people who had that spirit they 
did it for the sake ….that is just my thinking...for the sake of having a 
contract and having their foot at the door at Albert Luthuli. But in spirit and 
terms of the vision it wasn’t really their vision they knew they were going to 
continue on their own with their own BEE parties.    The mistake that our 











who were to abide by the this and the big companies were not expected to 
abide”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
When the respondent was asked if it was clear in the document that this 
particular clause is not quid pro quo, the response was: 
“Is there, but you need a lawyer to say …that this it is quid pro quo. To say 
if BEE partners are going to compete. Why are you going to compete? 
You find that for the past few years we’ve been out of the market”. 
[Women’s Group participant-O] 
It appears the negative impacts of this particular clause are being felt already. 
There was a widespread lament of this disadvantageous oversight.  
“No it wasn’t a good deal… no I can tell you now, it wasn’t a good deal, 
because what it does is you have these blind lawyers that say we are 
going to grow together with this company and then when the contract 
comes. They…. have to weigh in ‘are we going in as Albert Luthuli 
partners or are we going in as ourselves?’ If we are going in as ourselves 
the [internal BEE] shareholding takes only 15% you know. And here the 
shareholding is 49%. and who do we really want to grow? What is the 
benefit of growing this company? Its gonna grow and at some point 
compete with us. so lets put in this one [internal BEE]’….so you put in this 
one. And when you ask questions we also want to bid for this… ‘You can’t 
bid because we have already put in our bid. So you are gonna be 
competing with us’. We’ve been fighting this thing for a long time.” 
[Women’s Group participant-O] 
“And if it comes to an end then we are back to square one. … you know… 
the company hasn’t grown enough to have its own contracts and have its 
own identity”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
When the issue is raised in meetings with the operators it’s always given a hard 










 “This BEE I tell you, it is difficult. When you raise these issues you must 
be prepared to go the legal route and fight, and who has got that time. It’s 
like ‘ok what is your problem, 40%/ 60% lets go to a vote’”. [Women’s 
Group participant-M] 
 “So if they had a strong lawyer with them, that lawyer might have said to 
them ‘Hey guys ….you know…I reckon you don’t sign this restraint of 
trade’’”. . [Government Official-D] 
 
 
ADVERSE SELECTION ANALYSIS (ASA/7) 
Although the respondents differ on their interpretation of the ‘restraint of trade’ 
clause it would appear that the clause itself is restricting both parties. But the 
agreement is being flouted by the FM operator who has financial leverage, and the 
PDIs seem to be stuck at IALCH and they can’t grow for the rest of contract tenure. 
Thus inducing unsuspecting new entrants to sign a restrictive clause such as this 
appears to have compromised their growth.  
BENEFICIARIES BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS (BBA/6) 
The inexperience of the women PDIs coupled with a weak advice induced them to 
agree to this clause which appeared to be mutually profitable to the established 
companies and the PDIs as well. It would appear to have been a legitimate 
proposal agreed to in good spirit and the reneging on this by established 
companies is simply because of their financial muscle to afford a good legal advice. 
And the PDIs simply have to accept the situation because they do not simply enjoy 
the benefit of a substantial financial endowment. The lesson is instructive to be 
better prepared in the future regarding seemingly harmless obscure clauses which 












5.5 EARLY DAYS OF OPERATIONS 
The early days of operations phase were very challenging to the women PDIs, 
because they were trying to settle in as new business people. At the same time 
the high standards that they found at IALCH meant that they had to get 
organized timeously and comply with the contractual requirements because there 
are heavy penalties in this self-monitoring contract. However it was also during 
this time that a lot of things that they unwittingly assented to became clearer and 
that created a lot of tension between them and the established companies.  
5.5.1 Underpayment of PDIs 
There was a general tendency among the established companies to try to 
underpay the PDIs. This included unfair payment mechanisms in the contract 
and this was realized earlier on during operations by the PDIs. These early 
experiences introduced them to the vicissitudes of the business world. 
“People expectations are not always matched with the reality that is in the 
agreement. So at the beginning there were serious tensions, even among 
BEE people”. [Government Official-S] 
AGENT BEHAVIOUR SHIFT ANALYSIS (ABSA/6) 
The leverage of the established companies allow them to renege on a prior 
agreement and flout the contractual clauses with the full knowledge that putting up 
a legal fight would be too hard for the PDIs, because of the costs involved. Again it 
is here demonstrated that the agent acts opportunistically in a situation where there 
is no government intervention. Contractual penalties are non-existence on this 
matter as far as the government is concerned as it is a private commercial 
agreement. The agent pursued this route to maximize their utility at the expense of 
the PDIs who will find it difficult to do likewise because of the possibility of a 











There was an attempt by the operator not to pay the PDIs the rightful pro rata 
amount paid by the government as it could reasonably be expected.  
“And the government agreed to a fee per month that is split according to 
the three tiers. One goes to FM company, based on what we had put and 
the assumption from day 1, we were paid for 100% occupancy….right.  So 
the government didn’t say …ok… we are going to do a check, 50% …no. 
It is better administration for them 100% from day one. If there are 900 
beds we are assuming there are 900 bodies on the beds …right. So that is 
the service fee that has been paid from day 1. And the escalation is CPIX 
linked and its quarterly ….right. So when we started we employed the staff 
and did everything else. And for two years we didn’t have a contract, 
because now we had to have a contract with the operator… as a supplier 
to them …and agree a fee. And then we see ourselves to finish, but we 
didn’t have a contract. They were dilly dallying and we didn’t have our 
money. Because my argument was as follows; if you are getting R100 with 
the assumption that it is 100 patients, for this particular service there is 
nothing that you have done to keep that R100 and give me R10 and 
control my budget….are you with me? Because if I have given you a 
budget based on what I am going to do. And then the number of people I 
am going to employ and all that . Then don’t hold it back. Then we had 
those fights. I tell you I could show you scares, so for 2 years we didn’t 
have a contract with the operator, and for 2 years they were withholding 
the money and saying no we would pay your employees. So you have a 
business where the person that you are supplying a service to, pays for 
those 2, 3 or 10 or whatever number of employees.  And why are you in 
business by the way? [Women’s Group participant-M] 
There was also a discrepancy in the CPIX adjustments for payments where the 
operator gets quarterly adjustments for their payments whereas the PDI 











 “So we got to Umongie…Umongie is struggling and for me its an artificial 
struggle because we lost the battle. It is FM [second tier] here who 
decides ‘how much I [i.e. FM]  pay to Umongie.’ FM gets CPIX 
adjustments quarterly, Umongie gets it annually”. [Women’s Group 
participant-M] 
Legal recourse had to be sought on one occasion where money could not be 
paid by the established company. However painful these lessons have been, the 
two women PDIs consider them invaluable in assisting them in their approach in 
future business endeavors. 
“And how… we have leant a lot…I can speak for myself. I still trust 
people…but I also protect myself.  It has gone further because I have had 
many lessons after that… that if you don’t have the same value system 
just go home….don’t form that partnership. It is not going to work. I don’t 
care who says what. …. you see there is more to life than money… the 
pain of fighting a relationship that is flowed because you just don’t have 
the same value system. There is nothing better in any partnership, it’s the 
same value system, I will still sign an agreement with [people] but your 
signature is worth much…you know….so that is what I have learnt. 
[Women’s Group participant-M] 
 
ADVERSE SELECTION ANALYSIS (EA/6) 
The behaviour of the agents (operators) here is no different from the other 
behaviours observed above that whenever the arrangement is considered private 
between the women’s Group PDI and established companies, they behave 
opportunistically to take advantage of PDIs inexperience. The above cited 
experiences are circumventing the fair cash outflows to the PDIs and as a result 
they are against the spirit of the policy and this is an adverse selection as far as the 













5.5.2 Centrality of BEE 
The start of operations would be a good barometer for the government to see if 
the centrality of BEE was understood and adhered to by all. The government side 
is convinced that in the final analysis the outcomes generally seem to reflect 
what they had hoped for. There seems to be a general agreement that 
government’s principal requirements were adhered to. 
“Sure, I think they understood clearly that it is was the government non-
negotiable requirement. So there was no effort to try to kind of side-step it. 
BENEFICIARY BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS (BBA/8) 
The general education standards of the women PDIs and the amount of homework 
they were doing as they progressed with the project assisted in them sporting a 
number of issues that were disadvantageous. The protracted fight for what they 
considered legitimate monetary claim demonstrate that they really understood that 
the intention of their involvement was being compromised. Going further to seek 
legal recourse again demonstrate that they understood the legal basis of their 
involvement in this scheme. However on this particular occasion there is no 
reference of any effort to seek government intervention, These early fights however 
were observed to have set a tone for their relationships with the established 
partners as it became clear that they clearly understand their rights. 
AGENT BEHAVIOUR SHIFT ANALYSIS (ABSA/7) 
The agent (operator) on this occasion was concerned with utility maximization and 
only changed their stance when legal recourse was sought. Even then the whole 
amount of was not paid. So this is again an example of a natural agent behaviour 
which according to the PA theory, is self-centered opportunistic behaviour which 
maximizes agent utility at the principal’s expense. In essence the stance of the 












Ah. what I saw in the negotiations was a good team working together. I 
had no doubt that behind the scenes they had fights like cat and dogs. 
That’s very common you know… in essence what you are deciding is the 
next 15 years of commercial reality. But what we saw …lets say… a good 
and balanced outcome of those…whatever was happening behind the 
scenes”. [Government Official-D] 
“BEE in terms of the role of government you could also analyze that BEE 
was a separate standing item. Each and every company, they had to 
supply and improve BEE information”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
The contract also emphasized strong local area improvement as part of BEE 
delivery. It appears as if most companies are adhering to that requirement.  
“They are from the community. Because the way that this contract is run is 
that we can only employ people from Cator Manor community. Everyone 
around this community here, Cator Manor, Mayville and Chesterville, 
that’s the agreement that we have. Well when they come they have to 
have a letter from the councilor that they come from here and the copy of 
their ID and proof of address”. [Contracts Manager-UC] 
“And according to the hospital policy we had a percentage that we had to 
adhere to, … a specific percentage that we had to employ from around the 
area. That was the requirement. When you advertise you always make 
sure that when you start screening people or from the candidates we 
always make sure that you’ve got some from the local community. .Before 
you go out to Umlazi, Kwa Mashu and other communities”. [Contracts 
Manager-MHW] 
“So we also have issues where you find that in terms of employment we 
are supposed to get 60% of employment from the local community and 











100km radius of the area, and then the 40% can come from anywhere 
else.” [Women’s Group participant-T] 
“They are all from the community. I would venture to say 60% is from the 
community. Very few I know are from Umlazi and Kwamashu but the rest 
is Chesterville, Cator Manor, Mayville all the surrounding areas”. 
[Contracts Manager-ES] 
There are also bursaries to help local kids in order to bring about empowerment 
and develop skills in the community.  
“So we’ve got projects where we’ve got bursaries, at IMPILO level. So we 
have projects like the bursaries because we felt that because it is a 15 
year contract we can’t for the whole of this time just be sitting here 
….because the community here . they are not educated. So we need to 
rectify that. So what we’ve done is we’ve come up with a bursary scheme, 
where we are educating the kids from the local community, from the local 
high schools. Where we are working with two institutions which is 
Mangosuthu Tech and Durban University of Technology. We give money 
to them, and from their database they pick up the kids that have got the 
Cator Manor address and then we pay for those kids. And then when its 
time for them to go for experiential learning we accommodate them here in 
our different companies until they are finished. Then we are hoping that 
the courses that they do it’s the things that they will be able to be 
employable in the hospital. Because we are trying to sort out that issue 
that people here are not educated. So you find that the only positions that 
they get is to be the cleaners, security people and catering. We want them 
to be also employed in bigger positions we have like engineers and the 













5.5.3 Staff and Racial Mix 
The centrality of BEE seems to have been understood by all the major players in 
the consortium, and this practice has trickled down even to sub-sub-contractors 
especially when it comes to employment equity. The staff of the majority of the 
companies is equitably reflective of all the racial groups in the country. 
“The primary function that you could say we are involved is making sure 
that our BEE figures and our BEE requirements is that the contract says 
that the principal sub-contractor for medical would have 25 people. And 
now on those 25 people in the first year there would be a certain BEE 
component. Second year BEE component and so and so on across the 
board. Up until the starting of 40% and then another one 15%? and 
another one of 55% of BEE component and every quarter we send those 
ADVERSE SELECTION ANALYSIS (ASA/8) 
There is generally a good compliance on issues of employment equity, and local 
socio-economic impact. These are the issues the government would have looked 
for in the evaluation of tenders so it should be expected that their centrality was 
emphasized during the negotiations and as result there is adequate compliance. It 
is less likely that given their centrality to this project that the consortium would have 
tried to side step them. And the compliance on these issues has trickled down to 
the sub-sub-contractors in this project. 
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/7) 
The area around IALCH is a very poor area with a high level of unemployment and 
allocating 60% of semi-skilled and unskilled jobs to the local community has 
contributed in uplifting some families from the poverty through the earning of a 
steady income. The provision of bursaries has also empowered the young people 
who might have been precluded from attaining adequate tertiary education 











figures to IMPILO  and say the project requires [this] and this is where we 
are. …from IMPILO they are send on….we don’t deal directly with the 
Department of Health, it is actually through IMPILO he sends it off to 
whatever parties he has to send it off to. …perhaps it is checked, I trust it 
is checked. If there are any problems they would come back to us and say 
…but we are well within what is required according to the numbers and 
the percentages. It is a big project, so we won’t ever grow in numbers. As 
in staff because there are no additional services that are being added on 
to by the Department of Health, so we had approximately 26 people, at the 
beginning of the project. We picked up a little bit slowly because there was 
a roll-out. You, you know the hospital did not just switch on at once. There 
were certain departments that weren’t life and. we could start with 4 
engineers and 6 engineers. and increase until we got to the levels of 26 
people effectively. And our figures for staff will remain the same. it will just 
depend sometimes we might have more of a BEE component in admin 
and slightly less in technical, and otherwise a year or two we might have 
slightly more in technical and slightly less in admin. But we don’t focus on 
finding a BEE employee we advertise and when people come along we 
pick the best. unless there is going to be a major problem whereby …we 
are really going to fall off with respect to BEE. If we need to be 40% and 
were are 55% BEE compliant we then find the right person for the job. The 
right person for the job to deliver service to the Department of Health. So 
we make sure that …because if we get penalized . we get penalized 
financially and we will have a major challenge. [IMPILO Consortium 
shareholder-G] 
The government officials seem to be satisfied with employment equity on the 
highly technical subcontractor jobs despite the challenges of finding the qualified 
black staff.  
“There they have achieved quite a lot whether you call that BEE …eh…or 











that they have got  problems in employing expert staff, plainly because of 
the shortage in the country not just black IT people, IT people in general. 
All over the place good IT people go to the big places, and this is not that 
big to …you’ve to have quite a lot of expertise. So they might have a bit of 
problems there. Siemed might have the same problems with the technical 
side.  I know that they have trained some local people …what they then do 
they send them to other countries… is not necessarily coming back here. 
So. eh….but I am pretty sure they are achieving that…. because 
otherwise they would have been penalties coming through”. [Government 
Official-C] 
In most sub-sub-contractor operators, because there is less technical 
qualification required from the staff there is more black participation at that level 
than at all levels. This is apparently the legacy of Apartheid. In highly technical 
and managerial levels where no black candidates were available the position are 
occupied by white people.  
“Its only black .its only black. I think I’ve got one colored lady who is also 
the manager here…. but its only black. And the contracts manager of 
specialized services is a white guy. But we are both under management 
not staff ”. [Contracts Manager-UCS] 
“I have got nine people here all of them black”. [Contracts Manager-FO] 
“I’ve got 1 black teacher, I’ve got 1 white teacher, and then the other 4 are 
Indian teachers. And I’ve got myself in the principal seat. [white]. I’ve got 1 
white teacher and 1 caregiver who is a white lady in the baby room. And 
then the other 6 black ladies are class assistants who have opportunities 
to become teachers and one of them is on the way there, because the 
company developed her in that direction. And then the others are at the 












“There is five of us here. Supervisor, admin clerk, two mail runners and 1 
driver. All of us are PDIs. Basically the percentage is quite high because 
the majority of workers are drivers and mail sorters. It’s more of a lower 
income set up. So most of our staff is from disadvantaged communities”. 
[Contracts Manager-UTIM] 
“When we first started here, we had two whites, eventually they resigned, 
and we also had about 6 Indians but they moved on. At this point in time 
we’ve got 1 colored, basically it’s all African. And according to the hospital 
policy we had a percentage that we had …. a specific percentage that we 
had to employ from around the area … Cator Manor. That was the 
requirement”. [Contracts Manager-MHW] 
“We manage the linen for the whole hospital. We are here to manage the 
linen, we’ve got about 34 staff who are divided into 2 departments. We’ve 
got this department which is called a dirty linen department they only deal 
with all the linen that has been used from theatres and clinics. With us on 
site we don’t have any Indians or colored’s its only blacks but all the 
management is Indian and white. Top management yes. But our 
management like my manager my operation manager she is an Indian and 
she report to a GM who is white but here on site its 100% black . We had 
Indians but they don’t stay with the kind of job that we are doing. They 
don’t stay I think is more of the hard work, like pushing trolleys and you 
have to count linen the whole day. And its more of a sweaty job its not like 
the office comfortable job”. [Contracts Manager-UL] 
“Including myself we are looking at 93. Ok. its myself white. as a  contracts 
manager… I’ve got one white lady and the rest are all black male and 













After the initial struggles the role players settled in, and the deliverance of the 
project became an overriding concern. For most players this was their first time 
to work in a PPP setup and they were as a result asked to voice their views on 
the standards found here at this project.  
5.6.1 PPP Standards 
The PPP mechanisms of service level agreement and penalty regime seems to 
be keeping the standards high at this hospital and the new players regard this as 
a positive influence on their careers.   
“No actually it was my first time here at Albert Luthuli, the other hospitals 
that I have worked for I think it is because there were no private partners 
in those hospitals. Whereas here at Albert Luthuli we’ve got private 
partners so I would say this is the first time I get this kind of monitoring. 
For each and every service provider even the DOH themselves they have 
procedure for each and everything that is going around here, that you 
have to adhere to, there are  standards that are set.  There are quality 
improvement programmes that are done by everybody, by all 
departments”. [Contracts Manager-F] 
“Honestly in other hospitals yes…sometimes we take short cuts because 
nobody is monitoring us…Ya”. [Contracts Manager-F] 
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/7) 
Again it appears that the issue of employment equity has really trickled down from 
sub-contractors to every sub-sub-contractor. A walk around the hospital in general 
reflects the racial composition of South Africa. Again this particular area is not very 
much different from the one above in the sense that the agent could not avoid 
proper compliance without jeopardizing the chances of securing a contract. The 
general dearth of black professionals in the country constrains the securing of 











I think also the penalty regime…is what keeps the standards as well for 
people to do any work. Because you know you gonna get the penalties if 
you don’t do the work. So as much as it is a very difficult system it is there 
for a reason and that has really helped”. [Contracts Manager-UCS] 
“Standards don’t change. The standards are always the same. It’s the 
people. Not the standards. Here the expectation is too high because we 
are the service provider”. [Contracts Manager-MHW] 
 “Personally I enjoy myself here because I am under pressure 24/7… and 
that is how I thrive I need to be under pressure then I am at my happiest. 
You are not going to find a more difficult site than this one. That I can 
assure you …I have no doubt”. [Contracts Manager-EF] 
The general standards induced by the PPP have trickled down to the IALCH 
general operational standards. This was cited as positive contributor in 
developing high levels of professionalism. 
“What I have discovered is that you get exposed to different levels of the 
operations but in other hospitals that I have worked in you only 
concentrate in the area where you are working. Here you get exposed to 
lots of different other operations within the entire hospital. So you get to 
liaise with other service providers and also you get Department of Health 
(DoH), you know that is why you are able to stand on your own. You can 
actually push your plans forward on your own in terms of bettering 
yourself”. [Contracts Manager-F] 
“Yes it has, …it has.  Because it becomes a part of our daily standards 
here and by keeping up to high standards everyday it becomes a part of 
you. And it grows you … definitely…. because the experience elsewhere 
the standards are not kept to scratch because of people not being 











“It helps you to ensure that all the time you adhere to the standards. Doing 
the right thing the first time, because that is the best. If you get used to 
doing the things the right way you won’t have problems”. [Contracts 
Manager-MHW] 
“Without IALCH I wouldn’t be where I am. I think we are the best…. if we 
can be the best here we can be the best anywhere”. [Contracts Manager-
UL] 
The respondents drew parallels with other government hospitals after they have 
experienced the high standards and a conducive environment at IALCH.  
“Albert Luthuli…I think it is a special child. Seeing that it is a government 
hospital and yet it is so different from the other hospitals. Here at Albert 
Luthuli everything is organized… done according to order”. [Contracts 
Manager-F] 
“I wouldn’t say patients are expecting too much I would say because of the 
environment here at Albert Luthuli they sometimes treat this hospital as a 
private hospital.  Whereas it is still a public hospital so they will expect to 
get the same experience that they are getting at the private hospital here”. 
[Contracts Manager-F] 
“And if you go to Inkosi Albert Luthuli….it could compete with any private 
hospital. Now if you go to a public [hospital]  it’s a mess….you just feel sad 
that the majority of the population that is all they can afford.  its just …its 
terrible….Ok I get emotional…[laughter]”.[Women’s Group participant-M] 
“Because the service that is provided is excellent, It is always on time. I 
think you have seen our hospital how clean it is….had it been done by 
somebody else who is not contracted it wouldn’t be what it is now”. 











“It’s helped to keep the standards of the hospital, because they is a very 
high expectation at Albert Luthuli. And to have service providers actually 
running the hospital I mean you don’t …. You just look at other 
government hospitals that maybe don’t have service providers. And you 
have people that are working there that are maybe employed by the 
government. And see how those hospitals are like. I mean you look at 
Prince Musheni Hospital in Umlazi, you look at King Edward Hospital. It’s 
a mess …it’s a mess”. [Contracts Manager-UCS] 
“Because really if you go to other hospitals its really a shame. So we are 
really doing a good job to maintain this hospital for so many years to keep 
it to this standard. So I think we are really doing a great job. Even though 
there are challenges…definitely there will be challenges but we are trying 
to excel. Everyday…anytime of the day you just have to lock a call… I 




EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/8) 
The high standards maintained at this hospital are delivered through the PDIs and 
this is empowering and it has demonstrated to the PDIs especially in this case the 
contracts managers what they are capable of achieving. Giving them this 
opportunity where their role is at the centre of the delivery has increased their 
sense of self-believe and professional confidence. Whereas in other non PPP 
projects PDIs might play peripheral roles, here they were observed manning offices 
and actually taking charge of the daily activities. 
BENEFICIARIES BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS (BBA/9) 
The experience of working with private service providers have managed to induce 
a culture of high standard among the PDI contracts managers and most seem to 
have embraced this opportunity, and this has given them the confidence and self-
believe to work anywhere. The hospital is regarded as a private facility because of 











5.6.2 Government BEE Monitoring  
Government monitoring is here discussed by the individuals who were/are 
working in the government and those who were/are involved in the project. By 
and large the government officials seem to be relying on the self-monitoring 
mechanism in the project to enforce compliance.  The self-monitoring mechanism 
works in the way described below by one respondent.  
“Yes there are penalties because … we’ve got a help-desk system 
whereby if the client needs anything. Lets say they need clean sheets they 
lock the call with the help-desk then help-desk will inform us and we will 
radio [one of our staff]. We’ve got a two way radio system whereby you 
pick the staff and Say ward A sister Nonvula requires whatever. Please 
make sure that she gets that service. After 30 minutes if the call is not 
addressed you get an escalation to say its been 30 minutes the client is 
still waiting. After 45 minutes you get another escalation to say 45 minutes 
then something is wrong. After that it goes to 100% that means something 
is really wrong.  
“We get escalation like we as management we are not on the floor, but we 
get this feedback that say the service is efficient or not. If not you start to 
get the escalation. That is where you address it with the supervisors as 
well” [Contracts Manager-UL] 
It is the efficiency of this system which monitors even the BEE issue that the 
government officials seem to be reliant upon. At the end of every month the BEE 
reports are submitted to IMPILO before they are passed on to the government. 
Any company which has defaulted on the BEE issue would automatically get 
penalties and suffer heavy financial loss. This makes BEE compliance a 
performance imperative to all the companies. Thus, the perceived confidence 
among the government officials that it is not easy for established companies to 











“People can’t cheat too much in a PPP contract because of the strictures 
that are there and these things are audited. But they will always take . 
…eh. sort of chances here and there”. [Government Official-S] 
“The best thing that happened with Albert Luthuli is that most of the 
requirements are actually contracted. Good fences make very good 
neighbors. So you disagree on the margins but the majority of stuff that 
you needed to do is documented in the contract”. [Government Official-S] 
“Well the contract is a self-monitoring contract. How good is that with the 
BEE I don’t know”. [Government Official-C] 
“Your agreement must make sure that its well monitored. I am pretty sure 
that this one as far as BEE is concerned has got very good provisions. A 
lot of it has been taken up nationally. Because there were no rules, no 
PPP rules. .nothing, but it was very much from scratch.  But if your 
contract is good. and you make sure that you do get things… you do have 
some self-control in it”  [Government Official-C] 
When the government officials were asked to comment about the presence of a 
permanent monitoring body within the government they gave the following 
responses. However it seems that the responsibility should however be with 
Department of Health which is in charge of all the project deliverables although 
the Treasury is taking charge to rectify the oversight. 
“There was a period here [Treasury] that nothing was being done, we 
have revived it now. So in the next few months we will be able to give 
those reports. At Health at the moment there is no monitoring ”.  
[Government Official-C] 
“At the moment we are only starting with the PPP unit. We are starting 
monitoring the reporting of the PPP, at Treasury, …but it should be 











“It is really a line function department which must then manage it, when 
we sit at Treasury we don’t get a feeling these things are tightly 
monitored”. [Government Official-S]   
The officials were asked if they believe that the private sector is not cutting 
corners on BEE they gave the following responses, which shows they rely on the 
strength of the PDI players to sound the alarm.  
“The project Sponsor  ….he is too strong, he would push it. I am pretty 
sure. I would be very hesitant if it was sleeping partners that you never 
see, but he is involved. There is no doubt in my mind, he is involved.  [if] 
there is a meeting he is there.  He is really involved. The two ladies are 
directly involved. I am pretty sure….if it didn’t add up there, certain things 
that had be bought through them in terms of the rules to make sure that 
they build their capacity and operators ignored them. And they came to 
say ‘these guys are not following the rules’. And that’s taken up in the next 
meeting with the Liaison Committee between partners and the hospital”. 
[Government Official-C] 
“Not deliberately….like any other regulation like the speed limit. If you are 
sure that there is no traffic cop you will go to 140..and it is not that you are 
generally a criminal but its that because nobody is watching and your car 
is capable of getting to 140 you would”. [Government Official-S] 
So the belief in the strength of the PDI players and the recognition that private 
parties would try to circumvent the provisions of the policy could have been 
based on experiences such as the ones cited below by one of the PDI players.  
“So I fought that again I actually eventually.… I don’t how many times I 
went to Pietermaritzburg,… because my argument was as follows: 
‘Government you put this together with an objective of empowering people 
that are black…do something.  Here is a problem,…  you know,  it wasn’t 











However there was one official who claimed he used to conduct spot checks on 
the hospital while he was still at the department although that experience does 
not appear to be shared by others players. 
“Oh yes we do that. When I was in government I used to enjoy that bit … 
because when you walk in the hospital and you test. and you see people 
wearing a different uniform and you ask which company do you come 
from? And they say this and this…and you say I don’t remember us 
approving this company. What [used] to happen [is] then you ask 
questions. and they say you remember in that meeting we said . . we’ve 
got difficulty with this company so we swapped them with this one and this 
is the  background of this company. So yes we do that”. [Government 
Official-S] 
“I have never heard a situation where they’ve come to do BEE spot 
checks. Because I was responsible for BEE report when I was in the 
women Group PDI, I used to compile a BEE report which actually 
explained each and every service provider, who the owners were, even 
the staff, how many black people… you know the whole thing. You know 
we would submit that to IMPILO”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“I think they need to monitor the so-called BEE companies. Like if the  FM 
operator is saying it is developing Women Group PDI  they need to be 
more hands-on to see if these people are being developed and to do the 
spot-checks that you were talking about.  Because they can’t just accept 
what they are given without even having to investigate if this is 
happening”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
There was again a general feeling that the government monitoring and 
interpretation of the requirements of the policy were dependent on individuals 












“There is no continuity. The person that took over from me….went through 
the whole thing….but I still have to tell  them you can’t do that. Go and 
read that part of the agreement. There is no buying-in from the new 
management into this whole project. This is the problem you are going to 
pick up. We don’t have the knowledge going forward with it. In the mean 
time you loose control …you don’t really know what you are supposed to 
do. If you’ve lived with the contract and it is better a group of people…. not 
one person, a group. You can go further. But I personally think we are not 
managing the contract”. [Government Official-C] 
“I think ….we are making …too many laws and trying too few people to 
implement all of those laws….I think the BEE framework is too 
complicated. How the poor BEE people understand it I don’t know. Now 
you have got to police that…..now you haven’t got people to police it.  So 
that is it in the broader sense….what the problem probably is …it’s a total 
new area…and its only when there are mistakes you realize. oh my God 
we should have done this …you don’t really have good contract 
management…. readily available”. [Government Official-C] 
“Ah….which I think is unfortunate even if they do put conditions and 
sometimes monitoring becomes a bit of a problem.  It depends on the 
person seating on the other side of the table. ah. unfortunately 
government like most institutions personalities change. And also what I 
have seen is that although there is a … BEE legislation and Codes they 
are interpreted differently by different arms of government and they are 
implemented differently by different arms of government. So you don’t find 
uniformity across government. You don’t find uniformity in terms of 
monitoring; you don’t find uniformity in terms of punitive measures that are 
put in place. They differ significantly. You are also finding that these 
projects are long-term projects and the tendency is to stick to the minimum 











years. So there is no way in which a BEE company can create capacity 
and be able to do it on their own”. [IMPILO Consortium shareholder-T] 
“There was one official who used to drink and eat this thing he used to eat 
this thing he knew everything in and out. And even in meetings when there 
is tender coming out he would want to ensure that, is it a BEE company 
and all that. So when he left it changed … We still do a quarterly report 
though”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“I think there is lack of capacity. And also the attitude that says. Let me 
make you an example .take for instance Inkosi Albert Luthuli…. the 
frontline face of the government is the hospital management followed by 
DOH. Who should be doing the monitoring of the performance of the 
contract? Rightly it should be the management of the hospital not the 
Department [of Health]. Because you can never manage removed, 
although it’s their project but its removed. It has representatives on site but 
I doubt if they see themselves as the custodians of the project. I doubt if 
they see themselves as fully charged with responsibility of monitoring 
BEE. They would probably be saying operationally yes, ..because it 
affects us directly but on other terms it’s the department that should be 
raising those things” [IMPILO Consortium shareholder-T] 
One of major lesson from the project is that every sub-contractor must be tight up 
with the SPV if there is going to be a proper monitoring of BEE. This, the 
government officials acknowledged would create bulky contracts but they 
however saw as the best way of monitoring practical empowerment. 
“Its fairly comprehensive. the problem that I had is how did you really 
measure you know. whether BEE is taking place. At 40% you could clearly 
see it is taking place. Omame is a business they were running a 
business..….and the lady who is doing CSD she is doing it. So that is easy 
to do. But when you go lower down [private sub-sub-contractors] then it 











problem that I find with BEEs……. I would have loved to have seen for 
instance practical BEEs. Instead of there being a Fedics it would have 
been a BEE catering company. The Fedics itself may be having their own 
BEE scorecards… but that you can’t see … because that’s not the report 
line. The report line is at the top and who are your sub-contractors? 
Ok…and they’ve got to conform to certain things but it is very difficult to go 
through in details to see if they have achieved everything that you wanted 
[them] to achieve. Eh... I think you probably could have achieved more in 
certain areas, very difficult in certain area like equipment and IT”. 
[Government Official-C] 
“That is part of the agreement. Whereas at the airport [King Shaka 
International airport PPP project], we have a contractor that is doing 
piling…. because it is a construction project, it has got nothing to do with 
the papers that you have signed. So it could be a white company … for all 
we know. But here if you are going to change Mbekani as a sub-contractor 
that  is doing sterile services, you’ve got to change that agreement  
otherwise the penalties kick in…although your contracts tend to be large in 
size and so on and detailed ….[however] you end up having everyone 
empowered in the contract. But it is better for monitoring the effects and 












5.6.3 Sub-Contractor Empowerment  
The contract is structured in such a way that the FM operator is the one dealing 
with all the sub-sub-contractors, bar one. There are twelve sub-sub-contractors in 
total.  Only one falls under the medical equipment operator with the remaining 
under the FM operator. The majority of the contract managers to these sub-sub-
contractors are PDIs, and they were asked to relate their experiences with the 
FM operator. Firstly the operator manager [from D&S] was given a chance to 
relate their approach to BEE. 
 “What the FM operator has done is they’ve said .ok. we will bring you in 
as our BEE partners and you will run those services but we will be able to 
mentor you in the process over the lifespan of the contract. The inception 
of the contract is [from] 2002 right to 2017. So [it] is a 15 year contract. So 
for the 15 years we said we will mentor Umongi and the system in terms of 
uplifting the skills base and being able to manage the contracts of this 
magnitude, and then from there the idea is that by [the] time that they 
leave here, they would have already acquired more contracts outside of 
this contract”. [IMPILO Consortium shareholder-D] 
MONITORING ANALYSIS (EA/9) 
The government has not been able to adopt a systematic monitoring as stipulated 
in the contract due to lack of capacity and lack of staff continuity. This has created 
an overreliance on the self-monitoring governance mechanism. The effectiveness 
of that has been based on the absence of any major complaints from the PDIs.  
The lack of a dedicated monitoring office on site which scrutinizes BEE has also 
been cited as a weakness of the monitoring mechanism.  
The government on its side has learned that in order to be able to properly monitor 
all the PDIs in the contract. Every PDI at all the levels must be linked to the SPV so 











“On the mentoring for …example lets look at Umongi. This is our offices 
here ….Umongi sits in our offices. They wear uniforms that say Umongi 
but they sit in our offices and they have access to all our systems they 
have access to all our documents. They have access to our IMS system, 
our Integrated Management System. They know how we manage the site 
and they have access to those resources to be able to manage the facility, 
their services. So we really… although we are two different companies we 
really work as one and the mentoring process is an ongoing day to day 
mentoring process. We are very involved in what they do, even with the 
service providers we at FM operator sit in on their meetings and we give 
them feedback and we guide them.  And we have regular meetings where 
we share ideas and share knowledge and they are really integrated into 
our system and we don’t see them as a separate entity. Its FM operator 
and Umongi we all see ourselves as one. [IMPILO Consortium 
shareholder-D] 
“And they are comfortable and confident that they can manage it. So we 
are sort of sitting here and saying we are the big brothers looking after 
Umongi. They’ve got a big scope here, I mean a lot of service and a lot of 
work they do. a lot of their employees…are people from the community. 
And they’ve got varying levels of education, …skills…so it is very 
challenging.  So we act as a bigger organisation in FM operator but we 
have this very strong bond with our BEE partner….ok. that is basically the 
model that we as an FM operator have adopted at all of our PPPs”. 
[IMPILO Consortium shareholder-D] 
“So we tend to …in our model. we take on a partner and sort of mentor 
and grow them to a stage where they can go on,. on their own. So Umongi 
is actually a registered facility management company like we are”. 











The women group PDI agrees with the fact that they have unfettered 
administrative and operational control. 
“Ja. with the soft stuff. They actually let us do everything….they actually 
let us do everything in terms of soft services. We are running our own 
show…you know. even .in everything. Even managing the contractors that 
we have we do it ourselves. There is no interference in terms of that”. 
[Women’s Group participant-T] 
Although in the quotation above they were speaking specifically of Umongi as the 
FM operator partner, all the sub-sub-contractors experiences seem to uphold the 
veracity of that claim. For the contracts managers of the sub-sub-contractors, it is 
basically the support they get from the FM operator. 
“I have this contract from FM operator. If I have a problem there I contact 
the managers of the FM operator to help me, there is no problem on that 
front”. [Contracts Manager-ES] 
“I’ll say FM operator looks after us”. [Contracts Manager-FO] 
 “Yes…we work as partners . that is what we are with FM operator. at the 
end of the day if our company is not performing well it affects all of us 
service providers. If we’ve got anything that we feel we are unable to do, 
we always refer it to them. If they can help us in any way they do”. 
[Contracts Manager-MHW] 
“Yes … we are sub-contracted to FM operator. Their management is very 
supportive as well. And the client the DoH they are also…. We are like a 
team. We are working as a team. With one mission to please the patient 
and we are given that opportunity to like excel where you are and if you 
are  doing well you get appreciated and you do more, you strife. . With FM 
operator we work hand-in-hand with them. We really work hand-in-hand 












The FM operator had recently embarked on a computer literacy drive for 
everyone under FM at the FM operator own cost.  
“Yes they help actually they have introduced a computer course by 
another computer company within the hospital and FM operator did 
address the other service providers including us. And we are now studying 
basic computer skills through that”. [Contracts Manager-UTIM] 
“At the moment we have the facility of the ICDL which is a computer 
training which is done by FM operator to empower all the service providers 
from the bottom to the top, which is a good thing. Everyone will finally 





EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/9) 
The supportive, interactive approach taken by the FM operator has managed to 
take a company that did not exist before the commencement of this project to a 
very efficient soft services FM operator, which is learning from a leader in the 
industry. The skills transfer appears to have worked very well with this kind of 
approach. 
All the sub-sub-contractors contracts managers consider themselves to be a team 
with the FM operator and as such they are able to thrive professionally in a 
conducive environment for PDIs.  
The initiative of making everybody working under FM operator to be computer 
literate shows the commitment and initiative to create staff that can work in this 
modern establishment, where computer literacy is a huge advantage. The trainees 












5.6.4 Quality Inspectors Influence 
The way the FM operator keeps the standards upheld is through the use of 
Quality Inspectors, whose job is to go around the hospital everyday 
systematically checking that there is no infringement of the contractual 
obligations by sub-sub-contractors. Their positive supportive and yet firm 
approach, has created a sense of awareness of the high delivery standards 
expected of all involved in the operation of this hospital. It’s not only them that 
have an influence but the self-monitoring mechanisms which carries penalties for 
any default has helped in keeping the performance standards high. As a 60% 
shareholder the FM operator is at the end of the day accountable for the overall 
FM performance and they have taken quality inspection as their prodding tool to 
uphold high standards. The following were the views of contracts managers on 
the impact of Quality Inspectors.  
“There is this lady that comes here all the time. If there is something 
wrong that smells bad she is always making comments.  All the time…. 
sometimes there is another lady if there is something which is not right 
she calls me …. Eih ‘I have seen this and that’ and I always respond ok”.  
[Contracts Manager-ESR] 
AGENT BEHAVIOUR SHIFT ANALYSIS (ABSA/8) 
Once the conditions of the PDIs involvement were set out and the operational 
responsibilities allocated, the FM operator shifted the approach from being a 
complying agent meeting the minimum requirements to a steward who goes an 
extra mile to empower the PDIs. The interactive management style and the support 
given to every sub-sub-contractor have created an environment where the PDIs 
feel that they are part of the team and this has let to professional growth. The fact 
that there is no complaint on the operational involvement of PDIs as agreed on the 
contract and the fact that there are extra innovative interventions to improve PDIs 











“They do that on the daily basis from them, from their quality inspectors 
who are on site they go around the hospital in making sure that were are 
adhering to the standard that was put forward. So that at the end of the 
day we get e-mails from them to say we went to this place and these are 
findings. Every week once a week on Friday we’ve got meetings with 
them… FM operator and their quality department where we discuss all the 
issues that came about, during the week. And we come up with ways of 
resolving those”.  [Contracts Manager-F] 
“It’s good in that it keeps you awake all the time to make sure that your 
service is up to standard. I have grown in a lot of ways. Compiling 
reports…. because from time to time you have to compile reports. So I 
have grown in that because compiling reports is not an easy thing 
because you cannot just wake up one morning and put together a report. 
You have to go in depth and do your investigation properly and make sure 
that you are giving a report that you will be able to implement because it is 
one thing to put together a report and giving it to a client who is not going 
to even monitor it. Whereas with FM operator the reports that you give to 
them they monitor them and make sure that you are implementing the 
actions plans that you put in that report”.  [Contracts Manager-F] 
“The supervisors come around and they look at maintenance, they look at 
the cleaning. And they come back to me and report what their findings 
are”. [Contracts Manager-FO] 
”So when we have meetings I am there. They have people that also 
evaluate us, they would say… not that it has ever happened…about the 
penalty clause I have never had that. Twice a year the company takes a 
private survey which I must find out what is the problem not that it is 
always negative. Its very much positive..so if there is a problem I must 











come around to check that everything is fine. What we are doing and so 
on” [Contracts Manager-LJC] 
“Ja. you see us as service providers we are run by a head company FM 
operator which sub-contracts all the work to us and everything is being 
monitored every second of the day. So all service providers are keeping 
up to whatever their service standards they need to keep up to. Their 
Quality Inspectors usually come every … in a week maybe 2 or 3 times. 
They have people whose job is to do this everyday …they walk around the 
whole hospital. They walk around with a board inspecting every office in 
the whole yard. Ya it is done on a daily basis….maybe they may not end 
up coming here everyday but they are patrolling the whole hospital. So 
maybe every few days they will end up coming past just to make sure 
everything is in order”. [Contracts Manager-LJC] 
We’ve got Quality Controllers from FM operator, so they are much 
involved. They come on regular basis . they take a walk. they are all over 
the hospital. They can come in now. For instance they can say ward AB 
you were supposed to have done this and that and its 8:00 o’clock and 
that hasn’t happened. And you say it did happen and then you take a walk 
to that ward and check if it really happened and the client is happy. And if 
there is any concerns that need to be brought up and we address all the 
issues on a daily basis. Yes they are very helpful. [Contracts Manager-UL] 
“Quality people have been very supportive because if there is something 
that you can’t see in the ward but because with them they are on the floor. 
So they bring up the issues and on our side we try to be as efficient as 
possible and give feed-backs”. [Contracts Manager-UL] 
“Well on the daily basis I would say they do walk about and obviously 
should they find something wrong within our operation, I will receive an e-











daily basis sometimes weeks go past before I get a call… you 
know….complaints from them”. [Contracts Manager-ES] 
Although most respondents were appreciative of the role the inspectors play in 
ensuring that they stick to their contractual mandates. They were equally candid 
about the defaults that their companies had had. This resulted in penalties being 
meted after an elaborate warning system that was explained in section 5.6.2  
above. 
“We have had penalties yes. … whereby the call would reach 100% yes. It 
happens once in a blue moon… but it does happen I am not gonna lie,. it 
does happen.” [Contracts Manager-UL] 
“Lately in the last four weeks there has. you know … there was…… let me 
put it this way. the client felt that there was under-performance from our 
side so you know they were on …but  for the last three weeks … its been 
quite”. [Contracts Manager-ES] 
 
 
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/10) 
The role of the Quality Inspectors appears to be central to the maintenance of high 
standards in this hospital. This has contributed in molding a highly professional 
cohort of PDI contracts managers.  
The call center logging system has created a very responsive service provision 
because of adverse penalties that are meted if there is delay in addressing queries. 
This too is credited with building world class PDI professionals.   
AGENT BEHAVIOUR SHIFT ANALYSIS (ABSA/9) 
The performance of PDI contracts managers is a reflection of the FM operator own 
performance because they are ultimately accountable as 60% shareholders. This 
has inspired them to take a very supportive approach through Quality Inspectors in 











5.7 REFLECTIONS ON THE DEAL 
5.7.1 On Proper Involvement of PDIs  
The contract has been in operation for seven years and looking back through the 
years, several people who were involved in its formulation as it now stands were 
asked to reflect on it and offer objective assessment. The strong feeling was that 
there should be involvement of PDI at all levels.  
“If you are going to make money at all, it is towards the end if you 
do…right. So it you are not playing at level two, just go home. It is a waste 
of time. If you have luck you play at level 2, you play at level 3…you are 
fine …you see”.. [Women’s Group participant-M]  
“BEE parties who are not involved either in operations or on the 
construction side have actually …no reason being involved in PPPs. 
Because their return on equity is …especially if your cost of funding is 
third party cost…is nothing”. [IMPILO Consortium shareholder-T] 
“One of the key lessons that we have learned is that it is better to have 
BEE participants at all levels. You would have… the SPV would be divided 
into your contracting companies… your main sub-contractors and your 
sub-sub-contractors”.  [Government Official-S] 
The issue of having a strong PDI player who might be compromising others was 
also cited because the individual needs of other smaller PDIs would not 
adequately be addressed especially when they are new entrants.  
“It was for that reason that I think it became easier for him to carry others 
along. Its got its own problems because if you were to talk others they 
would tell you that he got himself a better deal than others. But those are 
perception people end up having if you lead, whether he did get a better 












“The problem with PPPs or anything, especially on the BEE side because 
we are learning, once you have control in one area, then it is doomed 
because everyone else become compromised”. [Women’s Group 
participant-M] 
“Yes…yes. its flawed. It is so flawed. You see if…you can’t be equal 
partners. We understand that. Its not a socialist country but give enough 
so that…. as there is a lion share, that is why I ran in the first place while 
others were walking. But these also are empowered. Because if BEE is 
about transforming the face of the economy  in this country its never going 
to work if there is one player for PPPs and that other person for that thing. 
10, 4, 5 spread the cake, but don’t compromise the big players… because 
the other thing is that government sometimes go to the extreme … they 
will actually give you tenders and you have cashflows and you think you 
are ok…And they would say she has got too much now…and they dump 
you completely and give someone else. Make this business 
sustainable…because if it is not sustainable it is a reflection on blacks; 
that they can’t sustain businesses. Make sure that …. this is the piece of 
the cake it is sustainable …the cashflows are sustainable because you 
pay on time…please. Because they don’t. And they kill these businesses”. 
[Women’s Group participant-M] 
“So I think Treasury… the responsibility of the government is not to punish 
the major players. You also don’t want to punish people who succeed, but 
just make sure there is a balance. Assuming … I am just making a 
scenario…. assuming that 10 people come. It is another PPP now and 
there is potential here. Give that person a chance. In an unlikely event that 
there is no potential of the 9 take this one but make sure there is a 
balance, with the one that must learn. So that next time they are on their 
own. But the truth of the matter is there is no way that out of 10 you will 
always pick up the same one unless, unless there is something 











“If you do BEE you must believe in it or don’t do it.  It is easier not to do it 
than to do it, than to give pretenses. Because when you give it pretenses, 
you don’t only undermine the policy but you pay more. Because there is a 
premium that you are always paying for BEE, so if you haven’t done it 
properly you are paying that premium for nothing. So there is really a need 
for those that are doing BEE projects or trying to promote BEE to be true 
to the projects. Secondly there is a cost element to it. If you pretend that 
you empower people there is a social cost which is not really measured in 
fiscal terms and that social cost because …over time you want to create 
business people that would be loyal to your course not as an individual but 
as state and government. Because if you have people that say I am in 
business because government created a programme that works, they are 
unlikely to be disloyal to the republic, In the true sense of patriotism. So 
the reason why state and government would do this policy is really to 
satisfy that which separates private administration to public administration. 
Because you have to write and articulate policy and write up policy and 
implement policy to satisfy a particular gap in society.  And importantly, to 
monitor implementation of that policy in order to attain the proposed 
results. So government has a job not only to balance the budget but 
primarily to ensure that this policy of BEE is actually properly 












5.7.2 The Commitment of the Private Sector to BEE 
The commitment of the private sector also was under the spotlight. Because of 
the experiences of many different parties there were a lot of opinions about the 
attitude towards BEE of the established companies.  
“I think so. Its difficult to say yes it is .its compliance. But you do get that 
impression. When are they gonna change I doubt it, if you ask me whether 
there have bought into it? Yes and No….I think they have bought in it 
completely as far as they are forced to do in terms of the agreement. Once 
you change the agreement tomorrow they might not do …[laughter]…do 
you understand what I am trying to say ….They are forced they have, 
…they have bought into it. But when you walk out you’ve got nothing to do 
with it”. [Government Official-C] 
“I don’t know of any B contractor in South Africa that does BEE because of 
the love of it. It’s primarily compliance….eh…. at best is something that 
will win me a contract if I do it well.   But is not something that people do it 
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/11) 
Full empowerment for the women’s Group PDIs was not realized especially 
because they were not involved at level two which carries more responsibility and 
financial benefits. 
The situation where one of the PDIs is much stronger than others seems to 
compromise the collective interest of the PDIs. This might give false pretenses of 
the intensions of the policy and end up tarnishing is ideals. The exclusion of PDIs 
from certain segments of the project creates a situation where they feel their 
inclusion is a mere compliance with no genuine effort for full empowerment. There 
should be a concerted drive to fairly empower as many of the PDI as is practically 
possible. It was felt by respondents that those goals might have not been fully 
achieved at IALCH, by the exclusion of women at the second tier and not 











as the first business meritorious kind of approach. I mean I hear people 
say it’s a business imperative, I am yet to see that. I am yet to see 
somebody who says look I am making money, I don’t necessarily need to 
sell my business but because there is BEE in the country and I understand 
and agree with it I am selling my business. I am not necessarily going to 
make a super profit”. [Government Official-S] 
“No they haven’t bought into the spirit…. those that have really bought I 
don’t know where they are. It’s a matter of what is in it for me in that 
company …of which is not wrong.  …but it defeats the long-term purposes 
of business. if I get into business I want to have that long-term vision I 
think BEE  kills that… I think BEE is just like a short-term thing to get a 
contract and that is it, which requires us to go back to being on our own. 
…. and starting up companies”. . [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“The industry would say. Why should we build up our own competition? 
But the question is why then BEE in the first place? The reason behind it 
is to actually do exactly that”. .[IMPILO Consortium shareholder-T] 
The general feeling of the PDIs is that from conception the established 
companies just wanted them in order to win the contract, and as a result they feel 
used.  
“If you are going to lead….they don’t want people who are going to make 
noise….you know.  And the less experienced the better. Imagine if we 
were experienced it will be a very different story that I am telling you now. 
So there are always going to be those dynamics”.[Women’s Group 
participant-M] 
“I think the problems in terms of BEE when we….as African people we 
were not very glued up about these things, and we were just taken to say 
come you will be partners with these people…..There are such 











deals there is a lot that we don’t know. We are getting in there for them to 
assist us but they are also abusing the fact that you don’t know much. And 
then they put us in the corner. Ya…….because we were not very glued up 
in all these things.  So this is what we are discovering years later when we 
are already inside the whole system”. [Women’s Group participant-T] 
“Another challenge that we have as BEE company is this issue of a 
common vision about BEE. I don’t think the conglomerate showed 100% 
commitment to BEE. It is BEE to get the contracts, I think they understand 
that in order to get the contract they need the black shareholding and that 
is where it ends. So being those black shareholders you feel… sort of… 
they use us just as the means to”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“I am still thinking about you know my profession. If somebody were to ask 
me to do something in my profession I would know exactly what to do. I 
know this is what you do A,B,. this is what you do. There we were new. we 
just  knew there it is BEE… and when there is BEE there is money that is 
involved. You gonna be involved with big guys. you know it is a big 
contract… but when it got to the nitty gritties in terms … ok fine. you are in 
this consortium, here are these big guys  ‘how do you make money 
here?’”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“I am beginning to see a lot of an attitude that says that BEE is a 
necessary evil lets deal with it that way. We are basically ticking boxes 
and which is unfortunate and the unfortunate part is most of our people 












5.7.3 PDIs Under-Preparedness and Lack of Capacity 
The under-preparedness of the PDIs when they enter the PPP deals also work 
against them, because there is too much expectation without probing earlier on 
about what they would get out of these deals. 
“And then they forget the primary objective of getting into business, which 
is to make money. And hope that by involvement they will make money.  
Instead of making sure that they know whether they are going to make 
money, how and how much”. [IMPILO Consortium shareholder-T] 
“If I were to advice anybody who is new and who want to get into BEE 
spaces I would say contracts. Understand the legal side. Because with 
watertight contracts you wouldn’t have a lot of problems. And getting an 
experienced lawyer, and not just a lawyer who is experienced 
commercially, but a combination of commercial law and BEE. You need 
somebody who understands BEE. You need somebody who understands 
the scorecard in and out. Because commercial law is another aspect 
because there are certain things which are fine when you look at them 
ADVERSE SELECTION ANALYSIS (ASA/11) 
It appears that the collective observation of the PDIs and government officials is 
that there is an intrinsic negative attitude by established companies towards BEE. 
And that deportment makes the PDIs to generally feel that they are just used when 
they discover the true intensions of the established companies. 
The many occasions of adverse selection cited above informs the collective opinion 
of the PDIs that established companies would just do the minimum required by the 
contract on BEE. This lack of maximization of the agent effort on BEE is intended 
to increase the utility of the agent, but at the end of the day it negatively affects the 
principal empowerment goals. However, this is done in such a way that there is no 
defaulting on the contractual requirements as the bare minimum requirements are 













from the commercial law aspect but which are not necessarily ah… 
facilitating BEE”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
“As African people we were not very glued up about these things, and we 
were just taken to say come you will be partners with these people”.  
[Women’s Group participant-T] 
“And I have also learnt that you have to pay money to get money out of 
anything.  You need professional help. right… go to lawyers …. because 
we are not alone…don’t sign agreements…go to lawyers to look at it: ‘is it 
saying what I want it to say?’ and read it. I have really learnt a lot …. and 
also agreeing upfront… you don’t say ‘hang on you want me, what 
percentage, lets talk equity upfront’. There is this attitude ‘I invited you so 
you must just follow diligently’. But the point is there is a reason you 
invited me. Let’s see what its worth in equity. So those are the things that I 
have learnt….you know… it’s a difficult …” [Women’s Group participant-M] 
“I think also we have capacity constraints as BEE, capacity to manage 
these projects that we get involved in, capacity to make proper 
assessment of things, capacity to play a meaningful role in them. 
Because, we probably cannot afford the capacity that is necessary to do 
that”. [IMPILO Consortium shareholder-T] 
 
BENEFICIARIES BEHAVIOUR ANALYSIS (BBA/9) 
Inexperience and economic hardship are a source of  PDIs rush to get involved into 
the PPP arrangements without properly assessing the economic benefits of their 
involvement and this makes them to be easily taken advantage of.  
The big lesson taken from the experience by the PDIs is the importance of a good 












5.7.4 Challenges at Independence 
The PDIs feel that after 7 (seven) years they are now empowered in some 
respects but they are still restrained by the restrictions of the original agreement, 
which is perceived to be one-sided.  
“When you look at it, it could have been a lot better had we bitten the 
bullet right at the beginning and setup our own companies and have 
operations with marketing and the [full] wares of a company. You 
know….[a company] that has control,… [where] you can see and you can 
manage your expenses. But here you can’t because everything is 
managed by this other company. But from the point of view… then take 
that cash and see how best you can use it maybe in other areas. Like you 
can see from the point of view we started in point A we are now in point B. 
we could have  been somewhere else but we are in point B so if you 
measure it by movement from point A to point B, we have moved”. 
[Women’s Group participant-O] 
“Its just that with this BEE thing is not as ideal as when you look at it from 
far, when you are actually inside then you know what is happening. So 
there is a lot of growth that is happening with Umongi. But the problem is 
that FM operator is a bit reluctant to let go. And also the fact that our 
company is supposed to be having more sites, .you know. Its seven years 
now. But its still only here….you know. And also the service providers in 
terms of procurement we do our own procurement but they have to 
approve that service provider. And as it is you find that most of the service 
providers that we are using they are FM operator service providers”. 
[Women’s Group participant-T] 
“They are not ready because they don’t have the infrastructure per se. 
Because in facility Management when you get a contract…. it will be both 
soft and hard [services], and our company is more glued up on soft 











happen in terms of hard services. so that is why for now they can’t…  It 
means . PDI companies should have more people that are educated in 
terms of the hard services …you understand. And also have the 
knowledge from the upper level you know. how to run the hard services. 
We have an idea on how to run it but now . we need in-depth [knowledge]. 
But if were to acquire the hard services expertise we could go [on] and 
tender by ourselves. But the problem is that clause”. [Women’s Group 
participant-T] 
There is a view that future PPP contracts should be structured in such a way that 
mid-way the PDIs should slowly take over the operations in order to create fully 
fledged PDI operators in the country.  
“Their contract needs to say we need to see within a certain time… maybe 
instead of all these 15 years the FM operator doing everything,  and 
Umongi only doing soft services. Maybe they should have said, maybe 
after 7 years we want to see Umongi  even more involved with hard 
services and we want to see FM Operator being less and less involved”. 
[Women’s Group participant-T] 
“If I am going to be used in a 25 years concession, why can’t the operator 
be bought mid-way so that it becomes a BEE operator and that operator 
then has the ability to bid elsewhere on its own”. [IMPILO Consortium 
shareholder-T] 
“It is impossible at the moment. It is impossible … they can argue and by 
the mere fact that you are involved you are a shareholder in this and you 
sit on the board,… you are involved in management. The work has not 
been split such that my company does this section of the work that one 
does that section of the work and I can claim that this is the section of the 
work that I do. No. .Entrepreneurship does not mean, is not professional 
services where you use you own skills, you know. As entrepreneurs we 











owning an operator 100% mid-tem, then that operator is mine, I direct it, I 
know everything. If I have to bid for another hospital project, I know 
exactly [what is involved] and I can stand on my own and I can point to 
that project. I am not pointing at [mere] involvement I am pointing at what I 
do”.  [IMPILO Consortium shareholder-T] 
 
5.7.5 Empowerment Assessment 
The women empowerment group was asked to offer the summary of their 
experiences after the years they have been involved in this scheme. 
“But it is has been so so worth it. … there is ownership there. You’ve 
learned employing people… paying them… strike…. we’ve heard it all. As 
I said I tend to use different legal entities. I started a company with other 
professionals and we invested in a big pharmaceutical multinational 
company. Which is a good investment. I sit on their board to represent this 
group that I invested with… Its doing well .I have learnt. You know…. 
because everything is about learning also and I have been involved in 
different things”. [Women’s Group participant-M] 
“I won’t lie to you when you look at the broader scheme of things and the 
level of the place I think it has benefited us a lot. depending on how you 
look at it. We were able to get our foot in the door, and for us we used it to 
our benefit. No-1 when you are bidding for other things even though they 
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/10) 
There appears to have been empowerment of the PDIs to the point where they feel 
that they have to be given complete control of the project management and 
operations. Now the original agreement binds them to work as sub-contractors to 
the established companies until the end of the contract, and that has actually led to 
the suggestion by some that future contracts should give PDIs an increasing 
involvement in the operations as the project progresses until they have taken over 











may not be in the same area you now have a track record. you’ve been 
there, you have done that, you have burnt, you understand ….you 
know…. what BEE is about and what ….you know to look out for. And how 
then to structure BEE contracts on the financial side it has helped us to 
have a base. First and foremost there are very few black companies which 
have got such an opportunity as ours, and so the mere fact that we have 
been involved gives us a track record”. [Women’s Group participant-O] 
The role of international players has done a lot in increasing the professionalism 
of those who work with them.  
“One of the things I probably should have mentioned is the 
professionalism that we see even from the international partners that we 
have in this project. And of course the service level agreement helps it a 
lot. You compare Luthuli to any government hospital; it is different. It’s like 
you are in a private hospital, so you could say it is the service level 
agreement but the involvement of the private parties as well. They come 
with a different culture, different management styles and ya… it really 
helps to jack up the performance of each and every company”.  [Women’s 
Group participant-O] 
The government officials also have observed the development of the PDI players 
at IALCH.  
“The project sponsor after the PPP project, it has actually become his 
business. I don’t know if he is doing any other business other than this. 
The other doctor has grown from … She was a medical doctor …….but 
from Albert Luthuli exercise she has moved forward …. she got so hooked 
up into cooperate sector. She really has become a big business woman.  I 












“I think I would safely say that all the BEE partners I know from Albert 
Luthuli have grown exponentially. The [two] ladies have benefited out of 
this project. They started actually like being invited from nowhere the other 
one was just a psychologist running here own practice.  But now she has 
signed up quite a few successful contracts after Albert Luthuli”. 
[Government Official-S] 
“The PDI sponsor can start a D&S. He can’t start a Siemens. But why 
can’t we start it….even if it is just part of D&S….You know the engineering 
side I don’t know if the project sponsor can do that …why can’t you run the 
kitchen, why can’t you run the cleaning.  …That is the way how I can see it 
…and now that you’ve the experience here. Same can happen with the 
number of say the jails ….correctional services one…. those are great 
opportunities”. [Government Official-C] 
“I think if there is another PPP, the IALCH project sponsor would play a 
major role in getting the team together which shows that I think we’ve 
achieved something”. [Government Official-C] 
 
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/11) 
From being complete novices in business, the two women have garnered enough 
experience and business acumen that they feel confident that they are now fully-
fledged business people. Pairing with multinational conglomerates, who come with 
a completely different culture and business approach has grown them and given 
them a rounded professional molding. 
The government officials involved in this project believes the major players have 
grown substantially and they can handle at least the FM soft services 
independently in a new project. 
The PDI project sponsor in this project is actually now just concentrating on 
structuring new PPP deals and is running a PPP investment business and this is 











5.7.6 Contracts Managers Empowerment 
There was general feeling among contracts managers that beyond IALCH they 
would like to see themselves owning their own businesses or attaining upward 
professionally mobility outside IALCH.  
“I would like to see myself owning my own company one day. Ehmm… I 
had planned to start a catering company with other people that I know. 
And I believe the experience that I’ve gained working here will contribute 
90% towards that”. [Contracts Manager-F] 
“Yes I am thinking…from my side if I loose my job now. and I am ready to 
start my own business. I have actually learnt a lot here”. [Contracts 
Manager-ESR] 
“Ahmmm…. It has helped to gain experience and it has helped me to 
realized how much one can do even opening your own company. And you 
have realized that doors are there they are opened”. [Contracts Manager-
MHW] 
“My dream is to run my own B&B. Because I have been to the Hotel, I’ve 
been to the convention centre, right now I am here. If I can look at those 
experiences I think I can have my own B&B. What is lacking right now I 
have to have some courage…courage is the only thing that I am missing. 
Because if I can go out there … I know I can get someone else who can 
help me. It’s just that I have to have some courage that is all”. [Contracts 
Manager-FO] 
“This year I have enrolled with DUT (Durban University of Technology), I 
am doing project management. To better myself here and maybe to grow 
beyond IALCH. yes . that is my vision.  When I started here I had just 
matric and basic computer course and hard work. Hard work. That is why I 
have actually enrolled because now there is no growth within IALCH and 











qualification and experience. Because it is not gonna be easy to go out 
and be a manager for whatever organisation. Yes I have got good 
experience but I have to have a backup of  [a] qualification.  ….I think we 




This chapter took the reader from the moment the two women who were 
managers of two women-led companies were invited to join the IMPILO 
consortium. Their involvement in this project was traced throughout the tendering 
process until the operations stage. Utilizing the PA lenses mentioned in the 
beginning the actions of the established members of the consortium and the 
reactions of the women PDIs towards empowerment were assessed. During the 
operations stage the reactions and experiences of the PDI contracts managers 
were also assessed, as they were also the beneficiaries of the BEE policy. At the 
different stages of procurement, flags were raised utilizing the PA theoretical 
framework, and these flags were later used to form the base of discussion and 
interpretation of the data in the following chapter. Whereas the current chapter 
essentially used the PA theory elements to analyze principal, agent and 
beneficiaries behaviours the next chapter discusses those behaviours and 
interprets them.   
EMPOWERMENT ANALYSIS (EA/12) 
The majority of PDI contracts managers would like to move on and establish their 
own business because of the experience they got at IALCH. Those who are not 
thinking of starting their own business would like to go outside and get better jobs. 
This is a sign of the professionalism and the confidence that has been instilled in 











6 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research explores the behaviours of the established consortium members 
(agents) and the BEE beneficiaries with regards to the implementation of the 
BEE policy requirements.  The interventionist actions of the government 
(Principal) in providing an enabling environment for the policy implementation 
were closely analyzed. Since the PA theory was used as a theoretical guidance 
all the observations were initially channeled through the principles of that theory. 
Where the tenets of the PA theory were found to be limited in providing an 
explanation of the observed behaviour, this was analysed further and the 
phenomenon which was explained through recourse to the Principal Steward 
(PS) theory, which could be regarded as a counterweight to the PA theory in that 
it explains behaviour in non-business settings. The utility of both of these two 
theories is pivotal in gaining an understanding of the totality of observed 
behaviours, which, as will be shown, became the rationale for attempting a 
synthesis of the two theories into a more encompassing new theory, which could 
accommodate both phenomena and explain the behavioural shifts. Taken on 
their own the limitations of each of the two aforementioned theories inadequately 
articulated the behaviour within their parameters.  
The critical discussions in this section center on the core categories used as 
areas of analysis delineated in Chapter 5 above. The discussions will be 
structured under the headings of adverse selection, moral hazard, monitoring, 
beneficiaries’ behaviour, empowerment and agent behaviour shift. These 
discussions are used to assess the applicability and fit of PA theory in PPPs with 
regards to BEE implementation and the utility of the PS theory in the molding of 
the synthesis.  
6.2 ADVERSE SELECTION 
According to the PA theory human beings (agents) are rational, self-interested, 











rewards and minimize punishments, particularly financial punishments 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1993). This behaviour manifests itself whenever there is an 
absence of rigorous monitoring and/or where there is any asymmetry of 
information favoring the agent. The government was very particular about ‘true’ 
PDI involvement in this project, but since this was one of the first PPP projects it 
has inevitably shed a light on the reactionary behaviours of agents (white-owned 
established consortium members). The centrality of BEE was emphasized in this 
project and all the contractual requirements were adhered to by the consortium. 
However the selection of PDI players in the consortium created a situation where 
their inexperience enabled them to be exploited by the established companies. 
This aligns with the PA theory, in that the consortium identified deficiencies in the 
women PDIs’ proper appreciation of complex contracts and used this information 
asymmetry to favour the established companies to the detriment of the new start-
up PDIs even though this opportunistic behaviour was executed in such a 
manner that the basic principles of the contract were not infringed upon. Had the 
established companies contravened any of the contractual requirements, like 
employment equity they would have suffered financial loss, and hence 
compliance with these requirements was paramount and was adhered to.  
The women PDIs were unprepared for involvement in a project of this magnitude, 
and had to learn as they went along. Several pitfalls emanating from this lack of 
preparedness were observed.  Firstly, there was no proper establishment of the 
equity apportionment and roles to be played by the women PDIs in advance, and 
this created a number of challenges as the project progressed. The absence of 
independent legal and financial advisors was detrimental to the women PDIs’ 
participation, and the self-centered nature of agents in established companies 
was clearly manifest. The established consortium partners maximized their own 
utility by disallowing any participation by the women PDIs at the second tier of 
the supply chain where greater financial control and operational management is 
exhibited. This exclusion maintains a power relationship where the women PDIs 
would never develop a full appreciation of the operation of a facility of this nature 











The established companies induced the women PDIs to sign an apparently 
mutually beneficial “restriction of trade” agreement, which the established 
companies did not adhere to but to which women PDIs could not contravene for 
fear of the legal implications. This created a situation where the established 
company can bid for other projects in KZN but where the women PDIs are 
restricted from doing so. This maximizes the established company’s utility at the 
expense of the women PDIs. This arose as a result of complex legal 
phraseology, which an experienced legal advisor would have been able to 
identify and probably advised the women PDIs on its negative implications at a 
later stage.  
The invitation and engagement of sub-contractors from the same conglomerate 
closed down opportunities for other potential PDI FM companies to become 
involved. These companies might have had adequate experience elsewhere and 
would have benefited from being involved in a PPP and of having a steady cash 
flow for the tenure of the project, in supporting their growth and development. 
However, when viewed as a profit-maximizer the FM operator (agent) could not 
be expected to act otherwise as they behaved as a rational being. Any other 
behaviour would have had to be imposed by legal stipulations.  Seen together, 
this demonstrates that the consortium (agent) will comply with all the contractual 
requirements to obtain business. However, should there be any weaknesses in 
the contractual arrangements, these are exploited to maximize the agent’s profit, 
provided such maximisation does not contravene the government’s (principal’s) 
stipulated contractual specifications.  
This pure compliance attitude results in a situation where PDIs feel like they were 
co-opted solely to meet the requirements of the bidding documents. Such 
behaviour is in accordance with the PA theory in respect of the intrinsic nature 
and behaviour of the agent. Any mitigation of this behaviour relies on the 
incumbency of the government to increase the rigor of the requirements and for 
the PDIs to better equip themselves prior to involvement in the PPPs in order that 











only happened where there was no government oversight due to the novelty of 
this procurement system then and the inexperience of the PDIs beneficiaries. In 
all other matters relating to BEE the government constructed a reasonably robust 
document, which advocated for the active and meaningful participation by new 
PDIs entrants. The consortium demonstrated that it had bought into the policy in 
so far as there is a business case for incorporating BEE in the implementation of 
the project, but otherwise all the intrinsic hallmarks of self-seeking profit-
maximizing tendencies, expected of business enterprises were exhibited by the 
established companies.  
6.3 MORAL HAZARD 
The view of the PA theory is that an agent as a rational player will always seek to 
maximize his/her utility with the least possible expense (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). This problem becomes acute where the principal does not possess full 
information about the extent of work that is delegated to the agent. In PPPs 
“moral hazard” is used to describe the situation where self-interested providers 
break the required standards of honesty and reliability as defined by their 
contract for project implementation and where the circumstances allow them to 
get away with it (Kasper & Streit, 1998). In IALCH the details of the bidding 
documents were very elaborate on the BEE issue and were also emphasized 
during negotiations. The insistence on the stipulations of the trickling down of the 
money to be paid to the women PDIs is one example of the extent of detail the 
government’s wanted. This was deemed necessary for the efficient monitoring of 
properly specified outcomes. However, (Donahue, 1989) asserts that since it is 
impossible to observe the agent at all times, it is possible that even a capable 
organisation will shirk from its responsibilities and divert resources to other tasks 
or simply to profit. This is confirmed by the argument of (Nordtveit, 2005) who 
posits that “moral hazard” has been a common problem in PPPs, since it has 











Contrary to these views, the observations at IALCH and the interviews held with 
role players refutes this argument, largely due to the self-monitoring nature of the 
contract. Although weak monitoring can lead to moral hazard, the self-monitoring 
mechanism on this project is very robust on project deliverables and on the issue 
of BEE. The BEE quarterly reports and the auditing of the financial trickle-down 
by auditing firms has created a situation where any form of moral hazard would 
be disadvantageous to the established companies. One respondent attested to 
the existence of vetting of BEE reports because he was summoned to the central 
consortium (IMPILO) offices, to clarify certain BEE issues. “I was … once I have 
been here I was once called to a meeting at the management building. Ahmm… 
they questioned me with regards to our BEE staffing”.  [Contracts Manager-ES] 
The centrality of this issue for government and the heavy penalties on non-
compliance created a situation where the BEE policy is regarded as a critical part 
of the overall project deliverables, which cannot be compromised. During the 
analysis in Chapter Five no single incident of moral hazard was observed and 
consequently the issue does not arise in the analysis. This finding contradicts the 
observation of (Nordtveit, 2006) that moral hazard always is to be expected in 
PPPs because government inefficiencies make it difficult to ensure contract 
compliance. What this project demonstrates is that provided project outcomes 
are clearly articulated in the bidding documents, performance measurements are 
clarified and emphasized during negotiations and robust monitoring mechanisms 
are put in place, substantial compliance can be achieved in PPPs.  
6.4 MONITORING 
To mitigate the moral hazard problem the actions of the agent have to be 
monitored.  In simple situations complete monitoring is possible; however in most 
cases observation is either impossible or prohibitively costly to the principal 
(Holmstrom, 1979). Monitoring is very critical as it controls agent behaviour and 
curbs post-contractual agent opportunism (Eisenhardt, 1989). Since contracting 
is an ongoing process monitoring is a key feedback mechanism (Hefetz., 2004). 











specification and continue with government oversight and assessment of service 
delivery. When monitoring is weak the output from the agent is likely to be lower 
than expected. The government BEE monitoring in IALCH appears to have been 
robust from the issuing of the tenders until the contract negotiations. Even during 
the negotiations a deficiency of the proper appreciation of the financial 
intricacies, was notable in the women PDIs and the services of an advisor were 
sought by the government from the DBSA.  
“At some point they had hired a person who was given by the DBSA to 
assist them with the financing. It wasn’t a very successful appointment. I 
think that guy was as lost as they were. He happened to come in from 
outside of South Africa and wasn’t really familiar with financial systems 
here …. But eventually they were carried by the advisors that were 
advising the larger group. But even in that consortium the project sponsor 
had done a project with prisons He had already done that which had 
assisted him to pay his school fees. So in a way he became the advisor of 
the rest of the BEE team” [Government official-C].   
Although ultimately this was not a successful appointment, it showed the 
government’s commitment in ensuring that PDI involvement is not token, but 
substantive and meaningful. However the fact that the project sponsor was a PDI 
made the monitoring at this stage somewhat lighter because it was someone 
who had been involved in PPPs and who understood what was required. This 
meant that there could not be a wholesale sidelining of PDIs because the very 
leader of the consortium was a PDI and he had an experience working in a PPP 
project before, and its financial arrangement peculiarities were not entirely new to 
him.  
The government’s insistence that the financial benefits should trickle down to the 
third tier women PDIs and that this be clearly defined showed a thorough scrutiny 
of the tender documents and a desire to achieve tangible BEE financial goals. 











scrutiny was the exclusion of the women PDIs from the second tier [sub-
contractor level]. This is the level where money from the SPV flows directly into, 
whereas the third level is merely apportioned money from the second level which 
might not reflect what is fairly due, since the government always pays for 100% 
occupancy. It is also at this level that operational and managerial control resides, 
and thus would have been a better position to place the PDIs in order for them to 
gain a wider appreciation of the operation of a PPP. 
However the government officials involved in IALCH noticed this oversight. “One 
of the key lessons that we have learned is that it is better to have BEE 
participants at all levels” [Government Official-S]. Although technically there is no 
blanket PDI exclusion at level two since the project sponsor is represented at this 
level, it appears in retrospect that the government’s understanding is now that 
any PDI who is involved at the first tier should also be involved at least at the 
second tier, to gain fully from the economic and operational benefits.  
However on the third level of the supply chain, government showed a more 
robust response when advocating for the inclusion of women. The government 
approached the FM operator to accommodate the women PDIs which led to the 
formation of a company called Umongi. The involvement at third level is a 
significant contribution to empowering women in understanding operational 
requirements at the ‘coal -face’, and has contributed in imparting many skills to 
other PDIs working as contracts managers. On most of the detailed internal 
arrangements of the consortium the government stance was removed providing 
an opportunity for the FM operator to involve a number of related/sister 
companies from the conglomerate that the FM operator was part of.  
The BEE status of these companies was inadequately scrutinized by the 
government officials. In retrospect one government official reflected:  “But when 
you go lower down then it looks like BEE firm but it is not…. or may not be” 
[Government Official-C]. Although these firms claimed to be BEE the government 











did to the other companies, which were directly involved in the consortium. This 
created a problem in that the contractor could even change its BEE structure 
mid-way and it becomes difficult to verify the BEE status of the company as they 
were not directly contracted at the SPV level. “So the numbers that were 
promised in the contract you can actually see through the life of the project, if you 
have locked anybody including the sub-sub-contractors in a contracting 
arrangement. From the beginning to the end of the term or period. And the 
monitoring mechanisms that you have put in place is more difficult if its not 
founded originally in the contract.   and your sub-contractors are not visible in the 
contract. So that is the lesson that we have learned in the last two that we have 
done”. [Government Official-S].  
If those companies, which ended forming the JVs, were scrutinized for their BEE 
status and were linked to the SPV any tampering with the BEE profile would 
result in penalties. This was illustrated by the following example: “if you are going 
to change Mbekani as a sub-contractor that is doing sterile services, you’ve got 
to change that agreement otherwise the penalties kick in…although your 
contracts tend to be large in size and so on and detail ….if you end up having 
everyone empowered in the contract. But it is better for monitoring the effects 
and the impact of BEE in these kinds of projects” [Government Official-S].  This 
oversight might have precluded a lot of PDI companies already involved in FM 
operations who could have gained from being involved in a PPP and benefiting 
from its steady cashflow offered by a PPP contract.  
In general the government monitoring was strong during tendering and 
negotiations but during operations, by their own admission, institutional 
weaknesses have meant that continuity has not been ensured. Individuals who 
were strong and conversant with the contractual requirements have moved on 
and their replacements do not seem to have been as technically capable. Even 
newly-trained project managers are not being retained in the civil service as once 
they complete their training they are recruited by the private sector. A new 











province is being established. However there seem to be confidence even in the 
present climate that the self-monitoring contractual mechanism at IALCH will be 
able to mitigate any contravention of the contractual requirements. The strong 
character of the PDIs appears to be relied upon for the reporting of any BEE 
infringements as they had a track record of doing this in the past. All the PDIs, 
including the contracts managers, confirmed that BEE monitoring by the 
government is almost non-existent, with compliance maintained by the 
entrenchment of BEE as a contractual deliverable.  Arguably this self-monitoring 
structure of the contract has contributed more to the BEE compliance than the 
government’s practical initiatives. Thus demonstrating the importance of a robust 
contractual agreement with robust monitoring regimen. 
6.5 BENEFICIARIES’ BEHAVIOURS 
The unexpected and rushed invitation for PDIs to participate in the PPP gave 
them little time to fully prepare themselves for what they were to take on. The two 
women PDIs undertook an honest introspection with regards to their 
inexperience and adopted a consultative posture from the start of their 
involvement. The PDI sponsor and other role players from the government 
provided guidance and intervened throughout the tender process. However, it 
was observed that the assertiveness, general high standard of education and 
hard work demonstrated that the two women PDIs needed to be taken seriously 
and be fairly accommodated in the consortium. This was evident in the way they 
fought for their inclusion in the bid presentation team before the government, a 
move that required them to research and thoroughly acquaint themselves with 
the BEE policy in procurement as it then existed. This input not only portrayed 
them as active members of the consortium to assessors but also bolstered their 
confidence, and demonstrated to all parties their willingness and initiative to 
empower themselves.  
Although the women PDIs pushed very hard for gainful participation throughout, 











However given their overall inexperience and lack of financial assets, they still 
managed to get reasonably good deals on other areas. They achieved this 
amidst a hostile environment, which was exacerbated by not being able to 
contribute to the bid bond, which normally provides leverage in negotiations. In 
addition, the lack of resources to access professional advice on legal and 
financial matters also resulted in the women PDIs having to agree to contractual 
arrangements that compromised their full financial empowerment. 
The experience of performing well at a world-class institution amidst the most 
stringent controls has demonstrated that these two women PDIs have been able 
to embrace the opportunities presented and of becoming world class companies. 
The benefit of working alongside international partners who are leaders in their 
own fields has given them the impetus to develop further in their professions and 
to broaden their views beyond IALCH. Although at the beginning economic 
hardship and inexperience hampered advantageous involvement, as the project 
progressed hard work, assertiveness and the presence of a responsive 
government assisted in achieving most of what the BEE policy intended. 
6.6 EMPOWERMENT 
As soon as the women’s group PDIs was invited to take part in the consortium 
they were integrated into all the deliberations although their role at this stage was 
primarily observatory. This enlightened the newcomers on the modalities of 
concluding knowledge-intensive deals. The observational experience was very 
empowering and its redolence could be evocatively utilised in later business 
opportunities. Soon after this experience the women’s group PDIs had to sit 
down and arrange Joint Ventures (JVs) with other companies who they would 
partner with in sub-contract arrangements with the FM operator. Although the 
deals were done in a controlled environment where 40% shareholding was the 
government’s stipulation, playing an active part in structuring the finer details of 
the deal was an empowering experience for these PDIs. The government for its 











shares apportionment, and this was used as a blue print for later PPP projects. 
The active role played by women PDIs in presenting the BEE component of the 
consortium proposal was a valuable experience demonstrating their initiative to 
be active members of the consortium and the willingness to garner the benefits of 
practical tutelage. All these ex ante experiences were invaluable and provided 
non-monetary empowerment to the women PDIs and they were very insightful on 
matters that would otherwise not be clear if the procurement mechanism was not 
as elaborate and as intensive as PPPs are, in terms of their intrinsically long 
tendering processes. The IALCH PPP demonstrates how PDIs gain extensively 
by being a part of an elaborate tender process, where observation, research and 
practical involvement can empower new PDI entrants on the vicissitudes of a 
complex tender process.  
6.6.1 Employment Equity and Local Socio-Economic Impact 
At IALCH 60% of unskilled jobs are allocated to the local people within 100 km 
radius of the hospital. The majority of the beneficiaries of this approach are 
people from the surrounding townships of Cator Manor, Gatesville etc. These are 
highly impoverished areas and this project has contributed to alleviating families 
out of poverty by providing a steady income from stable employment. The 
requirement to produce an identity document, proof of address and a letter from 
the ward councilor appears to work as a vetting mechanism to assess whether 
people are bona-fide residents of the designated beneficiary areas. The similar 
approach applicable for awarding scholarships at local universities ensures that 
genuine recipients are granted financial assistance from this impoverished area. 
It was observed that the racial composition of the staff at the hospital is reflective 
of the population of South Africa albeit with a bias to white employees occupying 
highly technical jobs and blacks predominating at the low-skilled end of the 
qualifications continuum. This is to be the expected legacy of apartheid, where 












The requirement for local socio-economic upliftment and employment equity was 
observed to have been more easily achieved on this project, than would have 
been the case in an older pre-existing hospital facility. Most of the blacks in 
middle management were brought into this project as a move by their companies 
to comply with contractual requirements. Those who did not have management 
experience received mentoring before assuming full management control. An 
insistence on their active role by the government meant they had to be properly 
mentored and trained because their performance would determine the delivery of 
their companies as stipulated in the service level agreement.  
A new long-term project in IALCH has contributed in providing steady jobs to 
previously unemployed locals, it has provided bursaries to needy learners to 
further their education and generally achieved employment equity in a highly 
technical, world-class project. A short-term procurement method would not have 
managed to invest as much on the training of locals to prepare them for 
involvement in the project. An established project would take time to achieve 
employment equity because of the challenges of restructuring an existing 
company. The longevity of this PPP agreement had one other positive spin-off 
where locals gain from proximity to this establishment, where the facility of a 
world-class crèche intended for staff also accommodates the general public for 
those who can afford the fees. A majority of the children were from PDI families, 
and they are gaining a high quality pre-school education that will assist them in 
their future school careers. In IALCH PPP the socio-economic impact and 
employment equity have been achieved, as a direct result of the longevity of 
PPPs and stipulations of the BEE policy. 
6.6.2 IALCH High Performance Standards and Empowerment 
The service level agreement at IALCH requires that high performance standards 
be maintained at all times. The call centre has specific response times for various 
queries and does not allow any form of shirking in service delivery. The 
deployment of Quality Inspectors by D&S and the ad hoc and yet systematic 











keeps everyone alert and ensures they act professionally at all times.  At the 
same time the structure of the IALCH PPP agreement is emphatic and specific 
about BEE centrality. This meant that many PDIs were involved at the 
management and operational level in the project. Many sub-sub-contractors’ 
contracts managers are PDIs and the majority of those contracts managers are 
women. Thus the FM operator to whom the majority of sub-sub-contractors are 
answerable to, adopted a very interactive and supportive management style to 
impart skills, and sought to create a environment conducive to promoting 
personal professional excellence.  
This management approach has created very efficient and competent PDI 
contract managers who have learnt the operational skills of running a complex 
world-class facility. Although the exclusion of women PDI companies at the 
second tier might have compromised a more-rounded development of PDI 
companies, much has been achieved in taking start-up outfits and turning them 
into competent companies ready to operate on their own whenever an 
opportunity presents itself. The confidence demonstrated by the contracts 
managers in the following statements demonstrated that they are people who 
feel they can face the challenges anywhere because of the mentoring obtained at 
IALCH. “Without IALCH I wouldn’t be where I am. I think we are the best…. if we 
can be the best here we can be the best anywhere” [Contracts Manager-UL]. It 
has helped to gain experience and it has helped me to realized how much one 
can do even opening you own company. And you have realized that doors are 
there they are opened”. [Contracts Manager-MHW]. The high performance 
standards in this PPP have created efficient and confident professionals who 
have acquired skills and are keen to move beyond IALCH for their personal 
economic enhancement. 
6.6.3 PPP and Creation of Entrepreneurs  
After seven years of being involved in a high performance project, the women 
PDI feel they can achieve the same level of delivery, independent of the 











strong feeling is demonstrated despite the women PDIs exclusion at level two 
where they could have had a broader appreciation of operational control. This 
situation they felt was exacerbated by a disproportional leverage exercised by a 
PDI sponsor, which ultimately meant that their share of economic proceeds was 
compromised. 
However despite the challenges the experiences gained in this project were 
considered invaluable. The interviewees were among the first PDI companies to 
be fully involved in a PPP project of this nature at operational level. The benefit of 
working alongside international players with different working cultures and 
professional discipline have boosted and imparted values that might not 
otherwise have been gained. The challenges have been used as lessons for 
future endeavors and one lady who owns Mbekani has established other 
businesses as an entrepreneur, despite her background being initially in 
medicine. The project sponsor in this project although this was his second project 
is now bidding for and running PPP projects as a specialized business. Thus the 
experience at IALCH has created PDI entrepreneurs who are now capable of 
fulfilling a critical role in the economy. 
6.7 AGENT BEHAVIOUR SHIFT 
All the established companies exhibited a willingness to comply with the BEE 
contractual requirements as stipulated in the bidding documents. Although the 
two firms supplying the Medical equipment and IT did not have PDI sub-
contractors working under them other than one working under the medical 
supplier, they had to comply with BEE requirements by adhering to the 
stipulations of the employment equity. With eleven subcontractors, the FM 
operator was inevitably the subject of much of the discussion in this section. 
During the post-contract award stage, the FM operator demonstrated a 
pronounced behavioural shift due their main contractor status charged with the 
ultimate responsibility of instigating contractual compliance. This scenario put the 











and professional enhancement of PDI contracts managers and PDI staff in 
general. The Principal Agent Theory was utilised to explain this behaviour and 
where limitations of the theory were encountered because the behaviour was 
inexplicable, the introduction of the Principal Steward (PS) Theory attempts to 
provide recourse in formulating a theoretical postulation. 
It was observed that in PPPs the agent lost some of the classical tendencies and 
demonstrated new tendencies that cannot be properly articulated by the PA 
theory as postulated by Eisenhardt (1989) and others. Although the new 
behaviour is not a complete behavioural transition it demonstrated the existence 
of a new phenomenon that is traditionally not pronounced in traditional 
procurement methods although its existence might be renounced outright. This 
new behavioural phenomenon which show tendencies akin to a non-profit 
seeking altruist, required a theoretical explanation in order to contrast it with the 
established economic theory of PA. This was more pertinent because altruistic 
behaviour was demonstrated by enterprises that one would expect to be normally 
utility-maximizing. Thus the Principal Steward (PS) theory was brought to the fore 
to offer a theoretical explanation of this agent behavioural transition. This theory 
is discussed below where it is also compared to PA theory,  
6.7.1 Revisiting the Principal Agent (PA) Theory 
The Principal Agent (PA) theory or ‘agency theory’ is a major theoretical 
framework utilised in ‘contracting-out’ literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). This is 
because it is regarded as providing a lens to better appreciate the accountability 
of the contracted provider. The agent is normally contracted with for reasons of 
reducing costs and/or his/her superior expertise. The principal may decide that 
there is a lack of expertise or adequate resources in-house to produce a good or 
a service, and that the expense of employing or breeding the expertise internally 
far outweighs contracting out. Once the decision is made to hire in expertise both 
parties agree on the terms and conditions of contract, including contract 
processes, deliverables, service level agreements, monitoring and performance-











meted on the agent for pursuing own goals above the principal’s (Slyke, 2007). 
At IALCH the government provided detailed documents during RFQ, RFP and 
negotiations stages delineating expected contractual deliverables including BEE, 
because government policy is to use procurement as a tool to achieve racial 
economic restructuring. Most established companies are white-owned and are 
relied upon to undertake the responsibility of empowering new and up-and-
coming black-owned business enterprises, thus creating a Principal Agent 
relationship between the government (principal) and established companies 
(agents). PPPs were particularly singled out for BEE because the longevity of 
their tenure makes them a good vehicle to empower the PDIs in South Africa 
(Treasury, 2004). 
According to the PA theory, agents are usually motivated by personal goals and 
focus on extrinsic tangible rewards, which invariably have a measurable market 
value (Davis, et al, 1997). PA theory views agents and principals as competing 
utility maximizers and works on the assumption that actors have bounded 
rationality and can always act opportunistically (Eisenhardt, 1989). (Williamson, 
1975, p. 9) describes opportunism as “a lack of candor or honesty in a 
transaction, to include self-interest with guile”. This opportunism is a result of the 
difficulty and cost involved in monitoring all the activities of the agent. The 
Principal’s first problem which is pre-contractual is adverse selection or “hidden 
information”, and this refers to a situation where an agent has hidden information 
about his/her ability, or true intent in the execution of the contract which may not 
be congruent with the principal’s best intentions. After the contract has been 
entered into the second challenge facing the principal is moral hazard or “hidden 
action”, and this is a situation where the principal cannot ensure whether the 
agent has put maximum effort in the execution of the contract (Arrow, 1984).  
The two challenges are encapsulated under information asymmetry, which 
always bedevils agency relationships, especially when it favors the agent. When 
the agent knows more about the product or service than the principal there is a 











which is invariably in variance with the agreed-upon contractual expectations. 
The basic tenet of the agency theory is that there is always a conflict between the 
power (bureaucratic and political) and budget/wealth-maximising behaviour of the 
principal and the utility-maximising behaviour of the agent (Pastoriza & Arino, 
2008). Through the PA theory the principal should always adopt a posture that 
clearly demonstrates suspicion, because the agent is never to be trusted. To 
reduce uncertainty associated with the unobservability of the agent’s actions, the 
principal has to introduce a mix of incentives and sanctions, information systems 
and monitoring mechanisms.  
The incidents cited above where the established companies did not act with 
candor and honesty towards the inexperienced PDIs were acts of opportunism. 
Enticing the PDIs to sign a contract prohibiting the FM operator and the women 
PDIs from competing with each other in KZN and then reneging on that 
agreement was opportunistic. The driving rationale for such a decision could 
have been based on the knowledge that a legal protest would be costly against 
PDIs, whereas on the other hand the move would result in utility maximisation for 
the established companies. The issue of the FM operator inviting companies 
from within their conglomerate to form JVs with women PDIs was also utility 
maximizing. This was so even though it was not infringing on any regulation 
since there was no stipulation against such a practice, as much as it could have 
benefited other PDIs who were not necessarily the consortium shareholders. The 
structuring of the contract such that women PDIs payments are CPIX adjusted 
annually whereas the FM operator’s and other operators have theirs adjusted 
quarterly was utility maximizing and was inhibiting the PDIs to have a full 
economic benefit of being involved in the project. The withholding of one of the 
PDIs payment for two years, for their protest against an unfair monetary 
apportionment which should have been allocated on a pro rata basis, was unfair 
because it was hampering their cash flow as a new enterprise while at the same 
time financially benefiting the established company. All these took place because 
the government’s stance of respecting private business arrangements, created a 











entrants but created a situation where the government was also paying for a 
service of a lower quality in the form of reduced BEE benefits to the PDIs. It 
therefore follows from the above deliberation that whenever there was a reduced 
observability from the government there was a tendency on the established 
companies to reduce the BEE benefits to the PDIs to maximize their own utility in 
a manner that is incongruent with the spirit of BEE.  
Opportunism was also observed where there was a lack of oversight on the 
government’s side to enforce PDI involvement in particular structures and 
activities of the contract. The exclusion of the women PDIs from participating at 
level two (second tier) of the contract hampered their full involvement and 
participation. It also created a situation where the financial trickle down due to 
them is susceptible to abuse and tampering by players who are involved at level 
two. The exclusion of PDIs to partake in hard FM services has created a situation 
where they are not full-fledged FM operators despite seven years of involvement 
in the contract. Their gradual introduction into this field would have benefited 
them since initially they did not have the required expertise, and the adequate 
management capacity in-house. This observation seems to be in line with the 
view of the PA theory that the principal and the agent are two competing utility 
maximizers, with bounded rationality who can always act opportunistically 
whenever the opportunity arises.  
The fact that the government did not push for the PDIs inclusion and participation 
induced the established companies to resist their participation on these areas. 
This disadvantaged the women PDIs’ full operational tutelage, and reduced their 
maximisation of gainful participation in the project. The above observations 
demonstrated that the principal/agent goal conflict endemic in typical PA 
relationships such as PPPs, engenders a situation where the weakness/oversight 
of the government (principal) in the utilisation of its intervention leverage, 
encourages the utility-maximizing consortium (agent) to always opportunistically 
exploit the situation at the detriment of BEE beneficiaries. However there are 











could not be properly explained by the PA theory, as a result a diametrically 
opposed theory of Principal Steward (PS) theory was utilised to ultimately 
provide a theoretical synthesis. 
6.7.2 Principal Steward (PS) Theory 
Principal Steward (PS) Theory was presented as an alternative to agency theory 
by Donaldson and Davis (1991 & 1993) to challenge the prevailing assumption 
about human motivation that was derived from PA theory described above. 
Rather than the pursuit of divergent personal goals, PS theory assumes that 
individuals and organisations strive for collectivist ideals. The theory examines 
the relationships and behaviours often discounted in organisational economic 
theories and could be regarded as a management alternative to PA theory. 
Whereas PA theory is always identified as critical to managerial behaviour (Ross 
S. A., 1987), PS theory can be regarded as its counterweight concentrating on 
organisational behaviour and was developed specifically for that purpose (Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997).  
In PS theory a steward places greater value on cooperation over defection and 
other self-servicing tendencies, even when his/her own goals are not perfectly 
realized. This view differs sharply with the original disposition of PA theory where 
the intentions of the agent were never to be trusted. PS theory proposes that 
initially the transaction costs for a PS may be higher compared to a traditional PA 
relationship (Slyke, 2007). This is because of the increased investment in time on 
the part of the principal by involving the steward in problem formulation, joint 
decision-making, information exchange and steward’s needs assessment, in 
order to achieve a collective management environment with the steward (ibid.).  
PS views the steward’s motivation as being driven by intrinsic rewards, such as 
reciprocity and mission alignment, rather than solely by extrinsic rewards. In 
contrast to the agent, the steward values collective goals over individual goals, in 
that the steward observes the success of the organisation as his/her own. This 











is viewed as having extrinsic motivations whereas in the PS theory stewards 
motivations are not so easily quantifiable, such as growth, achievement and duty 
(Pastoriza & Arino, 2008). This directly affects the way the two are monitored. 
Whereas the agent is watched closely, the steward never uses private 
information surreptitiously for self-interests but for goal alignment, and as a result 
he/she is being monitored less and receives rewards of enhanced reputation and 
involvement in goal setting and programme evaluation (Slyke, 2007). 
Once the IALCH was operational and after the initial challenges during this stage, 
the behaviour of the FM operator changed and acquired characteristics akin to a 
steward.  “It has improved quite a lot from the first day I started working 
here….initially it wasn’t that good, I would say we’ve ironed out some of the 
challenges the… relationship has grown. At least now we know that we are able 
to conduct them whenever we are met with challenges. I would say it was . from 
my experience …. When I started working here I felt we were working against 
each other more than working together. Between FM operator and ourselves, but 
those challenges were addressed and ironed out”. [Women’s Group Participant-
F]. Another contracts manager expressed a similar sentiment about the way they 
are treated by FM operator, “Yes….we are sub-contracted to FM operator…. 
their management is very supportive as well. And the client the DoH they are 
also…. We are like a team. we are working as a team. With one mission to 
please the patient and we are given that opportunity to like excel where you are 
and if you are doing well you get appreciated and you do more, you strife”. 
[Women’s Group Participant-UL]. The operator seems to be extolling cooperation 
more than defection on BEE implementation. The general attitude of entrenching 
professionalism and maintaining standards seems to be centered around a spirit 
of cooperation rather punitive supervision and alienation of PDIs. The Quality 
Inspectors who are daily on the ground, although they are firm in their disposition 
towards adherence of standards, this is founded on team-building than being 











“They do on the daily basis from them, from their quality inspectors who 
are on site they go around the hospital and make sure that were are 
adhering to the standard that was put forward. So that at the end of the 
day we get e-mails from them to say we went to this place and these are 
the findings. Every week, once a week on Friday we’ve got meetings with 
them… FM operator and their quality department where we discuss all the 
issues that came about, during the week. And we come up with ways of 
resolving those” [Women’s Group Participant-F]. 
“Yes on regular basis .. they take a walk… they are all over the hospital. 
They can come in now….And if there are any concerns that need to be 
brought up and we address all the issues on a daily basis. Yes they are 
very helpful”. [Women’s Group Participant-F]. 
“That’s their job ….I mean for everything. They walk around every time 
you see them leaving and coming back to the office with their book. They 
do help because when they come across something……..although we are 
together walking around. They would come back or may be send an email 
to you and we sit down and discuss how we are going to solve this 
problem”. [Women’s Group Participant-UFSP]. 
Apart from building a team spirit and engaging the PDIs in problem-solving in an 
interactive manner the FM operator has adopted skills transfer strategies that 
have demonstrated a behaviour of a truly committed unselfish steward. The 
sharing of the FM operator’s integrated management service (IMS) with the PDIs 
has generated an environment where all information is easily accessible to the 
PDIs for their proper tutelage and efficient execution of the contract. The 
acceptance of the secondment of the women PDIs management staff at the FM 
operator’s other sites is imparting invaluable experiential professional 
enhancement. This would seem to mostly benefit the PDIs and thus indicative of 
a tendency to cooperate with the government on BEE rather than adopting a 











computer literacy training for all the sub-sub-contractor staff at all levels looks 
unfamiliar to a normal profit maximizing company, because it is solely meant to 
equip the PDI staff to be fully integrated in this highly computerized facility. 
However the computer skills they acquire can be utilised even beyond IALCH. All 
these initiatives demonstrated an operator who has collectivist ideals about PDI 
empowerment indicative of a steward, rather than a profit-maximizing self-serving 
agent.  
Although the behaviours described above are akin to steward characteristics 
there isn’t a complete fit with the broader PS theory. According to the PS theory 
the steward will pursue the principal’s goals even when his/her own goals are not 
perfectly realized. The FM operator is in this project to maximise their profit, 
although imparting skills involves some costs, but those costs would not be so 
great as to infringe on the profit-maximisation tendencies expected of a normal 
business enterprise. There is an observed attitude to cooperate and not defect 
and behave opportunistically on BEE, but this observation is not indicative of an 
isolated innocent cooperative behaviour with no mutual benefits. According to the 
PS theory the steward places collective goals over individual goals but in a 
contract structure where 40% of shareholding is in the hands of start-up PDI 
companies requiring a huge operational and management responsibility on the 
part of the steward, then it is in the interest of the of the FM operator as the 60% 
shareholder to ensure that they adopt a cooperative disposition to develop the 
PDIs in order to achieve performance parity in contractual delivery. While BEE is 
being achieved in the process there is clearly a direct operational benefit for the 
FM operator, which shows that the PS theory does not adequately accommodate 
or explain their behaviour.  
The other characteristics of a steward according to PS theory do not adequately 
address the normal behaviour of a profit-maximizing business enterprise. The 
agent in PA theory is said to be driven by extrinsic motivations like monetary 
reward, whereas a steward in a PS theory is motivated by the less easily 











operators are in this contract for profit attainment and have undertaken to adhere 
to all contractual requirements stipulated by the government including BEE, only 
if such adherence does not compromise their profit attainment. As much as they 
might corporately share the core values of the BEE policy, they would still require 
a level of profitability to justify their involvement in a PPP arrangement. The PS 
theory asserts that the steward never uses private information for self-interests 
but for goal alignment with the principal but the incidents described above 
indicates that at times the same players have demonstrated characteristics akin 
to an agent in a PA relationship. Thus the preceding discussions lead to an 
observation of established companies’ dual agent/steward personality at different 
stages of the project requiring a further interrogation of the two theories and their 
applicability in PPP contracts. Before these two theories are assessed in section 
6.7.6 below, the critical role of monitoring and trust in explaining the contractor 
behaviour is first scrutinized. 
6.7.3 Oversight Utility in PA and PS Theories 
Monitoring and oversight are integral to PA and PS theories (Lambright, 2009). 
6.7.3.1 Monitoring and the Principal Agent Theory 
Both PS and PA depend on the use of monitoring, trust, reputation, incentives 
and sanctions in the contract in order to establish goal congruence between the 
contracting parties. PA theory argues that a robust monitoring regime will raise 
the agent’s productivity and has to be applied provided the associated 
transaction costs are low. Although it has its critics the PA theory has contributed 
to a better understanding of different aspects of organisational function. Its 
traditional proponents assert that its main assumptions can be relaxed given the 
context, length of time, programmability of the service/product and the level of 
cooperation that exist between the contracting parties (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Principals who provide unambiguous incentives, like contract renewal and 
stability, discretion and flexibility in program implementation, and vigilant 











agent opportunism and goal incongruence (ibid.). If from the onset the principal 
invests in entrenching lasting contractual relationships in the proper use of, and 
enforcement of, the agency mechanism, the potential for enhanced alignment is 
increased and over time this could lead to reduced transaction costs. The agent 
gains by increasing the trust bestowed on him/her and an enhanced reputation, 
which could free up resources previously allocated to meet reporting 
requirements.  
There is a huge investment at IALCH in ensuring a lasting robust PA relationship 
particularly in elaborating on the BEE outcomes, in order to lessen the ambiguity 
that might have led to conflicts later on during project execution. The RFQ, RFP 
and negotiation stages emphasized the BEE requirements and the modus of 
delivery. The project is lucrative and all the role players are keen to be involved 
when the government reviews the contract in seven years time when the project 
ends its fifteen (15) year tenure. All these considerations might impose positive 
pressure to induce contract compliance. According to the PA theory the duration 
of the contract is very important in avoiding moral hazard; long-term contracts 
prevent opportunistic behaviour ex post and promote commitment and efficient 
conduct ex ante (Laffont & Tirole, 1990). This is extended by Eisenhardt (1989) 
who argues that the longer the term of the contract, the lower the incentive for 
the agent to shirk, because even if he were to shirk the level of his mediocre 
effort will be exposed over time (Eisenhardt, 1989). That might partially explain 
the adherence to BEE contractual stipulations by the agent, however the role of a 
self-monitoring system in IALCH has a greater practical influence in enforcing 
compliance as attested to by established companies, than mere contractual 
longevity. Eisenhardt (1989) however fail to fully explain how the 
revision/relaxation of theoretical assumptions in a context of principal/agent 
cooperation and long-term contract, could be accommodated in the traditional 
tenets of the PA theory. This necessitates the introduction of a new theoretical 
explanation of those anomalies not adequately accommodated in the traditional 












The PS heavily relies on the significance of the principal’s and steward’s initial 
trust disposition, in the belief that trust leads to the realisation of collective 
interests. Trust and incentives are deployed to achieve alignment, and monitoring 
is not coercive but is intended to direct the contracting parties towards a proper 
relational alignment (Slyke, 2007). The notion of trust, which is never considered 
a virtue in PA theory, is critical in PS theory, because the steward attitude 
towards the contract is regarded as being personal (psychological) rather than 
purely economic. Increased monitoring could be perceived by the steward as a 
lack of trust and can be demotivating for him/her (Bruno, 2000). Reduced 
monitoring for fear of creating the “crowding out effect” dominates when the 
relationship is personal or psychological, while the “disciplining effect” of 
monitoring dominates in the abstract relationship of a normal PA transaction, 
which is theoretically impersonal in character. The notion of trust needs to be 
interrogated in order to elucidate the unique characteristic of PS’s lack of 
rigorous monitoring. 
6.7.4 Trust 
Mayer et al (1995) describes trust as the willingness and risk of being vulnerable, 
on the part of both actors, to the possibility that one actor in the contract may 
pursue his/her own self-interest to the exclusion of the collectively agreed upon 
goals of the contract. It is a major psychological and social process that lies at 
the root of the development, maintenance, change or discontinuance of 
contractual relations (Rousseau, 1995). There are different types of trusts, but in 
contracting, strategic trust is a very useful concept as it is based on the 
knowledge and experience with the other party and a legitimate mutual 
expectation of reciprocity (Slyke, 2007). While the PA theory assumes the agent 
is always inward looking and as such can never be trusted, the PS theory 
assumes that the steward has noble intentions and can be trusted. Trust is never 











be predominant disposition assumed by government officials as the citations 
below demonstrate. 
“I don’t know of any B contractor in South Africa that does BEE because 
of the love of it. It’s primarily compliance….eh…. at best is something that 
will win me a contract if I do it well.   But is not something that people do it 
as the first business meritorious kind of approach”. [Government official-S] 
“Like any other regulation like the speed limit. If you are sure that there is 
no traffic cop you will go to 140 …and it is not that you a generally a 
criminal but its just that because nobody is watching and your car is 
capable of getting to 140 you would. So there would be those tendencies, 
because people can’t cheat too much because in a PPP contract because 
of the strictures that are there and these things are audited. But they will 
always take. …eh. sort of chances here and there”. [Government official-
S] 
“If you ask me whether there have bought in? Yes and No….I think they 
have bought in completely as far as far as they are forced to do in terms of 
the agreement. Once you change the agreement tomorrow they might not 
do.…[laughter]…do you understand what I am trying to say …. They are 
forced they have, they have bought into it. But when you walk out you’ve 
got nothing to do with it”. [Government official-C] 
The following discussion demonstrates that a purely abstract relationship 
consistent with PA theory where trust is not a natural disposition can evolve over 
time, to an involvement-oriented steward-like relationship. The metamorphosis 
into the new character is mainly moulded by contractual stipulations and the 
interactions of contracting parties, and it is indicative of a willing compliance and 
demonstrates the steward-like characteristics although the ubiquitous PA traits 
depict government tender-stage weakness/oversight in adverse selection 












6.7.5 PA/PS synthesis in PPP Delivery 
Proponents of either PA or PS theories have deliberately tried to portray them as 
the “one best way” to the understanding of organisational behaviour (Davis et al, 
1997). However a blending of the two can enrich the understanding of the natural 
behaviour in reality. Agents are not static but can when necessary deviate from 
an agent position towards being stewards (ibid.).  
Under PA theory the ‘model of man’ is a rational, self-interested actor who seeks 
to maximize his own utility, and the company is considered a nexus of contracts 
that are able to motivate, reward and supervise agent’s efforts (Pastoriza & 
Arino, 2008). Conversely, PS theory is humanistic in its approach and does not 
adopt such simple and reductionist managerial propositions and as such does 
not proffer sharp and testable propositions. The rational economic man of PS 
theory is ordered such that individual’s behaviour is preceded by pro-
organisational behaviours (Davis et al, 1997). The agent might have higher-order 
motivations, better disposition to identify with the objectives of the firm, value 
commitment and greater use of personal power as a basis for influencing others 
to share the firm’s vision (ibid.). The decision for an agent to make the transition 
to become a steward is firstly driven by the interaction both parties to the 
relationship have. Secondly, the psychological and cultural background of each 
party plays a major role in an individual’s choice in deciding to be either an agent 
or make a transition into becoming a steward.  
What is of interest to researchers in this field is the underlying mechanisms that 
make an individual opt towards one position or the other, or to find the role 
played by psychological and situational factors in influencing the agent to 
transcend his/her own self-interests and resolve internal inter-motivational 
conflicts. Agents are not naturally altruistic but there are situations where serving 
the interests of the principal benefits the agent in the long run and is as good as 
serving ones own interests (Pastoriza & Arino, 2008).  Davis et al (1997) 
describes such a situation as where a principal has shown that he/she is also a 











of the parties not reciprocate, then mechanisms are put in place to monitor the 
behaviour of the other and the relationship is a typical PA relationship. If the 
principal is betrayed by a lack of reciprocity from the agent, the relationship over 
time develops to a typical PA one as both parties end up behaving like agents.  
This places great importance on the initial interactions. In a situation where the 
principal behaves like an agent and the agent does not show any steward 
characteristics, there is a low risk of betrayal, as the principal would have put in 
place control measures to curb opportunism.  
Pastoriza and Arino (2008) argue that the preceding argument is static and does 
not accommodate the fact that in a choice of agency versus steward relationship, 
agents are capable of learning as they interact with principal throughout time. 
There are a number of different elements that influence the choice to become an 
agent/steward beyond pure rationality, and the principal plays an important role 
in that learning process. It is likely in most contracts that at the first stage PA is 
the most likely explanation of the behaviour of the parties, however the 
transaction cost could decrease due to increased cooperation between the 
parties especially as the agent understands the principal’s motives (ibid.). This 
means the PA theory offers little explanation after the alignment of the interests 
has been achieved, because there will emerge benefits that could be associated 
with PS relationship as there will be fewer contracts revisions and strict 
monitoring. The observations made above during the IALCH operations, after all 
the contractual obligations had been mutually agreed to, demonstrated an 
emergence of a completely new agent disposition which could not be adequately 
addressed by the PA theory as it depicts an agent who has tendencies 
demonstrative of a steward.  
The dynamics of the interaction between the two parties largely determines how 
and why an individual decides to act as an agent or as a steward. According to 
Pastoriza and Arino (2008), the PA theory relies on rather reductionist 
assumptions on the one hand whilst on the other the PS assumptions are too 











degree of altruism. It is therefore impossible to find a person who is purely a 
steward or purely an agent. The reality is that each person is located on a 
continuum (ibid.). For any action by the principal (active agent-AA) a reaction is 
induced in the agent/steward (reactive agent -RA) and this could lead to one of 
three results: 
 Extrinsic results - observable outcomes 
 Intrinsic results - unobservable outcomes within the AA that comes as a 
result of the response of the RA. They are inferable as they affect future 
decisions of the AA in relation to RA 
 Transcendental results – outcomes that happen within the RA (whoever 
he/she may be) as a result of the AA action. They are identical to intrinsic 
results but are caused by the other party.  
The intrinsic result is the learning the AA gets in the interaction, whereas the 
transcendental result is the learning the interaction produces in the agent. This 
learning can be operative, where it is the acquiring of new skills, or relational 
where one party learns about the motives and intentions of the other party as 
they interact. These interactions reflect the underlying motivations. Part of the 
relational learning is to learn about the position on the agent/steward continuum 
adopted by the other party. This is because an individual will consistently make 
certain decisions because they are interested in an extrinsic result, an intrinsic 
result or a transcendental result. Depending on which one they choose they will 
be acting out of extrinsic, intrinsic or transcendental motivation. Under normal 
circumstances Pastoriza and Arino (2008) argue that any motivation to act is a 
combination of all three motivations. Any decision to act more like an agent or 
steward depends on the relative weight of the three motivations each person has. 
Someone with a tendency towards stewardship will include a good measure of 
transcendental motivation in their acts. A chain of actions and reactions between 
the two parties eventually leads to forging of a contractual relationship and its 











steward-agent relationship, will evolve into a steward-steward relationship, if the 
principal who behaves as a steward produces positive relational learning in the 
agent. If he/she fails it will end up as agent-agent relationship, even though the 
motivational quality of the active agent (AA) is towards stewardship, the 
relationship with the reactive agent (RA) will essentially be an agency 
relationship. 
It is one thing to abstractly understand the most appropriate attitude but quite 
another to embrace it. Because of selfishness it is easier to embrace an agent 
role whereas being a steward is more difficult; for an agent to act under a selfish 
motivation is spontaneous, but to choose a transcendental result does not 
naturally lead to spontaneous action. This requires a high level of rationality in 
thought and action (Pastoriza & Arino, 2008) to understand that there is virtue in 
pursuing someone else’s goal. Virtuousness is described by Pastoriza and Arino, 
(2008, p. 14), as the “capacity to control the spontaneous impulse to pursue our 
own goals, in order to pursue the transcendental results that rationality tells us 
are worthy of pursuing.” So two parties who enter a relationship with a long-term 
perspective can deviate from their original position as either stewards or agents 
as a result of their interaction. In other words agents can learn to become 
stewards by repositioning their internal motivation, from extrinsic towards 
transcendental motives although this was not their original spontaneous 
disposition. 
6.7.6 Contextualizing the PA/PS theoretical synthesis in IALCH 
According to Pastoriza and Arino (2008), the initial principal behaviour and/or 
gestures are the initial triggers of a responsive behaviour from the agent. In 
IALCH the consortium would not have incorporated start-up PDI’s if the 
government had not stipulated their involvement in this lucrative contract. The 
profitability of the project triggered amenability towards the PDI inclusion even 
among players that would not have otherwise assented to outside PDI 











“When BEE started all these big companies were told to have 
empowerment partners and they did. Bidvest has got Dinatla….which 
owns 15% of Bidvest ….and in terms of the scorecard they are fine. But 
the problem is regionally… when it comes to KZN region they cannot 
claim the 15% empowerment of Bidvest as its own. So when they come to 
the regions, these companies are forced to have regional partners. So 
they do these to get the contract but not with the long-term view because it 
does not make business sense to them to have long-term relationship 
when they have national partners” [Women’s Group participant-O].  
“Bidvest although they had their own BEE parties because they wanted a 
piece of the cake they said we will accommodate them [Mbekani/Omame]” 
[Women’s Group participant-O]. 
Prior to approaching Bidvest another company had been approached but they 
refused to take on the regional PDIs players and they lost out on the opportunity. 
“Company X said ‘no no ….we have our own BEE, we won’t take them.’ D&S 
was like ‘well if you don’t take these women then you gonna loose the 
opportunity because these women are shareholders and government is insisting 
on us demonstrating how shareholders especially BEE shareholders are 
benefiting from this. So if you are saying you are coming with your own BEE 
parties tough” [Women’s Group participant-O].  
Apart from IALCH project being a long-term contract with a steady cash flow for 
fifteen years there is also a possibility of renewal with the same players after the 
initial fifteen year project tenure, when the government undertakes its review and 
assessment of the overall project performance including BEE. The fact that the 
government undertook to pay for 100% occupancy irrespective of patient 
occupancy contributed in making a project a lucrative engagement for any profit 
maximizing enterprise.  
“From day 1, we were paid for 100% occupancy….right.  So the 











better administration for them 100% from day one. If there are 900 beds 
we are assuming there are 900 bodies on the beds …right”  [Women’s 
Group participant-M]. 
Although it is a lucrative contract there are a number of mechanisms put in place 
to monitor contractor performance. The self-monitoring nature of the contract 
drastically reduced the possibility of uncontrollable shirking. The periodic BEE 
reports send by IMPILO to the government and the government’s BEE spot-
checks which are contractually sanctioned were all intended to ensure that there 
is continuous BEE compliance. These monitoring mechanisms coupled with very 
heavy penalties for non-compliance assisted in entrenching the centrality of BEE 
and ensuring its compliance. So compliance for BEE was not based on 
contractor rationality but it was a direct reciprocity towards a firm governmental 
stance on BEE policy. This position was demonstrated in early interactions that 
set the tone for all contractual deliberations.  
According to Pastoriza and Arino (2008) the initial disposition and attitude of the 
principal is critical in influencing the ultimate positioning of the agent in the 
agent/steward continuum. The bounded rationality of the consortium at IALCH 
was to fully comply with all the clearly articulated BEE stipulations in the contract 
on one hand, while on the other they decided to adopt a more agent-like stance 
on private commercial agreements with the PDIs where there was limited 
government oversight. The FM operator for instance agreed to take women PDI 
managers on a secondment basis, in order to enhance training and skills 
transfer. The FM operator also arranged their office setup to enable an 
interactive engagement with the women PDIs where there is complete access to 
the operator’s IMS (integrated management system). However on the private 
commercial agreements, they induced the women PDIs to sign a mutual 
‘restriction of trade’ agreement, which the FM operator have since reneged on 
several times. The women PDIs’ payments are annually CPIX adjusted, whereas 
the FM operator’s payments are adjusted quarterly disadvantageously benefitting 











a while refused to pay a pro rata monetary apportionment to Mbekani to the 
detriment of a steady cash flow to a fledging PDI company. The above discourse 
clearly demonstrates that the natural disposition of the established members of 
the consortium is towards agency tendencies. These tendencies are propagated 
continuously even during operations in the areas where there was no 
governmental (principal) intervention. So any observed apparent metamorphosis 
of agency characteristics into steward tendencies is only when it serves the long-
term interests of the agent to comply although that is not their instinctive initial 
disposition. The acquired adherence to the BEE requirements was maintained 
even when there was an apparent government incapacitation on BEE monitoring.  
The dual character discussed above is in line with Pastoriza and Arino (2008) 
postulation that everyone acts with some degree of altruism and some degree of 
selfishness. It is impossible to find a pure steward or a pure agent, the dynamics 
of the contracting  parties determines how and why an individual decides to act 
more as an agent or more as a steward. The oversight of the government in 
intervening on certain BEE issues exercebated women PDIs marginalisation in 
some particular areas, while the government’s emphatic insistence on other 
issues bred a steward-like BEE implementation disposition from established 
companies in other areas. This posture was brought about by several interfaces 
encapsulated in the principal (active agent-AA) and agent (reactive agent-RA) 
chain of interactions as postulated by Patroriza and Arino (2008) above.  
According to Patroriza and Arino (2008) the AA and RA interactions result in the 
final contracting parties’ disposition. In IALCH the government initiated the 
adoption of BEE and the accommodation of women PDIs as part of the contract 
requirements. This was an active action by the government the reactive action 
response from the consortium was to accommodate them as shareholders and 
this resulted in an extrinsic result clearly observable in reality. The instruction to 
further come up with a structure that accommodates women at the third tier was 
another active action by the government, which was assented to by the FM 











‘D&S come up with a structure that accommodates women, which led to the 
formation of Umongi’” [Women’s Group participant-O]. Somehow during the 
tender stage interactions it occurred to the government that the financial trickle 
down to the women PDIs is not clear enough and hence the government insisted 
on being given a detail trickle down of financial flow to the women group PDI. “On 
the monetary side he [government official] wanted the flow of money he wanted 
to know how it flows to BEE companies… because in terms of reporting 
companies were reporting that if you own 40% then you are getting 40% of the 
project. Then he said no I want the trickle down. How does it trickle down to 
BEE? Because it does not mean you own 40%. Because if government pays in 
money; money is going to pay for operations. It is only the profits that get paid to 
BEE, our partners wanted to know what exactly should they put on the report. 
Should they put 40%, which is your ownership or the actual money that goe? He 
said I want to know the actual money. Because we know that most of the BEE 
companies they are not involved in operations so you can’t assume because they 
own 40%, [they get] 40% of what government pays. He said no. I want the actual, 
the profit. So companies started reporting on those profits at that time” [Women’s 
Group participant-O]. This was part of the government’s intrinsic results 
(relational learning) that were brought up by observing the tender documents of 
the consortium and their vagueness on this particular issue, and this led to the 
decision to make it more elaborate.  
There are other initiatives during the operation stage of the contract that are 
demonstrative of transcendental motives of the agent after a number of 
interactions with the principal. The sharing of office space with the FM operator 
and availing the IMS for use by the women PDIs demonstrate a desire to give 
more relative weight to transcendental motivation. The positive team spirit 
created between the FM operator and sub-sub-contractors, the supportive 
Quality inspectors, secondment of women PDIs managers to other sites of the 
FM operator and the free computer literacy training offered to all the sub-sub-
contracts staff are all demonstrative of transcendental actions depicting a very 











demonstrated and discussed above regarding unfair remunerative practices by 
established companies, it appears that when it comes to skills transfer in 
particular the FM operator also demonstrated steward-like tendencies by placing 
more relative weight on transcendental motivation.  
This metamorphosis of character was brought about by a chain of actions and 
reactions between the two parties which in the end placed the agent more on the 
steward side of the continuum on issues relating to skills transfer on the other 
hand, and more on the agent side of the continuum in matters relating to fair 
financial apportionment. This finding confirms Patroriza and Arino (2008) in so far 
as they refute the existence of a pure agent or a pure steward. It however 
demonstrates that an agent positive reciprocity which shifts its behaviour towards 
the stewardship end of the agent/steward continuum is heavily dependent on the 
relative weighting of the principal’s own active actions. According to this finding it 
is possible to have an agent who is selfish on issues not adequately emphasized 
and contractually stipulated, and who is also at the same time more altruistic on 
issues that were particularly contractually emphasized and reiterated during 
tender stage interactions. This makes the agent’s transcendental motivations 
directly dependent on the principal’s extrinsic and intrinsic actions. 
6.8 PPP EMPOWERMENT EFFICACY 
The PPP project process at IALCH initially bears all the hallmarks of an agency 
relationship as depicted by the core categories utilised in chapter 6 above. The 
inclusion of BEE as a project deliverable in a context of skewed skills and 
economic racial bias favoring the predominantly white previously privileged 
members of the population, meant that the empowerment agents had to 
transcend their self-interests and internal inter-motivational conflicts of protecting 
their economic status in implementing a legal BEE policy requirement. This 
scenario is intrinsically shrouded with agency pervasiveness. The emergent 
bipolar inclinations as the project progressed, demonstrated divergent 











theories. The PA theory was useful in explaining the interaction between the 
agent and the Principal during the tender stages. However, the positive 
behavioural anomalies in agent behaviour during the operation stage could not 
be accommodated within the parameters of the PA theory and recourse was 
sought from PS theory. The simplicity of PS theory with regards to its one-sided 
rigidity on steward positive behaviour also failed to account for the totality of 
observed agent’s operation-stage tendencies. It was consequently concluded 
that both theories had limitations in adequately explaining agent behaviour at 
different stages of the contract in isolation.  
A synthesis of the two theories as postulated by Pastoriza and Arino (2008) 
adequately addresses and accommodates the deficiencies demonstrated in the 
two theories, when viewed in isolation. The IALCH project has confirmed the 
behaviour of agents (consortium) to be a shifting response to the principal’s 
(government) stipulations and initial disposition, running on an agent/steward 
continuum rather than discrete immovable dispositions. What emerges is a 
guardian who is instinctively an agent but who acquires some steward 
tendencies provided adequate active actions are innitiated by the principal to 
instigate transcedental motives. The selective coding of core categories has 
revealed an esteemed level of empowerment and skills transfer not normally 
found in traditional procurement. This was directly connected with unique PPPs 
characteristics of robust self-monitoring mechanism, a prolonged tendering 
process which assist in the elaboration of outcome processes, the longevity of 
the project which entrenches a culture of contract compliance and an incetivising 
remuneration arrangement. 
6.9 SUMMARY 
This chapter utilised the data that was analysed in chapter 5 and discussed it 
using PA and PS theoretical filters. The conclusions emanating from the 
discussion assisted in the formulation and consolidation of a new theoretical 











theoretical framework were discussed within the context of the PPP procurement 
method and a suitable theoretical formulation was articulated. It was 
demonstrated that PA theory alone is inadequate in addressing the intricacies of 
principal and agent relationship post-contract award in the project. The use of PS 
theory had a limited utility at operations stage and hence an existing theoretical 
synthesis combining the two was used in developing an emergent theory that 
could adequately explain the anomalies not covered by existing theories. The 
next chapter discusses the conclusions and recommendations emanating from 











7 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE 
RESARCH DIRECTIONS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The implementation of BEE policy in South Africa has been beset with 
challenges and weaknesses in institutional monitoring. The construction industry 
has been particularly plagued by the diversion of preferential procurement 
benefits through pervasive misrepresentation practices. This research recognizes 
the critical role played by established white-owned companies in imparting skills 
and enhancing the economic position of PDIs. Government’s reliance on these 
white-owned companies for implementing BEE creates a Principal Agent 
relationship. By founding the theoretical investigation of the research on the PA 
theory, the efficacy of PPPs in ameliorating the challenges of implementing BEE 
was investigated.  The weakness of the PA theory in explaining the behavioural 
nuances of the consortium at the operations stage was augmented by the 
introduction of, and theoretical synthesis with, the diametrically opposed PS 
theory. What emerged from this synthesis was a bipolar consortium whose 
behavioural tendencies justified the unification of these theoretical dualities 
without eliminating either pole or reducing one pole to the other. The synthesis of 
PA/PS theories served as a base for the development of an improved theoretical 
explanation of the behaviour of the consortium in its implementation of BEE on a 
PPP. It is through this theoretical framework that the efficacy of PPPs was 
analyzed and understood.  
The success of this research should be judged in its adequacy in explaining the 
practical achievement of PPPs in stifling tendencies that have diluted BEE 
intentions in contract implementation. The comprehensive articulation of the 
behavioural changes of the established companies in their response to the 
government’s demands and contractual stipulations on BEE elucidates the 











7.2 FINDINGS OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
At this stage of the research it is necessary to review the research findings in 
relations to the research questions that triggered this investigation. The individual 
research questions and findings are discussed below: 
What Principal Agent problems exist in PPPs and in traditional procurement? 
The endemic PA problems faced by the construction industry can be 
encapsulated in the problems of Fronting and Window-dressing. Window 
dressing gives a tenderer the appearance of true BEE compliance whereas the 
intended beneficiaries are receiving minimal gains from their inclusion in the 
tender documentation. Fronting is any ex post practice that places the PDIs at 
strategic positions with little practical/operational control or responsibility in the 
company, or any practice that deceptively ascribes a role to PDI companies 
when in reality their involvement is peripheral and superficial.  Findings of open 
interviews held with all the managers/shareholders of all the major participants in 
the IALCH PPP project demonstrated that there are PA problems in PPPs but 
that these emerge in the form of adverse selection. The PPP structure and self-
monitoring system is robust enough to mitigate the problem of moral hazard so 
there were no observations of either window dressing or fronting at IALCH during 
its operational phase.  
Open-ended Interviews conducted with the shareholders of the PDI companies 
where they recounted their experiences, demonstrates the presence of subtle, 
adverse selection on matters that the government would consider to be private 
commercial agreements within the consortium. This phenomenon was 
predominant whenever there was reduced oversight by the government on the 
established companies’ reactive actions towards BEE. It was observed that when 
the established companies were not closely watched they would reduced the 
BEE benefits to the PDIs in order to maximize their own utility in a manner that is 
incongruent with the spirit of BEE. The novelty of the PPP procurement system at 











resulted in adverse selection on the implementation of BEE in some areas. The 
lack of experienced professional advice available to the PDIs also contributed to 
the PDI’s accepting disadvantageous contractual arrangements which stifled 
their economic empowerment.  
How can the principal use his influence to improve BEE delivery in PPPs given their 
long-term nature? 
It was observed from the case study that the existence of a profitable long-term 
contract triggered amenability towards the inclusion and training of PDIs. 
Government’s insistence on the accommodation of new entrants and the 
longevity of the IALCH project triggered the inclusion and appropriate training of 
the PDIs which enhanced their empowerment. The aspirations of socio-economic 
impact at IALCH were better planned and served as a direct result of the 
longevity of the PPP agreement and the stipulations of the BEE policy.  
The gradual transfer of management and operational responsibility from the 
established firms to the PDIs was cited as the most positive improvement that 
can be made on the current PPP structures. The static nature of the PDIs’ 
participation in the project would normally confine them to a perpetual state of 
dependence on the established companies, even when enough practical 
experience has been gained from being involved in the daily operations of the 
project. However, the government recognised immediately after the contract 
close of the IALCH deal that it would be beneficial for the PDI shareholders to be 
involved at all the levels of the PPP contractual operations, in order to gain a 
complete knowledge of the operations. The operational exclusion of PDIs at 
highly technical areas at IALCH meant that they have a limited knowhow in the 
complex knowledge-intensive areas of the project. Thus bolstering the advocacy 
for a gradual take-over of all the operations over the project tenure in order to 













“Are there underlying reasons that could militate towards PPPs being a better platform 
to interrogate the Principal Agent relationship in delivering BEE?” 
It was observed at IALCH that BEE compliance is maintained because BEE is a 
contractual deliverable and is not an adjunct government policy requirement. The 
self-monitoring mechanism had more impact on contract compliance and showed 
itself to be durable even when government’s monitory initiatives collapsed. 
IALCH also demonstrates that PDIs gain from participating in the prolonged 
tender process, where observation, research and direct involvement can impart 
the necessary knowledge on the vicissitudes of a complex tender process. This 
experience and knowledge equip the PDIs to know the contract outputs, their 
rights and realistically align their expectations. Empowering knowledgeable 
beneficiaries was observed to assists in the government oversight role, as the 
beneficiaries continually reported perceived unfair practices which are 
incongruent with the spirit of the policy.  
“How does the efficiency of the Principal Agent relationship in PPPs in delivering 
BEE compare with traditional procurement methods?” 
The prolonged tendering process in IALCH PPP created a long chain of 
interactions that demonstrated the centrality of BEE and clarified the 
expectations of BEE output to the bidding consortia. The length of the tender 
period reduced the information asymmetry over the intensions of the agent 
(consortium) in implementing BEE. The short tender period characteristic of 
traditional procurement practices allows the awarding of the contract to a bidder 
who might not have completely bought in to the BEE policy and might therefore 
deliver inferior BEE outcomes and may not be detected by weak monitoring 
mechanisms. The long-term nature of IALCH created a situation where the 
established companies had to metamorphose their agent character and adopt 
tendencies that were more akin to stewards in their training of PDIs to fully 
achieve operational parity. In traditional procurement the emphasis is on having 











the way of practical mechanisms to ensure the active participation of the 
intended beneficiaries of BEE. 
7.3 REVISITING THE RESEARCH PROPOSITION 
From the onset the rationale of this research was predicated on the notion 
embodied in the main proposition:  
PPPs offer a better environment than other procurement methods where the Principal 
Agent problems can be mitigated in the delivery of BEE 
The utilisation of the PA theory in this research as the principal theoretical 
framework was based on the assumed universality of the self-centred nature of 
employer/employee relationships. Whereas the PA theoretical analysis works for 
most relationships where the agent (employee/contractor) works for material 
gain, it was found that the theory is limited when applied in situations where 
material gain is not the sole post-contractual remunerative goal of the agent.  
However the utility of this theory proved invaluable in analysing and 
understanding the pre-contractual behaviour of the agent. The PPP contractual 
structure and tender processes were found to be adequate to stifle the ill-effects 
of pre-contractual agent opportunism. There was an observed absence of post-
contractual BEE agent opportunism at IALCH which could directly be ascribed to 
the effectiveness of the PPP self-monitoring mechanism, demonstrative of the 
PPP efficacy in comparison to the traditional procurement methods. More 
especially because with PPPs the contract is contextualised to each particular 
project to meet its unique challenges with regard to BEE. The traditional 
procurement methods deploy generic contracts which cannot cover every 
scenario, and this is exacerbated by a lack of robust continuous BEE monitoring. 
7.3.1 Revisiting the sub-propositions 
The following sub-propositions were postulated at the beginning of the research: 
There are Principal Agent problems in PPPs and also in the traditional procurement 











The robust nature of the scrutiny of PPP tenders was observed to stifle the 
occurrence of the traditional PA procurement problems of Window-dressing and 
Fronting. At the same time it led to the emergence of even more subtle aversion 
of basic BEE ideals. The prevalence of this was observed where the 
inexperienced new PDI entrants unwittingly entered into disadvantageous private 
contractual arrangements with experienced consortium partners. The following 
pre-contractual opportunistic behaviours were identified at IALCH: 
 Precluding PDIs to enter strategic and operational areas of the project (i.e. 
second tier and highly technical areas) 
 Structuring disadvantageous payment methods that restrict PDIs optimal 
economic benefits (annual CPIX payment adjustments for PDIs’ and 
Quarterly adjustments for established companies). 
 Introduction of apparently mutually beneficial agreements that can easily 
be contravened by economically powerful parties (“restriction of trade” 
agreement precluding the consortium partners from competing against 
each other in the designated province).   
Since the relationship between the principal and the agent is long-term, the principal is 
better placed to learn and equip himself throughout the life of the project to institute 
measures that will ameliorate the Principal Agent problems.  
The structure of the PPP agreement does not allow scope for amendment during 
operations, limiting post-contractual intervention by the principal (government). 
However the RFQ, RFP and protracted negotiation stages during tendering 
allows the principal (government) to learn of the agent (consortium) 
implementation intentions and also to emphasise the centrality of particular 
issues. The active actions of the principal which triggers the reactive actions of 
the agent instil on the agent the intentions of the principal and breed 
transcendental motivations which benefit BEE implementation.  
The long-term and lucrative nature of a PPP project makes the agent 











principal/agent interactions demonstrate the principal’s BEE intentions which are 
consequently reciprocated by the agent transcendentalism to resolve inter-
motivational conflicts. The principal’s (government) overriding BEE intrinsic 
motivations were observed to be reflected in the metamorphosis of the agent’s 
post-contractual character, which expressed steward-like characteristics.   
The relationship of the parties in a PPP are an ideal Principal Agent relationship, the 
proper understanding of which can yield maximum BEE benefits. 
The government and consortiums’ pre-contractual relationship in PPPs perfectly 
fits with the PA theory. However, the agent’s transcendental post-contractual 
behaviour cannot adequately be explained within the confines of the classic 
agent characteristics proffered by the PA theory. This undermines the 
applicability of the theory throughout the project in its pure form as propagated by 
Eisenhardt (1989) and others. The positive post-contractual behaviour of the 
agent (consortium) in BEE implementation could adequate be attributed to 
rigorous screening processes to mitigate adverse selection. However the overall 
post-contractual steward-like tendencies surpassed the theoretical purview of the 
PA theory, and could only be partially explained by the PS theory. The resultant 
PA/PS synthesis was necessary to generate a better theoretical explanation. It 
was however found that the PA theory still provides a foundation for 
understanding the PPP’s mechanisms that are most likely to yield efficacious 
BEE implementation. 
Because of an ideal Principal Agent relationship in PPPs they will yield more of the 
key BEE elements than the other procurement methods  
This research established that the government/consortium relationship does not 
reflect a pure PA relationship, because PA theory does not adequately explain 
the totality of the agent behaviour throughout the project. However adopting the 
new grounded theoretical development which builds on PA/PS synthesis and on 
the work done by Pastoriza & Arino (2008), a better theoretical framework is 
outlined which better explains the government/consortium relationship. The PA 











adoption of which would lead to the structuring of PPPs to yield even better BEE 
benefits. The new theory suggests that PPPs are better platform for efficacious 
BEE implementation. Chiefly, because there is no single BEE moral hazard 
incident observed during the project operation, demonstrating the efficacy of 
PPPs in mitigating PA problems ex post. The new theory also explains the 
generally positive attitude towards BEE by the consortium, which surpasses the 
normal expected compliance parameters by an agent, demonstrative of a 
behavioural transition induced by the PPP contractual strictures and 
environment. 
7.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The PPP tendering mechanisms are found to be more rigorous than traditional 
procurement methods’ but not foolproof in mitigating adverse selection in BEE 
delivery. The compliance of the consortium to the BEE stipulations at the time of 
tender is directly related to the level of government oversight in instigating 
congruence with the ideals of BEE. Any weakness in contractual stipulation 
and/or direct government tender stage intervention is likely to be exploited to 
maximize the agent’s profitability from the project. Any opportunistic actions that 
contravened BEE ideals were executed in such a way that there is no technical 
infringement of the contractual specifications. Despite the intrinsic hallmarks of 
self-seeking profit-maximizing tendencies demonstrated by the consortium’s 
general behaviour, it was established that PPPs have robust screening 
processes that induce increased compliance in BEE delivery. The active 
meaningful PDI participation in PPPs is a direct result of the centrality of BEE in 
the PPP contractual requirements. 
The case study demonstrated that in comparison to traditional procurement 
methods substantial BEE compliance in PPPs is largely due to clarity in the 
articulation of project outcomes, unambiguous performance measurements and 
effective self-monitoring mechanisms. Compliance is also maintained by 











becomes punishable via the self-monitoring mechanism utilised in the project.  
The effectiveness of the self-monitoring mechanism maintains and upholds BEE 
compliance even when government’s monitory initiatives falter through lack of 
capacity etc. However the continued government involvement and 
responsiveness at all stages served to bolster the PDI ability to resist 
disadvantageous practices that are detrimental to empowerment.  
During the bidding stage the PDIs gained from being a part of the elaborate 
tender process, where observation, research/consultation and involvement 
empowered the new PDI entrants on the vicissitudes of dealing with a complex 
tender process. The observational experience was empowering and its redolence 
could be evocatively utilised in future business opportunities. During the 
operations stage the high standards demanded on the PPP has developed 
efficient and confident PDI professionals who have acquired valuable skills by 
working with international and local industry leaders. The PPP’s high standards 
have also fostered a spirit of entrepreneurship, which has supported the 
emergence of successful and competitive PDI-owned businesses capable of 
playing a crucial role in the PPP market and other business ventures. The 
general BEE positivity among PDI players is a direct result of a supportive 
environment fostered by the PPP agreement which has succeeded in developing 
a cadre of ambitious, upwardly inclined professionals.   
The profitability and longevity of PPP projects triggers amenability towards PDI 
inclusion by the established firms. Any resistance against their stipulated 
involvement can lead to a consortium losing out on a steady cash flow over a 
number of years, and this creates a strong incentive for the proper inclusion of 
PDI’s in the project. The longevity of the PPP projects is also beneficial to socio-
economic impact and employment equity. The long-term nature of the project 
assists in the proper assessment, planning and implementation of socio-
economic needs of the local community. Recruiting and training PDIs who are 
going to be of a long-term benefit to the companies enhances PDI empowerment 











The high level of service delivery expectations in the PPP and the fact that big 
established companies have to deliver through PDIs, makes the skilling and 
uplifting of PDI standards a business imperative. In order to deliver service at a 
required level big experienced companies adopt a posture that creates a 
harmonious working relationship with PDIs in order to enhance project output. A 
mixture of penalties and constructive monitoring assists the PDIs with fine-tuning 
their skills and gives them enough confidence to develop independently outside 
of the project. The resultant high level of cooperation and interaction between the 
big companies and PDIs reduces any BEE moral hazard.  
7.4.1 Theoretical Contribution 
This research demonstrates the importance of the PA theoretical framework in 
the analysis of PPPs efficacy in implementing BEE. It also highlights the utility of 
PS theory in the theoretical discourse of employer/contractor relationship. The 
adoption of the PS theory was necessitated by the positive post-contractual 
behavioural tendencies of the agent. It was however observed that neither theory 
could independently account for theoretical behaviour anomalies of the agent, 
which appears to spill over the traditional purviews. The synthesis of the two 
theories advocated by Pastoriza & Arino (2008) was adopted to explain the 
metamorphosis of the general character of the agent who demonstrated a shift 
toward steward-like tendencies. This new theoretical development demonstrates 
the importance of interpreting the agent behaviour as a shifting phenomenon 
based on a continuum with pure agent behaviour and pure steward behaviour 
positioned at each end. It also rejects the view of the agent compliance paradigm 
as being a discrete, immovable inclination. 
This synthesis of the two theories as propagated by Pastoriza and Arino (2008) 
assumes that a relative increase in either agent/steward tendencies necessarily 
leads to the gradual diminishing of the opposite behaviour. This research, 
however, demonstrates that there is a consistent retention of certain agent 
behavioural tendencies, even when there is an apparent character 











character polarity is a further theoretical development building on the work by 
Pastoriza & Arino (2008), and is one of this thesis’s critical contributions to 
knowledge. The recognition of the existence of this duality of character means 
that the predominance of one tendency does not necessarily subsume the other. 
The contribution of this research can be judged in enhancing awareness in the 
identification of this character duality, because the pre-contractual identification 
and mitigation of undesirable agent behaviours can enhance BEE in PPPs even 
more. 
7.5 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The title of this research could be misleading as it gives the impression that the 
PA theory is the sole theoretical framework utilised throughout the research. 
However it has to be accepted that initially it was thought to be the sole relevant 
theoretical analysis suitable to address all the PPP contract phases. However the 
nuanced character interface at the commencement of contract operations which 
discovered shifts in agent behaviour necessitated the introduction of the PS 
theoretical perspective. The PA has widely been utilised in very many fields and 
has been very successful in providing adequate explanations of agent behaviour 
in those areas where it was deployed. However the peculiarities of a PPP 
environment at different phases has necessitated a theoretical conflation with PS 
theory to adequately account for the agent behaviour. However the following 
areas still need to be further investigated. 
 The government needs to have a permanent provincial PPP unit manned 
by experienced staff with a thorough understanding of PPP projects. The 
current over-reliance on the self-monitoring mechanism to prevent BEE 
shirking does not address PDI operational challenges, which need 
government intervention. 
 The gradual introduction of PDIs into knowledge sensitive and highly 
technical fields should be promoted in PPP projects. The PPP project 











operation and management provided their empowerment is to the 
government satisfaction. The perpetual sub-contractor status that PDIs 
play on projects would never lead to a development of major PDI industry 
players in PPPs, capable of leading at first and second tiers. 
PPP contracts should include a mechanism allowing for mid-term reviews to 
counter any BEE inhibiting practices or agreements. New entrants into the PPP 
arena are susceptible to disadvantageous agreements because of the lack of 
expertise and access to technical and legal resources, but the PPP should allow 
such agreements to be revised in a way that the PPP does not become 
unattractive to major players.  
7.6 FURTHER WORK 
Further work is needed in understanding the nature of, and power relationship 
dynamics in private commercial agreements between PDIs and established 
consortium partners. This research has established that further regulation of the 
principles governing these agreements in PPPs is needed. It is in these 
agreements where the government has a limited oversight that adverse selection 
takes place to the detriment of optimal PDI empowerment.  
This project is led by a PDI sponsor and that might have contributed to a lot of 
positive results in BEE implementation. A comparative study is needed where the 
sponsor is not a PDI to assess the role of a sponsor in instigating beneficial BEE 
optimal implementation.  
The IALCH project was done before the codes of good practice for BEE in PPPs 
(2004) were promulgated. When the codes came out their requirement for BEE 
shareholding were lower at 30% as opposed to 40% in this project. A 
comparative study would serve to clarify if that has somehow affected the 
general BEE benefits under the current legislation.  
Some work needs to be done in projects that have characteristics that mirror 










contractual deliverable and robust government oversight to see if similar results 
could not be attained. The main reason is that PPPs cannot always be chosen by 
the government but their unique characteristics which benefit BEE could be 
emulated and implemented in projects that are traditional procured.  
There are manifestations of relational contracting in the operation of this contract 
but the contract itself was not designed as a relational contract. These 
manifestations could not go unnoticed and unrecorded by the writer. Although 
relational contracting as a concept on its own could not be extensively 
interrogated without unnecessarily broadening the scope of the research in a way 
that might refocus it, to the detriment of initial theoretical considerations which 
are still considered to be relevant. The writer has decided to embark on the study 
of the contribution of relational contracting in enhancing BEE implementation 
innovation. 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
Opportunism in the form of fronting and window-dressing has bedeviled the 
implementation of the BEE policy since its earliest days and has been a 
challenge to those tasked with using procurement as a tool to empower the PDIs. 
This research has utilised the PA theoretical framework to first understand the 
general agent behaviour, and contextualized this within the PPP environment. 
The peculiarities of a PPP procurement method could not provide a perfect fit 
with the PA theoretical stipulations, and recourse was sought from the PS theory. 
The synthesis of the two theories provided a foundation for a development of a 
proper theoretical understanding of agent behavioural ‘anomaly’ found in PPPs. 
This unique behaviour was found to be positively favoring BEE. This research 
has identified measures that can be taken to maximize the manifestation of this 
positive character transition by the agent. The research has also demonstrated 
that such transition could better be induced where there is longevity of the tender 
process, longevity of project tenure, unambiguity of project deliverables, robust 











responsive government disposition to the needs of PDIs. It has been established 
that PPPs provide a platform where all these elements can be properly 
accommodated. Thus advocating for the deployment of PPPs, to adequately 
garner the benefits of procurement in attaining BEE. Where PPPs cannot be 
practically be deployed it is proposed that structuring the projects to emulate key 
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ECONOMIC HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
INTRODUCTION 
EARLY PEOPLES OF SOUTH AFRICA AND FIRST EUROPEAN 
CONTACT  
To understand and contextualize Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) in South 
Africa, it is important to first trace the economic history of the country.  The 
geographical area that is now recognized as South Africa was, by the 17th C. 
occupied by a number of indigenous black people who were pastoralists and 
subsistence farmers, who had originally migrated from East-central Africa 
(Worden, 2007). In addition to those of East-Central African descent were the 
San who predated this migration and who lived primarily as hunter-gatherers 
(Wilcox, 1976). Within the San was a semi-nomadic pastoralist subgroup called 
the Khoikhoi who resided in the cape peninsula (ibid.). These were the first 
people to come into contact with Europeans in South Africa (Hart, 1967).  
In May 1488 a group of Portuguese sailors led by Bartholomew Dias looking for a 
way around Africa to the Far East, rounded the southern tip of Africa (ibid.). 
Contact was established with these indigenous people, more so because Dias 
saw valuable herds of livestock at Cape Agulhas (ibid.). However it was not until 
two hundred years later that the Dutch East India Company (also known by its 
Dutch acronym VOC –Vereenigde Ooste-Indische Campagnie) decided to set up 
a station to supply its ships, with fresh vegetables and meat, that a permanent 
European settlement was established in the Cape (Elphick, 1977). A group of 82 
men and 8 women were dispatched from Holland led by Johan Anthonisz “Jan” 
van Riebeeck and his wife Maria de la Quellerie. They came in three ships 











had no aims for the conquest of the land or administration of the territory other 
than to provide vital supplies to the company’s passing ships on their way to the 
spice rich Far East. In fact van Riebeeck’s specific instructions were to build a 
fort, erect a flagpole for “signaling” the passing ships and to build pilot boats to 
escort them safely into the bay (ibid.). 
Trading with the Khoikhoi had started in the 1590s when the Dutch and English 
ships began to put in regular stops at Table Bay en route to the Indies from 
Europe (Elphick, 1977). It was because of this prior trading relationship that in 
1652 the Dutch initially never intended their settlement to go beyond the 
peninsula (Worden, 2007; Ross, 1999). The original intention was to continue to 
trade, albeit intensively with the Khoikhoi for cattle and sheep, and to establish a 
strong agriculture, based on market gardens with orchards and vegetable 
patches (Guelke, 1989). Van Riebeeck soon found out that the Khoikhoi were not 
often willing traders and that intensive agriculture on unimproved ground and the 
building of fortifications demanded more labor than was anticipated (ibid.).  
Within the first month Van Riebeeck had requested the directors of VOC for slave 
labor. The first slave load from Angola and Guinea arrived at the cape in 1658. 
Subsequent slaves were from Madagascar, Mozambique, East Africa up to 
Zanzibar, Mauritius, India, China, Malaya and Batavia (Jakarta, Indonesia)  
(Armstrong & Worden, 1989; Bradlow & Cairns, 1978). Their numbers grew 
steadily from 200 in 1658 to more than 6000 in 1672. To solve the trading 
problem with the local Khoikhoi trading expeditions were sent further inland to 
trade with other Khoikhoi clans (Worden, 2007).  In 1657 a class of 9 free-
burgers (Vrijburgers –independent farmers) was released from the company’s 
employ to ameliorate agricultural shortfall; they were given land on loan or 
freehold to farm along the Liesbeeck river and were supposed to sell their 
produce to the VOC at a fixed price. In time their numbers grew and they spread 













SETTLER EXPANSION INTO THE SOUTH AFRICAN INTERIOR 
Expansion did not stop but continued further inland and in doing so amounted to 
a piecemeal conquest of the Khoikhoi and San lands (Worden, 2007; Ross, 
1999). A combination of superior technology in the form of firearms and horses 
and the use of bureaucracy meant that the Khoikhoi were permanently displaced 
from land where they had practiced transhumant animal husbandry for years 
(Guelke & Shell, 1992). Within 150 years of European settlement the Khoikhoi 
had almost completely been displaced from their land and those who could not 
move further inland were incorporated in the settler economy of the Dutch (ibid.).  
From here the settlers moved North and East and their movement was largely 
unchecked from the 1720’s and 1730’s until they encountered the numerous 
Xhosa (Bantu) agriculturists in the vicinity of the Great Fish River in 1779 
(Guelke, 1989). This first migration generally defined the boundaries of the Cape 
colony for some time (Worden, 2007; Legassick, 1989). In 1795 the British took 
control of the Cape as part of the ‘spoils’ of the Napoleonic wars (ibid.). Although 
there was a brief interlude from 1803 where the Dutch Batavian administration 
took over, the British gained permanent control in 1806 (ibid.). 
The most immediate and significant change introduced by the British was the 
internal ordering of the colony (Keegan, 1996). A tied labor system was removed, 
with the restrictions on the Khoikhoi labor lifted in 1828 by Ordinance 50, giving 
them more mobility and freedom to choose employers, and slavery was 
abolished in 1834 (Ross, 1999; Crais, 1986).  These developments, which 
challenged the fundamentals of Dutch settlers’ way of life, were not welcomed 
and 15,000 Eastern Cape Dutch pastoralists left the colony in what became 
known as the “Great Trek” (Muller, 1975). These migrants or Trekboers (later 
called ‘Voortrekkers’) contributed in the early formation of a collective “Afrikaner” 
ethnicity, as the South African Dutch were later to be called (ibid.).  According to 
Muller (1975) this migration came to be seen in the 20th C. as the seminal event 











development of the ethos of Afrikaner nationalism (ibid.) that would ultimately 
give rise to apartheid.  
The migration of the Trekboers landed them in present day Kwazulu-Natal, 
Orange Free State, Gauteng (former Transvaal) and Northern Cape (Gluckman, 
1960; Guy, 1980). These areas were occupied by African Bantu polities, which 
were undergoing a process of social upheaval called Difaqane (ibid.). Difaqane 
resulted from the social re-organisation of the Zulu kingdom by King Shaka in the 
early 1820s (ibid.). This process was cataclysmic and highly destructive for the 
existing African Bantu polities over a wide area, as chiefdoms sought to evade or 
resist Shaka’s forced amalgamation into his kingdom (Omer-Cooper, 1966). The 
main polities around this time were the Sotho, the Swazi, the Ndebele, the Pedi 
and the Tswana (ibid.), who the Afrikaners were later to interact with, and they 
had roughly delineated territorial boundaries.  
First contacts between the Afrikaners were mostly cordial and symbiotic as the 
Afrikaners needed land for their herds and the locals needed firearms (Worden, 
2007). Nevertheless, all the relationships would ultimately turn sour due to the 
Afrikaner need for absolute ownership of the resources and to establish territorial 
advantage to oppose British rule and influence. Thus conflict, cooperation and 
complex interaction between trekkers and others marked the history of mid-
nineteenth-century South Africa (Worden, 2007).  For instance from the early 
nineteenth century, ivory and hide hunters and agents of Cape merchants had 
established a small settlement in Port Natal (later Durban) with nominal 
allegiance to the Zulu kingdom (Slater, 1980). When the Afrikaners arrived in 
1838 they formed an alliance with the traders and disaffected African cultivators 
in the region (ibid.). Together they defeated the Zulu leader Dingane at the battle 
of Blood River, declared a new republic of Natalia and claimed rights to the land 
between the Tukela and Mzimkulu rivers (ibid.). The Afrikaners were, in turn, 
dislodged by the British in 1843 when Natalia was annexed, ostensibly because 
the Afrikaners were still practicing slavery and also to curb Afrikaner rivalry in the 











Large-scale British commercial plantations emerged and thrived through the use 
of indentured labor from India in the 1860s (ibid.). The Afrikaners left and joined 
their compatriots at the Transvaal who had arrived there earlier through different 
routes (ibid.). They established a regional centre at Potchefstroom, drove the 
local Ndebele further north and were granted independence by the British as the 
“South African Republic” at the Sand River Convention of 1852 (Worden, 2007). 
The area controlled by the South African Republic was north of the Vaal River 
(Worden, 2007; Ross, 1999). South of Vaal to the Orange River there were 
complex alliances and conflicts between Afrikaners and Bantu polities. For 
instance Afrikaners partnered with the Rolong of Thaba-Nchu to drive the 
Ndebele out of their land in 1836-7 (ibid.). On the other hand they were renting 
land from the Griquas (European and Khoikhoi/slaves descendents migrants 
from the Cape) further East. In the area between the Caledon and Orange they 
were in continual fight in the 1840s with Moshoeshoe of the Sotho, who was 
disrupting lines of trade with the Cape (ibid.).  In 1848 the area between Vaal and 
Orange was annexed by the Cape Governor, Sir Harry Smith and named 
“Orange River Sovereignty” (ibid.). He tried to further restrict Moshoeshoe’s 
cultivation and pasturage on this land, but was defeated by him in all occasions 
(ibid.). The neutrality that was proffered by the Afrikaners to the British in these 
British-Sotho wars was rewarded by the grant of independence of the Afrikaner 
South Africa Republic (ibid.). Further resistance by Moshoeshoe led to a truce 
and a withdrawal of the British from this region (ibid.). However, by the 
Convention of Bloemfontein of 1854, the Afrikaners gained nominal control of this 
region and renamed it the Orange Free State (ibid.). This control was nominal 
because Moshoeshoe was still assertive about his grazing and cultivation rights 













DIAMOND/GOLD DISCOVERY; AND TOTAL BRITISH CONTROL 
OF AFRICAN POLITIES 
Griqua and Tswana Suppression  
In the 1850s the British appeared to withdraw from asserting direct political 
control of the South African interior (Worden, 2007). However, from the 1870s an 
aggressive thrust into the whole sub-continent was adopted (ibid.). In a space of 
two decades, Basutoland, Griqualand West, the South African Republic in the 
Transvaal, the Transkei and Bechuanaland were either annexed or conquered, 
and finally the Zulu and Pedi were defeated and their lands brought under 
imperial control. The event that influenced this drive was the discovery in 1869 of 
diamond fields in Kimberly (ibid.). The British soon took a pre-emptive interest in 
the area by backing the Griqua and Thlaping claims to the diamonds fields, 
ostensibly to protect these polities against the Afrikaner republic’s encroachment. 
In 1878 the Thlaping, the Griqua together with the San rebelled against British 
colonialism. This rebellion was quelled and their cattle confiscated.  
The peoples of these polities were confined to rural locations where they were 
obliged to pay hut taxes to the British authorities (ibid.). In 1880, Griqualand west 
was handed over to the Cape colony, while British expansion in the area went on 
unabated with the annexation of Southern Bechuanaland in 1884-5 in a 
disguised move to protect them against the German interests, who were now in 
control of South West Africa (Namibia) and to stem Transvaal encroachment into 
the area (Shillington, 1987).  The main reason was to secure timber, grain and 
labor supply to Kimberly (ibid.).  In 1895 the British handed this region to the 
control of the Cape Colony, which was under the premiership of the mining 
magnate Cecil Rhodes (ibid.). In 1896 the Tlhaping rebellion was suppressed 
with further confiscation of their land and loss of cattle due to culling ostensibly to 
curb rinderpest, imprisonment of their leadership and indenturing of the majority 
of the population as laborers, which led to heretofore unforeseen impoverishment 












Subjugation of the Pedi 
The experiences of the Tswana were paralleled by the experiences of the Pedi.  
Counter claims over land between the Pedi and the Afrikaners led to a number of 
skirmishes, which the Afrikaners failed to win (Delius, 1983). The Afrikaners had 
to pay tribute to obtain Pedi labor and claims in the 1860s to collect rent from 
other African communities compelled them to migrate to the Pedi polity to seek 
protection (ibid.). In all these attacks the Afrikaners were assisted by the Swazis, 
and the Swazis also had independent claims on Pedi territory but were repelled 
on all occasions (Worden, 2007). These skirmishes weakened the Transvaal and 
it was in this context that the Transvaal was annexed by the British in 1877 
(ibid.). This move was opposed by many Afrikaner farmers but welcomed by 
mining, mercantile and banking sectors in the Transvaal who desired access to a 
confederated South Africa. The British soon bolstered their own claim to Pedi 
lands by demanding war indemnity and hut taxes from the Pedi which were hard 
to come by at a time of drought and cattle shortage (ibid.). In 1879 with the help 
of the Swazis, the British saw the Pedi as standing in the way of colonial land 
and labor policy and attacked them. Their conquest was final and the subjugation 
of the people of these regions continued even after the Afrikaner were handed 
back control of the Transvaal in 1881 (ibid.). 
The Defeat of the Zulu 
The defeat of the Pedi came in the immediate wake of the defeat of the largest 
African polity, the Zulu state. This came after a growing resentment amongst 
Natal settlers over their failure to extract labor from the African population 
compelling them to import indentured labor from India (Worden, 2007; Guy, 
1982). The Zulu were militarily strong and were less easily subdued and the 
Natal colony had entered into an uneasy alliance, which recognized the Zulu 
state and supported their claims to land against the Transvaal (ibid.). After the 
defeat of the Transvaal, this position changed as the British saw a corridor 
between Transvaal and Natal as important for the movement of migrant labor 
from the North (ibid.). Shepstone, the British statesman encouraged the British 











immediately amassed troops and accused Cetshwayo the Zulu king of violating 
the colony’s borders (ibid.). After the Zulus refused the disbandment of their army 
and accepting a British resident in 1879 war ensued. 
 After a catastrophic defeat at the battle of Isandlwana, the British managed a 
victory only after receiving massive reinforcements (Worden, 2007.). Cetshwayo 
was exiled in Cape Town and his kingdom was divided into smaller chiefdoms, 
governed by people with no traditional authority (ibid.). After defeat the Zulus 
were subjected to heavier taxes, labor demands, crop seizures and land 
destruction. Collectively, these led to the final Zulu popular resistance of the 
Bambatha rebellion of 1906-8. This was the final show of resistance to 
colonisation by the Zulus (Marks, 1986) and ended in their ultimate defeat. 
Control of the Xhosa 
The Xhosas living on the fringes of the Cape colony did not escape British 
subjugation. In 1878, Frere invaded the Transkeian territories after the Cape 
Colony’s intervention in a dispute between the Mfengu and the Xhosa (Worden, 
2007;Ross, 1999). In the 1880s these two polities were placed under the indirect 
administration of colonial-appointed magistrates and were then formally annexed 
(ibid.). Even Pondoland, which was initially left out, was finally incorporated into 
the Cape colony in the 1890s (ibid.). At the same time numerous attacks were 
carried against the Basotho by the colonial authorities on the suspicion that they 
were amassing guns with the wages of migrant labor. The Sothos refused to pay 
taxes and cede their guns to the Cape administration and in a war that broke out 
in 1880 the Cape colony invaders once again failed to subjugate Moshoeshoe 
(ibid.). However Moshoeshoe did ask for “protection” directly from Britain, 
resulting in Basutoland becoming a “British Protectorate”. At this time Basutoland 
was already supplying labor for the colonial authorities, and there was nothing to 
be gained by treating the Sotho like the Zulus. As a result, in Basutoland the local 
chiefs retained much of their traditional authority and this facilitated the 
establishment of Lesotho as an independent country although wholly surrounded 











Although varied in their approach the British had by the end of the 1880s, 
managed to exert control over a large number of African Societies, either directly 
or indirectly through their colonies in the Cape and Natal (Worden, 2007).  This 
British control, particularly in respect of the interior of South Africa, led to 
immense growth in Afrikaner nationalism and resentment (Bonner, 1983). After 
the defeat of the Pedi the British army presence was removed from the 
Transvaal, but created a vacuum that allowed an Afrikaner rebellion led by 
farmers (boers) who succeeded in defeating the British civilian occupiers (ibid.). 
After a final showdown in Majuba in 1881 the British decided to withdraw. This 
development gave the Transvaal under President Kruger to harass whatever was 
remaining of the African polities. Thus the Rolong Tswana in the West, the 
Venda to the North and the Swazis to the East eventually had their land taken 
from them and in the case of the Swazis heavily reduced (ibid.). Afrikaner 
dominance in these areas however was short-lived although Africans suffered a 
permanent loss to their land. 
THE DISCOVERY OF GOLD AND THE ANGLO-BOER WAR 
The most important development in the history of South Africa was the discovery 
of gold in the Transvaal, which made the Transvaal the most economically 
valuable region in South Africa. In 1886 the discovery of shallow-level gold led to 
a sudden rush, which depleted all the reserves (Worden, 2007; Davenport, 
1991). By 1895 deep-level gold production predominated, but this needed major 
capital investment not only from mining houses in Kimberly but from Europe, 
particularly Britain (ibid.). However Transvaal was still in the hands of a hostile 
Kruger government. Without direct influence and control over the Transvaal, the 
British economic and political dominance in South Africa was incomplete and 
impossible (Davenport, 1991). 
A hastily organized coup in 1895 arguably supported by the mining companies 
and Cape governor Cecil Rhodes, who ordered a small force of troops from 











failed coup exacerbated tensions and brought the situation in the Transvaal to 
wider international attention (Henshaw, 1998). While on the one hand Britain 
learnt the lesson of poor planning in local initiatives and appointed the known 
expansionist Milner as the Governor of Cape (ibid.), on the other hand Kruger 
consolidated an alliance with the Orange Free State and approached Germany 
and Portugal for assistance (ibid.). Portugal alerted the British to these 
approaches since they were in turn looking to grow the strategic importance of 
their port at Delagoa Bay (now Maputo) to the South African interior over Port 
Natal and Cape Town (ibid.).  
In 1899 Kruger recognizing that his forces would soon be outnumbered, 
launched a pre-emptive strike and declared war on the British asserting 
independence from what he perceived to be bullying British tactics (Nasson, 
1999). He received immense support from the Afrikaner community especially 
the poor, reeling from a harsh drought and rinderpest epidemic, who saw him as 
the defender of their homeland (ibid.). Despite early success by the middle of 
1900 massive British troop reinforcements had helped the British to reverse the 
tide and capture Bloemfontein, Johannesburg and Pretoria. In theory all that the 
Afrikaners had ever called their homeland was occupied and their guerilla 
commandos were forced to surrender through intensive British military control 
over the Highveld (Warwick, 1980). The signing of the treaty of Vereeniging in 
1902 ended this costly war. Over 22,000 British troops died, mostly from disease, 
over 30,000 households in the republics and Northern Cape were destroyed by 
the “scorched earth” tactics of the British and about 26,000 Boer women and 
children and 14,000 black internees died in the British concentration camps 
(ibid.). 
THE CREATION OF THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
This defeat by the British of the Transvaal and Orange Free State paved the way 
for the creation of a unified South African State in 1910. The mayhem of the war 











some Afrikaners during the war saw some Africans reclaiming their land back 
(Mbenga, 2002; Kirkler, 1993). The impact of these gains by Africans was 
immediate, with both white farmers and mine owners complaining about their 
inability to obtain sufficient labor (Worden, 2007). This rolling back of settler land 
control was limited in extent and short-lived, as the period between the war and 
1905 was Milner’s intensive “reconstruction” period (Marks & Trapido, 1979).  
This was marked by an intensification of colonial labour and land control and a 
process of “social engineering”, albeit with African resistance, to appease the 
interests of a growing capitalist economy (Kirkler, 1993). Continuing African 
resistance ultimately compelled the state to import cheap indentured labour from 
China to work in the mines, which undercut African demands for high salaries 
and improved working conditions (Richardson, 1982). Milner also resettled 
Afrikaner farmers to the land as well as introducing new British immigrants, while 
at the same time opposing any land tenancy for Africans and “was determined to 
transform all black tenants into wage labourers” (Marks & Trapido, 1979, p. 70). 
Thus the political developments in the aftermath of the South African war marked 
the end of the protracted process of the conquest of South Africa by settler and 
imperial powers. From that point onwards it was apparent that there were only 
two major role players in South African politics, the British imperialists and the 
Afrikaner farmers. 
The terms of the Treaty of Vereeniging had turned the Afrikaner republics into 
British colonies, with promises of internal self-government as soon as possible 
(Worden, 2007). However after the war, Economic and political stability required 
the co-option of Afrikaner politicians into the central organ of government rather 
than leaving them confined in self-governing Afrikaner provinces. After the 
Afrikaner parties had won elections in 1907 in self-governing parliaments in both 
republics (Het Volk in the Transvaal and Orangia Unie in the Free State), these 
governments came together with those of Natal and the Cape to form the Union 
of South Africa in 1910 (ibid.). The Union had major central government power, 











Town became the legislative capital, while Pretoria the administrative and 
Bloemfontein the legal. The main intention now was white unity in the face of 
black resistance, especially in the aftermath of the Bambatha rebellion, and to 
allay the fears of Afrikaners by structuring a political union where white interests 
were upheld. White supremacy was entrenched in the constitution and the Act of 
Union formalized the conquest of the land. It was only in the Cape where there 
was a non-racial franchise, although it was circumscribed by high qualification for 
property ownership (Worden, 2007; Ross, 1999). 
FORMATION OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS 
After the Unification of the republic, it was apparent to all Africans that they had 
to speak with one voice to secure their political rights and survival. In 1912 at a 
conference held in Bloemfontein, the Native National Congress (later in 1923- the 
African National Congress) was inaugurated (Worden, 2007; Ross, 1999). The 
majority of its leaders were drawn from the missionary educated Christian elite, 
most of whom were Christian ministers. For decades their protests were 
ineffective because of their reliance in the tradition of petitions and delegations. 
However the congress served as a symbolic national forum for Africans’ opinions 
and grievances (ibid.).  The change of leadership and the formation of the 
Congress Youth league in 1943 changed the emphasis towards direct action 
such as boycotts, strikes and union mobilisation (Gerhart, 1978). This was 
bolstered by the election of youth leaguers into the executive of the African 
National Congress (ANC), namely Anton Lembede, Walter Sisulu, Oliver Tambo 
and Nelson Mandela (ibid.). These men with time became the stalwarts in the 
politics of South Africa in the second half of the 20th Century, as they continued 
the black struggle launched in 1912. 
THE EARLY SEGREGATION LAWS 
At the heart of the Africans’ dissatisfaction was racial segregation, not just 
subordination, in the spheres of work, residence and government (Cell, 1982), 











of 1903-05 appointed by Milner took at heart the testimony submitted by an 
influential Afrikaner politician Louis Botha (later the first prime minister of the 
Union) in outlining policies for Africans (Worden, 2007). The commission 
proposed separation of land ownership, the establishment of “Native locations” in 
towns, regulation of labour influx to the cities with pass laws, differential wage 
level, mission-based schooling for African rather than state education, 
administration in separate Native councils, and no extension of the Cape’s non-
racial franchise to other parts of the Union (ibid.). Although some of these were 
already practiced in different parts of the country it was the first time they were 
formally articulated and combined into an overarching general policy, and were 
put into practice in the legislation of subsequent decades (ibid.).  
Most notable were the Mines and Works Act (1911), which imposed the color 
bar, the Native Land Act (1913), which segregated land ownership, the Native 
Urban Areas Act (1923), which enforced residential segregation in towns 
(Worden, 2007). According to Ross (1999) segregation in view of the new Union 
government was not designed to split the country apart, but merely to maintain its 
hierarchies (Ross, 1999). In particular the Native Land Act of 1913, established a 
clear legal distinction between African reserves (e.g. Transkei and Zululand) and 
white farming areas and ordained that no land could be shifted from one category 
to the other (Ross, 1999; South African Native Land Laws, 1915). The Native 
reserves, which later became Bantustans were land reserved for exclusive 
African use and they were officially defined and delimited after 1910. They 
amounted to about 7% of the entire area of South Africa, and the Native Trust 
and Land Act (1936) released more land for purchase by or on behalf of Africans 
to increase this to 13% (Lacey, 1981). The reserves were heavily populated and 
poorly endowed in natural resources, and most of their land was not arable. This 
combination of factors compelled most Africans to seek employment in the 
broader South Africa where they were considered temporary migrants by the 











THE RISE OF THE NATIONAL PARTY AND “APARTHEID” 
In the meantime, poverty and class differentiation in the 1930s within the 
Afrikaner population caused the opposition National Party to mobilize Afrikaners 
across divisions of region and class. It first tried to woo them away from trade 
unions dominated by English speakers with their socialist ideas considered 
inimical to Afrikaner unity (Vincent, 2000). It also encouraged the development of 
Afrikaner-owned business and capital in order to stem an overwhelming 
domination of the English speakers in these fields. Afrikaner nationalism was 
now better prepared to deal with the realities of an industrialized society, contrary 
to the previous promotion of an idealized rural and pre-industrial society. In 1939 
SANLAM (an Afrikaner insurance conglomerate) underwrote an “Act of Rescue 
Fund” to support fledging Afrikaner business interests (Giliomee, 1983). The 
intention was to counteract foreign-dominated capital and monopolies, which 
were blamed to have caused proletarianisation and class division among the 
Afrikaners (ibid.).  
In the 1943 elections, the National party emerged as the official opposition 
against the ruling United Party and the Labour Party coalition. Between then and 
1948 a number of parliamentarians crossed the floor and joined the National 
party. They mostly lamented the breakdown of segregation, which had led to an 
increased African urban influx, relaxed pass laws and the lack of robust action to 
stem increasing black protests (Nuttall, 1996; O’Meara, 1976). Although the 
National party had mainly emphasized Afrikaner ethnic identity in the 1943 
campaign, after 1945 it stressed a need for a firm “native policy”, owing to the 
views of earlier segregationists to keep the cultures distinct because of the overt 
notions of the purported scientifically proven white race supremacy (Dubow, 
1992). The National Party’s Sauer Report of 1946 recommended consolidation of 
the reserves, rigorous controls over African urban settlement, segregated 
facilities for coloured’s and Indians and the abolition of the heretofore white 
representatives of Africans in parliament. This policy, named  “apartheid”, was 











had a tremendous electoral support and helped the National Party to win the 
1948 general election (Worden, 2007). 
 
THE NATIONAL PARTY POLITICAL DOMINATION AND BLACK 
RESISTANCE 
Early Apartheid Laws and the Writing of the Freedom Charter- the 1950s 
This victory was to prove critical to the politics of South Africa as the National 
Party would remain at the helm of government from 1948 until 1994. The second 
half of the twentieth century was dominated by apartheid and the resistance it 
evoked. Until 1994 each decade can be viewed broadly as being distinct in its 
content and implementation of this policy. The first decade was concerned with 
codifying all practices and strengthening segregation laws that had been relaxed 
in the 1940s in response to the rapid industrialisation of the economy and 
urbanisation of society.  Thus prohibition of “mixed marriages” (1949) and the 
Immorality Act (1950) extended the banning of sex between whites and Africans 
outside marriage to prohibition of all sexual contact between whites and non-
whites, coloreds and Indians included (Worden, 2007).  
The Population Restriction Act (1950) enforced the classification of people into 
four racial categories: white, colored, Asiatic (Indian) and Native (later ‘Bantu’ or 
African) (ibid.). Every sphere of human activity was affected as the Group Areas 
Act (1950), comprehensively and forcefully extended the principle of separate 
racial residence (Mabin, 1992). The removals were often done under the pretext 
of slum clearance and the adoption of modern town planning theories that 
advocated massive urban re-structuring (Parnell & Mabin, 1995). This 
justification notably affected the Indians in Pretoria and Durban city centers and 
the coloreds in Cape Town’s District Six (Bickford-Smith et al, 1999). The Natives 
Resettlement Act (1954) empowered the state to override local municipalities and 











Resettlement were the residents of Sophiatown, whose inhabitants were 
relocated to Soweto in 1955 (Worden, 2007). 
The Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) enforced social segregation in 
all public amenities, such as transport, cinemas, restaurants and sports facilities. 
Educational apartheid was enforced in schools (1953), technical colleges (1953) 
and universities (1959) (Christie & Collins, 1984). The Bantu Education Act 
(1953) phased all independent missionary institutions by placing all African 
schools under the Department of Native Affairs; missionary institutions were seen 
as breeding grounds for independent African thinking and protest (ibid.). The 
curriculum introduced by the Act deliberately only prepared students for a life of 
manual labour in service of white industry. At the same time African schooling 
was neither free nor compulsory although it was for whites, creating a perpetual 
supply of unskilled black labour (ibid.). All these legislations were opposed at 
every level of black civil society, using many of the tactics advocated in the ANC 
Programme of Action of 1949 such as boycotts, stay-aways, strikes and civil 
disobedience.  
The Suppression of Communism Act (1950) gave the Minister of Justice the 
power to ban any person or organisation viewed as “communist”, a broad 
definition, which included any form of opposition to apartheid (Lodge, 1987). A 
joint ANC and Communist Party mass defiance campaign against the 
discriminatory laws, led to the arrest of 8000 people, in the meantime the ANC’s 
membership surged from 7000 to 100,000 between 1951-53 (ibid.). In order to 
speak with one voice against segregation, the ANC linked up with the Congress 
of Democrats, the Indian Congress movement and with the South African 
Colored People’s Organisation in 1953 to launch a National Congress of the 
People (Ross, 1991; Worden, 2007). A “Freedom Charter” was drafted after 
collecting and incorporating all the grievances and demands, collected from local 
committees (ibid.).  In June 1955 this was accepted unanimously by 2844 











by all the member organisations (ibid.). ‘Charterism’ became the ANC ideological 
foundation, and remained the benchmark to apartheid opposition into the 1990s.  
Apartheid Entrenchment, Suppression of Opposition and the Establishment of 
Homelands – the 1960s 
The 1960s were the years of the entrenchment of state control and the devising 
of new methods of dealing with opposition. The 1960s have therefore been 
labeled the years of apartheid second phase (Worden, 2007). The catalyst for the 
government policies was a reaction to the Sharpeville Massacre, where Robert 
Mangaliso Sobukwe, the leader of the Pan Africanist Congress, a radical offshoot 
of the ANC, called all the Africans around South Africa to present themselves 
without their passes at all the local police stations and demand to be arrested. 
On the 21st March 1960,  in Sharpeville Southwest of Johannesburg a crowd of 
20,000 Africans surrounding a police station manned by only 20 officers, created 
a panic amongst the officers and who opened fire killing 69 people (Worden, 
2007; Time, 1960). This was a turning point in many respects in the history of 
South Africa (Ross, 1999), after solidarity strikes and stay-aways the government 
declared the state of emergency and banned both the PAC and the ANC and 
detained most of their leaders. As a retaliatory move the government made 
attempts to remove all rights of urban residence from Africans, including those 
previously accepted under section 10 of the Natives (Urban Areas) Amendment 
Act of 1955 (Posel, 1991).  
This followed the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959), which set up 
eight (later extended to ten) distinct self-governing “Bantu Homelands” allocated 
along geographical tribal origins (Worden, 2007). Most of them consisted of 
fragmented small patches of land interspersed by white farmland whose white 
owners had rejected consolidation because they would have lost their land. 
Kwazulu Natal for instance consisted of eleven patches of territory while 
Bophuthatswana had seven (Ross, 1999). The formal establishment of 
homelands was followed by forced relocations, as the Group Areas Act produced 











forcibly remove a sizable number of African tenants, freeholders and squatters 
on ‘white’ farms, many of which were now redundant because of the heavy 
mechanisation of farm activities (Lodge, 1983). According to (Murray, 1992) the 
massive relocation of Africans by the government was a clear sign of the state 
power over African lives.  
To contain the uprisings within homelands, the “Broederbond”, a conservative 
clique in the Apartheid parliament proposed a bill which would have given 
preferences to industries relocating to or near these areas, but was opposed by 
commercial and industrial employers, but the evictions continued nonetheless 
(Worden, 2007).  To circumvent an opposition to setting up of businesses inside 
the homelands and purportedly increasing the emergence of a stable and 
dangerous proletariat, the government later succeeded in encouraging business 
to set up on the border of homelands and have access to cheap labour. The 
rationale of separate development was “political independence with economic 
interdependence” (Giliomee, 1985). Apart from the initial disturbance of 
Sharpeville, the 1960s seem to have been a decade of relative calm and growth 
as the GDP grew by 5% p.a. and the average real wages increase at a steady 
level narrowing the gap between blacks and whites (Feinstein, 2005). Relative 
economic stability, imprisonment of opposition black leadership, as well as state 
oppression, may well explain the relative lack of oppositional protest during 
the1960s. 
World Inflation and Resurgence of Political Unrest – the 1970s 
This reprieve from political upheaval was to last until 1973 when there was a 
sudden rise in the price of gold and a hike in inflation caused by the OPEC 
increase in the price of oil. The sudden recession that followed provided a 
backdrop for renewed labour unrest, with numerous strikes taking place around 
major urban centers in the country particularly Durban and the rest of Natal 
(Hirson, 1979; Friedman, 1986).  Hirson (1979) argues that the increase in work 
militancy fueled the township revolts that started in Soweto in June 1976. The 











A sop to the conservative “Broederbond” (Ross, 1999) in South African 
parliament by appointing their chairman Dr. Andries Treurnicht as the Under-
Minister for Bantu education triggered the student revolt.  Treurnicht decreed that 
half the subjects in African schools, notably mathematics, be taught in Afrikaans, 
and this was deemed by Africans to lower the quality of education and was 
considered a pure demonstration of state power, as few teachers could teach 
mathematics let alone Afrikaans (Worden, 2007). On the 16th of June 1976 a 
crowd of 15,000 protesting students went on a rampage when two of their 
number were shot dead by police. An enlarged picture at the United Nations of a 
mortally wounded 12 year old Hector Peterson being carried on the street, in the 
ensuing mayhem of police brutality (Worden, 2007) became an iconic reminder 
of the South African freedom struggle. The violence spread across the country, 
although government initial reaction was repression, with time it started the move 
away from the strict fundamentalist apartheid (ibid.). 
In the late 1970s a number of factors drove change in the policies of the South 
African government (Moss, 1980). The labour unrests of the 1973-1977 caught 
the government off guard. After the Soweto student uprising it was evident that 
repression alone was not enough to contain African revolt. Attempts were made 
by the government to develop a black middle class, and to woo township 
residents from sympathizing with the exiled ANC and PAC (Worden, 2007). At 
the heart of this new thinking were the needs of the now dominant manufacturing 
sector with its complex technologies requiring permanent semi-skilled labour.  
Traditional dependence on migrant unskilled labour fostered by segregation and 
apartheid, whilst useful in the earlier development and growth of industry, were 
no longer suitable (Lipton, 1988; Feinstein, 2005). A final factor explaining the 
reforms (Worden, 2007), was the negative response and the threat of sanctions 
in the aftermath of Soweto; this, coupled with independence in the Portuguese 
colonies of Mozambique (1975) and Angola (1975) and slightly later the British 
colony of Zimbabwe (1980), meant the Southern African government needed to 











Total Strategy – the 1980s 
The outcome was a series of developments in the early 1980s called the “total 
strategy”.  The government at this time was convinced that it was under attack 
from a “total onslaught” of communism under the USSR leadership, with the ANC 
as their minions (Ross, 1999). This explanation was justified by the presence of 
prominent communists in the ANC leadership, notably Chris Hani and Joe Slovo 
(ibid.). To counteract the activities of the revolutionaries both inside the country 
and in exile, “total strategy” sought to combine effective security measures with 
reformist policies aimed at removing grievances that could easily be exploited by 
the communists  (Swilling & Phillips, 1989). It aimed at restructuring the society in 
a fashion that was conducive to the better functioning of industry (Swilling, 1988). 
Thus it combined the economic interests of business, the political interests of the 
government and the security interests of the army and police (ibid.). In order to 
create ideological hegemony with big business formal links with industry were 
established at the 1979 Carlton Conference in Johannesburg, where the 
government pledged its support for free enterprise and orderly reform in the face 
of perceived “Marxist” onslaught (Greenberg, 1987).  
Two government commissions in 1979 had proposed changes to favor stable 
business development (Maylam, 1990). The Wiehahn report influenced by the 
recalcitrant strikes of the mid 1970s recommended that African rights to join trade 
unions should be recognized.  The Riekert Commission advocated the 
dismantling of white job reservation on the one hand, whilst on the other hand 
maintaining influx control (ibid.). Another report; the de Lange report on 
education (1981), emphasized the need for a semi-skilled black labour 
(Chisholm, 1984). This called for compulsory primary education for all as well as 
black technical training at secondary and tertiary level. Multiracial private schools 
were allowed, although the recommendation for a single education authority was 
rejected. The “total strategy” was now steering the country towards class 
stratification (Hyslop, 1988) as opposed to racial differentiation. Other “petty 











for universal access in large cities, where hotels, restaurants, and theatres could 
be accessed by all who could afford. 
The second phase of “total strategy” was introduced after Africans demonstrated 
that their main priority was political representation and not token acceptance by 
whites (Murray, 1987).  In 1983 a “tricameral” constitution created separate 
parliamentary assemblies for whites, colored and Indian members of parliament. 
Whereas the government would monopolize all other matters in this new system, 
separate racially categorized issues of education, health and community 
administration would be administered by these separate chambers (ibid.). It was 
seen as a means of whites sharing power without loosing control and it was 
rejected by most Indians and colored voters. It did not however include Africans, 
whose permanent stay in the townships was slowly being recognized by the 
introduction of Community Councils (1977) and the extension of these councils 
through the Black Local Authorities Act (1982) (ibid.). The army through the State 
Security Council (SSC) was used extensively to quell the ever-increasing civil 
disobedience in the townships, to weaken the ANC/PAC underground networks 
and to deliberately destabilize neighboring countries for accommodating the ANC 
(Davies & O’Meara, 1984).  
In 1983 the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) served as a proxy 
ANC voice in South Africa, it called for the rejection of the apartheid state, 
boycotting of the “tricameral” system and the acceptance of the Freedom Charter 
principles (Swilling, 1988). The massive recruitment led to wide support from 
local community organisations across the country, particularly the Eastern Cape 
and the Transvaal (Gauteng). By 1985 this bore fruit in a series of local 
campaigns including bus and municipality rent boycotts, school protests and 
worker stay-aways (ibid.). Responsive state repression fueled further violence 
and opposition. On Sharpeville day in Uitenhage in the Eastern Cape, the police 
opened fire on a funeral procession killing 20, triggering violence throughout the 
country that ended in the declaration of a state of emergency by the government 











remained in place for a long time (ibid.). Civil government in most townships was 
in total collapse as government-recognized local councils were replaced by 
unofficial organisations calling for “people’s power”. Throughout the 1980s the 
male youth political assertiveness which had hitherto been expressed through 
gangs entered the arena, depicting deep-rooted frustration with the political 
situation in the country (Glaser, 1998; Ross, 1999). This was unfortunately 
mostly depicted in the tit-for-tat attacks between the UDF supporters and Inkatha 
Freedom Party (a Zulu dominated party), and the latter was later found to have 
received funding and training from South African security forces (Sapire, 1992). 
By the end of the 1980s the tactics of “total strategy” of the mid-1980s had been 
utterly thwarted. The three-tier parliament (Tricameralism) and African Urban 
Councils were rejected with demands for full political participation. The campaign 
to win hearts and minds was ineffective with thousands of Africans in detention 
without trial and the army enmeshed in township violence (Lester, 1996; Lodge & 
Lasson, 1991). A stalemate was broken in 1989 when Prime Minister Botha was 
forced to step down by his own cabinet ironically for his public rebuke of F.W. de 
Klerk’s (Transvaal leader of the National Party who consequently replaced him) 
plan to visit the ANC in Lusaka. Resistance to government took a new course 
during 1989, when the UDF combined forces with a Confederation of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU), to form the Mass Democratic Movement 
(MDM). The MDM ran a well coordinated campaign of civil disobedience to 
challenge segregated facilities such as hospitals, schools and beaches and their 
success was assisted by a toned-down police attacks during de Klerk’s reign 
(Lodge & Lasson, 1991).  
End of Apartheid and First Democratic Rule - the 1990s 
In the opening of the parliament on 2nd of February 1990 president de Klerk 
unexpectedly announced the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and the South African 
Communist Party (Lester, 1996; Worden, 2007). In the succeeding weeks, many 
political prisoners were released notably, Nelson Mandela. In 1991 important 











Land Act and the Population Registration Act (ibid.). Later that year the apartheid 
government decided to enter into formal negotiations with a number of parties, 
including the ANC at the much publicised Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa (CODESA), committing itself to a new constitution which would grant 
democratic rights to all in a single unitary state (ibid.).  
This was a clear shift from a dual reform-repress strategy of the 1980s, where 
the government was hoping to co-opt black urban “insiders” (through the 
tricameral parliament and Black Local Authorities) to ensure smoother 
development while retaining white economic and political superiority (Stadler, 
1987; Lester, 1996). The government’s own rhetoric of reform had raised 
expectations that a deteriorating economic situation could never meet. The 
widening gap between expectations and reality triggered a popular mobilisation 
led by UDF, linking local and national political and economic grievances (Price, 
1991). The extent of the challenge was causing a concern to both the initiators 
and beneficiaries of “total strategy”, particularly because of the increase in capital 
flight out of the country. President de Klerk thus came into the scene as the 
leader of the reformist bloc within the National party, which was genuinely aware 
of business interests and recognized the need for meaningful negotiations with 
legitimate black representatives, most notably the ANC (Lodge, 1992; Lester, 
1996).  The negotiations with unbanned political movements which followed, with 
their epiphenomenal violence and embedded mistrust and suspicion about 
government intentions, finally led to a new democratic constitution and the 
election of an ANC-led democratic government in 1994 (Worden, 2007; Lester, 
1996). 
SUMMARY 
The indigenous Khoikhoi inhabitants of the Southern tip of Africa were 
disenfranchised, dispossessed and oppressed almost immediately from the first 
Dutch European settlement in the Cape in 1652, well before the formation of 











the original inhabitants from their land in the Cape but introduced slaves mostly 
from East Asia. The victory of Britain during the Napoleonic wars dislodged the 
Dutch and brought in new British colonial masters in the cape, who changed the 
structural composition of the political economy introduced by the Dutch by 
granting limited rights to the Khoikhoi and abolishing slavery. The disgruntled 
Dutch farmers moved further inland in the eighteenth century to escape British 
control and to maintain their racial hierarchical way of life. This mass movement 
otherwise know as the Great Trek led to the further jostling for land resources 
with a lot of black Bantu polities who inhabited wide and isolated parts of the 
hinterland. The incursion of the Dutch or Afrikaners as they were now called 
complicated an already volatile climate because of the lifaqane troubles 
instigated by King Shaka, and this led to the weakening of once thriving 
independent Bantu polities. The discovery of rich diamond and gold mineral 
deposits at Kimberly and the Transvaal respectively in the mid to late nineteenth 
century brought in a renewed British interest in the interior of South Africa. This 
interest and scramble for mineral resources resulted in the subjugation of all 
African polities and the incorporation of the newly established Afrikaner republics, 
into one political entity and thus redefining the borders and politics of South 
Africa for a long time to follow. 
Once any form of African independence was eliminated, racial segregation was 
widely practiced in the newly formed South Africa republic. The disgruntled 
Africans had few options rather forming a political movement in the form of the 
ANC in 1912. However, segregation since then was widely practiced and 
entrenched by law, and manifested itself in land segregation, blacks limited 
economic participation and political disenfranchisement. The coming to power in 
1948 of the Nation Party bolstered an already well-established practice of racial 
intolerance, and only granted it a political legitimacy through the philosophy and 
policy of Apartheid. The aftermath of the introduction of Apartheid led to the most 
turbulent political climate in the history of South Africa, as the ANC adopted a 
militant posture through the formation of its armed wing –“umkondo we sizwe”, 











different shapes and forms in all of the decades following the introduction of 
Apartheid. The global energy crisis of the early 1970s started the unprecedented 
political unrest resulting in the 1976 Soweto student uprisings and the police 
brutality that attempted to quench it. It was only with widespread international 
condemnation, nationwide civil unrest, capital flight out of the country and the 
generally changing geo-political climate in the region, that the white regime finally 
deemed it rational to engage in talks with all peoples of South Africa. In 1994 
when the ANC assumed office it had to redress 342 years of systematic 
disempowerment of black people in South Africa. The following chapter is going 
to elaborate on the concept of Affirmative Action (AA) which is employed by the 
South African government as a tool to effect economic redress for the 
consequences of the apartheid system. 
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